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PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

Purchased  by  the  Hamill  Missionary  Fund. 

Division  ""1?.  ^ H 0)  T 
Section  re4.e. 


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To-Morrow  in  Cuba 


NEW  YORK 

YOUNG  PEOPLE’S  MISSIONARY  MOVEMENT 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ANI)  CANADA 


IQIO 


Copyright,  1899,  by  Harper  & Brothers. 


All  rights  reserved* 


IDe&lcation. 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OK  MY  FATHER, 

THE  REVEREND  GEORGE  W.  PEPPER. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/tomorrowincuba00pepp_0 


PREFACE 


My  profession  as  a newspaper  correspondent  took  me 
to  Cuba  in  the  spring  of  1897.  With  the  exception  of 
a short  intermission  passed  with  the  American  army 
and  navy  outside  the  island,  it  kept  me  there  in  the 
midst  of  the  events  shaping  the  destiny  of  the  Antilles. 
Impressions  of  these  events  as  they  appeared  to  me 
were  published  in  various  journals.  They  were  record- 
ed from  time  to  time  as  they  were  caught  up  at  the 
moment. 

In  the  new  responsibilities  that  have  come  to  the 
American  people  in  the  border  tropics,  exact  informa- 
tion is  above  all  things  desirable.  At  the  end  of  more 
than  two  years  it  has  seemed  to  me  possible  to  give 
information  with  perhaps  more  confidence  than  in  the 
beginning.  What  is  set  forth  in  these  pages  is  not  for 
the  purpose  of  supporting  preconceivod  opinions  or  of 
defending  any  special  policy.  While  the  author’s  views 
aro  stated,  it  has  beon  his  aim  to  set  fortli  tho  facts  on 
which  these  views  aro  based.  Somo  persons,  doubtless, 
will  roach  different  conclusions.  Whatever  opinions 
may  bo  developed,  it  is  important  to  know  that  tho 
problems  of  Cuba  cannot  bo  sottlod  from  without.  On 
tho  surface  aro  tho  political  ijuestions;  but  deeper  than 
these  lie  the  social  and  economic  problems.  It  has 


PREFACE 


seemed  to  me  that  if  the  American  people  could  feel 
themselves  more  at  home  in  the  surroundings  in  which 
all  these  problems  must  be  worked  out,  they  would  be 
better  equipped  for  the  task.  As  the  majority  of  them 
cannot  see  for  themselves,  I have  sought  to  make  them 
see  through  other  eyes,  with  the  belief  that  they  will  be 
the  better  able  to  discriminate  between  the  fretting  cir- 
cumstances which  are  transitory  and  the  underlying 
conditions  which  are  permanent.  To  do  this  it  is  nec- 
essary to  know  something  of  the  past,  and  it  has  been 
my  aim  to  exhibit  the  revolutionary  movements  of  the 
island  in  their  true  perspective. 

In  conclusion,  the  utterance  of  an  Italian  statesman 
may  be  paraphrased,  “Cuba  is  made,  but  who  shall 
make  the  Cubans?”  and  the  answer  be  given,  “Them- 
selves.” But  under  what  conditions?  Perhaps  these 
pages  may  aid  those  who  seek  an  answer  for  the  good  of 
Cuba  and  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  responsibilities 
of  the  United  States.  C.  M.  P. 


Washington,  D.  C. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

CHAPTER  I. 

Prologue  to  Autonomy, 3 

chapter  n. 

The  W estern  Invasion, 23 

CHAPTER  III. 

Campos  and  Weyler, 47 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Wooing  the  Lost  Colony, 65 

CHAPTER  V. 

Epii.ooue  to  Autonomy, 84 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Transition  to  Local  Home  Rule, 107 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Provinces  as  a Federal  Framework, 124 

CHAPTER  VIII. 


Tiie  Race  op  Color, 141 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Tiie  Spanish  Colony, 160 

CHAPTER  X. 

Immigration  and  Colonization, 175 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Sugar  and  Toiiacco — Other  Products 102 

vll 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


PAGE 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Trade  and  Taxation — Railways  and  Internal  Develop- 
ment,   214 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Religion  as  a Withered  Branch,  . 235 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Coban  Priests  the  Living  Branch, 253 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Manners  and  Morals, 273 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

American  Military  Control, 291 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Political  Aptitudes, 309 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

To-Day, 328 

Appendix  A — Bibliography,  ......  350 

Appendix  B — Trade  Prospects,  .....  356 


PART  I 


CHAPTERS  FROM  YESTERDAY 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


CHAPTER  I 
Prologue  to  Autonomy 

Record  of  an  Experiment — The  Pact  of  El  Zanjdn — Concessions 
Which  Were  Not  Autonomy — Grouping  into  Political  Parties — 
Programme  of  the  Liberals — Loyalists  the  Union  Constitutionals 
— Echo  of  European  Democratic  Movement — Points  of  Agree- 
ment— Disappointment  of  Autonomists — Promulgation  of  Con- 
stitution— Growth  of  Autonomist  Movement — Alarm  of  the 
Privileged  Classes — Farce  of  Cuban  Representation  in  the 
Cortes — Birth  of  Reformist  Party — Its  Members  Opportunists — 
Parties  Engulfed  in  the  Waves  of  Revolution — Influence  of 
Reciprocity  Repeal  and  the  Sugar  Market. 

Autonomy  was  instituted  in  Cuba  on  New  Tear’s 
Day,  1898.  Twolvo  months  later  to  a day  Spanish 
sovereignty  was  yielded  in  trust  to  the  Uuitod  States. 
The  developments  of  tho  iutorvouing  yoar  woro  swift. 
So  rapidly  had  they  moved  that  tho  chapter  with  which 
they  Iwigan  was  forgotton.  In  tho  broader  field  of  world 
domain  that  has  opened  to  tho  United  States  as  a con- 
sequence of  tho  war  with  Spain,  tho  brief  existence  of  this 
colonial  ox|>orirnont  has  almost  passed  from  mind.  Yot  it 
was  tho  first  attompt  of  Spain  in  four  centuries  to  give  her 
colonies  a systom  of  solf-govornmout.  Short  as  was  tho 
period,  tho  story  of  tho  oxporimout  is  worthy  of  record. 

3 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


When  the  system  was  decreed  in  Cuba,  the  fondness 
of  the  Latin  intellect  for  historical  sequences  caused 
much  philosophical  and  reflective  writing,  which  traced 
the  series  of  events  precedent  as  the  prologue  to  a 
national  drama.  The  real  prologue  to  autonomy  in  the 
Spanish  Antilles  was  the  Ten-Years’  War,  which  raged 
from  1868  to  1878.  The  machete  and  the  torch  then 
gained  what  peaceful  agitation  had  not  been  able  to 
achieve.  The  pact  of  El  Zanjon  which  brought  that 
insurrection  to  an  end  was  arranged  by  Martinez  Cam- 
pos and  Maximo  Gomez.  It  affirmed  forgetfulness  of 
the  past  and  gave  pledges  for  the  future.  It  was  based 
on  promises  to  Cuba  which  were  to  insure  to  the  rebel- 
lious island,  once  more  become  faithful,  distinct  politi- 
cal rights.  Radical  changes  were  to  be  made  in  the 
organic  laws  and  in  the  administrative  system.  Cubans 
were  to  be  recognized  and  to  share  in  the  government 
of  Cuba.  They  were  to  have  representation  in  the 
Cortes  of  Spain  the  same  as  Puerto  Rico. 

Spain  carried  out  the  letter  of  the  pact  of  El  Zanjon. 
The  organic  laws  were  changed.  The  restrictive  stat- 
utes of  printing,  of  public  meetings,  and  of  associations 
or  societies  were  modified  and  liberalized.  A sup- 
posedly popular  basis  of  Cuban  representation  in  the 
Cortes  was  provided,  and  the  electoral  law  was  passed 
in  conformity  with  that  provision.  In  the  administra- 
tive system  the  statute  changes  were  many.  They  were 
carried  into  effect  to  the  extent  of  a nominal  compliance 
with  the  new  laws.  Mediaeval  absolutism  yielded  some 
of  its  cherished  and  hereditary  privileges. 

Yet  neither  the  spirit  nor  the  letter  of  the  legislation 
enacted  in  1878,  and  in  subsequent  years,  was  autono- 

4 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


mous.  It  was  as  if  oue  of  the  provinces  of  the  penin- 
sula which  had  been  under  a discriminating  system  of 
laws  and  administration  had  succeeded  in  getting  itself 
placed  on  the  same  plane  as  the  other  provinces.  For 
a colony  beyond  seas  requiring  a definite  measure  of 
independence  there  was  no  recognition.  A critical  study 
of  the  statutes  and  the  administrative  reforms  enacted 
by  the  Spanish  Government  after  the  peace  of  El  Zan- 
jdn  produces  a plain  deduction.  A Cuban  citizen  as 
a Spanish  subject  could  engage  in  political  agitation 
with  less  danger  of  coming  under  the  charge  of  conspir- 
acy than  formerly.  Theoretically,  also,  his  right  to  a 
share  in  the  local  administration  was  conceded.  With 
a sincere  and  honest  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  supe- 
rior authorities  a reasonable  degree  of  local  and  insular 
government  might  have  been  put  in  force.  But  the 
analysis  of  the  legislation  and  of  the  decrees  of  1878  and 
subsequent  years  shows  that  in  essence  there  wras  little 
dilution  of  what  had  always  been  tho  cardinal  principle 
of  Spanish  colonial  government.  This  was  military 
rule.  Tho  paths  were  somotimos  crooked,  the  passages 
wound  into  labyrinths  of  codulas,  docroes,  orders, 
edicts,  circulars,  and  bandos.  They  brought  up  at  the 
same  barrior.  Tho  beginning  and  tho  end  was  tho  Gov- 
ernor-General exorcising  his  military  functions  as  Cap- 
tain-General. After  1878,  Cuba  had  good,  bad,  and 
indifferent  Captain-Generals.  Thoir  character  was  re- 
flected in  tho  administration  of  tho  island. 

It  would  be  an  unnocossary  task  to  set  forth  moro  in 
detail  wherein  the  legislation  and  tho  administrative  acts 
following  thocompactof  El  Zanjdn  woro  not  autonomous. 
A comparison  with  tho  actual  regime  of  autonomy 

& 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


when  established  twenty  years  later  is  sufficient 
to  demonstrate  it.  Though  the  conception  of  colonial 
home  rule  for  Cuba  was  non-existent  among  the  Spanish 
statesmen  of  that  day,  the  perception  of  it  was  clear  on 
the  part  of  the  thinking  people  of  the  island.  They  had 
felt  it  when,  three  years  before  raising  the  cry  of  Yarain 
1868,  they  signed  a petition  thanking  the  Duke  de  la 
Torre  for  his  motion  in  the  Senate  that  political  rights 
be  granted  Cuba.  All  those  things  and  many  more, 
they  said  in  this  document,  foreshadowed  that  wdthin 
a few  years  there  would  be  a change  in  policy,  and 
Cubans  would  be  allowed  some  voice  in  the  government 
of  their  own  island.  The  educated  and  wealthy  Cubans 
who  in  1865  formed  themselves  into  a national  party 
and  urged  administrative  and  economic  changes  upon 
Madrid  felt  the  lack  of  understanding  among  Spanish 
statesmen.  The  concessions  asked  were  not  a broad  ap- 
plication of  civil  liberties.  When  their  programme  was 
rejected  in  its  entirety  they  ceased  to  ask  favors.  They 
inaugurated  the  Ten-Years’  war. 

Political  organization  of  a mechanical  and  artificial 
kind  followed  the  'restoration  of  peace.  The  grouping 
was  into  Liberal  and  Union  Constitutional  parties. 
This  formal  resolution  of  the  political  elements  into 
distinct  and  opposing  groups  took  place  in  August, 
1878.  Tho  first  platform  or  declaration  of  Liberal  prin- 
ciples was  a conservative  one.  It  accepted  candidly  the  « 
peaco  established  by  tho  treaty  of  El  Zaujon,  and  pro- 
claimed the  principles  which  woro  the  bases  of  that 
compact.  It  was  an  organized,  though  timid,  move- 
ment to  hold  tho  Spanish  Government  to  the  pledges 
of  reforms  and  enlargod  liberties  for  Culm.  Its  pro- 

0 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

gramme  was  comprised  under  the  respective  heads  of 
social,  political,  and  economic  questions.  Its  founda- 
tion was  the  liberty  of  print,  freedom  of  political  meet- 
ing and  association,  religious  liberty,  and  the  right  of 
petition.  Immunity  of  domicile,  of  person,  of  corre- 
spondence, and  of  property  was  claimed.  It  demanded 
the  apjdication  to  Cuba  in  their  integrity  of  the  organic 
laws  of  the  peninsula,  including  municipal,  provincial, 
and  electoral  statutes.  Reforms  in  criminal  law  were 
included.  It  called  for  a colonial  constitutional  regi- 
men as  a vivification  of  the  lifeless  constitution  of  the 
monarchy  not  then  promulgated  in  Cuba.  The  admis- 
sion of  Cubans  to  the  public  offices  on  equality  with 
Spaniards  was  also  affirmed.  Laws  which  would  insure 
decentralization  within  the  limits  of  the  national  unity 
were  indicated.  The  root  trouble  was  recognized  in  the 
demand  for  a separation  and  independence  of  the  civil 
and  military  powers.  Au  Antillian  constitution  was  de- 
clared to  bo  necessary  in  order  that  the  inhabitants  of 
Cuba  might  consecrate  and  organize  with  respect  to  its 
government  the  principle  of  responsibility.  This  was 
also  assortod  to  bo  essential  in  order  to  reintegrate  the 
possession  of  the  individual  rights  and  the  onjoymont  of 
tho  liberties  which  woro  proclaimed  iutho  first  articlo  of 
tho  constitution  of  tho  monarchy  as  inherent  in  tho  con- 
dition of  tho  Spanish  citizen.  Tho  oconomic  difficulty 
was  met  with  boldness.  Suppression  of  tho  eiport 
duties  was  demanded.  Reforms  in  the  customs  were 
formulated  which  would  prevent  tho  oxcossivo  discrimi- 
nation of  tho  Spanish  tariff — a discrimination  practised 
not  for  the  bouofit  of  Cuba,  but  for  tho  onrichment  of 
Spain.  Tho  basis  was  thut  tho  tariff  system  should  bo 

7 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA 


a fiscal  and  not  a differential  one.  Beciprocity’with  tlie 
United  States  was  particularly  specified  as  desirable. 
Exclusive  white  immigration  and  further  emancipation 
laws  for  the  blacks  were  favored. 

The  Union  Constitutional  party  formulated  a pro- 
gramme which,  in  some  of  its  declarations,  was  the 
reverse  of  reactionary.  It  called  for  the  liberty  of  the 
press,  the  right  of  petition,  of  peaceful  public  meeting, 
of  assimilation  in  political  rights  to  the  other  provinces 
of  Spain,  of  special  laws  with  relation  to  the  particular 
interests  of  Cuba,  for  improved  morality  in  public 
administration,  and  for  new  laws  which  would  be  effi- 
cacious in  securing  judicial  responsibility.  On  the 
economic  question  it  pronounced  for  customs  reforms, 
special  protection  for  the  agricultural  production  of  the 
island  and  for  the  tobacco  industry,  suppression  of 
export  duties,  a rational  reduction  of  the  imposts,  espe- 
cially on  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  a liberal  commercial 
treaty  with  the  United  States  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity. 
It  favored  the  abolition  of  slavery  on  the  terms  of  the 
law  of  Moret,  but  with  modifications  suitable  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  country.  It  also  favored  immigration  un- 
der the  direction  of  the  government  on  the  basis  of  free 
contract. 

An  echo  of  the  democratic  movement  in  Europe  was 
found  in  a third  platform,  but  there  was  no  political 
organization  standing  upon  it.  This  democratic  pro- 
gramme called  for  free  trade,  free  shipping,  free  banks, 
free  labor,  free  teaching,  provincial  militias,  municipal 
taxes  solely,  complete  abolition  of  slavery,  abolition  of 
the  death  penalty,  and  universal  suffrage.  These  planks 
were  in  addition  to  the  principles  which  it  indorsed  in 


TO-MORROW  m CUBA 


common  with  the  Liberals  and  the  Union  Constitution- 
als. Spanish  laws  had  not  been  liberalized  to  the  degree 
of  allowing  the  propaganda  of  this  theoretical  universal 
democracy.  A few  Cubans  of  intellectual  strength 
gave  it  their  approval  in  the  abstract,  but  it  never 
became  an  organized  political  movement.  Some  of  its 
tenets  were  subsequently  modified  and  adopted  by 
the  Autonomists,  and  the  definite  programme  was 
forgotten. 

Comparison  of  the  declarations  of  Liberals  and  Union 
Constitutionals  does  not  show  a marked  divergence.  It 
may  bo  said  there  were  no  conflicting  principles  which 
afforded  a basis  for  political  parties.  This  is  true.  In 
the  beginning  the  difference  was  simply  one  of  tenden- 
cies and  of  men.  The  economic  ideas  were  similar,  and 
there  was  not  an  essential  point  of  distinction  on  the 
social  and  political  articles.  Both  parties  accej)ted  the 
understanding  back  of  the  compact  of  El  Zanjon  and 
the  promise  of  measures  to  make  it  effective.  The 
similarity  of  their  creed  is  the  proof  that  Spain  was 
plodged  to  grant  Cuba  political  rights  which  would  in- 
sure a certain  degree  of  economic  independence.  The 
assertion  of  this  understanding  was  broader  and  more 
definite  on  the  part  of  the  Liberals.  The  programme 
of  the  Union  Constitutionals  reflected  moro  accurately 
the  vice  of  Spanish  politics.  Thero  were  reservations, 
chocks,  and  limitations  which  could  bo  used  to  defeat 
the  principles  that  woro  affirmed.  Yet  thero  was  recog- 
nition of  a now  regimen  under  which  would  bo  political 
organizations.  Tlio  tendency  of  tho  Union  Constitu- 
tionals to  become  tho  party  of  tho  opposition — not  to 
tho  authorities  in  power,  but  to  innovations — was  just 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


discernible  in  the  provisos  and  the  checks  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  peninsula. 

With  so  little  cardinal  difference  in  the  announced 
principles  of  the  two  groups,  the  tendencies  could  be 
understood  only  from  a knowledege  of  the  men  who  in- 
terpreted and  gave  them  direction.  The  Liberal  party 
was  a Cuban  organization,  and  it  so  remained.  Then 
and  afterwards  no  leading  Spaniards  in  the  island  took 
their  stand  for  autonomy  as  an  avowed  creed.  The 
Union  Constitutional  party  might  fairly  claim  the  title 
of  conservative  from  the  character  of  its  members.  The 
reactionaries,  the  Spanish  classes  who  did  not  accept  the 
concessions  to  the  insurgent  elements  and  who  wanted 
Cuba  to  continue  a dependency  of  the  peninsula  with- 
out political  rights,  antagonized  it.  They  were  the  in- 
transigentes.  This  term  should  be  understood.  For 
many  years  the  temporary  nature  of  the  stay  of  the 
Spaniards  in  Cuba  was  shown  by  designating  them  as 
transeuntes — transients  or  sojourners.  As  it  was  the 
Spaniards  who  always  stood  out  against  granting  what- 
ever Cuba  wanted,  and  as  they  were  the  transients,  by  a 
Gallic  adaptation  in  political  discussion  they  became 
known  as  intransigentes.  The  etymology  is  that  of 
Cuban  politics.  The  term  is  no  longer  applied  solely  to 
the  Spanish  classes.  The  instransigente  is  the  irrecon- 
cilable, the  reactionary,  the  hopeless  Bourbon ; the  polit- 
ical ostrich  who  has  only  ono  way  of  avoiding  the  storm 
of  the  desert  or  the  deluge. 

The  antagonism  of  the  blindly  loyal  Spanish  classes 
to  the  enunciated  programme  of  the  Union  Constitu- 
tionals is  evidence  of  its  agreement  in  essentials  with 
the  principles  of  the  Liberals.  But  the  inherent  ten- 

10 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

dencies  of  the  two  partios  developed  the  difference  when 
interpreted  by  men  of  divergent  convictions  and  purposes. 
Tlio  artifical  nature  of  the  two  organizations  formed 
mechanically  as  part  of  a new  political  regimen  was 
soon  lost.  Their  growth  was  along  natural  lines.  Tho 
Union  Constitutionals  modified  or  ignored  their  original 
economic  precepts.  Then  they  became  jealous  of  the 
integrity  of  Spanish  institutions  in  the  Antilles.  The 
control  passed  away  from  the  original  supporters.  The 
intransigentes  at  first  had  looked  with  contempt  on  the 
group  of  Union  Constitutionals.  They  began  by  criti- 
cizing its  assumptions  and  combating  its  principles. 
They  ended  by  dominating  tho  organization.  Whatever 
party  was  in  power  in  Spain  they  were  the  government 
party  in  Cuba.  The  Union  Constitutionals  were  minis- 
terial under  all  ministries.  Being  thus  the  props  of  au- 
thority, they  gradually  secured  for  themselves  the  offi- 
cial employments,  and  no  Captain-General  was  strong 
enough  to  dislodge  them. 

The  Liberal  party  celebrated  the  second  anniversary 
of  its  foundation  in  August,  1880,  by  a reunion  of  its 
chief  members.  The  original  programme  was  reaffirmed 
and  broadened.  The  addresses  reflected  the  disappoint- 
ment which  already  had  come  upon  those  who  had 
trusted  that  the  understanding  back  of  the  pact  of  El 
Zanjdn  would  be  vitalized  and  given  force.  Distrust 
and  suspicion  had  given  way  to  the  conviction  that  they 
had  been  deceived  by  Madrid.  They  were  discovering 
that  the  ruling  influence  in  the  peninsula  did  not  mean 
to  concede  to  Cuba  real  liberty  of  political  action  within 
even  a limited  sphere.  The  ministry  of  Martinez  Cam- 
pos had  fallen  in  the  midst  of  doubts,  perplexities, 

11 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  hesitation.  The  ministry  of  Canovas  del  Castillo, 
always  resolute  in  his  opposition  to  colonial  liberties, 
had  taken  its  place.  The  Cuban  Liberal  Autonomists 
could  only  deliver  addresses  voicing  their  disappoint- 
ment and  their  fears.  Nor  were  their  voices  heard  from 
the  housetops.  They  spoke  to  one  another  and  among 
themselves. 

The  Constitution  which  had  been  in  force  in  the 
peninsula  since  1876  was  promulgated  in  Cuba  in  the 
spring  of  1881.  Previous  to  that  there  had  been  prose- 
cution of  individuals,  usually  journalists,  who  inter- 
preted too  literally  and  too  liberally  the  royal  cedulas 
and  the  laws  enacted  by  the  Cortes  following  the  peace 
of  El  Zanjbn.  Some  ayuntamientos,  or  municipal 
councils,  which  sought  to  apply  the  new  regime  to 
local  government  too  broadly,  found  themselves  stripped 
of  their  authority.  It  was  a discouraging  experience, 
which  served  as  a warning  and  an  example  to  other 
municipalities.  The  power  of  construing  the  law  and 
the  facts  rested  with  the  Governor-General,  jand  the  con- 
struction was  commonly  on  the  side  of  arbitrary  power. 

The  promulgation  of  the  Spanish  Constitution  did 
not  lessen  the  prosecution  of  the  journals  advocating 
Liberal  principles,  though  convictions  did  not  always 
follow.  The  most  notable  instance  was  that  of  the  organ 
El  Triiwfo,  which  had  not  long  previously  declared 
that  it  was  not  autonomist.  The  newspaper  was 
charged  with  attacking  the  national  unity  in  propagat- 
ing the  autonomist  creed  or  doctrine.  Ultimately  the 
judicial  tribunal  absolved  it.  Yet  the  victory  for  a free 
press  was  not  a signal  one.  These  prosecutions  were 

effective  reminders  that  the  law  of  imprint  had  not  abol- 

12 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


islied  the  censorship  of  the  press.  Thoy  were  meant  as 
warnings  against  too  great  freedom  of  political  discus- 
sion, and  were  so  accepted.  Nor  wrero  instances  want- 
ing of  the  arbitrary  suppression  of  journals. 

In  1882  the  Junta  Magna,  or  central  committoo,  of 
the  Liberal  party  ceased  to  apologize  and  deny  that  it 
was  autonomist.  In  April  it  issued  declarations  that  it 
favored  colonial  autonomy  under  the  sovereignty  and 
the  authority  of  the  Cortes  and  the  head  of  the  nation. 
It  further  demanded  identity  of  civil  and  political  rights 
for  the  Spaniards  of  both  hemispheres.  This  was  an 
effort  to  propitiate  the  Spaniards  in  Cuba,  and  to  oblit- 
erate the  line  which  divided  insulars  and  peninsulars. 
Tho  movement  had  been  growing  in  strength.  With  the 
more  open  definition  of  autonomy  as  a political  creed, 
its  vigor  spread.  The  shadow  of  military  government 
and  the  press  censorship  rested  over  it,  yet  the  organiza- 
tion grew  within  the  shadow.  Tho  intransigentes  took 
alarm.  They  sought  to  make  the  political  division  ap- 
pear as  one  between  integristas  and  separatistas.  They 
were  the  integristas,  the  defenders  of  Spanish  unity  and 
sovereignty.  The  Liberals  were  the  separatistas,  the 
traitors  who  would  betray  their  birthright  and  encour- 
age the  colony  to  set  up  an  independent  government. 
Autonomy  was  the  viper  which,  if  warmed  in  the  bosom 
of  Spain,  would  instil  the  poison  that  would  destroy  the 
national  unity.  Though  the  thought  was  not  put  in 
these  words,  to  the  intransigentes  it  was  also  the  mon- 
ster that  would  devour  the  special  privileges  which 
made  Cuba  valuable  to  Spaniards,  if  not  to  Spain. 

Students  of  this  period  of  Cuban  political  history  will 
find  its  phases  reflected  in  the  newspapers,  in  rnani- 

13 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


festoes,  allocutions,  addresses,  and  in  pamphlets.  The 
addresses,  manifestoes,  pamphlets,  and  controversial 
articles  of  the  journals  show  a deep  knowledge  of  his- 
torical precedents.  They  go  to  the  root  of  the  causes 
that  destroy  empires.  They  contain  all  that  is  true  of 
political  and  civil  liberty  in  the  abstract.  In  the  pres- 
entation of  these  subjects  there  is  more  of  speculative 
political  philosophy  than  of  practical  understanding 
of  the  principles  of  applied  government.  Beyond  this 
the  literature  of  the  day  is  the  ordinary  polemics  of 
parties.  It  is  not  of  the  campaign  or  of  the  stump  as 
manifested  in  the  United  States,  for  there  were  no  elec- 
tions of  a kind  which  could  give  the  opportunity  for 
campaign  discussion.  Pamphleteering  was  never  super- 
seded by  newspaper  discussion.  For  the  leading  Auto- 
nomists it  is  to  be  said  that  one  true  and  consistent 
note  is  sounded  through  all  the  agitation  which  they 
carried  on  for  twenty  years.  This  is  the  warning  of  the 
fate  which  overtakes  empires  and  absolutist  govern- 
ments that  refuse  to  recognize  the  element  of  popular 
representation. 

It  has  been  truly  said  by  a Cuban  writer,*  that  “the 
virile  advance  of  civism  among  the  Cubans  through  the 
energetic  and  spontaneous  organization  of  the  Liberal 
Autonomist  party  resulted  in  the  awakening  of  the 
old  intransigente  and  reactionary  party,  fearful  that  the 
new  order  of  things  would  undermine  the  edifice  of  its 
interests.”  The  Union  Constitutionals  rallied  against 
the  movement  with  the  passion  of  tigers  whose  prey  is 
about  to  be  taken  away  from  them.  Yield  the  first  de- 


* Cabrera,  “ Cuba  y sua  Jueces.” 

14 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


maud  of  thoso  Autonomists  and  Spanish  sovereignty 
decrees  its  own  death,  was  their  angry  cry.  National 
unity  and  colonial  liberty  were  analyzed  to  their  ulti- 
mate results  logically  and  with  ability.  Tho  speeches 
and  prouuuciamentos  of  the  Autonomist  leaders — some- 
times radical  in  talk,  as  when  Antonio  Govin,  who  was 
in  time  to  become  a member  of  the  Autonomist  cabinet, 
called  the  Spaniards  birds  of  passago — were  quoted  to 
show  the  real  purpose  of  the  movement.  This  was  de- 
clared to  bo  separation  from  the  mother  country. 

The  Autonomists  in  their  turn  would  protest,  the 
radical  sentiments  of  individuals  would  bo  disclaimed, 
and  tho  personal  controversies  would  go  on.  Occasion- 
ally these  were  settled  by  duels  after  the  French  fashion. 
Throughout  tho  agitation  the  intransigentes  kept 
steadily  before  the  Spanish  classes  that  whatever  threat- 
ened or  lessened  Spanish  absolutism  threatened  their 
special  privileges.  It  was  the  argumenturn  ad  Jiominem 
applied  with  a tremendous  effect.  Intellectually,  the 
discussion  on  the  part  of  the  Union  Constitutionals  was 
a morass,  as  discussion  usually  is  in  championing  vested 
political  wrongs.  In  this  day  the  historian  will  not  be 
repaid  for  losing  himself  in  the  bog.  The  intransigen- 
tes were  the  defenders  of  the  theory  of  the  divine  right 
of  Spain  to  govern  the  Antilles  as  possessions  rather 
than  as  either  provinces  or  colonies.  Often,  too,  they 
were  the  inflexible  champions  of  the  Church,  and 
charged  their  opponents  with  plotting  to  undermine  that 
support  of  lawful  government. 

During  this  period  of  political  movement,  Cuba  had 
representation,  of  a kind,  in  the  Cortes  of  Spain.  It 
was  of  the  kind  that  could  be  possible  only  under  the 

19 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


system  of  government  which  made  elections  tlie  regis- 
tering of  the  will  of  the  governing  power.  Among  the 
Cuban  Deputies  and  Senators,  sometimes  as  many  as 
half  a dozen  would  be  known  as  Autonomists.  Ordinar- 
ily one-fourth  would  be  Cuban  born,  and  the  remainder 
peninsulars.  Rafael  de  Labra,  the  most  eminent  of  the 
publicists  in  Spain  who  advocated  colonial  government, 
represented  the  district  of  Habana  as  an  Autonomist. 
Martinez  Campos  sat  as  the  Conservative  Deputy  for 
Matanzas. 

How  far  the  Spanish  statesmen  comprehended  the 
Cuban  movement  for  autonomy  must  remain  unde- 
termined. Emilio  Castelar  wanted  no  transatlantic  Po- 
land, yet  his  republican  principles  did  not  carry  him 
to  the  length  of  advocating  complete  home  rule  for  Cuba. 
Moret,  who  was  to  formulate  the  system  when  it  came  to 
be  proposed,  at  that  time  was  giving  it  little  support. 
Praxades  Sagasta,  in  the  regular  changes  of  power  which 
made  him  the  ruler  of  Spain  alternately  with  Canovas 
del  Castillo,  never  suggested  home  rule  for  Cuba.  The 
pendulum  swung  between  these  two  prime  ministers; 
sometimes  vibrated  with  hope  of  broader  and  truer 
parliamentary  government  for  Spain  itself,  sometimes 
remained  in  equilibrium,  but  never  swung  loose  from 
the  orbit  of  colonial  subjection.  Sagasta  was  up  and  Ca- 
novas was  down : the  Liberal  party  had  its  vague  and 
hesitating  schemes  for  the  Antilles.  Canovas  was  up 
and  Sagasta  was  down:  the  Conservative  party  had 
liberal  legislation  in  view,  and  nothing  came  of  it.  If, 
in  the  farcical  election  of  Deputies  from  Cuba  to  the 
Cortes,  the  government  in  power  occasionally  permitted 
an  Autonomist  to  bo  chosen,  it  was  merely  good-natured 

1C 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tolerance.  If  tho  Autonomists  !it  times  scut  delegations 
to  Madrid  and  were  represented  by  resident  committees, 
this  was  treated  as  a colonial  chimera  not  worthy  of  seri- 
ous attention.  Canovas  had  his  policy  of  assimilation 
by  which  Spaniards  and  Cubans  were  to  approach  one 
another  in  their  political  rights.  But  he  novor  yielded 
his  ground  that  autonomy  meant  separation  of  Cuba 
from  the  peninsula.  And  what  he  called  the  national 
actualities,  the  noed  of  supporting  the  bureaucratic 
classes,  was  always  a bar  to  tho  real  insular  government 
of  Cuba  by  its  own  people. 

In  Cuba  in  time  the  stubbornness  and  tho  aggressive- 
ness of  tho  autonomist  propaganda,  the  steady  growth 
of  both  industrial  and  political  discontent,  produced  an 
effect  on  what  had  seemed  to  be  stone.  A score  and  a 
half  of  newspapers  were  advocating  the  doctrine.  Tho 
mass  of  conservatism  quavered  a little.  Then  came  an 
era  of  inquiry.  Was  it  not  better  to  do  something  to 
still  this  perennial  discontent?  Could  not  the  Cubans 
be  taken  into  limited  partnership  iu  the  administration 
of  insular  affairs?  Could  not  some  of  the  abuses,  the 
existence  of  which  everybody  admitted,  be  corrected 
and  the  system  be  modified  without  endangering  the 
national  unity?  To  these  questions  the  majority  of  the 
intransigentes  returned  a passionate  No.  Yet  the  agi- 
tation, the  need  of  doing  something,  continued.  It  came 
about  that  the  conservatives  divided  among  themselves. 
The  Union  Constitutional  party  had  liberal  tendencies 
within  its  being.  It  split  into  right  and  left  wings. 
The  left  favored  doing  something.  Its  members  were 
known  as  dissidents.  The  right  favored  doing  nothing 
beyond  castigating  the  sowers  of  sedition.  After  these 
2 17 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


divisions  came  the  rapprochements,  the  reunion  of  the 
elements  naturally  cohesive  which  had  drifted  apart. 
Customarily  the  basis  of  reunion  was  simple.  When  the 
irreconcilables  found  that  the  reforms  proposed  in  the 
Cortes  were  paper  reforms,  when  they  learned  that  the 
system  wThich  to  them  represented  the  unity  of  national 
sentiment  and  the  preservation  of  special  principles  was 
in  no  real  danger,  the  dissensions  were  healed.  The 
Union  Constitutional  party  took  back  to  its  bosom  the 
repentant  wanderers. 

Yet  the  movement  grew.  The  Autonomist  group  be- 
came as  much  a political  party  as  it  could  become  under 
Spanish  institutions.  Perception  of  a great  truth  in 
human  government  ultimately  dawned  upon  the  more 
enlightened  of  the  Spanish  classes  in  Cuba.  If  the 
agitation  would  not  down,  and  if  the  intransigente  op- 
position would  make  no  concessions  to  this  alarming 
continuance  of  sentiment,  the  movement  which  was  going 
steadily  forward  might  be  controlled  and  diverted  into 
other  channels.  It  was  not  possible  to  gain  control  of  the 
Autonomist  party.  Had  this  been  feasible,  the  connec- 
tion with  supposedly  separatist  principles  would  have 
been  too  marked  to  permit  the  Spanish  element  so  to 
identify  itself.  The  diversion  might  be  made  if  a new 
group  wore  formed. 

Out  of  these  conditions  was  born  the  Reformist  party. 
It  had  a practical  aim.  Spaniards  who  sincerely  wanted 
a more  liberal  government  for  Cuba,  but  who  could  not 
afford  to  join  themselves  with  the  Autonomist  organiza- 
tion because  it  was  too  radical  and  too  Cuban,  could 
shelter  themselves  under  this  tenting.  The  Reformist 
party  embraced  many  worthy  Spaniards  and  Cubans. 

^8 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


In  ono  respoct  its  aim  was  definite:  it  did  not  contem- 
plate colonial  self-goveramont  at  the  oxpense  of  Spanish 
sovereignty.  It  welcomed  the  electoral  reforms  which 
Maura,  the  Liberal  Minister  of  the  Colonies,  proposed  in 
the  Cortes  in  1890,  and  in  subsequent  years.  Its  mem- 
bers joined  the  Autonomists  in  mocking  the  Union  Con- 
stitutionals when  that  party  accepted  the  reforms  of 
Abrazurza  offered  by  the  Conservative  ministry  in  the 
Cortes  in  1895. 

The  Reformist  party  was  formally  organized  in  1893. 
It  did  not  advance  materially  in  numbers,  but  it  was  a 
distinct  influence,  and  maintained  the  shell  of  an  organ- 
ization till  the  last.  It  professed  not  to  favor  compro- 
mise with  the  radical  tendencies  of  autonomy,  but  merely 
concessions  to  better  government.  Towards  the  end  its 
propaganda  was  bold  and  clear.  In  the  despair  which 
was  coming  over  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba  with  the  rising 
of  the  insurrection,  its  efforts  partook  of  the  activity  of 
desperation.  But  there  was  a fundamental  weakness. 
Tho  poles  were  positive  and  negative.  The  Autonomists 
affirmed  and  demanded  full  colonial  liberty.  The  Union 
Constitutionals  denied  and  rejected  tho  basis.  No  mag- 
net midway  between  them  could  draw.  The  Reformists 
were  not  a compromise  party  as  compromise  had  been 
applied  successfully  in  the  United  States.  They  simply 
favored  concessions.  At  first  the  name  of  the  Autono- 
mists, the  thing  to  the  Conservatives.  Later  it  was  a 
reversal  of  position  with  some  substance  for  colonial 
home  rule. 

Spanish  conservatives  who  were  of  liberal  tendencies 
and  who  foresaw  destruction  if  something  were  not  done 
joined  the  Reformists  in  moments  of  disgust  and  l’eac- 

19 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


fcion  from  the  hopeless  Bourbonism  of  their  own  party. 
Timid  Autonomists,  with  the  ultimate  outcome  of  sepa- 
ration before  them,  and  face  to  face  with  the  early  prob- 
abilities, hesitated,  faltered,  and  turned  back.  The 
Reformist  standard  was  their  refuge.  They,  too,  became 
opportunists.  The  Reformist  party  pitched  its  tent 
on  the  beach.  The  waves  of  revolution  were  rolling 
inward.  The  Reformists  raised  their  brooms  to  sweep 
the  billows  back.  The  waves  broke  over  the  shore,  and 
Conservatives,  Reformists,  and  Autonomists  were  swal- 
lowed in  the  waters.  Their  emergence,  drowsled  and 
dripping,  is  the  subject  for  a later  chapter  of  autonomy. 

Armed  revolt,  begun  in  1868,  had  brought  the  first 
change  in  the  outward  form  of  Spanish  absolutism  dur- 
ing four  centuries  of  despotic  government.  Peaceful 
agitation  following  the  concessions  wrung  by  the  revo- 
lutionists of  that  day  had  been  able  to  show  little  further 
progress  in  liberalizing  the  spirit  of  Spanish  political 
institutions.  The  energies  of  the  Liberal  party  in  Cuba 
were  absorbed  and  distraught  in  seeking  to  check  the 
reactionary  tendencies  of  parties  in  Spain  which  were, 
reverting  to  the  system  that  had  obtained  jmevious  to 
the  compact  of  El  Zanjon.  When  it  was  apparently 
going  forward  the  Autonomist  party  was  in  reality  sim- 
ply checking  the  movement  backward.  There  were 
periods  of  self-deception  and  of  unconscious  deception 
to  the  people  of  the  island.  Quiescence  of  the  revolution- 
ary elements  was  mistaken  for  acquiescence.  When  the 
whole  world  was  prospering,  industrial  prosperity  could 
not  be  wholly  destroyed  by  official  corruption  and  mis- 
government.  Sugar  production  with  an  abnormally 
profitable  market  aided  in  the  temporary  quietude.  In 

20 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


1890  it  was  complacently  romarkod  that  the  spirit  of 
armed  revolution  had  passed  away  in  the  embrace  of 
agitation  within  constitutional  lines  by  tho  great  Auton- 
omist party.  The  Cortes  was  busy  with  reforms  for 
Cuba.  The  plans  were  not  for  home  rule,  but  they  were 
pledges  of  improvement  which,  if  carried  out,  would 
enable  the  Autonomists  to  show  that  the  evolution  of 
colonial  self-government  in  tho  logical  order  which  they 
advocated  had  begun.  They  were  very  fond  of  that 
phrase,  “evolutionary  colonial  government.”  Then 
came  the  exigencies  of  Madrid  politics,  the  shifting  of 
ministries  and  the  mockery  of  the  Antillian  aspirations 
for  wider  liberties.  And  then,  too,  came  the  tariff  leg- 
islation in  the  United  States,  which  repealed  the  Blaine 
reciprocity  legislation  and  lowered  at  a stroke  the  profit 
of  raising  sugar-cane  in  Cuba.  The  quiescent  elements 
began  to  move.  They  were  no  longer  acquiescent.  In 
this  inchoate  activity  was  disclosed  the  abyss  which  the 
Autonomists  had  not  been  able  to  bridge.  This  was  the 
knowledge  that  the  mass  of  revolutionists  of  the  Ten- 
Tears’  war  never  had  been  reconciled  to  Spanish  dom- 
ination. 

Antonio  Maceo  had  been  a young  chief  in  that  war. 
He  had  not  accepted  the  regimen  of  peace,  but  had  con- 
sented to  depart  from  the  island  under  a safe-conduct 
from  Martinez  Campos.  His  subsequent  life  in  Central 
America  and  the  watch  which  the  Spanish  authorities 
kept  on  his  movements  are  matters  of  common  history. 
They  do  not  need  recounting.  Maximo  Gomez  had 
retired  to  his  farm  in  Santo  Domingo,  and  withdrawn 
himself  from  participation  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba.  Ca- 
lixto  Garcia,  after  joining  a second  abortive  rebellion 

21 


TO-MORROW  D;  CUBA 


known  as  the  Little  War,  which  raged  in  Santiago 
province  within  a twelvemonth  after  the  peace  of  El 
Zanjon,  had  accepted  the  friendship  of  Campos  and 
taken  a civil  position  as  a bank  officer  in  Madrid, 
where  he  was  under  espionage.  Other  leaders  of  the 
Ten-Years’  war  had  voluntarily  exiled  themselves  to  the 
United  States,  to  Mexico,  and  to  the  countries  of  Cen- 
tral America.  That  they  did  not  trust  the  Spanish 
promises  was  evidenced  by  their  actions.  Their  lack 
of  faith  in  the  success  of  the  Autonomist  party  was 
equally  clear.  Some  conspired  and  plotted.  Others 
merely  waited. 

The  culmination  came  with  the  simultaneous  failure 
of  Cuban  reform  legislation  in  the  Cortes  and  the 
decrease  in  the  profits  of  the  American  sugar  market. 
Economic  causes  combined  with  political  discontent  in 
keeping  the  embers  of  insurrection  glowing  under  the 
ashes  of  apparent  indifference.  The  period  of  freedom 
from  internecine  war  has  been  called  a parenthesis 
within  a fact.  The  insurrection  of  1895  was  the  last 
act  in  the  revolution  which  began  in  1868.  There  had 
been  an  interregnum,  nothing  more.  Armed  revolt  was 
coming  again. 


CHAPTER  II 


Tiie  Western  Invasion 

Alarm  Bell  of  Insurrection  Sounded— Old  Leaders  in  Arms — Mani- 
festo of  Autonomists  Reprobates  the  Insurrection — Subsequent 
History  of  the  Signers — Activity  of  Gdmez  and  Mac6o — Martin- 
ez Campos  Takes  Command — Battle  of  Bayamo — Arrival  of 
Spanish  Reinforcements — Autonomists  Deported — Formation  of 
Revolutionary  Government — Gdrnez’  Address  to  the  Cuban  Peo- 
ple—His  Plan  for  Nationalizing  the  Insurrection — March  to  the 
Occident  Begun — Machete  as  a Weapon— Progress  of  Insurgents 
— Campos  Quiets  Censure  of  Spanish  Classes — Promise  of  Vigor- 
ous Military  Operations — Blazing  Cane-Fields  the  Mark  of  the 
Insurgent  Campaign — Tremor  and  Turmoil  in  Habana — Official 
Orders  for  Defence — Gdmez  in  the  Outskirts — Macdo  in  the  To- 
bacco Country — The  Invasion  G6mez’  Conception  and  Macro’s 
Execution — Spain’s  Military  Power  Broken. 

Torch  and  machete  make  short  work  of  constitutional 
agitation.  They  are  not  the  weapons  of  political  par- 
ties. When  they  were  resorted  to  it  was  a question 
whether  they  would  convert  the  Autonomists  into  re- 
cruits or  into  enemies  of  the  faith  that  proclaimed  its 
doctrines  by  war.  A little  time  had  to  be  allowed  be- 
fore the  answer  could  be  given. 

It  was  known  in  the  United  States,  in  the  winter 
months  of  1894-95,  that  something  was  expected  to 
happen  in  Cuba.  The  Spanish  authorities  in  the  island 
were  both  blind  and  impotent.  They,  too,  knew  that 

23 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


something  was  going  on,  yet  they  did  not  know  where 
to  look  for  the  uprising.  One  day  a small  party  of 
insurgents  raised  the  banner  of  revolt  at  the  hamlet  of 
Ybarra  in  Matanzas  province.  Four  hundred  miles 
away  in  the  villages  of  Baire  and  Juguani,  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Santiago  de  Cuba,*  small  uprisings  also  were 
noted.  At  Baire  the  peaceable  demand  was  made  for 
the  implantation  of  the  reforms  of  Maura.  At  Juguani 
the  demand  tvas  for  the  removal  of  the  local  ayuntai- 
mento,  or  municipal  council,  because  of  some  alleged 
malfeasance.  At  Guantanamo  there  was  an  open  revolt 
without  a stated  grievance. 

The  movement  at  Ybarra  was  premature.  The  little 
band  of  insurgents  was  quickly  dispersed.  Some  of  the 
leaders  were  arrested  and  deported  in  chains  to  the  penal 
settlements  of  Africa,  among  them  the  mulatto  publicist 
Juan  Gualberto  Gomez.  Small  risings  in  the  province 
of  Santa  Clara  were  also  dispersed.  But  the  alarm  bell 
had  been  sounded.  It  was  to  ring  through  months  and 
years.  The  night  of  February  23d,  1895,  the  print- 
ing-presses in  Habana  were  kept  whirling  with  the 
proclamation  of  the  Governor-General,  Emilio  Calleja, 
suspending  the  constitutional  guarantees.  This  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  official  announcement  that  the  provinces  of 
Matanzas  and  Santiago  de  Cuba  were  in  a state  of  war. 
Then  was  disclosed  the  existence  of  the  Cuban  revolu- 
tionary party  with  headquarters  and  branches  in  the 
United  States,  and  with  a net  extended  throughout  the 
island  the  completeness  of  which  was  not  suspected. 
All  the  agencies  of  secret  police  and  of  similar  means 

* Santiago  means  St.  James.  Cubans  and  Spaniards  call  the  city 
and  the  province  simply  “Cuba.” 

24 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


which  wero  a part  of  the  Spanish  system  had  not  uncov- 
ered this  universal  political  conspiracy. 

Jose  Marti,  dreamer,  poet,  and  idealist,  had  visited 
Maximo  Gomez  in  his  retirement  in  Santo  Domingo, 
and  on  behalf  of  the  Cuban  revolutionary  societies  had 
offered  him  the  command  of  an  insurgent  army  that  was 
to  come  up  from  the  earth.  Gomez  had  accepted  the 
command.  Antonio  Macuo  had  been  communicated 
with  and  was  ready  to  aid.  The  sympathizers  in  Cuba 
had  been  secreting  arms,  and  were  awaiting  the  call. 
Bartolomd  Maso,  a sugar-planter  at  Manzanillo,  who 
had  been  an  insurgent  colonel  in  the  Ten-Years’  war, 
wras  quickly  in  the  field  with  armed  followers.  He  had 
the  respect  of  the  Spanish  classes.  Though  he  had  been 
friendly  to  the  Autonomist  propaganda,  he  had  refused 
to  accept  the  presidency  of  tho  party.  Maso  was  said  to 
have  taken  up  arms  in  order  to  compel  Spain  to  yield 
autonomy  without  granting  absolute  independence.  Mi- 
nor engagements  took  place  in  the  Oriente,  as  Eastern 
Cuba  wras  called,  and  wdthin  a month  the  insurrection 
was  in  full  movement.  Spain  was  sending  troops 
across  the  ocean,  and  the  leading  Spaniards  in  Habana 
were  calling  for  more  vigorous  action  by  the  Govern- 
ment. They  were  also  seeking  to  place  the  responsibil- 
ity for  the  insurrection.  The  Union  Constitutionals 
shrieked  that  the  Autonomists  had  done  it  all.  Insur- 
rection, which  meant  separation,  they  cried,  was  the 
fruit,  as  they  had  warned  the  loyal  classes,  of  the  per- 
nicious doctrines  of  autonomy. 

Thus  attacked,  the  Autonomist  leaders  through  the 
Magna  Junta,  or  central  committee,  of  the  party  made 
vigorous  reply.  They  vindicated  their  loyalty  by  offer- 

25 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ing  their  unconditional  support  to  the  Government. 
They  issued  an  appeal  to  the  country  in  which  they 
eulogized  themselves  and  reprobated  the  insurgents. 
The  insurrection,  they  said,  had  sounded  the  cry  of 
revolt  at  the  moment  when  a new  regimen  was  on  the 
eve  of  being  inaugurated.  They  condemned  all  over- 
turning of  order  because  the  Liberal- Autonomist  party 
was  a party  of  legality  which  had  faith  in  constitutional 
methods.  Besides,  it  was  fundamentally  Spanish  be- 
cause it  was  essentially  and  exclusively  autonomist. 
And  colonial  autonomy  presupposed  the  reality  of  the 
Metropolis — Spain — in  the  plenitude  of  its  sovereignty 
and  of  its  historic  rights.  For  that  reality  from  its 
birth,  their  party  had  inscribed  on  its  banner  as  its 
motto,  “Liberty,  Peace,  and  National  Unity.”  It  also 
resented  the  injurious  imputations  of  its  adversaries, 
meaning  the  Union  Constitutionals.  Recurring  to  the 
rebellion  again,  the  manifesto  declared  that  the  insur- 
rection made  impossible  at  that  time  the  liberties  which 
the  Autonomists  had  conquered.  But  by  good  fortune 
it  would  not  succeed.  All  the  signs  showed  that  the 
rebellion,  limited  to  a part  of  the  eastern  provinces,  had 
with  a fow  exceptions  only  succeeded  in  dragging  into 
it  the  classes  proceeding  from  the  most  ignorant  and 
destitute  of  the  population,  who  from  lack  of  cohesion 
and  discipline  would  soon  disperse  or  give  themselves 
up.  The  Liberal  party  of  1808  had  folded  its  standard 
and  abandoned  its  post  to  the  revolutionists  of  Yara. 
The  Liberal  party  of  1878  would  not  lower  its  flag  nor 
cede  the  field  to  those  who  came  to  undo  their  laborious 
harvest  and  cloud  the  perspective  of  their  destinies  with 
the  horrible  spectre  of  misery,  anarchy,  and  barbarism. 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


By  their  characterization  of  the  ignorant  classes  it 
will  bo  observed  that  the  Autonomist  leaders  did  not 
consider  the  insurrection  respectable.  They  themselves 
were  eminently  respectable.  Their  natural  opponents, 
the  Union  Constitutionals,  while  denouncing  them  and 
their  policies,  always  conceded  their  respectability. 
They  proved  poor  prophets,  because  instead  of  the  in- 
surrection failing  from  lack  of  cohesion  and  discipline, 
it  grew  more  coherent  and  put  disciplined  ranks  in  the 
field.  But  truly  the  classes  who  formed  its  base  wore 
not  respectable.  They  were  farm  laborers,  workers  in 
the  cane-fields  who  had  never  risen  to  a high  condition 
of  education.  Nor  had  they  ever  given  support  to  the 
movement  for  autonomy,  because  the  leadors  of  that 
movement,  while  championing  the  system  of  popular 
government,  had  no  knowledge  from  experience  of  the 
function  of  the  masses  in  popular  government.  The 
manifesto  in  its  reference  to  the  liberties  the  Autono- 
mists had  conquered  meant  the  reforms  of  Abarzurza. 
Having  been  unable  to  obtain  the  reforms  of  Maura, 
they  accepted  the  diluted  substitute  as  a step  in  their 
programme  of  evolutionary  autonomy. 

It  is  instructive  to  follow  the  history  of  the  signers 
of  this  manifesto,  and  of  other  Autonomists  not  mem- 
bers of  the  central  committee  who  indorsed  it.  The 
majority  of  them  had  been  for  fifteen  years  and  more 
advocating  the  principles  of  the  party.  They  could  say 
with  truth  that  they  had  cradled  the  organization.  In 
the  years  that  were  to  come,  some  remained  unwavering 
in  the  support  which  they  had  pledged  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Spain.  Among  them  were  found  apologists  and 
eulogists  of  Weyler.  But  others  went  into  voluntary 

27 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


exile,  unable  to  stand  between  tbe  two  firing-lines. 
Many  joined  tbe  insurgents  in  tbe  manigua  or  brush. 
Some  became  involuntary  exiles  or  political  prisoners, 
because  they  either  fell  away  from  the  policy  announced 
in  the  manifesto,  or  because  their  support  was  not  zeal- 
ous enough  to  satisfy  the  military  authorities. 

This  manifesto  of  the  Liberal-Autonomist  party  was 
published  on  the  4th  of  April.  The  insurrection  had 
been  in  movement  for  six  weeks.  Martinez  Campos, 
the  pacificator  of  the  former  revolution,  had  been  named 
Governor-General  of  the  island,  and  had  sailed  for  his 
post.  Antonio  Maceo,  his  brother  Jose,  and  a score 
of  companions  who  formed  the  expedition  from  Costa 
Rica  had  disembarked  near  Baracoa  on  the  north 
coast.  A troop  of  Spanish  volunteers  lay  in  waiting 
for  them.  There  was  fighting  in  the  hills,  and  some 
members  of  the  expedition  were  taken  prisoners.  The 
brothers  Maceo  escaped,  and  Antonio  placed  himself  in 
command  of  the  increasing  bands  of  insurgents  in  the 
eastern  regions.  Within  a fortnight  Jose  Marti  and 
Maximo  Gomez  landed  near  Guantanamo.  Marti  was 
the  president  of  the  revolutionary  party.  He  had 
been  a student  in  Seville  and  Madrid,  and  was  old 
enough  to  be  imprisoned  during  the  Ten-Years’  war  for 
complicity  in  that  uprising.  He  was  not  a military 
chief.  Marti  lost  his  life  in  combat  with  the  Spanish 
troops  on  the  banks  of  the  Contraestre  River,  in  the 
western  part  of  the  province,  within  five  weeks  after  his 
arrival.  Gomez  at  once  took  command  of  the  insur- 
gent forces  which  began  coming  up  from  the  earth  to 
receive  him. 

Two  days  after  the  secret  landing  of  Marti  and 

28 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Gomez,  Genoral  Campos  disembarked  in  the  port  of 
Guantanamo.  Ho  immediately  assumed  bis  office  as 
Governor-General  and  Captain-General  of  the  island, 
without  waiting  to  take  the  formal  oath  and  undergo  the 
ceremonies  customary  at  Habana.  At  that  time  the 
Spanish  authorities  estimated  that  the  insurgents  under 
arms  in  the  province  numbered  5, (XX).  General  Cam- 
pos issued  an  address  to  the  people,  and  organized 
energetic  military  operations.  In  proclaiming  martial 
law  he  enjoined  on  his  own  soldiers  the  recognized  prin- 
ciples of  humane  warfare.  His  policy  was  to  win  back 
the  insurgents  by  kindness,  and  to  show  them  that  they 
could  trust  the  indulgence  of  Spain.  At  this  time  he 
had  27,000  troops  under  his  command.  After  remain- 
ing in  Santiago  a week  ho  proceeded  to  Habana. 

While  Campos  was  combating  the  insurrection  with 
the  sword  in  one  hand  and  the  promise  of  pardon  in  the 
other,  Gomez  and  Maceo  wTere  pushing  it  westward 
through  Santiago  to  the  thinly  populated  province  of 
Puerto  Principe.  These  Camagueyans,  as  the  natives 
of  the  central  part  of  the  island  are  called,  were,  like 
the  inhabitants  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  perennial  foes  of 
Spanish  power.  The  Autonomist  party  had  an  organi- 
zation in  Puerto  Principe  which  reaffirmed  its  condem- 
nation of  the  insurrection  and  its  earnest  desire  to 
uphold  the  military  authorities.  After  drawing  to  the 
ranks  of  the  insurrection  the  leading  Cubans  of  Cama- 
giiey,  Gomez  retired  to  the  southern  part  of  Santiago 
province.  In  the  mean  time  General  Campos  had  taken 
command  in  person  of  the  Spanish  troops  in  the  field, 
and  was  directing  the  movements  in  that  region.  The 
volunteers  in  many  places  had  been  called  into  action 

20 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  were  supporting  the  regular  troops.  The  guerillas, 
or  native  Spanish  forces,  organized  in  the  different 
communities,  and  the  movilazados,  or  irregular  native 
forces,  were  also  being  utilized. 

On  July  13th  was  fought  the  first  real  battle  of  this 
war.  It  was  at  Peralojo,  near  Bayamo.  Maceo  and 
Jesus  Rabi  were  known  to  be  contemplating  a descent 
on  the  Spanish  garrison  which  held  Bayamo.  The 
columns  under  Campos  were  advancing  from  Manza- 
nillo. The  Spanish  troops,  according  to  the  statement 
of  the  officers,  numbered  1,600.  The  insurgents  under 
Maceo,  the  Spaniards  afterwards  said,  numbered  be- 
tween 5,000  and  6,000.  There  may  have  been  3,000 
of  them  who  fell  upon  the  advancing  Spanish  columns 
of  equal  number, — certainly  more  than  1,600, — attacking 
them  in  front  and  in  the  rear.  General  Juan  Fidel 
Santocildes,  a distinguished  officer  and  the  devoted 
friend  of  Campos,  was  killed  at  the  head  of  his  column. 
Other  officers  were  killed  and  wounded.  General  Cam- 
pos himself  narrowly  escaped  death.  By  a strategic 
movement,  turning  his  rear-guard  into  the  van-guard 
and  changing  the  course,  he  succeeded  in  leading  his 
troops  into  Bayamo.  The  laurels  of  the  engagement 
were  with  Maceo,  and  the  insurgent  cause  gained  pres- 
tige. General  Campos,  after  strengthening  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Bayamo  and  increasing  the  garrison,  succeeded 
in  clearing  the  country  in  the  immediate  neighborhood 
of  the  insurgents,  who  confined  their  activity  to  the 
northern  part  of  the  province.  Ho  then  returned  to 
Manzanillo. 

Through  the  remaining  months  of  the  summer  the 
insurgent  activity  was  greatest  in  las  Villas,  which  is 

30 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  province  of  Santa  Clara,  or,  as  tlio  Cubans  call  it, 
Villa  Clara.  One  uprising  followed  another,  and  one 
baud  after  another  took  to  the  manigua.  The  success- 
ful disembarkmont  of  filibustering  expeditions  on  the 
south  coast  w’ith  arms  and  recruits  for  the  insurgents 
kept  the  fires  of  revolution  flaming.  Tho  military  au- 
thorities were  energetic,  but  the  bands  of  insurgents 
in  the  province  managed  to  avoid  many  encounters  with 
the  troops.  They  attacked  isolated  Spanish  garrisons 
successfully,  though  in  some  of  the  combats  they  tvero 
worsted.  In  Santiago  de  Cuba  Maceo  was  active,  and 
his  followers  had  several  sharp  engagements  with  the 
enemy.  At  Sao  del  Indio  a column  of  1,000  Spanish 
soldiers  attacked  a force  of  insurgents  under  Maceo 
alleged  to  number  3,000,  and  probably  numbering  half 
as  many,  and  dispersed  them.  All  this  time  reinforce- 
ments were  coming  from  the  peninsula.  By  the  end  of 
summer  a total  of  80,000  Spanish  regulars  were  in  the 
field.  A thousand  loyal  Spaniards  had  come  from  the 
Argentine  Republic  and  Brazil  to  the  city  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba,  and  enrolled  themselves  as  volunteers.  Sub- 
sequently more  Spaniards  arrived  from  South  America, 
and  also  from  Mexico.  In  Habana  the  disembarking 
of  the  battalions  was  a weekly  occurrence.  The  Leon 
battalion,  that  of  the  Asturias,  of  Barcelona,  of  Valen- 
cia, and  of  other  provinces  in  Spain  showed  that  the 
army  was  recruited  from  all  parts  of  the  peninsula. 
The  insurgents  may  have  had  20,000  men  in  arms  and 
without  arms,  though  this  is  a liberal  estimate. 

During  this  period  happened  an  untoward  circum- 
stance. It  was  a rude  shock  to  the  credulous  and  loyal 
Autonomists.  General  Campos  began  deporting  Auton- 

31 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


omists  to  tlie  penal  settlements  of  Africa  without  civil 
or  military  trial  and  without  explanation.  In  the  latter 
part  of  September,  four  leading  citizens  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba  were  deported  to  Ceuta  by  his  orders.  They 
were  Don  Eutaldo  Tamayo,  president  of  the  provincial 
deputation  and  also  president  of  the  local  autonomist 
central  committee;  Antonio  Brava,  an  educator;  Alfre- 
do Betancourt,  a lawyer;  and  Desiderio  Ortiz,  a jour- 
nalist. Clearly  these  men  did  not  belong  to  the  igno- 
rant and  destitute  classes  of  whom  the  central  committee 
of  the  Autonomist  party  had  written  in  the  celebrated 
manifesto  reprobating  the  insurrection.  Their  political 
associates  in  Habana  sought  their  releases,  but  the  Cap- 
tain-General denied  the  request  for  reasons  which  were 
thought  to  indicate  knowledge  of  complicity  in  the 
insurrection.  Later,  by  his  direction,  other  Autono- 
mists were  deported.  Military  executions  of  insurgent 
cabecillas,  or  chiefs,  who  were  captured  in  arms  also 
began.  These  chiefs  received  more  consideration  than 
the  Autonomist  suspects  exiled  without  trial,  for  they 
had  the  benefit  of  summary  court-martial. 

The  revolutionists,  on  their  part,  were  beginning  to 
destroy  sugar  plantations  and  blow  up  railroads  and 
trains  with  dynamite.  They  also  formed  their  provi- 
sional Cuban  republic  in  the  woods  with  Salvador  Cis- 
neros Betancourt,  better  known  as  the  Marquis  de 
Santa  Lucia,  as  President.  The  possessor  of  a Cuban 
patent  of  nobility  and  answering  all  the  requirements 
of  breeding  and  education,  a revolutionist  of  18G8,  he 
had  taken  into  the  field  with  him  many  young  men  of 
the  older  families  of  Yilla  Clara.  The  insurgent  chiefs 
met  and  organized  an  assembly  at  Jimaguayu,  a corner 
, 33 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  Puerto  Principe.  They  decided  that  the  revolution- 
ary civil  government  should  bo  kept  separate  from  the 
military  administration.  They  confirmed  Gomez  as 
general-in-chief  and  Maceo  as  next  in  command.  Bar- 
tolome  Maso  yielded  liis  commission  in  the  field  to 
become  Vice-President  of  the  provisional  government, 
and  he  subsequently  succeeded  the  Marquis  de  Santa 
Lucia  as  President.  A civil  cabinet  was  also  formed. 
This  assembly  adopted  the  first  constitution  of  the 
Cuban  republic.  Its  creator,  the  provisional  govern- 
ment, sought  recognition  from  the  United  States. 
Nominally  the  provisional  government  in  the  woods 
was  the  supreme  power.  It  issued  commissions  and 
directed  the  movements  of  the  insurgent  army.  Nomi- 
nally, too,  Gomez  and  Maceo  and  the  other  insurgent 
commanders  respected  and  obeyed  it.  Actually  the 
provisional  government  registered  their  plans,  or  if  it 
did  not  it  was  ignored  by  them.  At  all  times  the  Junta 
in  New  York,  of  which  Estrada  Palma  was  the  head 
and  Gonzalo  de  Quesada  the  representative  in  Wash- 
ington, uras  the  more  potent  body,  for  it  raised  and 
disbursed  the  funds  and  managed  the  filibustering  expe- 
ditions. The  tribute  or  tax  levied  by  Gomez  on  the 
sugar  planters  and  railroad  managers  was  frequently 
paid  directly  to  the  representatives  of  the  Junta. 

Six  months  of  revolt  passed  before  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment in  Cuba  knew  that  the  insurrection  had  a regu- 
larly organized  plan  of  compaign.  Insurgent  maurad- 
ing  bands,  though  acknowledging  the  orders  of  Gomez 
or  Maceo  while  engaging  in  guerilla  warfare,  did  not 
themselves  fully  realize  that  they  were  working  as  part 
of  a whole.  Maceo  knew  it,  and  the  veteran  chief  of 
3 33 


TO-MORROW  m CUBA 

the  revolution  knew  it.  In  the  autumn  of  1895  his 
plans  began  to  take  form.  On  assuming  command  of 
the  insurgent  forces,  Gomez  had  issued  an  address  to 
the  Cuban  people.  It  is  worth  reading  in  the  light  of 
the  history  that  has  since  been  made.  Its  language 
may  appear  verbose  and  extravagant  to  the  unsenti- 
mental American  mind.  To  the  emotional  people  of 
the  Latin  and  the  African  races,  for  whom  the  address 
was  meant,  it  was  neither  verbose  nor  extravagant.  In 
this  manifesto  Gomez  promised  to  lead  them  in  the 
struggle  for  their  liberties.  Though  the  words  were 
glowing,  the  difficulties  and  the  supreme  nature  of  the 
task  before  them  was  set  out  with  mathematical  pre- 
cision. Spain,  he  warned  them,  would  never  yield 
Cuba  to  its  people  while  the  land  was  worth  possessing. 
She  would  only  yield  when  there  was  nothing  to  keep. 
And  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  must  be  prepared  for  the 
sacrifice.  Every  household,  he  declared,  would  have 
its  martyr  before  the  island  became  free. 

In  this  address  Gomez  put  forth  other  ideas,  though 
not  with  the  distinctness  with  which  they  existed  in 
his  own  mind.  If  not  local,  the  Ten-Years’  war  had 
been  at  least  provincial.  It  was  confined  to  the  cen- 
tral and  eastern  part  of  the  island.  Barely  an  emeute 
had  taken  place  in  the  west.  If  Cuba  were  to  be  freed 
from  Spain,  Gomez  knew  that  the  revolution  must  be 
made  universal.  Ho  proposed  to  nationalize  the  insur- 
rection. Many  young  Cubans  and  some  older  ones  had 
joined  it  believing  that  they  could  engago  in  a gue- 
rilla warfaro  in  the  neighborhood  of  their  own  homes. 
Gomez  did  not  understimate  the  value  of  this  support. 
Ho  used  this  local  aid,  but  did  not  depend  upon  it. 

34 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Instoad,  ho  took  tho  most  capablo  of  the  recruits  and 
sent  them  to  commands  in  othor  localities.  From 
Habana  he  chose  officers  for  Puerto  Principe.  From 
Pinar  del  Rio  he  selected  officers  for  tho  bands  in  Santa 
Clara.  The  development  of  this  plan  was  coincident 
with  the  broader  purpose  of  nationalizing  tho  insurrec- 
tion by  making  war  throughout  the  island.  Tho  west- 
ern invasion  began  late  in  the  fall,  at  the  end  of  tho 
rainy  season.  Tho  insurgents  were  leaving  parts  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba  in  a state  of  comparative  calm  while 
their  bands  were  spreading  west  and  attacking  the 
Spanish  garrisons.  One  of  these  assaults  was  on  the 
fort  of  Cascarro,  in  Puerto  Principe,  which  was  made 
notable  by  the  heroic  defence  of  the  Spanish  soldiers. 

As  the  insurrection  developed  in  intensity,  the  penin- 
sular classes  in  the  island  were  alarmed  and  disgusted 
by  rumors  that  a peace  had  been  agreed  upon  with 
autonomy  as  a basis.  The  rumors  were  without  foun- 
dation. The  Autonomists  were  in  eclipse  with  both 
insurgents  and  the  Madrid  Cabinet.  Gomez  crossed 
the  Jucaro-Moron  trocha  with  a force  of  1,200  or  1,500 
mounted  Camagiieyans  on  the  30th  of  October.  This 
trocha  or  trench  runs  from  coast  to  coast  a few  miles 
east  of  the  Santa  Clara  line,  and  is  known  as  the  rail- 
road trocha.  It  was  established  and  maintained  during 
the  Ten-Tears’  war,  and  was  again  garrisoned  as  soon 
as  the  insurrection  broke  out.  Gomez  circled  from 
Sancti  Spiritus,  in  the  southeastern  part  of  Santa  Clara, 
to  the  northwest,  in  the  direction  of  Remedios,  like  a 
hawk.  He  reduced  several  small  forts  and  released  the 
Spanish  soldiers  who  were  taken  prisoners.  During 
November  his  forces  fought  with  the  Spanish  troops  at 

35 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Manacas,  Rio  Grande,  Covadanga,  and  other  villages  or 
sugar  plantations.  Later  lie  moved  eastward  again 
and  formed  a junction  with  Maceo,  who  had  advanced 
from  Santiago  province  through  Puerto  Principe,  meet- 
ing little  resistance.  They  attacked  a Spanish  convoy 
under  General  Segura  at  Iguara,  and,  though  having 
a superior  force,  were  repulsed.  Maceo  crossed  the 
Moron  trocha  on  December  10th  at  Ciego  de  Avila,  its 
central  point. 

The  march  to  the  Occident,  the  western  invasion, 
was  begun.  Las  Villas — Santa  Clara  province — was 
the  basis  of  military  operations  for  this  irregular  in- 
surgent army  which  had  mysterially  mobilized  itself. 
General  Campos  and  his  military  advisers  had  foreseen 
the  danger  in  that  region,  which  was  tremulous  with 
the  enthusiasm  of  revolution.  They  had  also  seen  the 
signs  in  Matanzas  and  even  in  the  provinces  of  Habana 
and  Pinar  del  Rio.  If  the  insurrection  made  headway 
in  las  Villas  they  knew  they  would  have  to  combat  more 
than  spasmodic  outbreaks  in  the  west.  General  Cam- 
pos took  command  in  person  in  Santa  Clara,  with  his 
headquarters  at  Cienfuegos.  In  that  central  section  of 
the  island  he  had  not  fewer  than  20,000  troops.  Go- 
mez and  Maceo  divided  their  bands,  and  the  Santiago 
negro  farmer  Quintin  Banderas,  who  had  developed 
capacity  for  getting  small  parties  over  the  country  with 
marvellous  rapidity,  baited  the  Spanish  columns.  On 
the  15th  of  December  was  fought  the  battle  of  Mai 
Tiempo.  It  was  one  of  the  genuine  combats  of  the 
insurrection,  though  the  number  of  men  engaged  in  it 
was  not  large.  Mai  Tiempo  was  a village  thirty  miles 
northwest  of  Cienfuegos.  Gomez  and  Maceo  watched 

30 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  engagement  and  directed  it.  Tart  of  their  forces 
harassed  the  Canaries  and  the  Baileu  battalions  when 
the  Spanish  columns  were  marching  through  the  brush, 
and  galled  them  with  a musketry  firo.  In  the  open 
road  a party  of  insurgents,  armed  with  machetes,  fell 
upon  a company  of  the  Bailen  battalion  and  annihilated 
it.  This  assault  gave  the  machete  a terror  to  the  Span- 
ish troops.  In  the  previous  brushes  with  the  insur- 
gents they  had  learned  something  of  its  effectiveness  at 
close  quarters,  but  the  annihilation  of  the  entire  com- 
pany was  to  them  a frightful  revelation  of  its  possibili- 
ties. The  machete  was  more  dangerous  than  the  Span- 
ish shortsword,  possibly  because  the  insurgents  who 
wielded  it  had  trained  their  right  arms  to  its  use  in 
cutting  cane  on  the  sugar  plantations.  Many  of  them 
served  through  the  insurrection  without  possessing  fire- 
arms. The  weapon  was  used  in  other  engagements, 
yet  the  machete  charges  by  battalions  of  insurgents 
of  which  vivid  accounts  were  related  were  rare  in  the 
actual  warfare. 

Gomez  and  Maceo  advanced  northwest  through  Santa 
Clara  to  Matanzas  province.  Their  movements  were 
aided  by  a troop  of  insurgents  under  General  Lacret 
Morlot,  who  constantly  diverted  the  attention  of  the 
enemy.  General  Campos  sought  to  throw  his  columns 
in  a living  trocha  along  the  line  to  intercept  them.  He 
could  not  overtake  them  with  his  troops  that  were  scat- 
tered through  las  Villas.  Those  in  Habana  and  Matan- 
zas provinces  were  his  trust,  and  they  were  moved 
quickly  eastward.  Experienced  generals  — Prats, 
Luque,  and  Suarez  Valdes — were  at  their  head.  The 
insurgent  leaders  misled  and  evaded  the  Spanish  gen- 

37 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


erals.  Their  forces,  partly  mounted,  appeared  unex- 
pectedly in  the  neighborhood  of  Colon  on  the  railroad 
in  the  eastern  part  of  Matanzas  province.  Blazing  cane- 
fields  announced  their  presence.  The  Spanish  troops, 
including  the  battalion  of  the  Asturias,  were  saved  from 
rout  in  the  encounters  on  the  sugar  plantations  only  by 
bringing  up  their  artillery,  which  consisted  of  several 
field-pieces.  The  insurgents  retired  along  the  road 
eastward  towards  the  town  of  Santo  Domingo.  General 
Campos  himself  was  at  the  head  of  the  column  on  the 
road  between  Cimarrones  and  Jovellanos  which  it  was 
supposed  the  insurgents  were  following ; but  Gomez  ap- 
peared in  the  hamlet  of  Roque,  closer  to  Colon.  The 
insurgents  had  outwitted  the  Captain-General.  Three 
groups  or  parties  were  moving  for  a junction  in  the 
hamlet  of  Coliseo.  One  was  under  General  Emilio 
Nunez,  one  to  the  north  under  Maceo,  and  the  forces 
of  Gomez  to  the  south  and  east.  They  entered  Coli- 
seo and  destroyed  it.  Campos  encountered  them  in 
the  adjacent  sugar  plantation  of  Audaz.  The  insur- 
gents had  their  lines  resting  along  the  base  of  the  hills 
in  front  and  in  the  manigua,  or  chapparal,  flanking  the 
Spanish  troops.  They  barred  the  advance  of  the  col- 
umns and  harassed  the  rear-guard.  General  Campos 
himself,  for  the  second  time — the  first  had  been  at 
Peralejo — was  in  danger  of  losing  his  life.  His  adju- 
tant by  his  side  was  wounded.  Night  came  on  and 
stopped  the  engagement.  Before  morning  the  insur- 
gents had  disappeared.  They  retired  eastward  towards 
the  village  of  Jaguey  Grande,  as  if  retreating  to  Villa 
Clara. 

At  Jaguey,  Gomoz  and  Macoo  reviewed  their  forces. 

38 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  Spanish  officers  at  the  time  said  that  they  had  in 
all  10,000  men.  Later  the  insurgents  declared  that 
their  force  was  larger,  but  the  statement  was  made  for 
effect.  The  Spanish  troops  in  active  service  in  Cuba 
at  this  time  were  in  excess  of  100,000.  From  March 
to  December  79,500  had  been  embarked  from  the  pen- 
insula ; the  rogulars  previously  on  the  island  had  been 
sent  to  tho  field,  and  their  numbers  had  been  aug- 
mented by  the  volunteers  and  the  local  guerillas. 
Figures  published  in  the  Habana  newspapers  in  the 
last  days  of  December,  1895,  placed  tho  full  number  of 
the  Spanish  forces,  active  and  in  reserve,  at  189,000. 
This  included  the  whole  body  of  volunteers,  63,000;  but 
they  were  largely  a reserve  force,  and  did  not  go  out  of 
the  cities  and  towns.  While  the  insurgents  had  been 
marching  across  the  country  the  harbor  of  Habana  had 
been  filled  with  transports  disembarking  the  soldiers 
from  the  peninsula.  General  Luis  Pando,  next  in 
rank  to  Campos,  had  arrived  and  had  taken  command 
in  Santiago  de  Cuba.  General  Pando  was  supposed 
to  have  talents  as  a politician  which  would  be  service- 
able in  dealing  with  the  insurgent  leaders  in  the  Ori- 
ente.  The  sugar  plantations  there  were  also  aflame,  and 
sharp  combats  between  the  troops  and  small  bands  of 
elusive  rebels  were  of  common  occurrence. 

The  Captain-General  returned  to  Habana,  where  it 
was  felt  that  he  had  suffered  defeat.  He  found  it  nec- 
essary to  meet  the  movement  that  was  arising  against 
him  for  his  ill  success  in  checking  the  spread  of  the 
insurrection.  The  Autonomists  proposed  a political 
manifestation  to  show  that  bad  fortune  had  not  caused 
Campos  to  lose  the  confidence  of  the  country.  The 

39 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Reformists  joined  it,  hesitating  and  doubtful.  The 
Union  Constitutionals  held  back.  They  were  full  of 
resentment  towards  the  Captain-General,  yet  were  not 
quite  ready  for  a public  rupture.  Out  of  the  divided 
opinions  among  themselves  it  was  finally  agreed  that 
they  should  take  part  in  the  demonstration.  Their 
spokesman  was  Santos  Guzman,  a violent  intransigente. 
He  referred  dubiously  to  the  circumstances,  difficult, 
as  it  seemed,  in  which  the  country  was  laboring,  but 
promised  the  loyal  co-operation  of  the  Union  Constitu- 
tionals. Rafael  Montoro  spoke  for  the  Autonomists, 
pledging  their  continued  support.  A word  was  also 
said  for  the  Reformists.  General  Campos,  in  respond- 
ing, felicitated  himself  on  the  consoling  union  of  the 
three  parties.  He  had  thought  of  resigning,  he  said, 
because  of  the  apparent  lack  of  unanimity  in  public 
sentiment  in  supporting  him ; but  with  these  evidences 
of  approval  he  would  reorganize  the  military  operations, 
and  so  long  as  all  parties  continued  to  honor  him  with 
their  confidence  he  would  not  separate  himself  from  the 
island.  The  clouds  were  lowering  over  the  head  of  the 
pacificator,  yet  his  feet  were  still  on  firm  earth.  The 
demonstration  for  the  moment  quieted  the  distrust  and 
the  growing  movement,  which  was  in  reality  a political 
conspiracy,  to  demand  his  recall. 

The  insurgents  burned  their  way  southwest  through 
the  province  of  Matanzas.  They  entered  Habana  prov- 
ince with  a pillar  of  fire  by  night  and  black  clouds  by 
day.  Gomez  had  said  in  his  address  to  the  Cuban 
people  that  Spain  would  never  yield  the  island  while  it 
was  worth  possessing.  He  was  showing  how  it  might 
be  rendered  not  worth  possessing.  "Various  military 

40 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


proclamations  by  him  bad  signalized  the  destruction  of 
the  sugar  crop  as  the  surest  means  of  crippling  Spain’s 
resources.  Nightly  the  skies  were  lit  up  by  the  blazing 
cane-fields.  Tall  chimneys  in  the  centre  of  gaping, 
scorched  plains  were  all  that  was  left  of  the  great  cen- 
trales or  sugar  mills.  Blackened  walls  were  all  that 
told  of  country  villas.  In  the  villages  and  towns  the 
ruins  were  all  that  remained  of  fine  residences  and  sub- 
stantial buildings.  The  destruction  was  not  wanton. 
The  insurgents  did  not  riot  in  it.  It  was  in  pursuance 
of  Gomez’  campaign  against  property.  They  did  not 
seek  to  take  human  lives.  They  released  Spanish  pris- 
oners when  captured,  and  in  their  successful  march  were 
always  merciful  to  the  small  garrisons  that  were  re- 
duced. In  regular  fighting  they  would  have  been  over- 
matched and  in  time  their  small  numbers  would  have 
been  exterminated.  So  they  applied  the  most  advanced 
principles  of  modern  warfare  by  systematic  and  remorse- 
less destruction  of  projjerty.  It  was  also  said  that  one 
purpose  of  Gomez  was  to  force  the  plantation  workers 
to  join  the  insurrection  by  taking  away  their  means  of 
livelihood.  Such  a course  was  not  necessary.  The 
plantation  hands  flocked  to  the  insurrection  voluntarily, 
almost  spontaneously.  Later  General  Weyler  was  also 
to  inaugurate  a campaign  of  property  destruction  and  to 
dispute  the  mastery  of  the  scorched  and  barren  wastes 
with  Gomez.  But  in  the  beginning  it  was  the  insur- 
gents under  Gomez  and  Maceo  who  made  the  trail  of 
fire  from  Yilla  Clara  to  Pinar  del  Rio. 

Martial  law  was  proclaimed  in  the  provinces  of  Ha- 
bana  and  Pinar  del  Rio  as  a tardy  New  Year’s  greeting 

on  January  2d,  1896.  The  whole  island  was  therefore 

41 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


officially  recognized  as  in  a state  of  siege.  The  mili- 
tary operations  of  the' Spanish  troops  in  the  western 
regions  were  paralyzed.  The  vanguard  of  Gomez  ad- 
vanced to  Marianao,  within  ten  miles  of  Habana.  The 
insurgents  occupied  Punta  Brava,  Hoyo  Colorado,  and 
other  towns  in  the  vicinity.  Cane-fields  were  burned, 
railroad  stations  destroyed,  trains  given  to  the  flames, 
tracks  torn  up,  and  bridges  dynamited.  The  railroads 
running  out  of  the  city  ceased  to  operate  their  trains. 

Habana  was  in  tremor  and  turmoil.  Though  troops 
had  been  disembarking  by  tens  of  thousands,  it  felt 
itself  defenceless.  Though  its  fortifications  and  de- 
fences, properly  garrisoned,  could  hold  out,  as  was  later 
boasted,  against  an  invading  army  of  100,000  American 
soldiers,  the  community  recoiled  before  a few  thousand 
half-armed  insurgents.  Panic  stalked  its  streets.  The 
military  authorities  were  overwhelmed  with  the  pleas 
to  protect  the  city  and  its  people.  To  calm  the  per- 
turbed jmblic  mind,  show  that  the  defences  were  suffi- 
cient and  the  army  authorities  alert,  General  Arderius, 
chief  of  the  general  staff,  issued  an  order.*  This  was 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  documents  of  the  insurrec- 
tion. It  reprobated  the  cowardly  insurgents  for  flying 
from  every  encounter  with  the  valiant  troops,  but  in 
order  to  guarantee  absolute  tranquillity  gave  an  account 
of  tho  measures  of  protection.  The  signal  of  alarm, 
this  military  manifesto  said,  would  bo  five  consecutive 
cannon  discharges  from  the  Castillo  del  Principe  and 
the  raising  of  the  flag  on  that  fort  by  day,  or  a streamer 
under  tho  flag  on  holidays.  By  night  the  signal  would 
be  a rod  light  on  the  flag-polo.  This  red  light  would 
• The  full  text  may  bo  found  in  “Crdnicas  do  la  Guerra”  for  1890. 

42 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


be  displayed  also  by  the  other  forts  when  they  saw  the 
signal  from  Castillo  del  Principe.  Minute  directions 
were  given  to  avoid  false  signals.  The  true  signal  onco 
given — that  is,  the  cannon  discharges  and  the  floating 
flag  or  the  red  light — the  various  bodies  of  troops  would 
form  in  designated  places.  A caution  was  enjoined 
against  allowing  the  cornets  to  be  played  while  the 
troops  were  concentrating.  Full  instructions  for  tho 
army  formations  followed.  They  filled  several  pages. 

The  public  alarm  was  increased  instead  of  being 
calmed  by  this  official  proclamation.  Castillo  del 
Principe  commands  tho  highest  hill  in  the  environs 
of  Habana.  It  did  not  come  about  that  the  flag  was 
raised  on  its  standard  and  the  five  consecutive  cannon 
discharges  made,  yet  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  shiv- 
ered for  days  and  nights  awaiting  that  signal.  Habana 
had  passed  through  the  Ten-Years’  war  without  hearing 
the  echo  of  a musket  discharge  from  the  insurgents  in 
the  Oriente.  The  difference  between  the  two  insurrec- 
tions in  their  ultimate  probabilities  is  shown  by  the 
necessity  of  giving  publicity  to  the  cannon  signal.  It 
recalled  the  measures  against  English  attack  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four  years  earlier.  Gomez  knew  where 
to  let  the  demonstration  stop.  He  never  had  the  pur- 
pose of  entering  within  the  garrisoned  outposts  of  the 
city.  Yet  he  did  enter  the  town  of  Bejucal,  only  fif- 
teen miles  south,  burned  many  of  its  buildings,  and 
spread  terror  to  the  great  city  northward.  Two  or 
three  days  later  in  Bejucal  again  he  successfully  com- 
bated and  evaded  the  Spanish  troops  under  Generals 
Linares  and  Suarez  Valdes.  For  a time  thereafter  he 
operated  on  the  south  coast. 

43 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

Maceo  and  Gomez  liad  divided  their  followers  in 
pursuance  of  a specific  plan.  Maceo  was  pushing  on  to 
the  west,  not  seeking  to  avoid  the  Spanish  troops  at 
some  places,  and  at  others  carefully  evading  them. 
While  Gomez  was  terrorizing  Habana,  Maceo  entered 
the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio.  He  had  a sharp  skir- 
mish at  the  town  of  Guanajay,  near  the  north  coast, 
with  the  Spanish  troops  under  General  Prats.  He 
ranged  through  the  rich  tobacco  regions  of  the  Yuelta 
Abajo  as  he  had  done  in  the  sugar  lands  of  Santa  Clara 
and  Matanzas.  Constantly  the  insurgent  forces  were 
augmented  by  small  parties  of  recruits.  Never  before 
had  Pinar  del  Rio  been  in  either  secret  or  open  rebel- 
lion. Now  it  blazed  with  revolt.  Maceo  carried  his 
standard  to  the  extreme  western  end  of  the  island. 
During  the  last  week  of  January  he  entered  the  town 
of  Pinar  del  Rio  and  held  it  for  a few  hours.  The  fol- 
lowing day  he  fought  a pitched  battle  on  the  adjacent 
hills  of  Taironas,  in  which,  notwithstanding  the  Span- 
ish accounts,  he  could  claim  a victory,  for  it  crowned 
his  purpose.  Maceo  then  turned  and  led  his  forces 
towards  the  eastern  end  of  the  province.  On  the  Gth  of 
February  he  attacked  the  railroad  town  of  Candaleria 
and  besieged  it  for  twenty-six  hours.  The  Spanish 
troops,  the  Volunteers,  made  a brave  defence  and  Maceo 
retired.  He  next  occupied  the  village  of  Paso  Real. 
Another  genuine  battle  was  fought  on  the  calzada,  or 
highway,  leading  from  this  town.  The  Spanish  troops 
under  General  Luque  had  both  artillery  and  cavalry. 
The  artillery  was  employed  with  some  effect.  The 
insurgents  also  had  cavalry,  and  it  was  here  as  at  Mai 
Tiempo  that  a gonuino  machete  charge  was  made.  Tho 

44 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


insurgent  horsemen,  according  to  the  story  of  the  Span- 
ish soldiers,  bore  down  upon  their  columns  in  a cres- 
cent with  such  impetuosity  that  they  were  forced  back. 
Finally  the  Spanish  troops  were  rallied  and  made  a 
successful  stand.  The  fighting  lasted  several  hours. 
Maceo  led  his  followers  in  many  charges.  The  losses 
on  each  side  were  nearly  equal — possibly  100  killed  and 
200  or  300  wounded. 

Thereafter  Maceo  ranged  through  the  southern  part 
of  Habana  province.  Ho  encountered  the  Spaniards  at 
Artemisa.  A week  later  General  Linares  attacked  him 
unsuccessfully  near  Giiines.  For  a fortnight  he  moved 
back  and  forth  through  the  southern  part  of  Matan- 
zas.  Later  he  returned  to  Pinar  del  Rio.  For  eight 
months  he  combated,  in  the  western  part  of  the  island, 
the  heavy  reinforcements  which  General  Weyler  threw 
into  that  section.  The  troclia  running  across  the  nar- 
rowest neck  from  Mariel  on  the  north  to  the  south  coast 
had  been  constructed  in  the  mean  time.  Maceo  crossed 
it  in  December  with  a small  band,  and  with  the  sup- 
posed purpose  of  moving  eastward  to  las  Villas.  He 
was  killed  in  an  encounter  with  the  Spanish  troops  on 
the  morning  of  December  7th,  1896,  at  a point  in  the 
woods  four  miles  from  Punta  Brava,  within  fifteen 
miles  of  Habana.  The  weight  of  evidence  is  that  it  was 
a chance  encounter,  and  not  a betrayal  or  an  ambush. 

Maceo’s  real  work  was  completed  ten  months  before 
his  death,  when  he  massed  his  troops  for  the  struggle 
on  the  hills  of  Taironas.  He  had  brought  most  of  them 
six  hundred  miles  across  the  country.  Some  of  his  offi- 
cers declare  that  he  had  11,000  men  with  him  when  he 
swept  around  Habana  and  into  the  province  of  Pinar 

45 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


del  Rio.  This  march  sometimes  has  been  described  as 
a mere  raid.  Students  of  military  campaigning  who  fol- 
low its  course  and  who  examine  the  number  and  the 
disposition  of  the  Spanish  troops  will  give  it  a higher 
rank.  It  was  in  verity  an  invasion.  Spanish  officers 
in  the  later  times  showed  with  pride  the  decorations 
which  were  conferred  upon  them  for  engagements  with 
the  insurgents  under  Maceo’s  command.  To  have  en- 
gaged the  mulatto  chieftain  in  combat  was  a title  to 
distinction.  The  glory  of  the  full  execution  of  the 
western  invasion  is  to  Maceo,  yet  its  conception  is  to 
the  grizzled  chief  of  two  revolutions.  Gomez  planned 
it.  The  success  of  his  plans  nationalized  the  insurrec- 
tion and  broke  the  military  power  of  Spain  in  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  III 


Camtos  and  Weyler 

Climax  of  Conspiracy  Against  Campos — Madrid  Accepts  Resigna- 
tion— Campos’  Prophecy  of  Spain  Losing  Dominion — Gdmez  in 
Sight  at  the  Departure — Two  Men  Who  Understood  Each  Other — 
Arrival  of  Weyler — Welcome  by  Spanish  Classes — End  of  Policy 
of  Moral  Agencies — Culmination  of  Fighting  Period  of  the  In- 
surrection— Issue  of  First  Concentration  Decree — Prison  Camps 
for  Pacificos— Failure  of  Weyler’s  Military  Operations — Atti- 
tude of  American  People— Policy  of  the  Cleveland  Administra- 
tion— Abuse  of  Naturalization  Laws — Consul-General  Fitzhugh 
Lee’s  Reports — Inauguration  of  McKinley— Changed  Attitude  of 
Spain— Visit  of  Special  Commissioner  Calhoun  to  Cuba — Assas- 
sination of  Canovas — Sagasta  Ministry  Proposes  Autonomy. 

Columbus  piloted  the  standard  of  Spain  to  Cuba. 
Martinez  Campos  bore  it  back.  He  was  not  the  last  of 
the  Captain-Generals,  but  when  he  yielded  his  charge 
and  withdrew  from  the  island  Spain’s  sovereignty  in 
the  Antilles  was  ended.  Thereafter  wThat  was  main- 
tained was  the  figment  of  power.  The  fate  of  her 
dominion  was  sealed. 

It  was  during  Christmas  week  that  the  movement  of 
the  Spanish  politicians  in  Habana  against  Campos  was 
temporarily  checked.  Within  a fortnight  it  was  blazing 
forth.  It  had  a degree  of  popular  discontent  among  the 
Spanish  classes  to  strengthen  it.  Yet  the  discontent 
was  not  universal.  The  Habana  Volunteers,  who  dur- 

47 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ing  the  Ten-Tears’  war  had  dominated  Captain-Generals 
and  had  speeded  their  departure  from  the  island,  were 
not  antagonistic  to  Campos.  They  were  not  the  same 
aggressive  organization  that  they  had  been  during  the 
previous  period  of  insurrection,  though  they  retained 
the  strength  of  armed  organization  and  of  unwavering 
loyalty  to  Spain.  The  Spanish  Casino,  which  was  con- 
trolled by  the  higher  classes  of  Spaniards  and  which 
was  still  a potent  influence,  was  not  more  hostile  to 
Campos  than  it  had  been  to  other  Captain-Generals. 
The  first  move  did  not  come  from  them.  The  Reform- 
ists were  the  opportunists  of  Cuban  politics.  They  had 
advocated  reforms  and  had  upheld  Campos.  But  they 
were  weathercocks  as  well  as  opportunists.  When  the  op- 
position began  to  develop  strength  the  Reformists  turned 
against  the  Captain-General.  Their  newspapers  were 
filled  with  articles  inculcating  distrust  and  calling  the 
situation  an  insupportable  one.  The  Union  Constitu- 
tionals also  became  open  in  their  demands  for  a change 
in  policy  and  in  men  to  carry  out  policies.  Madrid 
was  deluged  with  telegrams  of  a disquieting  nature. 

General  Campos  met  the  emergency  like  a soldier. 
He  convoked  the  chiefs  or  leaders  of  the  three  parties  in 
the  palace  of  the  Governor-General.  Then  he  demanded 
to  know  the  meaning  of  recent  affairs.  Santos  Guzman, 
the  Andalusian  who  three  weeks  before  had  promised 
hearty  and  loyal  support,  was  again  the  spokesman  of 
the  Union  Constitutionals.  Ho  declared  that  the  party 
was  not  in  conformity  with  the  policy  of  Campos.  The 
Reformist  spokesman  echoed  the  same  sentiment.  The 
Autonomists,  faithful  among  the  faithless,  renewed  their 
adhesion.  General  Campos  said  that  ho  was  only  a sol- 

48 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


dier,  and  that  if  he  had  lost  the  confidence  of  the  ele- 
ments whose  union  was  necessary  he  would  not  remain. 
He  sent  a message  to  Canovas  in  Madrid,  giving  the 
result  of  the  conference,  and  adding  that  the  Autono- 
mists believed  the  policy  he  had  followed  should  be  con- 
tinued. 

The  night  of  January  17th,  189(5,  it  was  known  in 
Habana  that  Madrid  had  yielded  and  that  the  resigna- 
tion of  Campos  had  been  presented  and  accepted.  Gen- 
eral Sabas  Marin  was  named  his  successor  temporarily. 
General  Campos,  iu  turning  over  his  office  to  General 
Marin,  made  an  address  in  which  he  said  that  the  pub- 
lic opinion  against  concessions  to  the  enemy,  such  as  he 
had  made,  existed,  but  was  unfounded.  In  the  Ten- 
Years’  war  he  had  caused  the  rebels  to  be  executed  and 
they  had  retaliated  in  like  manner.  Now  they  were 
following  a different  course.  They  wished  to  raise  the 
structure  of  independence  on  the  ruins  of  the  country. 
They  burned  and  destroyed,  but  they  did  not  harm  the 
Spanish  soldiers.  They  released  prisoners  and  cared 
for  the  wounded.  Therefore  a different  means  was 
necessary  to  combat  the  present  war.  He  had  caused 
chiefs  of  the  insurrection  to  be  shot,  and  others  to  be 
condemned  to  perpetual  chains,  but  it  was  because  they 
had  been  taken  in  the  acts  of  incendiarism. 

General  Campos  also  spoke  of  the  demands  on  Madrid 
for  his  recall  as  though  they  had  not  been  spontaneous. 
He  issued  a brief  and  dignified  farewell  to  the  army. 
After  he  ceased  to  be  Governor-General  he  talked  to  the 
Habana  journalists  of  the  political  conspiracy  which 
had  made  it  necessary  for  him  to  retire.  The  traitor- 
ship  of  the  Union  Constitutionals  and  Reformists,  he 
4 49 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


declared,  was  the  cause,  and  he  spoke  with  bitterness 
of  the  domineering  caprice  of  certain  classes.  Of  Cuba 
he  declared  that  which  had  happened  would  not  have 
happened  if  it  had  been  treated  as  a province  of  the 
peninsula.  He  uttered  the  warning  that  if  the  system 
were  not  changed  it  would  confirm  once  more  the  his- 
toric apothegm,  that  Spain  had  lost  dominion  of  Amer- 
ica through  the  fault  of  the  Spaniards.  Prophetic 
words  were  these.  General  Campos  sailed  on  January 
20th.  As  he  was  about  to  embark  he  said  to  those  who 
bade  him  farewell:  “My  successor  will  fail  as  I have 
failed.”  He  dictated  a message  to  the  Madrid  Cabinet, 
in  which  he  said  he  had  not  known  how  to  content  all 
parties,  although  they  had  not  been  just.  This  was 
another  way  of  saying  that  the  Spanish  classes  in  Cuba 
had  driven  him  from  power  and  must  accept  the  respon- 
sibility of  subduing  the  insurrection  after  their  own 
manner.  On  his  arrival  in  Coruna,  General  Campos 
maintained  silence  in  response  to  popular  demonstra- 
tions. General  Lanchez  Bregua,  his  military  friend  and 
voyage  companion,  said  if  he  would  speak  his  thoughts 
they  would  be  that  on  par  with  vigorous  military  action 
must  be  guarantees  of  administrative  and  political  re- 
forms, even  to  autonomy. 

The  day  on  which  General  Campos  embarked  from 
Habana,  Mdximo  Gomez  with  his  insurgent  followers 
was  encamped  on  the  hills  of  Lajas  on  the  road  to  the 
plain  of  Giiines,  almost  within  sight  of  the  city.  It  is 
said  that  persons  in  Habana  scanning  the  surrounding 
country  from  their  housetops  with  strong  glasses  were 
able  to  see  the  camp  of  Gomez.  The  insurgents  knew 
that  Campos  was  leaving.  If  ever  two  men  understood 

50 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


each  other,  they  wore  Maximo  Gomez  and  Martinez 
Campos ; and  if  ever  two  men  knew  Cuba  and  the  Cu- 
bans, they  were  the  ones.  They  had  arranged  the  pact 
of  El  Zanjbn.  Gomez  had  retired  to  Santo  Domingo; 
and  Campos  had  returned  to  Spain,  vainly  to  strive  to 
implant  the  reforms  and  even  the  principles  of  political 
liberty  which  were  the  basis  of  that  pledge.  None 
knew  better  than  he  how  shameful  had  been  the  betrayal 
and  how  complete  the  failure  of  the  reforms.  Knowing 
that,  he  could  appreciate  the  intensity  of  the  feeling 
which  animated  the  Cubans.  Ho  also  grasped  the  new 
plan  of  campaign  which  Gomez  inaugurated  in  this  in- 
surrection. He  knew  that  the  Spanish  intransigentes 
had  no  conception  of  its  scope  and  possibilities,  and 
that  they  would  beat  against  it  hopelessly.  Gomez,  on 
his  part,  knew  that  the  recall  of  Campos  ended  the  pos- 
sibility that  the  Cubans  would  be  seduced  from  the  in- 
surrection by  conciliatory  methods.  He  knew  that  the 
first  acts  of  the  intransigente  authority,  when  it  should 
be  free  to  act,  would  be  in  the  line  of  greater  rigor  and 
blinder  folly.  The  Union  Constitutionals  thought  the 
recall  of  Campos  was  their  triumph.  They  could  not 
perceive  that  it  was  a victory  for  Mdxiino  Gomez  and 
Antonio  Maceo. 

General  Valeriano  Weyler,  marquis  of  Tenerife,  was 
appointed  the  successor  to  Campos.  After  an  interval 
of  a few  weeks  he  arrived  and  relieved  General  Marin. 
The  Spanish  classes  welcomed  him  with  real  enthu- 
siasm. They  had  an  inspiration  of  what  his  coming 
meant.  Madrid  had  heeded  their  demands.  The  de- 
pendence on  moral  agencies  to  combat  the  insurrection, 

the  policy  of  conciliation  and  attraction  which  Campos 

51 


TO-MOKEOW  IN  CUBA 


had  sought  to  employ,  would  cease.  In  its  place  would 
come  rigorous  and  relentless  action  against  the  Cubans. 
A score  of  years  had  notr  blotted  out  the  memory  of  the 
new  Captain-General’s  record  in  Cuba  when  he  was  first 
the  Colonel  and  then  the  Brigadier  Weyler,  and  always 
the  Butcher.  The  veterans  of  the  Ten-Years’  war  re- 
membered engagements  between  him  and  Gomez.  The 
insurgents’  welcome  was  an  attack  on  the  town  of  Mana- 
gua, fifteen  miles  from  Habana,  and  a raid  to  the  gates 
of  the  city. 

It  might  almost  be  said  that  armed  revolution  ceased 
with  the  departure  of  Campos,  though  actually  there 
was  some  vigorous  fighting  after  Weyler  took  command. 
But  the  Cubans  had  put  forth  their  supreme  fighting 
ability  in  the  first  fifteen  months.  They  could  not  sur- 
pass those  efforts,  nor  could  they  expect  to  continue 
them  on  the  same  scale.  They  had  spread  revolution 
in  every  province  and  in  every  hamlet  of  the  island. 
Now  their  aim  was  to  keep  the  insurrection  alive  until 
Spain  yielded,  because  Cuba  was  not  worth  the  sacrifice 
of  blood  and  money  which  it  was  costing  the  peninsula, 
or  until  the  United  States  intervened.  The  recognition 
of  belligerency  would  have  been  grateful  to  them,  but  it 
was  of  small  consequence  how  the  United  States  came 
into  the  struggle,  provided  it  could  be  actually  drawn  in. 

After  the  recall  of  Campos,  the  insurrection  gained 
absolutely  the  support  of  the  middle-class  Cubans. 
Though  sharing  the  aspirations  of  their  people  for  po- 
litical liberty,  they  were  not  certain  it  could  be  achieved 
by  fire  and  musket  against  the  superior  forces  of  Spain, 
and  they  were  doubtful  of  the  ability  of  their  people  to 

maintain  an  independent  government.  Autonomy  under 

52 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Campos  would  have  held  a portion  of  them  to  Spanish 
authority.  Under  Weyler  they  all  became  revolution- 
ists, and  the  insurgent  juntas  in  the  towns  and  cities 
were  strengthened  by  their  accession. 

General  Weyler  began  b}'  publishing  the  usual  ban- 
dos,  offering  amnesty  to  the  insurgents  who  presented 
themselves  and  sought  pardon.  The  first  concentration 
decree  was  issued  within  a week  after  his  coming.  The 
story  of  the  reconcentration  fits  into  the  last  chapter  of 
Spain’s  efforts  to  subdue  the  insurrection.  It  was  the 
belief  in  Cuba  that  the  plan  was  conceived  by  Canovas 
del  Castillo,  and  that  Weyler  was  merely  the  instru- 
ment. Many  circumstances  supported  this  view;  but 
the  instrument  was  a willing  one,  and  Philip  II.  had 
no  more  faithful  servant  in  the  Duke  of  Alva  than  the 
relentless  Premier  of  Spain  had  in  General  Yaleriano 
Weyler. 

Of  the  concentration  itself,  a paragraph  will  suffice 
to  tell  the  story.  It  wras  a thorough  military  measure, 
but  it  failed  to  accomplish  military  results.  And  it  did 
not  recognize  the  principles  of  civilized  warfare  which 
require  that  prisoners  shall  be  fed.  The  country  peo- 
ple— the  pacificos — were  shut  up  in  prison  camps.  Often 
they  were  herded  in  settlements  enclosed  within  stock- 
ades or  trenches,  with  forts  commanding  every  approach 
and  troops  on  guard.  When  they  were  permitted  to 
wander  in  the  larger  towns  the  bounds  were  still  set  by 
military  lines  which  kept  them  within  the  prison  camp. 
No  system  of  issuing  rations  to  them  was  ever  carried 
out.  They  were  left  to  live  on  the  charity  of  the  beg- 
gared communities  in  which  they  were  herded.  Spain 
did  not  recognize  the  principle  of  humanity  in  its  treat- 

53 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ment  of  the  pacificos — the  women  and  children,  the  non- 
combatants  who  were  made  prisoners  by  Weyler’s  de- 
crees. That  was  the  essence  of  it  all.  No  apologists 
could  ever  alter  this  fact,  and  the  defenders  of  military 
measures  could  not  defend  this  enforced  starvation. 
But  famine  did  not  conquer  and  could  not  conquer 
insurrection,  though  in  time  it  would  have  exterminated 
the  non-combatant  portion  of  the  rural  population.  Con- 
centration was  the  confession  of  Spain  that  it  could  only 
keep  the  island  without  the  people. 

When  General  Weyler  arrived,  Spain  had  poured 
117,000  troops  into  Cuba.  The  Canovas  ministry  con- 
tinued to  send  him  recruits.  His  military  operations 
were  active.  Since  the  insurgents  had  carried  the  re- 
bellion to  the  western  end  of  the  island,  he  sought  to 
isolate  it  and  partition  it.  The  building  of  the  trocha 
from  Mariel  to  Artemisa  was  one  measure.  It  was  not 
a difficult  feat  of  military  engineering  to  dig  ditches 
along  either  side  of  the  highway,  garrison  them  with 
forts  and  barracks  at  short  intervals,  and  to  unroll 
barbed-wire  fencing  on  either  side.  That  was  the 
trocha. 

General  Weyler,  in  the  beginning,  threw  most  of  his 
reinforcements  into  the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio. 
After  the  death  of  Maceo  ho  moved  heavy  battalions 
into  the  interior,  into  Santa  Clara.  That  section  had 
now  become  the  centre  of  Gomez’  operations.  After 
various  encounters  with  the  Spanish  troops,  Gomez 
retired  to  the  heart  of  Villa  Clara,  and  from  there  ho 
directed  the  scattered  forcos  of  the  insurgents.  The 
time  for  opposing  the  Spanish  troops  by  open  en- 
counters was  past,  and  Gomez  himself  never  intended 

54 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


that  they  should  meet  iu  battle.  Ho  rarely  had  with 
him  500  mou,  but  he  kept  the  insurgent  troops  moving 
in  small  bands  in  pursuance  of  a general  plan.  In  San- 
tiago province  it  might  be  said  that  the  war  was  wagod 
on  an  independent  basis,  and  there  was  occasional  fight- 
ing even  to  the  time  of  the  invasion  of  the  province  by 
the  American  army.  General  Calixto  Garcia,  after  boing 
wrecked  on  the  Hawkins  filibustering  expedition,  had 
reached  the  island,  and  aftor  Maceo’s  death  ho  became 
next  in  command  to  Gomez.  He  conducted  all  the 
operations  of  the  insurgents  in  the  Oriente. 

The  arrival  of  General  Weyler  in  Cuba  was  almost 
simultaneous  with  the  knowledge  in  the  United  States 
that  a real  war  was  waging.  Lack  of  geographical 
knowledge  and  lack  of  consecutive  news  had  caused  the 
insurrection  as  an  armed  movement  to  bo  minimized. 
Practically  nothing  was  known  of  what  the  Western 
Invasion  had  been,  and  in  truth  not  much  is  known  to 
this  day.  When  the  American  people  came  to  interest 
themselves  in  the  fighting  there  was  simply  bushwhack- 
ing, guerilla  warfare,  and  it  never  changed  its  character. 
The  Spaniards  continued  to  complain  of  the  insurgents 
because  they  would  not  come  out  of  the  manigua  into 
the  open  as  though  the  affair  were  a knightly  tourna- 
ment of  the  olden  times.  The  insurgents  were  neither 
Don  Quixotes  nor  crusaders.  They ’were  perhaps  a half 
rabble,  and  most  of  them  were  barefooted  and  shirtless. 
But  they  knew  how  to  prevent  the  pacification  of  Cuba, 
and  Weyler  never  pacified  it.  He  destroyed  property 
as  the  insurgents  had  done,  and  he  made  desolate  what 
they,  by  chance  or  by  policy,  had  left  green.  He 
cleared  the  country  by  fire,  left  staring  walls  as  monu- 

55 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ments  to  his  military  thoroughness,  left  standing  the 
bare  bamboo-poles  which,  when  thatched,  had  been  the 
bohios  or  dwelling-huts  of  the  pacificos,  and  crowned 
every  hilltop  with  a fortina.  But  neither  by  his  mili- 
tary operations  nor  by  his  reconcentration  as  a military 
measure  did  he  end  the  insurrection.  After  eighteen 
months  his  failure  was  more  conspicuous  than  had  been 
that  of  Campos. 

In  the  States  the  insurrection  had  received  popular 
sympathy  from  the  outset.  It  was  little  understood  in 
its  details.  Enough  w'as  known  of  Spanish  rule  and 
Spanish  character  and  of  the  history  of  Cuba  to  satisfy 
the  public  mind  that  the  revolt  was  a just  one.  This 
popular  sentiment  was  at  first  apathetic.  Genuine  re- 
forms, honestly  applied,  might  have  restrained  it  with- 
in bounds.  No  genuine  reforms  were  honestly  ap- 
plied, and  the  sentiment  of  sympathy  grew.  President 
Cleveland,  in  his  message  of  December,  1896,  without 
asserting  specifically  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  asserted 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  stated 
circumstances.  Previous  to  that  the  proffer  of  the 
good  offices  of  his  administration  to  Spain  in  bring- 
ing peace  to  Cuba  by  helping  to  establish  a system  of 
autonomy  had  been  rejected  proudly  and  scornfull}'. 
Spain  would  subdue  her  rebellious  subjects  without  the 
good  offices  of  a friendly  nation  and  without  conceding 
a form  of  local  self-government  that  would  remove  the 
basic  grievances.  Mr.  Cleveland’s  message  was  a re- 
statement of  the  historic  position  of  the  United  States 
with  regard  to  Cuba.  It  was  John  Quincy  Adams 
speaking  again.  The  message  was  a declaration  of 
ultimate  war  between  the  two  countries,  and  this  was 

50 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


recognized  more  clearly  in  Madrid  than  in  Washington. 
Mr.  Cleveland,  while  ignoring  the  resolutions  of  Con- 
gress recognizing  tho  belligerency  of  the  insurgents, 
assortod  tho  right  of  interference,  but  apparently  he  did 
not  contemplate  its  exercise. 

But  policy  must  sometimes  give  way  to  event.  Mr. 
Olney,  as  Secretary  of  State,  defiantly  fought  the  For- 
eign Relations  committee  of  the  Senate  when  that  com- 
mittee reported  the  Cameron  resolution  recognizing 
the  independence  of  Cuba.  Tho  eclat  of  this  antagon- 
ism may  have  afforded  personal  gratification  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  yet  its  purpose  was  a public  one. 
This  was  to  assure  Spain  and  the  world  that  the  United 
States  had  no  intention  of  involving  itself  in  war  over 
Cuba.  The  contemptuous  term  of  Senatorial  jingoism 
was  thought  to  be  sufficient  to  quiet  all  apprehension. 
It  might  have  been  sufficient  had  not  other  causes  been 
working.  Spain  felt  that  she  had  a righteous  grievance 
against  American  citizens  who  were  either  engaged  in 
aiding  the  insurrection  or  who  were  suspected  of  aid- 
ing it. 

The  impartial  historian  must  admit  that  in  the  inter- 
national sense  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United 
States  were  grossly  abused.  American  citizenship  in 
Cuba,  as  a lump  or  as  a mass,  was  something  to  cause 
the  republic  to  blush.  But  the  United  States  having 
thrown  the  mantle  of  its  citizenship  over  this  mass, 
could  not  shame  itself  before  the  world  by  denying  pro- 
tection to  those  who  could  lawfully  claim  the  shelter  of 
its  flag.  The  State  Department,  under  the  direction  of 
Secretary  Olney,  did  the  best  it  could  to  discourage 
recognition  of  this  class  of  citizens.  In  doing  so  it 

57 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


clouded  the  rights  of  all  American  citizens  in  Cuba. 
The  Spanish  authorities  under  Weyler  became  as  intol- 
erant as  they  had  been  during  the  Ten-Years’  war, 
which  had  culminated  in  the  butchery  of  the  Virginius 
prisoners.  The  forbearance  and  indifference  of  the 
State  Department  led  them  to  the  presumption  that 
American  citizens  could  be  treated  as  Spanish  subjects 
were  treated.  Suspicion  was  allowed  to  take  the  place 
of  evidence.  Treaty  rights  were  ignored.  President 
Cleveland  and  Secretary  Olney  were  not  willing  to  go  to 
war  in  order  to  enforce  the  American  construction  of 
the  Cushing  protocol  to  the  treaty  of  1795. 

The  treatment  of  American  citizens  by  the  Spanish 
officials  continued  with  a high  hand  until  an  untoward 
event  brought  the  climax.  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  of 
Virginia,  had  been  selected  by  President  Cleveland  for 
the  delicate  position  of  consul-general  to  Cuba.  One 
avowed  purpose  in  his  selection  was  to  enable  the 
administration  to  have  the  benefit  of  the  presence  of 
an  experienced  military  observer.  It  was  not  publicly 
stated  that  he  was  to  report  on  the  military  situation, 
but  in  time  it  became  known  that  he  credited  the  insur- 
gents with  a strength  in  the  field  and  in  reserve  of 
50,000  men. 

The  correctness  or  incorrectness  of  this  numerical 
estimate  was  not  a vital  question.  The  significant 
feature  of  the  consul-general’s  reports  was  the  reit- 
erated statement  that  Spain  was  making  no  real  prog- 
ress in  subduing  insurrection.  The  purport  of  these 
communications  may  have  been  known  to  Madrid  and 
to  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Habana.  The  actions  of 
the  latter  showed  resentment  towards  the  consul-gen- 

58 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


oral.  His  own  Government  was  not  upholding  him  with 
the  vigor  which  ho  thought  was  due  to  his  official  posi- 
tion. The  culmination  in  his  relations  with  the  Spanish 
officials  came  in  the  death  in  the  jail  at  Guanabacoa, 
across  the  bay  from  Habaua,  of  Dr.  Ricardo  Ruiz.  Dr. 
Ruiz  was  a dentist  who  had  been  educated  in  Philadel- 
phia, had  been  naturalized  as  an  American  citizen,  and 
had  returned  to  Cuba  to  practise  his  profession.  There 
was  less  ground  to  distrust  his  good  faith  in  becoming 
a citizen  of  the  United  States  than  existed  in  the  major- 
ity of  cases.  His  character  was  excellent.  In  January, 
1897,  some  insurgents  under  Nestor  Aranguren  stopped 
a train  on  which  Spanish  officials  wei’e  returning  to  Ha- 
bana,  made  a prisoner  of  the  paymaster,  but  released 
the  officers.  It  was  one  of  the  demonstrations  which 
the  insurgents  were  in  the  habit  of  making  in  order  to 
show  their  contempt  for  the  pacification  of  the  province 
by  the  Spanish  troops.  Dr.  Ruiz  was  arrested  for 
alleged  complicity  in  this  affair.  He  was  thrown  into 
jail  and  kept  incomunicado  as  prescribed  by  Spanish 
practice.  The  first  information  the  consul-general  had 
of  the  military  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  this  Ameri- 
can citizen  was  when  the  news  came  that  he  had  been 
murdered  by  his  jailers.  Whether  Dr.  Ruiz  was  actually 
murdered  or  whether  he  was  driven  to  madness  and  beat 
his  brains  out  against  the  walls  of  his  cell  has  never 
been  satisfactorily  determined. 

In  its  bearing  on  the  relations  of  Spain  and  the  United 
States  the  incident  was  reduced  to  the  fact  that  Dr.  Ruiz 
was  dead  in  circumstances  which  created  great  popular 
indignation  in  the  United  States  and  fixed  public  at- 
tention afresh  on  what  was  happening  in  Cuba.  The 

59 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Cuban  question  was  in  suspension  during  the  brief 
remainder  of  Mr.  Cleveland’s  term.  The  reasons  which 
actuated  Mr.  Cleveland’s  policy  were  unquestionably 
patriotic,  but  in  its  historic  aspect  only  one  conclusion 
can  be  reached.  By  his  administration  Spain  was  given 
every  opportunity  and  every  aid  towards  putting  down 
the  insurrection.  Her  sensibilities  were  respected  to 
the  point  of  withdrawing  American  war-vessels  from 
West  Indian  waters  and  keeping  them  withdrawn.  The 
consuls  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  who  began  mak- 
ing reports  on  the  actual  conditions,  including  the  first 
death-fruits  of  the  reconcentration,  were  ignored  and 
discredited  by  their  own  Government.  That  weakened 
them  with  the  Government  to  which  they  were  accred- 
ited. The  State  Department  forbore  to  press  the  treaty 
rights  of  American  citizens.  That  forbearance  was  mis- 
understood. Passed  into  review,  it  may  be  said  that 
during  the  Cleveland  administration  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  towards  Spain,  with  reference  to  Cuba, 
was  one  of  indulgence  which  was  barren  of  results. 
The  assertions  of  the  right  of  intervention  made  in  Mr. 
Cleveland’s  messages  were  barren  because  of  the  indul- 
gent attitude  that  preceded  and  followed  them.  His 
administration  had  done  its  best  for  Spain.  It  had 
done  nothing  for  the  United  States  in  so  far  as  would 
place  the  army  and  navy  on  a footing  to  carry  out  the 
right  of  intervention  which  Mr.  Cleveland  affirmed,  and 
it  had  done  nothing  for  Ciaba. 

When  Mr.  McKinley  was  inaugurated,  with  his  cus- 
tomary acute  penetration  of  the  popular  sentiment  ho 
outlined  a policy  for  his  administration  which  served  a 
twofold  purpose;  it  freed  him  from  the  embarrassment 

60 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  specific  declaration  of  intentions,  and  satisfied  the 
unquiet  public  mind  to  await  future  developments.  The 
protection  to  American  citizens  which  he  announced  was 
a broad  statement.  Its  application  was  narrow.  It 
meant  American  citizens  in  Cuba.  From  the  4th  of 
March,  1897,  no  consular  representative  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Antilles  lacked  support  in  maintaining  the 
rights  of  American  citizenship.  Nor  were  their  reports 
of  the  conditions  of  the  country  discredited. 

The  astute  minister  of  Spain  in  the  United  States, 
Mr.  Dupuy  de  Lome,  was  quick  to  grasp  the  situation. 
He  saw  that  American  popular  sentiment  might  not 
become  dangerous  if  it  coidd  be  kept  in  certain  chan- 
nels. Sympathy  for  the  Cubans  would  not  cause  an 
American  administration  to  be  driven  into  war.  When 
their  own  citizens  were  touched  the  prospect  was 
changed.  The  irritation  over  these  instances  woidd 
cause  a clamor  which  could  not  be  brooked.  Mr.  Du- 
puy de  Lome  was  able  to  present  this  fact  so  forcibly 
that  Premier  Canovas  modified  the  arrogant  stand  his 
ministry  had  taken.  General  Weyler,  who  was  plung- 
ing violently  to  a collision  with  the  United  States  by 
his  arbitrary  actions,  was  checked.  Thenceforth  Ameri- 
can citizens  in  Cuba  were  given  the  fullest  protection 
due  them.  This  protection  extended  to  some  individ- 
uals of  whose  unworthiness  as  American  citizens  there 
could  be  no  dispute ; but  they  had  the  shield  of  citizen- 
ship, and  that  could  not  be  tarnished. 

Mr.  McKinley  followed  this  definite  evidence  of  the 
administration  policy  with  another  step.  The  death  of 
Dr.  Ruiz  called  for  investigation.  Spain  professed  its 
willingness  to  co-operate  with  the  United  States  in  ascer- 

61 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


taining  the  truth.  Judge  William  R.  Day,  the  friend 
and  neighbor  of  the  President,  was  selected  to  go  to 
Cuba,  in  a legal  capacity,  to  aid  Consul-General  Lee  in 
the  investigation.  Actually  it  was  known  that  he  would 
be  also  a special  commissioner  to  gather  information 
about  the  real  conditions.  Before  the  time  set  for  his 
departure,  Judge  Day  became  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  and  Mr.  William  J.  Calhoun,  of  Illinois,  who 
also  possessed  the  friendship  and  confidence  of  the 
President,  was  chosen  for  the  Cuban  inquiry.  Mr.  Cal- 
houn reached  Habana  in  May.  The  Ruiz  investigation 
followed  the  usual  lines.  One  report  was  made  to  the 
Spanish  Government  exculpatory  of  the  Spanish  author- 
ities, one  to  the  American  Government,  incriminatory. 
Mr.  Calhoun  did  little  travelling.  It  was  said  at  the 
time  that  one  trip  to  Matanzas,  sixty  miles  distant  from 
Habana,  and  a visit  to  the  reconcentrado  settlements 
there,  sufficed  him.  His  temperament  was  judicial  and 
his  actions  judicious.  He  sifted  all  he  saw  and  heard. 

Mr.  Calhoun  returned  to  Washington  in  June.  His 
report  to  the  President  wras  a private  and  unofficial 
document.  In  a general  way  it  was  known  that  he 
indorsed  the  consuls  as  worthy  of  credence.  He,  too, 
saw  the  first  death-fruits  of  reconcentration.  He  also 
gained  information  which  negatived  the  claim  that  the 
insurrection  was  maintained  by  bandits  and  the  lower 
classes  of  negroes.  He  got  a passing  glimpse  of  the 
degree  to  which  it  had  spread  among  all  classes  of 
Cubans.  Mr.  Calhoun  noted  that  General  Weyler  was 
not  pacifying  the  island  so  that  peaco  could  be  assured 
at  any  definite  time  in  the  future.  His  own  conclusions 
were  understood  to  be  that  Spain  could  not  subdue  the 

62 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

insurrection  and  that  the  insurgents  of  themselves  could 
not  end  the  power  of  the  peninsula.  At  the  period  of 
Mr.  Calhoun’s  visit  another  chapter  in  legislation  for 
Cuba  had  been  taken  in  Madrid.  New  reforms  had 
been  proposed  by  Canovas.  They  had  not  secured  con- 
fidence in  Cuba  and  General  Weyler  had  not  promul- 
gated them.  They  were  never  promulgated,  and  their 
analysis  is  not  worth  the  while.  While  hints  of  Mr. 
Calhoun’s  confidential  report  appeared,  they  were  only 
hints  and  could  have  no  official  standing.  The  answer 
from  Madrid  to  these  hints  was  an  official  statement  to 
the  Spanish  minister  in  Washington  that  the  Queen 
Regent  would  retain  the  Canovas  ministry  and  that 
General  Weyler  would  not  be  recalled. 

General  Stewart  L.  Woodford,  of  New  York,  had  been 
appointed  minister  to  Spain.  It  was  known  that  his 
instructions  contained  urgent  representations  on  the 
imperative  need  of  Spain  adopting  a policy  which 
would  bring  prompt  amelioration  in  Cuba.  Diplomacy 
covered  the  ultimatum  with  feathered  phrases.  Pro- 
voking delays  in  the  arrival  and  the  reception  of  the 
American  minister  followed  his  appointment.  It  was 
August  when  his  credentials  were  presented.  For  a 
month  Premier  Canovas  made  no  sign.  Then  the  assas- 
sin ended  his  career.  The  most  resolute  enemy  to  colo- 
nial liberties  that  Spain  had  produced  was  no  more.  A 
temporary  ministry  was  formed  with  General  Azcarraga 
as  Premier.  It  was  a weak  attempt  to  continue  the 
conservative  policies  and  traditions.  With  the  further 
months  allowed  him  General  Weyler  had  made  no  visi- 
ble progress  in  pacifying  the  island.  The  irritation 
over  the  treatment  of  American  citizens  in  Cuba  was 

63 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


stilled,  but  the  public  feeling  against  Spaii  had  not 
lessened.  During  this  time  the  horrors  of  the  recon- 
centration in  Cuba  were  continued.  The  American 
people  were  slowly  learning  what  it  all  meant.  They 
had  disbelieved  at  first,  because  it  was  incredible. 
When  they  believed  and  knew,  their  wrath  was  men- 
acing to  the  peace  of  two  friendly  nations.  Moreover, 
timid  commerce  was  beginning  to  demand  that  some- 
thing be  done  to  end  the  situation  which  destroyed  sub- 
stantially all  trade  between  Cuba  and  the  United  States. 

The  Queen  Regent  of  Spain  formed  a new  ministry 
with  Praxades  Sagasta  at  its  head.  As  Liberal  Premier 
during  the  previous  terms  of  power  he  had  never  pro- 
posed self  - government  for  Cuba.  In  the  month  of 
October,  the  year  1898,  he  proposed  the  experiment. 
Weyler  was  recalled  and  Ramon  Blanco  was  appointed 
to  succeed  him.  A complete  system  of  autonomy  for 
Cuba  was  outlined  with  the  promise  of  its  early  enact- 
ment. All  this  came  to  Cuba  not  from  a conviction 
which  had  caused  the  rulers  of  Spain,  and  of  such  frac- 
tion of  the  nation  as  had  a voice  in  the  Government, 
to  change  their  policy  into  one  of  enlightened!  justice. 
Autonomy  came  from  without,  from  the  pressure  ex- 
erted by  the  United  States  with  diplomatic  inflexibility 
on  the  Madrid  Cabinet  and  the  monarchy.  The  insur- 
gents of  1895  had  not  been  able  of  their  own  strength  to 
compel  either  autonomy  or  independence.  They  were 
strong  enough  to  create  and  to  continue  a condition 
which  was  bound  to  cause  the  intervention  of  the  United 
States. 


I 


CHAPTER  IV 


Wooing  the  Lost  Colony 

Olive  Branch  Brought  by  Blanco — A Cold  Reception — Measures  of 
Amnesty — Concentration  Decrees  Revoked — Interest  in  McKin- 
ley’s Message — Analysis  of  Autonomous  Decrees — Insular  Par- 
liament and  Its  Powers — The  Cabinet  and  the  Council — Veto  of 
Governor-General — Comparisons  with  Canada — Defects  in  the 
Light  of  Experience — System  Accepted  by  a Remnant  of  Au- 
tonomist Party — Allocutions  and  Addresses — Adhesion  of  Re- 
formists— Opposition  of  Union  Constitutionals — They  Adopt 
the  Retraimiento — Rejection  of  Policy  by  Cubans — Formation 
of  Autonomist  Cabinet — Its  Personnel — Historic  Oath-Taking 
Scene— Aspirations  of  the  Past. 

Cuba  was  lost  to  Spain.  It  was  lost  when  General 
Ramon  Blanco  came  to  the  island  with  autonomy  as 
a peace-offering  to  the  armed  revolutionists  and  their 
unarmed  supporters.  The  task  before  him  was  to  win 
the  island  back  to  its  allegiance.  Conciliation  was  to 
supersede  concentration.  Recourse  was  to  be  had  once 
more  to  the  moral  agencies. 

The  instrument  of  the  new  policy  was  a good  repre- 
sentative of  the  better  type  of  the  soldier  of  Spain. 
Ramon  Blanco  had  been  Governor-General  of  Cuba 
from  the  beginning  of  1879  until  the  end  of  1881,  suc- 
ceeding Martinez  Campos.  He  had  served  in  the  Ten- 
Years’  war  as  a colonel  and  had  reached  the  rank  of 
general.  The  period  of  his  authority  in  the  island  wras 
5 65 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  era  of  mild  agitation  for  autonomy.  As  Governor- 
General  he  had  tolerated  the  movement,  but  had  never 
shown  a leaning  towards  its  principles.  The  first  year 
of  his  administration  had  been  marked  by  the  guerra 
chiquita — the  little  war — in  the  province  of  Santiago  de 
Cuba.  He  had  stamped  it  out.  Though  he  had  shown 
the  military  spirit  in  dealing  with  political  movements 
during  his  term  of  office,  he  had  left  no  harsh  and  bitter 
memories.  What  was  remembered  of  his  rule  awakened 
no  feeling  of  resentment  deeper  than  would  have  been 
felt  for  any  former  Captain-General.  He  was  not 
odious  to  the  Cuban  people  for  any  conspicuous  act  of 
tyranny. 

General  Blanco  arrived  from  Madrid  in  the  early  days 
of  November.  His  welcome  was  not  a generous  one. 
The  partisans  of  Weyler,  the  Spanish  classes,  were 
sullen.  The  Autonomists  were  waiting  further  informa- 
tion before  committing  themselves  to  the  new  adminis- 
tration. They  were  now  a very  small  body,  but  were 
still  respectable.  The  mass  of  the  Cuban  people  were 
distrustful  or  indifferent.  The  community  was  be- 
numbed. It  had  no  faith.  When  not  critical  it  was 
cynical.  The  public  was  apathetic.  The  presence  in 
Habana  of  the  celebrated  bull-fighter,  Mazzantini, 
excited  greater  popular  interest  than  the  promise  of 
autonomy. 

The  acts  of  Captain-General  Blanco  were  an  earnest 
of  the  intentions  of  the  Sagasta  ministry.  The  Official 
Gazette  was  filled  with  decrees  modifying,  suspending, 
or  annulling  previous  decrees.  On  paper  the  reversal 
of  the  policy  of  C^novas  and  Weyler  was  complete. 
The  reconcentration  bandos  were  modified  so  as  to  per- 

66 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


mit  the  reconcentrados  to  leave  their  prison  camps 
within  an  extended  zone  of  cultivation  under  tho  ap- 
proval of  the  local  military  authorities.  At  the  time  it 
was  erroneously  supposed  that  the  decrees  were  abso- 
lutely revoked.  The  difference  is  not  of  historical 
moment.  If  there  had  been  power  enough  in  Spanish 
authority  as  personified  in  the  Captain-General  to 
enforce  tho  modification  of  the  reconcentration  baudos, 
the  world  would  not  have  known  that  they  were  not 
revoked  in  their  entirety. 

Proclamations  of  amnesty  to  those  in  arms  against 
Spanish  sovereignty  followed  one  another.  The  fullest 
pardon  of  past  offences  was  offered  on  the  sole  condi- 
tion of  those  in  arms  laying  down  their  arms  and 
accepting  the  new  regimen.  Political  prisoners  who 
for  real  or  suspected  complicity  in  the  crime  of  rebel- 
lion had  been  deported  to  the  penal  settlements  of 
Ceuta,  Chafarinas,  and  Fernando  Po,  or  shut  up  in  the 
prisons,  were  freed  and  returned  to  their  homes.  This 
release  was  not  universal,  for  after  the  peace  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain  hundreds  more  of  Cuban 
political  prisoners  in  the  penal  settlements  or  in  the 
prisons  were  released.  Yet  the  amnesty  was  general 
enough  to  give  proof  that  it  was  genuine.  Tho  military 
executions  in  the  Laurel  ditches  at  Cabana  fortress 
ceased.  After  Blanco  took  command  no  Cuban  patriot 
puffed  his  last  cigarette,  nodded  to  the  spectators 
gathered  on  the  hill  above  the  fortress,  and  cried,  “ Yiva 
Cuba  libre ! ” while  awaiting  the  volley  of  the  firing 
squad. 

The  royal  decree  implanting  autonomy  in  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico  was  affirmed  by  the  Queen  Regent  in 

67 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Madrid  on  November  25tli,  1897.  The  same  day  were 
affirmed  the  decrees  establishing  universal  suffrage,  the 
laws  of  political  equality,  and  the  adaptation  of  the 
electoral  laws  of  Spain  for  the  Antilles.  The  promul- 
gation of  the  decrees  in  Cuba  was  made  by  Captain- 
General  Blanco  when  the  official  text  was  received  in 
the  early  part  of  December.  As  the  new  system  was 
enacted  through  the  pressure  of  the  United  States,  it 
was  of  momentous  consequence  to  Spain  and  to  Cuba 
to  know  what  would  be  the  position  of  the  national 
administration.  This  position  was  shown  in  the  mes- 
sage of  President  McKinley.  Spain  could  not  com- 
plain. Having  tacitly  acknowledged  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  dictate  colonial  reforms  in  the  interest 
of  humanity  and  of  peaceful  commerce,  she  could  not 
object  to  the  temperate  language  in  which  the  executive 
statement  outlined  the  American  policy.  The  best  con- 
struction was  put  by  the  President  on  the  system  as 
meeting  the  demands  of  the  hour,  and  credit  for  good 
faith  and  sincere  intentions  was  given  in  outlining  or 
sketching  the  decrees.  An  argument  meant  for  Con- 
gress and  the  country  was  made  against  the  recognition 
of  either  the  belligerency  of  the  insurgents  or  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  provisional  government  for  which  they 
claimed  an  existence.  The  balm  for  Spain  was  soft, 
and  the  ointment  was  sweet.  Yet  there  was  vinegar, 
too.  The  message  in  its  strongest  terms  reaffirmed  the 
paramount  right  of  intervention  by  the  United  States. 

The  administration  of  Mr.  McKinley  having  given 
Spain  the  benefit  of  the  assumption  that  the  system  was 
genuine  colonial  self-government  and  would  end  the  con- 
ditions of  chronic  insurrection  in  Cuba,  the  examination 

C8 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

of  the  system  itself  remains,  as  also  its  reception  by  the 
Cubans  and  the  Spaniards  in  the  island.  The  docree  of 
November  25th  provided  that  for  the  government  and  ad- 
ministration of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  respectivel}-  there 
should  be  an  insular  parliament  divided  into  two  cham- 
bers and  a Governor-General,  representative  of  the  Me- 
tropolis, who  should  exercise  in  the  name  of  Spain  the 
supreme  authorit}’.  The  legislation  of  colonial  affairs 
should  be  the  function  of  the  chambers  concurrently 
with  the  Governor-General.  The  parliament  should  be 
composed  of  two  bodies  possessing  equal  powers — the 
Chamber  or  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Council 
of  Administration.  The  Council  should  consist  of  thirty- 
five  members,  of  whom  eighteen  should  be  chosen  after 
the  manner  prescribed  by  the  electoral  law,  and  seven- 
teen should  be  designated  by  the  Crown  through  the 
nomination  of  the  Governor-General.  The  Crown  rep- 
resentatives should  serve  for  life;  the  elective  ones  for 
five  years,  unless  the  Council  should  be  dissolved.  The 
members  of  the  House  or  Chamber  of  Representatives 
should  be  chosen  in  the  proportion  of  one  to  each  twenty- 
five  thousand  inhabitants,  and  their  term  should  be  for 
five  years. 

The  legislative  powers  defined  were  substantially 
those  of  an  insular  assembly  with  reference  to  local 
affairs.  The  colonial  parliament  was  to  control  the 
colonial  budget.  To  the  Cortes  of  Spain  it  was  reserved 
to  determine  what  were  the  obligatory  expenses  inher- 
ent in  sovereignty  and  to  fix  the  revenues  necessary  to 
cover  them.  Regarding  foreign  commerce — a root  sub- 
ject, a fundamental  necessity  for  genuine  colonial  home 

rule — whether  the  initiative  negotiations  came  from  the 

69 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


•insular  government  or  tlie  central  authority  in  Spain, 
delegates  especially  authorized  by  the  colonial  govern- 
ment were  to  participate  in  the  negotiations.  The 
treaties  of  commerce  in  which  the  insular  government 
had  not  intervened  were  to  be  communicated  to  it  in 
order  that  it  might  declare  whether  or  not  it  adhered 
to  the  stipulations.  The  framing  of  the  tariff  of  both 
import  and  export  duties  was  conceded  to  the  insular 
parliament.  These  were  the  cardinal  provisions  of  the 
legislative  powers.  There  were  reservations.  After 
the  definition  of  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  parlia- 
ment, note  the  definition  of  the  Governor-General’s 
authority : “ The  supreme  government  of  the  colony 
shall  be  exercised  by  a Governor-General.”  He  could 
suspend  the  constitutional  guarantees  and  apply  the 
Law  of  Public  Order,  which  was  martial  law.  He  was 
to  be  the  viceroy  patronate,  exercising  the  faculties 
inherent  in  the  patronate  of  the  Indies.  He  was  to  be 
commander  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  the  delegated 
representative  of  the  ministries  of  state,  war,  navy,  and 
colonies  in  Spain.  All  the  authorities  of  the  island 
were  subordinated  to  him.  He  was  responsible  for  the 
order  and  security  of  the  colony.  His  veto  power 
allowed  him  to  suspend  parliamentary  legislation,  refer- 
ring the  veto  to  Madrid  for  confirmation  or  rejection. 

The  cabinet  was  to  consist  of  five  members  or  secre- 
taries with  portfolios  and  a president  without  portfolio. 
The  secretaries  could  be  members  of  either  the  Camara 
or  the  Council,  could  take  part  in  the  discussions  of 
both  bodies,  and  could  vote  in  whichever  body  they 
held  membership.  They  were  responsible  to  the  par- 
liament. The  debt  incurred  in  the  Ten-Years’  war  and 

70 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


in  the  then  existing  insurrection  was  loft  subject  to 
futuro  adjustment. 

This  system  of  colonial  government  proposed  by 
Sagasta  and  drafted  by  Morot  was  a laborious  effort  to 
apply  to  the  Spanish  Antilles  the  autonomy  of  Canada 
as  it  could  be  learned  from  the  books.  In  his  expo- 
sition of  the  subject  to  the  Queen  Regent,  Sagasta 
declared  that  the  Autonomist  constitution  was  not 
exotic,  was  neither  copied  nor  imitated,  yet  the  student 
will  search  in  vain  through  the  pages  of  Spanish 
national  or  colonial  history  for  ovidence  that  it  was  in- 
digenous. The  system  could  not  bo  analyzed  merely 
from  the  written  text.  Its  nature  was  to  be  gathered 
from  the  circumstances  in  which  it  was  proposed.  Its 
application  and  interpretation  had  to  be  in  the  light  of 
past  events.  Experience  with  Spanish  administration 
of  previous  reforms  could  not  be  overlooked.  When 
the  critical  examination  was  finished,  the  conclusion 
was  strong  that  Spanish  statesmen  did  not  know  the 
meaning  of  colonial  self-government.  In  the  ultimate 
analysis  all  powers  centred  in  the  Governor-General 
as  the  viceroy  of  the  Crown  and  the  representative  of 
Spanish  sovereignty;  and  notwithstanding  Sagasta’s 
declaration  that  the  Autonomist  constitution  was  not 
exotic,  the  chief  recommendation  of  its  sponsors  was 
its  resemblance  to  the  Constitution  of  Canada. 

A literature  of  annotation  followed  the  publication  of 
the  decrees.  This  literature  went  into  laborious  com- 
parisons to  show  the  points  of  resemblance  and  also  the 
improvements.  The  difference  was  fundamental.  The 
constitution  of  Canada  is  interpreted  and  applied  in 
the  spirit  of  free  institutions.  All  parties  to  the  com- 

71 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


pact  understand  parliamentary  government.  The  for- 
eign office,  the  British  Parliament,  and  the  English 
people  know  the  weakness  of  the  reserve  powers  if  their 
exercise  should  ever  be  attempted.  A comparison  on 
paper  of  the  respective  functions  of  the  Governor-Gen- 
eral of  Canada  and  the  Governor-General  of  Cuba  was 
an  absurdity.  Spanish  statesmen  had  no  conception  of 
executive  power  falling  into  forgetfulness  through  dis- 
use. To  their  minds  power  was  conferred  only  to  be 
exercised. 

The  people  of  Cuba  were  of  a similar  mind.  They 
had  no  conception  of  authority  reserved  to  a supreme 
power  and  not  being  exerted.  Their  knowledge  wa3  the 
knowledge  drawn  from  experience.  Their  experience 
had  been  with  one  Captain-General  after  another  who 
construed  the  laws  to  suit  his  own  notions  and  executed 
them  with  military  rigor.  The  composition  of  the 
Council  was  the  broadest  evidence  of  the  lack  of  faith  in 
colonial  home  rule.  With  the  Crown  creating  seventeen 
life  members,  a condition  could  not  arise  in  which  it 
would  be  unable  to  secure  the  additional  member,  and 
thus  having  a majority,  block  absolutely  all  popular 
government.  Taken  in  addition  to  the  veto  powers  of 
the  Governor-General,  this  Council  was  an  exhibition 
of  how  easily  Madrid  could  continue  to  control  Cuba 
against  the  interests  of  the  island.  Leaving  the  debt 
unsettled  was  to  leave  an  irritant  which  in  the  future 
was  certain  to  cause  dissensions  between  the  peninsula 
and  the  island,  and  possibly  foment  another  revolution. 
But  it  was  the  system  itself  which  was  submitted  to  dis- 
cussion rather  than  the  debt,  which  properly  lay  outside 
of  autonomy.  And  the  discussion  had  hardly  begun 

72 


TO-MOliltOW  IN  CUBA 


before  the  end  was  seen.  Moret  had  joined  his  name 
imperishably  with  the  emancipation  law  of  1871,  which 
was  crowned  in  188(5  by  the  complete  freedom  of  the 
slave  race.  His  fame  was  not  to  be  joined  imperish- 
ably with  the  constitutional  autonomy  which  would  save 
the  Antilles  to  Spain. 

The  adhesion  of  the  Autonomists  who  had  not  joined 
the  insurgents  in  the  field,  been  thrown  into  prison, 
deported  to  the  penal  settlements,  or  gone  into  volun- 
tary exile  was  made  clear  after  the  promulgation  of  the 
decrees  of  autonomy.  Madrid  was  waiting  to  know 
how  the  system  would  be  received  by  the  different 
political  groups.  Naturally  the  Autonomists  were  the 
first  ones  to  be  considered.  Individually  they  pub- 
lished manifestoes,  allocutions,  and  addresses  pledging 
their  support.  They  exchanged  felicitations  among 
themselves  and  sent  congratulatory  telegrams  to  Ma- 
drid. The  Autonomists  in  Paris  were  also  satisfied. 
Those  in  the  United  States,  with  a very  few  exceptions, 
were  silent.  Speaking  collectively,  the  central  Junta 
of  Autonomists  issued  an  address  telling  the  people 
of  Cuba  to  prepare  for  the  elections  without  fear  that 
the  verdict  of  suffrage  would  be  falsified.  This  was 
an  indirect  way  of  characterizing  the  former  elections 
as  fraudulently  controlled  by  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties, which  was  simply  history.  The  local  juntas  were 
requested  to  begin  the  preparation  of  the  regimen  of 
autonomy.  The  central  Junta  adopted  as  its  sentiments 
an  article  in  its  newspaper  organ  * which  declared  that 
the  new  system  was  the  realization  of  their  doctrine  of 
1881.  Former  reforms  were  slighted  in  the  statement 

* El  Pais. 

73 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


that  the  system  proposed  by  Sagasta  was  not  the  ad- 
ministrative and  economic  decentralization  previously 
offered  by  Liberal  governments.  This  which  was  now 
presented  was  the  genuine  autonomy — representative 
autonomy  with  responsible  parliamentary  government, 
the  ultimate  evolution  of  the  process  which  the  Auton- 
omist programme  had  formulated. 

What  was  lacking  in  minor  details,  the  Autonomists 
said,  was  unimportant.  The  system  in  its  entirety  con- 
ceded all  that  they  had  sought.  It  gave  Cuba  home 
rule  without  impairing  the  national  unity.  It  was  a tie 
that  would  forever  bind  the  island  to  the  peninsula  not 
in  chains,  but  in  free  will.  Under  it  the  mother  coun- 
try and  the  erring  child  would  walk  again  hand  in  hand. 
Peace  and  prosperity  would  come  again.  Cuba  had  been 
rebellious ; her  aspirations  for  political  liberties  had  been 
discouraged,  and  some  of  her  children  had  unfortunate- 
ly taken  up  arms.  But  now  that  autonomy  was  to  be 
implanted  the  past  would  be  forgotten,  and  they  would 
return  to  the  ways  of  peace  and  cultivate  its  growth. 
The  annexationists  in  the  United  States  would  redouble 
their  efforts,  would  again  talk  of  manifest  destiny,  but 
the  Cubans  would  not  be  deceived.  At  the  bier  of  the 
decrepit  ancestor — absolutist  government — they  would 
imitate  the  heralds  who  preceded  the  funeral  car  of  the 
French  kings,  and  would  cry,  “Long  live  autonomy !” 
Dead  the  fault  which  had  caused  discontent,  would  die 
also  the  spirit  of  rebellion.  Autonomy  meant  the  defi- 
nite failure  of  the  insurrection,  already  broken  by  arms. 
The  central  Junta  appealed  to  the  patriotism  of  the 
insurgents.  It  knew  that  the  eternal  revolutionists, 
the  anarchists,  would  not  be  satisfied.  No  matter. 

74 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Autonomy  would  satisfy  by  its  fruits.  The  arch  of  the 
new  alliance  between  Cuba  and  Spain,  it  aflirmed  the 
indestructiblo  sovereignty  of  the  mother  country  in  the 
love,  the  gratitude,  anti  the  liberty  of  the  colony.  The 
shades  of  the  Autonomists  who  had  died — most  of  them 
in  exile,  it  was  parenthetically  observed — were  saluted. 
“ Long  live  Cuba — long  live  Spain !” 

But  Spain  in  Cuba  had  not  long  to  live,  and  a new 
life  was  iinfoldiug  for  Cuba. 

The  Reformists  also  proclaimed  their  adhesion. 
Nothing  had  been  heard  of  them  during  a twelvemonth 
and  its  half.  In  the  elections  for  deputies  to  the  Cortes, 
which  were  held  two  months  after  General  Weyler  took 
command  of  the  island,  they  had  been  retired  along  with 
the  Autonomists.  Their  treachery  to  Campos  was  fruit- 
less. The  Weylerites  kept  them  under  the  ban  of  sus- 
picion. Now  the  weather-vane  had  shifted.  The  wind 
was  north  by  northeast.  Being  opportunists,  the  Re- 
formists turned  with  the  weather-vane.  Autonomy  was 
more  than  they  had  ever  asked  or  wanted.  It  was 
something  they  had  not  believed  in.  But  it  was  the  pro- 
gramme of  the  day,  and  they  would  accept  it.  They 
sent  effusive  telegrams  to  Madrid,  exchanged  felicita- 
tions among  themselves  and  congratulations  with  the 
Autonomists.  They  would  co-operate  with  the  latter  in 
making  the  new  system  effective.  Liberal  leaders  in 
Spain  and  the  organs  of  their  opinions  were  deceived 
by  this  effusiveness.  They  discussed  it  as  a fusion,  as 
though  two  great  and  powerful  political  organizations 
differing  in  principle  had  coalesced  and  would  form  a 
cohesive  unit. 

It  was  left  to  the  intransigentes  dominating  the  Union 

75 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Constitutionals  to  demonstrate  once  more  that  they 
were  the  unchanging  element  in  Spanish  power  in  Cuba. 
When  autonomy  was  proposed  in  October,  1897,  the 
intransigentes  were  wrhat  they  had  been  in  1879,  when 
the  proposition  had  been  made  to  carry  out  in  spirit 
and  in  letter  the  compact  of  El  Zanjon.  Their  impor- 
tance and  their  influence  could  not  be  decried.  They 
ostracized  General  Blanco.  He  dwelt  in  isolation 
among  his  own  race  and  his  own  people.  They  re- 
ceived the  first  suggestion  of  autonomy  -with  distrust. 
This  gradually  grew  into  violent  opposition.  The  sen- 
timent was  unified  and  consolidated  when  the  Union 
Constitutional  party  called  a convention  for  the  third 
week  in  December.  These  Spanish  Tories  in  Cuba  had 
claims  to  be  called  representatives  of  public  sentiment. 
They  showed  the  vigor  of  party  organization  in  dele- 
gated assembly.  The  Autonomists  had  been  content 
with  the  declarations  of  adhesions  from  the  local  juntas. 
Three  men  might  constitute  a junta.  The  Reformists 
had  been  satisfied  with  the  approval  of  small  groups. 
The  Union  Constitutionals  were  numerous  enough  to 
hold  a convention  to  which  delegates  w-ere  chosen  by 
the  various  local  juntas.  Some  of  these  delegates  were 
from  sections  of  the  island  in  control  of  the  insurgents. 
It  was  the  only  political  assembly  held  in  Cuba  in  five 
years. 

The  symptoms  were  stormy.  Captain-General  Blanco 
wras  making  a shrewd  and  persistent  effort  to  gain  con- 
trol of  the  organization.  The  president  of  the  Union 
Constitutional  party  was  the  Cuban-born  Marquis  de 
Apezteguia,  wdio  possessed  more  liberal  instincts  than 
the  Spanish  classes  of  whom  he  wras  the  representative. 

70 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Blanco  sought  to  make  the  conservatives  more  auton- 
omist than  the  Autonomists  themselves.  The  Marquis 
Apezteguia  was  in  sympathy  with  the  plan.  It  was  a 
conception  of  high  politics.  But  tho  majority  of  the 
Union  Constitutionals  were  not  fitted  for  high  politics. 
They  thought  the  mission  of  their  party  was  to  preserve 
Spanish  sovereignty,  and  they  believed  colonial  celf- 
government  would  destroy  this  sovereignty.  “ Author- 
ity, not  autonomy,”  was  their  watchword.  The  deter- 
mination of  their  leaders  was  to  make  a demonstration 
of  the  rejection  of  the  new  colonial  policy  which  would 
be  echoed  in  Spain  and  would  overthrow  the  Sagasta 
ministry.  They  were  not  satisfied  with  their  experi- 
ence in  forcing  the  withdrawal  of  General  Campos.  In 
the  preliminary  private  meetings  of  the  Habaua  dele- 
gates these  cried  out  anathema  to  autonomy. 

The  convention  was  as  intolerant  as  conventions  usu- 
ally are  when  conservatives  become  radicals  in  the 
violence  of  their  opposition  to  a stated  course.  The 
central  Junta,  which  had  shown  receptiveness  for  Cap- 
tain-General Blanco’s  schemes,  was  repudiated.  Mar- 
quis Apezteguia  was  rebuked,  shorn  of  his  power  as 
president  of  the  party,  and  then  left  in  that  position. 
The  Queen  Regent  was  congratulated  in  entire  sincerity 
on  the  restoration  of  peace  in  the  Philippines.  Violent 
speeches  were  made  against  the  United  States,  Presi- 
dent McKinley,  and  Congress.  A telegram  was  sent  to 
General  Weyler  which  was  meant  to  show  that  the  con- 
vention was  in  sympathy  with  him  and  with  his  policy. 
The  official  attitude  of  the  party  was  expressed  by  formal 
resolution  which  made  opposition  to  autonomy  a party 
creed.  Sedition  was  condemned,  and  as  loyal  Spaniards 

77 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  Union  Constitutionals  would  not  hint  at  armed  resist- 
ance to  the  programme  of  the  Government.  They  would 
not  themselves  become  rebels  by  talking  sedition,  but 
they  would  have  none  of  the  responsibility  for  the  new 
system.  Instead,  they  adopted  the  Eetraimiento.  This 
meant  the  drawing  within  the  shell.  It  pledged  the 
party  to  retire  from  participation  in  public  affairs  and  to 
take  no  part  in  the  elections.  The  Autonomists  spread 
the  table,  the  Reformists  ate  the  feast,  and  the  Union 
Constitutionals  were  asked  to  pay  the  bill.  Never. 
This  action  was  taken  in  order  that  the  non-partici- 
pation should  not  be  interpreted  as  lending  moral 
support.  It  was  passive  resistance  in  the  most  sullen 
and  embarrassing  form.  The  Government  was  drawing 
nearer  the  precipice.  They  would  not  be  the  ones  to 
push  it  over. 

After  these  declarations  had  been  made  specific  and 
the  attitude  of  the  party  defined,  some  leniency  was  shown 
the  central  Junta,  whose  membership  had  been  altered. 
This  directory  was  given  power  to  act  if  developments 
later  called  for  drawing  out  of  the  shell  and  partici- 
pating in  public  affairs.  But  the  great  end  of  the  in- 
transigentes  was  accomplished.  The  powerful  Union 
Constitutional  party  was  placed  on  record  as  inflexibly 
opposed  to  autonomy.  The  intransigentes  did  not  be- 
lieve that  autonomy  would  conciliate  the  insurrection 
out  of  existence ; they  did  not  believe  it  would  succeed, 
and  they  meant  that  it  should  not  succeed. 

There  was  no  insurgent  political  party  to  which  the 
Madrid  authorities  could  turn  in  seeking  support  for 
autonomy,  yet  there  was  something  which  in  a degree 
represented  the  insurgents.  This  was  the  Junta  in  New 

78 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

York  and  tho  secret  revolutionary  committees  in  the 
Cuban  towns  and  cities.  Weyler  had  not  succeeded  in 
breaking  up  the  latter.  Blanco  did  not  succeed;  but  it 
was  thought  that  they  might  bo  persuaded  out  of  exist- 
ence by  securing  the  support  of  leading  Cubans  who 
were  suspected  of  being  in  sympathy  with  them.  A 
very  small  number  of  Cubans  did  join  themselves  to  the 
Autonomists,  but  the  majority  of  the  Cuban  people  not 
in  the  field  remained  as  determined  in  not  accepting  the 
new  policy  as  were  the  actual  insurgents.  They  had  be- 
come revolutionists  to  the  core.  The  American  Junta 
also  repudiated  the  system.  Its  effort  was  given  to 
showing  that  the  autonomy  proposed  was  not  genuine. 
It  made  comparisons  with  the  colonial  government  cf 
Canada;  pointed  out  the  defects  in  the  regimen  prepared 
for  Cuba,  and  showed  especially  the  danger  of  the  reserve 
powers.  All  this  was  meant  for  American  public  opin- 
ion. The  time  had  gone  by  when  the  actual  provisions 
of  autonomy — parchment  autonomy,  they  called  it — were 
of  consequence  to  the  Cuban  revolutionists,  whether  in 
the  United  States  or  in  Cuba.  They  were  waiting  for 
events  to  determine  the  limit  of  the  near  future  fore- 
shadowed by  President  McKinley  as  determining  Amer- 
ican intervention.  , 

Immediately  after  his  arrival,  General  Blanco  began 
putting  the  new  policy  into  effect.  The  Weyler  officials 
throughout  the  island  were  removed.  Influential  Cubans 
were  invited  to  take  office.  Here  was  met  the  first  diffi- 
culty. It  was  a responsibility  which  most  of  them 
sought  to  decline.  In  some  instances  what  was  called 
gentle  compulsion  was  used.  Jose  Bruzon,  a leading 
lawyer  of  Habana,  was  persuaded  to  accept  the  office  of 

79 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


civil  governor  of  the  province,  llis  position  was  de- 
fined as  waiting  while  Cuba  drifted  to  its  destiny.  The 
insurgents  showed  no  resentment  towards  him.  It  was 
commonly  believed  that  compromising  documents  in  the 
hands  of  the  Spanish  authorities  induced  him  to  take 
the  post  of  governor  in  preference  to  involuntary  exile 
to  Chafarinas.  In  Santa  Clara  province  Marcos  Garcia 
was  prevailed  on  to  accept  the  office  of  governor.  Mar- 
cos Garcia  was  an  insurgent  colonel  in  the  Ten- Years’ 
war,  in  which  he  was  associated  with  Gomez.  He  had 
not  been  suspected  of  active  sympathy  with  the  last  in- 
surrection. For  the  other  provinces  fairly  good  men 
were  secured,  and  in  the  municipalities  changes  were 
made  in  the  alcaldes,  or  mayors,  by  selecting  either 
Cubans  or  Spaniards  who  had  not  been  too  closely  iden- 
tified with  the  Weyler  administration. 

The  royal  decrees  provided  for  an  insular  cabinet. 
Until  elections  could  be  held  and  the  full  system  of 
autonomy  be  got  in  working  order,  the  cabinet  necessar- 
ily would  be  a provisional  one.  Captain-General  Blanco 
and  the  officials  in  Madrid  gave  the  composition  of  this 
body  careful  thought.  It  was  developed  that  though 
the  Autonomists  were  not  numerous,  they  were  broken 
up  into  factions.  One  faction  was  known  as  the  historic 
Autonomists.  The  other  faction  was  less  historic  and 
more  radical.  The  Reformists  also  had  to  be  taken 
into  consideration.  The  comment  at  the  time  was  that 
they  showed  a greedy  eagerness  to  get  office.  Ulti- 
mately the  cabinet  was  arranged.  Madrid  approved 
and  Habana  smiled. 

The  cabinet  was  inaugurated  on  the  1st  of  January, 
1898.  It  was  an  historic  scene  in  the  throne-room  of 

80 


/ 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

the  Palace — tho  same  room  which  oxactly  a year  later 
was  to  be  the  sceue  of  the  yielding  of  Spanish  author- 
ity to  the  United  States.  All  the  foreign  consuls,  tho 
official  representation  of  Spanish  authority,  and  the  dig- 
nitaries of  the  Church  were  present.  Captain-General 
Blanco,  after  the  members  had  taken  the  oath  of  fidel- 
ity to  Spain,  tho  Queen,  and  Spanish  institutions,  ad- 
dressed them.  Peace  and  the  welfare  of  Cuba,  he  told 
them,  formed  the  best  propaganda  they  could  make 
in  behalf  of  autonomy  and  against  the  revolution,  w'hich, 
although  it  was  never  justified,  would  thereafter  have  no 
pretense  whatever  to  exist.  He  closed  his  address  with 
the  exhortation,  “Long  live  Cuba,  forever  Spanish.” 
At  the  conclusion  of  the  ceremony,  mass  was  celebrated 
in  the  chapel  of  the  Palace  by  the  bishop  of  Habana. 
A few  hundred  of  the  populace  were  gathered  outside. 
They  made  a feeble  demonstration  when  the  new  cabi- 
net appeared.  The  community  as  a whole  showed  little 
concern  in  the  ceremonies.  Military  precautions  had 
been  taken  against  an  outbreak  or  an  unfriendly  dem- 
onstration. 

The  new  cabinet  might  justly  be  called  representative 
of  the  aspirations  and  agitation  of  the  Autonomists  of 
the  past.  The  president,  without  portfolio,  was  Jose 
Maria  Galvez,  a lawyer  and  political  orator.  His  name 
was  attached  to  the  first  manifestoes  issued  by  the  Auton- 
omists, in  1879.  It  was  attached  to  the  manifesto  issued 
in  1895,  reprobating  the  insurrection,  deploring  its  effect 
in  postponing  Autonomist  reforms,  and  predicting  its 
failure.  The  leading  figure  in  this  Autonomist  cabinet 
was  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  Rafael  Montoro. 

His  had  been  the  consistent  career  of  a constitutional 
6 81 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


agitator.  A student  in  Madrid,  lie  liad  been  educated 
as  a lawyer  and  bad  shown  force  as  an  advocate.  He 
was  the  most  accomplished  orator  in  the  island.  His 
admirers  called  him  the  Cuban  Castelar;  and  he  was 
such,  if  allowance  be  made  for  the  difference  between 
the  man  of  talent  and  the  man  of  genius.  Montoro’s 
public  addresses  and  writings  are  voluminous.  His 
name  appears  to  the  introduction  and  prologues  to  many 
books  by  Cuban  authors  on  politics  and  on  literature. 
He  was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Liberal-Autonomist 
party.  He  signed  the  manifesto  of  1879,  and  afterwards 
was  an  Autonomist  Deputy  to  the  Cortes,  where  he  sat 
in  obscurity.  Montoro’s  name  appeared  at  the  head  of 
those  who,  in  the  name  of  the  Liberal- Autonomist 
party,  repudiated  the  uprising  of  1895.  He  indorsed 
the  reforms  proposed  by  Canovas,  and  was  rewarded  by 
the  bestowal  of  the  title  of  marquis.  From  that  time 
his  influence  with  the  Cuban  people  ceased  utterly. 
They  forgot  his  past  services,  and  characterized  him  as 
Weyler’s  partisan  and  parasite. 

Antonio  Govin  was  named  as  secretary  of  justice  and 
administration.  He  was  a forcible  personality.  He 
was  both  an  historic  and  a radical  Autonomist.  He 
was  the  secretary  of  the  party  in  its  early  days,  one  of 
the  signers  of  the  first  platform,  and  the  author  of  docu- 
ments which  were  put  forth  in  its  name  in  explanation 
of  the  principles  of  autonomy.  Govin  was  capable  of 
making  enemies,  and  during  the  period  of  the  active 
agitation  for  autonomy  his  boldness  arrayed  the  Span- 
ish classes  against  him.  He  signed  the  manifesto  of 
April,  1895,  but  he  never  permitted  himself  to  be  iden- 
tified with  Weyler’s  acts.  Ultimately  he  sought  volun- 

82 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tary  exile,  and  settled  with  his  family  in  the  United 
States.  He  did  not  reach  Habana  in  time  to  take  the 
oath  of  office  with  his  colleagues.  Govin  was  a promi- 
nent freemason,  and  it  was  thought  that  his  influence 
might  be  potential  with  the  masonic  organizations, 
which  were  filled  with  the  revolutionary  spirit. 

The  Reformists  were  given  a member  of  the  cabinet. 
He  was  Eduardo  Dolz,  a lawyer,  who  had  shown  some 
talent  for  arranging  compromises.  He  was  a Deputy  in 
the  Cortes.  He  came  direct  from  Madrid,  and  it  was 
said  that  he  would  represent  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the 
bosom  of  autonomy.  Autonomy  never  warmed  to  this 
representative  of  the  monarchy.  Francisco  Zayas,  an 
educator  who  had  the  public  respect,  was  made  sec- 
retary of  public  instruction.  Laureano  Rodriguez,  a 
peninsular  from  the  province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  be- 
came secretary  of  agriculture,  industry,  and  commerce. 
The  irony  of  these  latter  departments  caused  only  a 
passing  sneer.  The  actual  functions  of  the  Autonomist 
cabinet  were  never  clearly  discernible.  The  cabinet  was 
chiefly  useful  as  a shield  for  the  unpopular  acts  of  the 
Spanish  Government. 


CHAPTER  Y 


Epilogue  to  Autonomy 

Colonial  Home  Rule  in  Function — Persuasion  for  the  Insurgents — 
Emissaries  Who  Were  Not  Envoys — A Major  Andre  Without  a 
Benedict  Arnold — Spanish  Army  Opposition  to  Autonomy — 
Conspiracy  of  Officers  Starts  Riots — Habana’s  Four-Days’  Siege 
from  Within — Its  Incidents — The  Riots  a Political  Demonstra- 
tion— The  Press  Disciplined — Influence  on  American  Sentiment 
— Demand  for  Official  Reports — Review  of  Relief  Movement — 
Misgivings  in  Spain — Lack  of  Military  Successes — Blanco’s 
Journey — The  Maine  Explosion — Hysterical  Feeling  Preceding 
and  Succeeding  That  Event — Rejection  of  Amplified  Autonomy 
by  the  Insurgents — Elections  for  the  Cortes — End  of  the  Experi- 
ment. 

Colonial  Lome  rule  was  finally  in  function,  as  the 
Castilian  idiom  has  it.  The  insurgents  in  the  field  had 
shown  little  disposition  to  assist  in  the  functions.  A 
glance  backward  is  necessary  to  understand  their  atti- 
tude. When  the  system  was  first  proposed,  Gomez, 
Calixto  Garcia,  and  the  other  insurgent  commanders 
made  known  positively  that  their  demand  was  for  inde- 
pendence, and  they  would  not  consider  autonomy.  It 
was  abundantly  and  conclusively  proven  that  they  repre- 
sented the  feelings  of  the  ragged  soldiers  who  acknowl- 
edged military  allegiance  to  them.  The  insurgent 
army,  as  an  army,  would  not  permit  autonomy  to  be 
talked.  It  was  held  that  to  propose  it  was  a violation 

84 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  Hie  Cuban  constitution  and  required  the  proponent 
to  be  passed  through  arms — that  is,  executed. 

Coincident  with  the  promulgation  of  the  decrees  of 
autonomy  the  Spanish  authorities  began  what  they 
called  their  moral  campaign.  This  was  a campaign  of 
bribery  and  persuasion.  They  were  very  persistent  in 
seeking  to  disintegrate  the  insurrection  individual  by 
individual.  Every  inducement  was  offered  to  the  Cu- 
bans  in  arms  to  present  themselves.  The  list  of  pre- 
sentados  began  to  be  followed  with  interest.  But  those 
in  arms  who  presented  themselves  were  discouragingly 
few.  The  insurgents  in  the  field,  by  an  understanding 
among  themselves,  permitted  the  presentations  of  their 
sick.  This  enabled  some  of  their  numbers  to  die  among 
friends  and  relatives  rather  than  in  the  camp.  A few 
chiefs  did  present  themselves,  some  of  whom  held  the 
rank  of  colonel.  The  invariable  explanation  of  these 
presentations  by  the  Cubans  was  that  the  officer  had 
been  deprived  of  his  command  or  degraded  by  Gomez, 
and  that  his  presentation  was  in  revenge.  While  this 
was  not  true  in  every  instance,  it  was  the  fact  in  a sur- 
prising number  of  cases.  A few  of  the  minor  chiefs 
who  were  among  the  presentados  undoubtedly  did  so  in 
good  faith.  They  were  weary  of  the  long  struggle  and 
were  willing  to  accept  the  promises  of  the  Spanish 
Government ; but  these  were  the  exceptions  rather  than 
the  rule. 

All  of  Spain’s  efforts  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the 
insurgents  in  the  field  were  made  by  private  messengers 
and  emissaries.  They  were  not  envoys.  Frequently 
these  were  relatives  who  were  forced  to  undertake  the 
doubtful  mission.  Towards  winning  the  moral  support 

85 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  public  opinion  of  tbe  world,  which  might  have  been 
had  by  an  honest  effort  to  present  the  policy  of  auton- 
omy to  the  insurgents,  Castilian  pride  was  an  insuper- 
able obstacle.  The  last  shred  of  territory  gained  in 
centuries  of  conquest  was  at  stake,  yet  Spain  could  not 
bring  herself  to  recognize  that  the  revolutionary  force 
which  had  brought  200,000  of  her  soldiers  to  Cuba  to 
combat  it  was  a force  in  arms.  No  conference  was 
asked,  no  truce  proposed  to  discuss  the  proposition  of 
autonomy,  and  no  white  flag  shown.  Instead,  depend- 
ence was  placed  on  secret  messengers.  That  some  of 
these  emissaries  were  executed  by  the  insurgents  is  be- 
yond question. 

The  Buiz  case  was  the  best  known.  Joaquin  Ruiz 
was  a colonel  of  the  Spanish  engineers  in  Habana,  and 
was  of  a winning  personality.  The  military  authorities 
sought  to  disintegrate  the  band  of  Nestor  Aranguren 
through  him.  Aranguren  was  a young  man  who  had 
made  reputation  by  his  daring  in  attacking  and  annoy- 
ing the  Spanish  forces  close  to  the  city.  He  had  been 
employed  in  the  office  of  a firm  of  contractors  which 
constructed  the  water  works,  and  this  had  brought  him 
in  relation  to  Colonel  Ruiz,  who  was  the  engineer  in 
charge.  If  Aranguren  could  be  reached  it  would  have 
a great  effect  in  Habana  and  among  the  insurgents  in 
that  province.  Colonel  Ruiz  undertook  the  task.  He 
opened  a correspondence  with  Aranguren — a less  diffi- 
cult matter  than  might  be  supposed.  Former  personal 
ties  and  family  relationship  kept  up  communication 
between  many  Spaniards  and  insurgents  in  the  field  so 
long  as  no  efforts  were  made  to  treat  of  the  insurrection. 
Ruiz  sought  a personal  interview  with  Aranguren.  The 

86 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


latter  agreed  to  it  if  be  did  not  come  on  a political'  mis- 
sion, and  warned  him  that  if  he  came  proposing  auton- 
omy it  would  be  at  his  peril.  Ruiz’  first  attempt  was 
unsuccessful.  Subsequently  ho  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  camp  of  Aranguron,  in  defiance  of  the  latter’s  warn- 
ing, with  his  propositions  from  the  Spanish  authorities. 
The  story  of  the  insurgents  who  were  in  the  camp  was 
that  on  Ruiz’  appearance  Aranguren  burst  into  tears, 
and  asked  him  why  he  had  come  to  certain  death. 
Then  an  insurgent  summary  court-martial  was  held  and 
Ruiz  was  executed.  The  full  story  was  never  told,  but 
the  common  belief  was  that  he  was  macheted. 

Rumors  of  Colonel  Ruiz’  disappearance  reached  Ha- 
bana.  The  authorities  feared  for  his  fate,  but  did  not 
dare  let  the  truth  be  known.  Finally  it  was  arranged 
that  a foreign  consular  representative  in  Habana  who 
was  a personal  friend  of  the  reckless  colonel  of  engi- 
neers should  ask  General  Lee’s  aid.  The  United  States 
consul-general,  in  his  unofficial  capacity  and  with  the 
consent  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  despatched  a mes- 
senger to  the  camp  of  the  insurgents.  When  the  mes- 
senger reached  the  camp  Aranguren  was  absent,  but  the 
officer  next  in  command  sent  a message  that  Ruiz  had 
been  tried  and  executed.  Intense  excitement  was  caused 
by  the  news,  and  the  officials  sought  to  make  capital  of 
it  in  the  United  States,  where  some  weak  sentiment  was 
shown,  and  the  execution  of  Ruiz  was  denounced  as  an 
act  of  savagery. 

A dispassionate  study  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
does  not  uphold  this  contention.  Colonel  Ruiz  bore 
no  white  flag  and  no  safe-conduct  to  the  insurgent  camp. 

He  went  against  warning.  He  sought  to  serve  his  Gov- 

87 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ernment,  and  that  service  would  have  been  rewarded  by 
military  promotion.  The  sendee  could  only  be  per- 
formed by  securing  the  treachery  of  Aranguren  to  his 
comrades  in  arms.  Back  of  the  attempted  interview 
with  the  young  insurgent  was  the  purpose  of  creating 
distrust  and  suspicion  among  the  revolutionists  of  one 
another.  The  mere  fact  that  a Spanish  emissary  had 
sought  to  visit  Aranguren  in  his  camp  was  relied  upon 
to  arouse  distrust  among  the  other  insurgents.  The 
military  authorities  professed  that  they  had  letters 
which  would  show  that  Aranguren’ s course  was  barbar- 
ous and  treacherous.  They  never  disclosed  such  letters. 
Instead,  Aranguren  himself  made  public  the  documents. 
These  were  a conclusive  showing  of  the  plot  to  discredit 
him  and  to  spread  dissensions  among  the  insurgents. 
The  plot  recoiled,  and  the  death  of  its  agent  was  the 
sequel.  Colonel  Ruiz  was  called  the  Cuban  Major  An- 
dre. The  difference  was  that  young  Aranguren  was  not 
a Cuban  Benedict  Arnold.  Weeks  afterwards  Aran- 
guren was  surprised  in  the  hills  of  Tapaste  by  the  Span- 
ish troops  and  killed.  His  whereabouts  were  betrayed 
by  a camp  follower.  His  body  was  brought  to  the 
morgue  in  Habaua.  He  was  buried  in  the  cemetery  of 
Columbus.  His  grave  is  a few  yards  away  from  that  of 
Colonel  Ruiz. 

The  execution  of  Ruiz  took  place  in  the  latter  part  of 
December,  1897.  A month  later  Augusta  Morales,  the 
alcalde  of  a village  iu  Pinar  del  Rio,  penetrated  the  camp 
of  the  insurgent  general  Pedro  Diaz,  near  San  Cristobal. 
He  brought  propositions  for  autonomy.  Morales  was 
tried  by  a court-martial.  Dr.  Hugo  Roberts,  a young 
insurgent  officer,  defended  him.  Ho  was  condemned  as 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


an  emissary  of  the  enemy  and  was  executed.  This 
ended  the  visits  of  secret  messengers  to  the  insurgent 
camps. 

The  army  of  Spain  in  Cuba  was  the  last  to  be  heard 
from  regarding  the  new  system.  By  the  army  was  al- 
ways meant  the  officers.  The  privates,  dumb  beasts 
of  burden  and  abuse,  were  not  taken  into  account.  The 
army  never  had  been  for  autonomy.  That  was  perfectly 
well  understood.  But  its  opposition  heretofore  had  been 
passive.  Military  discipline  was  lax  and  the  military 
commanders  in  the  different  districts  were  supreme. 
Where  they  happened  to  be  in  sympathy  with  General 
Blanco,  a little  support  was  given  the  new  policy  by  not 
throwing  insurmountable  hindrances  in  the  way  of  ex- 
tending the  zones  of  cultivation  and  aiding  the  reconcen- 
trados.  These  cases  were  not  numerous.  Usually  the 
military  commander  nullified  every  effort  to  relieve  the 
starving  population.  The  army  was  not  in  its  own  un- 
derstanding disloyal  to  Spain,  but  it  did  not  want  the 
insurrection  to  end  just  then.  That  would  end  also  the 
double  pay,  the  pensions  and  promotions,  the  decora- 
tions, and  the  monstrous  system  of  corruption  which 
prevailed.  The  army  had  not  been  fearful  of  autonomy 
succeeding,  and  therefore  did  not  fear  the  early  end  of 
the  insurrection.  All  it  wanted  was  to  be  let  alone. 
But  it  was  not  let  alone,  and  this  precipitated  the  dem- 
onstration which  showed  that  the  army  wras  not  for 
autonomy. 

The  restrictions  of  the  Weyler  rule  had  been  relaxed 
in  so  far  as  affected  the  freedom  of  the  press.  The  cen- 
sorship was  not  abrogated  under  Blanco,  yet  a certain 
latitude  of  comment  was  permitted  the  newspapers. 

89 


TO-MOEKOW  IN  CUBA 


Some  of  them,  professing  faith  in  the  sincerity  of  the 
more  liberal  policy,  ventured  criticisms  of  admitted 
abuses.  A newspaper  called  La  Discusion  had  been 
suppressed  by  Weyler  because  of  its  insurgent  leanings. 
It  had  been  an  organ  of  radical  autonomist  tendencies. 
The  paper  reappeared  under  Blanco.  It  began  to  call 
attention  to  gross  abuses  of  the  army,  and  to  demand 
their  reform.  Another  paper  of  less  character  than  La 
Discusion,  which  had  adopted  the  title  of  The  Reconcen- 
trado,  was  also  sensational  and  personal  in  its  criticisms. 
The  army  officers  took  alarm.  One  night  groups  of  them 
dropped  into  a cafe  and  did  not  leave  till  after  midnight. 
The  next  morning  a score  or  more  of  these  officers  in 
uniform  went  in  a body  to  the  office  of  The  Rcconcen- 
trado  and  wrecked  it.  Then  they  proceeded  to  the  office 
of  La  Discusion  and  began  to  demolish  it.  The  office  of 
this  journal  was  on  the  Prado,  opposite  Central  Park,  in 
the  very  heart  of  the  city.  Soon  the  officers  had  a mob 
back  of  them  which  completed  the  wreck.  Many  mem- 
bers of  the  Volunteers  were  seen  among  the  mob.  The 
officers,  having  started  the  demonstration,  retired  and 
left  the  rioters  to  finish  their  work.  The  Orden  Pub- 
lico, the  military  police  of  the  city  and  the  finest  body 
of  regulars  in  the  service  of  Spain,  sought  to  drive  them 
back  by  gentle  means.  They  were  not  allowed  to  use 
their  swords  or  firearms.  The  rioters  flouted  them,  and 
mob  orators  addressed  the  populace,  inciting  them  to 
greater  activity.  The  authorities  were  powerless. 

It  was  a Wednesday  morning,  the  morning  of  January 
12th,  when  the  rioting  began.  There  was  a lull  during 
the  midday,  but  in  the  afternoon  the  mob  rallied.  It 
made  little  demonstration,  however,  and  was  content 

90 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


with  throwing  stones  ami  breaking  windows.  But  the 
city  feared  something  more.  It  was  known  that  the 
authorities  had  been  unravelling  several  supposed  con- 
spiracies, and  that  at  all  the  recent  bull-fights  extraordi- 
nary precautions  had  been  taken  to  prevent  an  outbreak. 
In  Spain  the  popular  uprisings  usually  begin  at  the  bull- 
ring.  That  afternoon  the  feeling  was  as  if  a black  cloud 
had  settled  over  the  city.  It  was  like  waiting  for  the 
thunder-storm  on  an  oppressive  summer  day.  General 
Parrado,  who  ■was  next  in  command  to  Blanco,  person- 
ally took  command  of  the  police  forces.  Orders  were 
given  that  all  shops  should  be  closed,  and  within  half 
an  hour  the  doors  were  locked  and  the  iron  shutters 
fastened.  People  were  warned  off  the  streets.  The 
Guardia  Civiles,  or  military  rural  police,  were  brought 
in  to  reinforce  the  Orden  Publico.  Then  some  of  the 
regulars  began  to  arrive  and  make  their  evolutions  in  a 
public  square.  After  them  came  the  Fifth  Battalion  of 
Volunteers,  suspected  of  disloyalty,  who  were  stationed 
in  the  palace  of  the  Governor-General  half  a mile  away 
from  Central  Park,  where  the  rioting  had  begun. 

In  the  evening  the  mob  rallied.  The  narrow  streets 
leading  to  the  Palace  were  choked  with  rioters.  The 
plaza  in  front  of  it  was  filled  with  them.  They  cried 
“ Long  live  Weyler ! ” “ Down  with  autonomy ! ” 

“ Death  to  Blanco ! ” Captain-General  Blanco  and  the 
members  of  the  Autonomist  cabinet  who  were  with  him 
in  the  palace  could  hear  these  cries.  After  a while  the 
troops  succeeded  in  clearing  the  plaza  and  the  streets 
leading  to  the  palace,  and  holding  them  against  ap- 
proach. Their  instructions  were  to  be  gentle.  The 
disorderly  crowds  were  permitted  to  roam  almost  at  will 

91 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


through  the  streets,  crying  long  life  to  Weyler,  to  the 
Volunteers,  to  Spain,  to  the  army;  death  to  Blanco  and 
death  to  autonomy.  Sometimes  they  had  sharp  col- 
loquies with  the  troops.  One  group  cried,  “War  to 
autonomy!”  and  the  captain  of  the  guard  which  had 
been  brought  in  from  the  country  afterwards  told  how 
he  had  heard  that  cry  before.  It  was  when  a band  of 
insurgents  had  laid  an  ambush  for  his  men  and  had 
borne  down  on  them  crying,  “ Death  to  autonomy ! ” 
The  night  was  passed  without  bloodshed. 

The  following  day  General  Juan  Arolas,  recently 
named  as  military  governor,  took  commmand  of  the 
forces.  He  had  just  arrived  from  Santiago  province. 
Artillery  was  brought  in  from  the  country,  and  the  gar- 
risons were  reinforced  by  the  addition  of  8,000  regulars. 
In  spite  of  this  heavy  force  the  mob  made  several 
demonstrations  during  the  day,  but  without  any  set 
purpose  beyond  baiting  the  troops.  At  night  there 
seemed  to  be  actual  danger.  The  rioters  gathered  in 
numbers  on  the  Prado  on  each  side  of  Central  Park. 
The  troops  frequently  charged  them,  sometimes  with 
the  cavalry  in  the  lead,  sometimes  with  the  infantry  on 
the  double  quick.  The  soldiers  were  not  allowed  to  use 
their  firearms  unless  a shot  should  be  directed  against 
them.  Happily  this  did  not  happen.  The  hospitals 
were  filled  with  people  suffering  from  bruises  and  sabre 
cuts,  but  they  had  not  drawn  the  fire  of  the  troops. 
The  belief  at  the  time  was  that  if  the  order  had  been 
given  to  fire  it  would  not  have  been  obeyed.  The  word 
ran  around  that  Spaniards  would  not  fire  on  Spaniards. 
It  took  four  days  for  Habana  to  resume  the  semblance 
of  order,  and  this  semblance  was  not  reached  until  the 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

artillery  was  placed  in  position  to  command  every 
point. 

The  events  of  that  week  constituted  a real  siege,  and 
Habana  was  garrisoned  against  the  rioters  by  thousands 
of  regular  troops.  But  they  were  not  a bloody  mob,  and 
this  caused  a misapprehension  of  the  serious  nature  of 
the  uprising.  During  the  days  of  rioting  it  was  ob- 
served that  the  rioters  seemed  to  be  incited  by  persons 
not  taking  part,  and  the  presence  of  the  fraternal  spirit 
between  them  and  the  military  forces  was  also  manifest. 
Yet  Habana  was  on  the  brink  of  bloodshed  all  the  time, 
and  8,000  troops  could  not  have  prevented  it  if  there 
had  been  one  musket  discharge  on  the  mob. 

When  the  tension  was  relieved  the  Spanish  authorities 
gave  themselves  up  to  explaining  that  the  rioting  had 
been  trifling  and  had  no  meaning.  But  it  had  a deep 
meaning.  It  was  a political  demonstration  of  the  army 
against  autonomy,  and  it  served  its  purpose.  Three  or 
four  score  of  the  officers  who  precipitated  the  rioting 
were  placed  under  military  arrest,  but  they  were  never 
punished.  Kot  one  was  court-martialled.  Pretexts  were 
found  for  releasing  most  of  them  within  a few  days  after 
their  arrest,  and  they  were  returned  to  their  commands. 
This  was  the  significant  confession  of  the  weakness  of 
Spanish  authority  in  Cuba.  Captain-General  Blanco 
did  not  dare  to  discipline  the  insubordinate  and  rebel- 
lious army  officers.  Instead,  the  Spanish  authorities 
disciplined  the  press,  which  was  held  responsible  for 
the  trouble  because  it  had  attacked  the  honor  of  the 
army.  The  Captain-General  issued  a decree  which, 
without  superseding  the  already  rigorous  laws  against 
the  freedom  of  the  press,  placed  the  censorship  abso- 

93 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


lutely  in  the  hands  of  the  general  staff  of  the  army. 
Persons  who  transgressed  the  censorship,  in  addition  to 
their  liability  for  the  penalties  of  the  law  were  held 
guilty  of  the  crime  of  rebellion ; and  the  crime  of  rebel- 
lion was  punishable  by  either  death  or  exile  in  chains 
to  the  penal  settlements.  And  this  was  done  with  an 
Autonomist  cabinet  in  nominal  power  and  under  a regi- 
men whose  first  principle  had  been  the  liberty  of  the 
press.  The  army  ended  autonomy. 

The  influence  of  the  outbreak  on  American  public 
opinion  was  pronounced.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  were  not  deceived  when  the  news  was  published 
as  to  what  had  happened.  The  censorship  of  cable 
messages  prevented  the  history  of  the  days  of  siege 
from  reaching  the  north  until  the  vessels  could  carry 
the  true  story.  Then  it  was  felt  that  the  army  officers 
and  the  rioters  had  uttered  a true  cry  in  their  “ Death 
to  autonomy.”  The  rioting  had  been  at  no  time  di- 
rected against  Americans,  but  there  was  inquietude  and 
a natural  fear  of  further  trouble.  It  might  be  said  that 
the  American  public  wras  convinced  of  the  failure  of 
autonomy.  There  was  at  once  a demand  for  the  reports 
of  the  consuls  and  for  full  information  regarding  the 
actual  state  of  affairs  in  Cuba.  The  condition  of  the 
reconcentrados  was  one  of  the  subjects  on  which  infor- 
mation was  wanted.  Their  relief  had  been  part  of  the 
promise  of  Spain  that  went  with  autonomy.  In  the 
generous  impulses  following  the  promise  of  that  system 
a proposition  had  been  advanced  that  the  American 
people  aid  the  starving  population.  Captain-General 
Blanco  j)roudly  rejected  it,  declaring  in  an  official  tele- 
gram to  the  Madrid  Cabinet  and  to  the  Spanish  minis- 
94 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tor  in  Washington,  that  Spain  could  caro  for  hor  own. 
Within  a fortnight  ho  was  compelled  to  admit  that 
Spain  could  not  care  for  her  own. 

President  McKinley  issued  a Christmas  appeal  to 
the  American  people  for  help.  At  first  the  responses 
were  slow.  The  American  people  wanted  the  aid,  if 
given,  to  reach  the  starving  Cubans,  and  they  were  not 
willing  to  trust  it  to  Spanish  officials.  But  back  of  this 
was  their  perception  that  this  kind  of  relief  could  only 
be  temporary,  and  that  no  permanent  alleviation  could 
come  until  the  circumstances  wore  changed.  They  saw 
that  until  the  cause  was  removed  the  distressing  condi- 
tions would  continue;  and  the  cause,  they  were  con- 
vinced, was  the  inability  of  the  Spanish  Government 
to  govern  the  island  satisfactorily.  Nevertheless  their 
hearts  and  their  purses  gradually  opened,  and  within  a 
few  weeks  American  aid  was  pouring  into  Cuba,  and 
continued  to  pour  in  until  war  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  was  declared. 

Captain-General  Blanco’s  Government  was  able  to 
make  appropriations  which  ultimately  reached  $250,000 
in  silver  for  the  relief  of  a suffering  population  of  half 
a million.  All  the  functions  of  Spanish  sovereignty 
were  paralyzed  and  it  could  do  no  more.  This  was  one 
cause  of  the  continued  refusal  of  the  Cuban  people  to 
believe  in  autonomy.  Material  relief  was  promised 
with  it,  and  this  relief  did  not  come.  The  consuls  of 
the  United  States  could  not  have  reported  honestly  that 
progress  was  being  made  in  relieving  the  distress.  Nor 
could  they  report  that  autonomy  was  making  progress. 
It  was  not  even  standing  still.  It  was  going  backward. 
The  consuls  could  see  what  was  going  on  in  the  vain 

95 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


effort  to  implant  the  new  system.  They  could  see  the 
exploradores,  or  pilot  engines,  preceding  the  trains  with 
armored  cars  and  troops  for  guards.  This  was  railroad 
travel  in  a pacified  country. 

They  knew  other  things  that  could  not  be  treated 
of  publicly.  With  one  exception,  every  consul  had 
lists  presented  to  him  of  Spaniards,  generally  of  the 
commercial  classes,  who  wanted  Cuba  annexed  to 
the  United  States.  They  had  private  and  confidential 
statements  made  of  the  movement  which  had  begun 
in  October  among  the  sugar  planters  of  Habana  and 
Matanzas  provinces  for  the  intervention  of  the  United 
States.  These  classes  had  absolutely  lost  faith  in  the 
ability  of  Spain  to  maintain  her  sovereignty.  As  the 
failure  of  autonomy  became  more  apparent,  they  became 
more  pronounced  in  their  desire  for  American  interven- 
tion. They  could  not  take  overt  action  because  they 
were  Spanish  subjects.  Such  action  would  have  made 
them  amenable  to  the  statutes  against  sedition,  and 
placed  them  in  the  category  of  the  insurgents  who  were 
charged  with  the  crime  of  rebellion.  But  they  managed 
to  let  their  attitude  be  known.  The  United  States  con- 
suls in  giving  their  judgment  had  to  take  account  of 
these  indications.  They  could  also  note  the  full  effect 
of  the  sullen  and  passive  opposition  of  the  Spanish 
classes  to  autonomy  as  manifested  in  the  attitude  of 
the  Union  Constitutional  party.  The  intensity  and  the 
influence  of  that  opposition  could  not  be  fully  under- 
stood in  the  United  States.  It  had  to  be  measured  in 
the  atmosphere  and  in  the  midst  of  the  events  which 
were  in  process  of  development. 

It  was  a question  how  fully  Spain  understood  the 

96 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


desperate  conditions  at  the  time  of  the  army  riots.  She 
had  been  watching  the  experiment  of  autonomy  in  igno- 
rant hope.  Tho  capacity  for  national  self-deceit  was 
apparently  illimitable.  Yet  the  reinsuring  accounts, 
without  practical  results,  were  beginning  to  cause  dis- 
trust. The  query  in  the  peninsula  was  why  greater 
progress  was  not  made  in  securing  the  support  of  the 
Cubans.  Her  statesmen  were  afraid  to  tell  the  peo- 
ple the  truth.  Blanco  was  not  winning  Cuba  back  to 
Spain.  Conciliation  had  failed,  and  autonomy  must 
be  implanted  by  the  sword.  The  Captain-General  was 
unable  to  make  a vigorous  military  campaign.  Weyler 
had  left  the  army  in  a state  of  suffering  and  demorali- 
zation second  only  to  that  of  the  pacificos.  General 
Blanco  began  its  improvement  at  once  like  the  trained 
commander  that  he  was,  but  it  wras  certain  that  the 
troops  could  not  be  got  in  condition  for  service  in  the 
field  till  the  rainy  season  came  on.  Then  there  could 
be  no  real  campaigning,  and  the  insurgents  would  ask 
the  United  States  if  the  reasonable  time  given  Spain  in 
which  to  implant  autonomy  had  not  expired.  Blanco 
did  one  thing  which  showed  that  he  intended  to  employ 
the  army.  He  called  for  more  recruits.  The  Madrid 
press  spoke  of  it  as  the  last  sacrifice;  but  the  15,000 
fresh  troops  were  started,  and  the  last  detachment  of 
them  reached  Cuba  just  in  time  to  form  part  of  the 
defensive  force  against  invasion  from  the  United  States. 

The  exact  position  of  Spain  was  exposed  in  February 
by  the  letter  of  Dupuy  de  Lome,  with  its  coarse  abuse 
of  the  American  executive.  Military  successes  were 
imperative.  The  best  possible  efforts  were  made  to 
manufacture  these  successes.  General  Jiminez  Castel- 
7 97 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


lanos  started  out  from  the  town  of  Puerto  Principe  with 
2,500  troops.  They  reached  the  mountain  hamlet  of 
Cubitas,  -where  the  Cuban  provisional  government  had 
had  its  wandering  existence.  The  government  was  gone, 
and  the  place  in  the  woods  was  not  worth  taking. 
Eight  hundred  of  the  insurgents  harassed  the  troops, 
and  a few  were  killed  and  wounded  on  either  side. 
Then  the  columns  returned  to  the  garrison  at  Puerto 
Principe.  That  was  the  nature  of  the  military  suc- 
cesses which  the  Spanish  troops  were  achieving  at  this 
critical  period. 

General  Blanco  left  Habana  in  the  latter  part  of  Jan- 
uary and  made  a trip  through  the  island.  He  went  by 
the  south  coast  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  returned  by 
the  north  coast.  His  journey  could  not  be  called  tak- 
ing the  field.  It  afforded  him  a full  insight  into  the 
despairing  state  into  which  Spanish  sovereignty  had 
fallen.  When  he  returned  to  Habana  the  Maine  had 
been  in  the  harbor  for  ten  days.  The  condition  of  the 
Spanish  mind  was  one  of  irritation  and  disappoint- 
ment. It  was  seeking  to  hold  the  United  States  respon- 
sible for  the  failure  of  autonomy  because  the  Junta  was 
not  expelled  from  New  York  and  because  occasional 
filbustering  expeditions  were  successful.  The  Spanish 
authorities  in  Madrid  and  in  Cuba  were  willing  to 
forego  their  irritation  and  to  forgive  the  United  States 
if  it  would  undertake  the  task  of  forcing  autonomy  on 
the  insurgents.  The  proposition  offered  by  Mr.  Cleve- 
land, which  would  have  placed  the  United  States  in  a 
position  of  guaranteeing  the  Spanish  flag  in  the  An- 
tilles, would  now  have  been  accepted  with  eagerness. 
But  with  the  knowledge  that  the  American  Government 

98 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


would  not  coerce  the  people  of  the  island  into  keeping 
allegiance  to  that  flag  the  resentment  was  fierce. 

The  Spanish  warships  were  ordered  to  Habana  har- 
bor to  keep  the  Maine  company.  When  that  vessel  was 
blown  up  the  feeling  in  Cuba  was  hysterical  and  Span- 
ish authority  bordered  on  anarchy.  To  one  living  in 
the  midst  of  those  events  as  was  the  writer  a plain  con- 
clusion was  inevitable.  With  the  passions  born  of  that 
hour  of  national  sorrow  stilled,  and  with  every  circum- 
stance reviewed  in  the  calmer  moments  of  reflection,  I 
have  not  changed  that  opinion.  A very  large  element 
of  the  Spanish  classes  iu  Cuba  rejoiced  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  3Iaine.  It  was  not  alone  the  ignorant  popu- 
lace. The  feeling  was  manifest  among  the  army  offi- 
cers. Outside  of  the  possible  conspirators  none  might 
know  whether  the  explosion  was  due  to  accident  or 
design.  But  the  satisfaction  felt  was  the  same.  The 
higher  officials  from  the  Captain-General  down  deplored 
it  in  itself  and  in  its  consequences.  Many  of  the  Span- 
ish merchants  were  sincere  in  their  sympathy.  Yet 
this  did  not  obscure  the  more  common  sentiment  of 
satisfaction.  The  violent  anti-American  circular  which 
was  distributed  the  day  a breakfast  was  given  by  Con- 
sul-General Lee  to  Captain  Sigsbee  and  the  officers  of 
the  31aine  is  sometimes  cited  as  evidence  of  the  plot- 
ting that  was  going  on.  My  own  belief  is  that  this 
circular  was  like  others  of  the  same  character,  an  in- 
vention. It  was  a coincidence.  Genuine  circulars  were 
occasionally  circulated,  but  they  were  of  a different 
kind.  They  were  short,  and  usually  typewritten  or 
struck  off  from  a hand-press.  The  resentment  which 

was  capable  of  the  deliberate  destruction  of  the  31aine 

99 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


was  too  deep  for  utterance  in  inflammatory  circulars. 
Regarding  the  higher  officials,  while  they  sought  to 
exculpate  Spain,  my  impression  was  that  they  did  not 
feel  sure  of  their  own  ground.  They  hoped  the  explo- 
sion was  due  to  an  accident,  and  they  advanced  the 
grounds  for  the  theory  of  an  accident,  yet  with  the 
apparent  fear  that  there  were  Spaniards  capable  of 
causing  the  destruction  of  the  American  warship. 

The  violent  intransigente  classes  were  in  earnest  in 
wanting  war  with  the  United  States  after  the  report  of 
the  naval  board  of  inquiry  was  made.  A part  of  the 
military  and  naval  element,  as  well  as  of  the  official 
class,  believed  in  war  in  order  that  Spain  might  lose 
Cuba  with  honor.  Her  honor  would  not  permit  her  to 
accept  a guarantee  of  $200,000,000  from  the  United 
States  and  concede  independence.  But  she  would  go  to 
war  and  take  the  consequences  rather  than  make  a 
trade  bargain  for  the  most  precious  of  her  colonial  pos- 
sessions. 

It  was  impossible  for  the  people  of  the  United  States 
to  understand  that  the  Spaniards  in  Cuba  believed  that 
in  the  event  of  hostilities  there  would  be  another  war  of 
secession  and  the  Southern  States  would  revolt.  Yet 
that  delusion  existed.  It  found  utterance  in  the  news- 
papers and  in  numerous  pamphlets.  These  pamphlets 
described  supposed  invasions  of  the  North  American 
nation,  and  their  repulse.  Some  of  them  were  filled 
with  contempt  for  the  bargaining  Yankee.  They  are 
interesting  reading  now  as  showing  that  the  delusion 
did  exist.  One  pamphlet  told  how  the  North  Ameri- 
cans achieved  success  after  success  over  the  Spanish 
in  arms,  but  were  finally  compelled  to  withdraw,  be- 

100 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cause  the  spirit  of  Spanish  resistance  was  impregnable. 
Other  pamphlets  wore  filled  with  Don  Quixotism.  The 
knight  of  La  Mancha  really  seemed  to  walk  abroad. 
More  important  than  this  supposed  secession  sentiment 
in  the  United  States  was  the  belief  in  European  inter- 
vention. That  was  found  in  the  pamphlets,  in  the 
newspapers,  and  among  the  army  and  navy  officers,  and 
the  representatives  of  the  Spanish  Government.  Spain 
would  yield  Cuba  with  honor;  but  perhaps  it  would  not 
be  to  the  United  States,  and  perhaps  it  would  be  after  a 
general  war  had  been  precipitated.  This  was  both  the 
spoken  and  the  unspoken  sentiment. 

All  this  time  the  overtures  to  the  insurgents  were 
redoubled.  Autonomy  could  be  cast  aside  and  Cubans 
could  have  the  island  if  they  would  keep  the  flag  and 
leave  the  forts  and  the  garrisons  to  Spain.  Govin  and 
Dolz  of  the  Autonomist  cabinet  were  encouraged  to 
press  these  overtures  on  the  insurgents.  Radical  Au- 
tonomists were  aided  and  indorsed  in  formulating  a 
new  set  of  propositions  for  Gomez.  These  were  a 
dozen  or  more  in  number.  They  failed.  Gomez  and 
the  insurgent  chiefs  who  were  invited  to  share  in 
the  government  treated  the  overtures  with  contempt. 
Whenever  Spain  would  concede  independence  as  the 
basis  they  would  open  negotiations.  And  with  inde- 
pendence as  the  basis  they  would  welcome  the  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States,  and  whatever  terms  it 
made  would  be  accepted. 

It  might  be  said  that  the  last  chapter  of  autonomy 
was  written  when  the  Maine  was  blown  up.  But  there 
was  an  epilogue.  Elections  were  held.  The  prepara- 
tions which  were  commenced  in  November  proceeded 

101 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


slowly.  An  electoral  census  liacl  to  be  taken.  It  was 
completed  in  March.  It  was  a remarkable  census. 
Though  the  official  reports  showed  that  people  had 
been  dying  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands,  this  demon- 
strated that  there  had  been  no  diminution  in  the  num- 
ber of  inhabitants.  The  island  was  divided  into  dis- 
tricts. This  first  election  under  autonomy  took  place 
the  last  Sunday  in  March.  The  Union  Constitutionals 
had  been  satisfied  to  let  affairs  drift.  An  arrangement 
had  been  made  by  which  they  wrere  to  have  one-third  of 
the  deputies  to  the  Cortes  to  be  known  as  the  opposi- 
tion, and  the  Autonomists,  or  Government,  two-thirds. 
The  arrangement  was  not  carried  out  to  the  letter,  for 
two  or  three  of  the  conservatives  were  rejected,  and  the 
Government  was  charged  with  treachery.  It  was  the 
old  story.  No  one  cared  to  deposit  a ballot,  and  the 
authorities  arranged  the  election. 

In  April  there  were  also  elections  for  members  of  the 
insular  chambers,  that  is,  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  the  Council.  Previous  to  that  time  Galvez,  as 
president  of  the  Autonomist  cabinet,  issued  a public 
appeal  to  President  McKinley  in  the  name  of  autonomy, 
urging  the  American  executive  not  to  let  the  system, 
which  was  on  the  eve  of  success,  be  made  a failure 
through  American  encouragement  of  the  insurrection. 

The  chambers  were  inaugurated  in  May,  and  the 
provisional  Autonomist  cabinet  also  became  a permanent 
cabinet.  President  Galvez  declared  that  the  programme 
of  the  colonial  government  should  be  to  defend  the 
Autonomist  constitution.  Of  this  Autonomist  congress, 
few  names  are  known  unless  they  are  gathered  from  the 
official  list.  In  the  flowing  Castilian  idiom  it  is  said 

102 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  them  that  they  celebrated  sessions,  pronounced  dis- 
courses, and  adjourned.  But  they  also  passed  laws. 
After  the  signing  of  the  protocol  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain  they  held  no  sessions.  In  October 
Captain-General  Blanco  declared  the  chambers  dis- 
solved. The  Autonomist  cabinet  was  dissolved  a fort- 
night before  the  end  of  Spanish  sovereignty.  Auton- 
omy would  have  been  better  thought  of  by  the  Cuban 
people  if  it  had  never  been  formed  into  an  insular  gov- 
ernment. 


rART  II 


THE  COMING  COMMONWEALTH 


CHAPTER  VI 


Transition  to  Local  Home  Rule 

Groundwork  in  Autonomous  Constitution — Spirit  of  Spanish  Local 
Institutions  — Paternal  Edicts  of  Governor-Generals  — Cuban 
Municipality  Similar  to  Township  and  County  Government  of 
American  States — Details  of  Organization — Illustrations  of 
the  Geographical  Basis— Minority  Representation — Alcalde  the 
Chief  Functionary — His  Position  and  Power — Attributes  of  the 
Ayuntamientos — Creatures  of  the  Central  Authority — Former 
Military  System — Lack  of  Knowledge  by  Citizens — Autonomist 
Modifications — Changes  Under  American  Military  Authority — 
Sources  of  Income. 

Armed  revolt  of  Cubans  brought  autonomy  when  too 
late  for  Spain.  Armed  intervention  of  the  United 
States  ended  the  experiment  which  had  failed.  As  a 
system,  the  breath  was  out  of  the  body  before  vitality 
could  be  discerned.  From  the  beginning  autonomy 
was  pulseless.  Has  it  then  left  no  trace? 

The  question  cannot  be  answered  in  the  negative. 
Most  of  the  Autonomists  who  consistently  opposed  the 
insurrection  and  who  took  office  under  the  Spanish 
Government  were  old  men.  The  unpopularity  which 
was  visited  upon  them  by  the  masses  of  Cubans  may 
die  out,  but  none  of  the  leaders  among  them  will  be 
called  on  to  direct  the  destinies  of  the  new  government. 
Their  day  is  gone.  Yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  their 
work  was  in  vain.  They  gave  Cuba  the  only  political 
education  in  its  history.  The  propaganda  which  they 

107 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


maintained  for  twenty  years  was  a preparation.  Under 
centralized  Spanish  authority,  with  the  traditions  and 
inheritance  of  absolute  power,  the  failure  of  autonomy 
was  certain.  With  free  institutions  under  the  guidance 
of  the  American  republic  it  may  not  be  said  that  the 
principle  is  worthless.  It  is  already  the  hope  of  Cu- 
bans and  Spaniards  who  fear  either  annexation  or  in- 
dependence. The  foundation  of  the  Cuban  common- 
wealth was  laid  in  insurrection,  but  it  may  properly  be 
said  that  autonomy  furnished  the  scaffolding  for  the 
new  structure.  The  Cuba  which  came  to  the  United 
States  in  trust  was  under  an  autonomous  constitution, 
legitimately  proclaimed  by  recognized  Spanish  sover- 
eignty though  never  put  into  complete  operation.  It  is 
therefore  as  much  an  inheritance  as  the  Spanish  code 
of  civil  and  criminal  laws. 

In  the  administrative  sense  autonomy  may  be  called 
the  basis  of  the  future  Antillian  state.  It  recognized 
the  political  and  geographical  division  of  the  island 
into  six  provinces,  it  affirmed  the  principle  of  decen- 
tralization under  provincial  government,  and  it  provided 
for  a new  basis  of  municipalities.  It  also  provided 
that  in  pursuance  of  the  autonomous  constitution,  laws 
should  be  enacted  for  local  self-government.  The  stage 
was  never  reached  at  which  these  laws  could  be  enacted, 
or  the  pledge  of  enacting  them  be  neutralized  by  the 
Spanish  authorities  as  with  the  compact  of  El  Zanjon; 
but  their  formulation  should  not  be  difficult.  The  sys- 
tem of  geographical  divisions  gives  an  excellent  ground- 
work for  home  rule.  The  groundwork  exists  to-day, 
and  on  it  may  be  built  a popular  system  of  home-rule 
administration.  This  possibility  is  the  first  inquiry 

10S 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


made  by  American  statesmen  who  have  practical  no- 
tions about  the  building  of  commonwealths  in  the  trop- 
ics. For  that  reason  I analyze  it  first,  though  this  is 
not  the  process  of  the  Cuban  political  philosophers. 
They  would  build  a republic  in  the  clouds  and  set  up  a 
complete  structure  at  the  very  beginning  of  independ- 
ence. Its  present  discussion  is  also  contrary  to  the 
natural  order  of  the  Spanish  system,  for  that  began 
with  centralized  authority,  and  what  there  was  of  local 
government  came  from  above. 

But  before  the  municipal  statutes  are  the  municipal 
institutions.  The  spirit  of  Spanish  local  administra- 
tion as  it  existed  for  a hundred  years  is  breathed  in 
hundreds  of  orders,  edicts,  and  circulars  of  the  Captain- 
Generals.  It  must  be  sought  there,  instead  of  in  town 
records  and  in  the  histories  of  village  communities. 
The  Spanish  regime  in  its  relation  to  the  individual — 
the  individual  was  a subject  rather  than  a citizen — for 
three-quarters  of  a century  is  embodied  in  the  Bando 
of  Good  Government  of  Governor-General  Geronimo 
Valdes.  In  a degree  it  is  the  regimen  up  to  the  present 
day.  The  compilation  is  both  curious  and  instructive. 
This  bando  or  edict  was  published  in  1842.  It  was 
republished  at  intervals  up  to  the  end  of  the  Ten- Years’ 
war.  It  is  something  more  than  a codification  of 
laws,  regulations,  and  customs.  It  is  a living  exposition 
of  a system  of  government  without  the  popular  element. 
It  reflects  the  political  existence  of  the  Cuban  people 
under  absolutism — sometimes  administered  by  a benev- 
olent and  progressive  despot  such  as  General  Valdes, 
oftener  by  a miltary  tyrant  such  as  ValeTiano  Weyler. 

Though  a score  of  years  have  passed  since  the  Span- 

109 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


isli  Constitution  was  extended  to  the  Antilles  and  mu- 
nicipal legislation  enacted,  to  a large  proportion  of 
Cubans  and  Spaniards  the  old  system  is  better  known 
than  the  new  one.  Their  transition  will  be  as  much 
affected  by  the  old  traditions  as  by  the  present  munici- 
pal statute  system.  Furthermore,  while  the  new  sys- 
tem was  embodied  into  statutes  the  former  practices 
continued.  So  the  gap  is  not  so  wide  as  a reading  of 
the  written  local  laws  would  lead  one  to  think.  The 
spirit  of  Don  Geronimo  Valdes  walked  abroad  through 
this  old  body  of  laws,  customs,  regulations,  edicts,  ban- 
dos,  decrees,  circulars,  orders,  and  injunctions  which 
he  gathered  together  and  vitalized.  The  regulations 
relating  to  slavery  are  the  only  ones  that  entirely  dis- 
appeared. 

The  titles  of  the  bando  relate  to  Religion  and  Public 
Morality,  Order,  Health,  Security,  Theatres, Cleanliness, 
and  Decoration.  It  required  two  hundred  and  sixty-one 
articles  to  define  the  relation  of  the  citizen  to  the  govern- 
ment or  the  municipality  with  respect  to  these  headings. 
A special  chapter  is  devoted  to  the  pedaneos,  or  petty 
law  officers.  The  instructions  give  an  insight  into  the 
entire  lack  of  personal  or  civil  liberty  reserved  to  the  in- 
dividual. The  pedaneos  and  their  assistants,  the  cabos 
de  rondas  or  roundsmen,  were  real  Paul  Prys  of  the 
State.  The  list  of  cases  in  which  they  could  acquire 
fees  is  a long  one,  and  they  could  impose  fines  in  com- 
pliance with  specific  articles  of  the  bando.  They  were 
practically  charged  with  the  regulation  of  both  the  pub- 
lic and  the  j>rivate  morals  of  the  community. 

The  regulations  are  wearisome  in  their  minuteness, 
from  their  prohibition  of  the  picador  at  the  bull-fight 

110 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

pricking  the  animal  when  in  the  contro  of  the  ring,  to 
the  requirement  that  the  bodega  keepers  should  have  a 
basin  of  water  standing  in  front  of  their  shops  so  that 
the  dogs  which  ran  through  the  streets  might  drink  as 
they  listed,  and  thus  avoid  the  danger  of  hydrophobia. 
But  through  them  all  runs  the  authority  from  above, 
and  it  is  the  very  highest  authority.  Long  after  Don 
Geronimo  Valdes  had  gone  to  his  reward,  the  Captain- 
General  and  his  Council  of  Administration  continued  to 
fix  in  detail  the  regulations  for  the  cock-fight.  The 
existence  of  this  supreme  authority  and  the  extent  to 
which  it  was  exercised  in  the  most  trivial  subjects 
should  be  kept  in  mind  in  reaching  an  understanding 
of  local  government  under  tho  general  municipal  leg- 
islation, the  basis  of  which  was  the  provisional  law 
of  1878. 

In  the  Spanish  meaning  the  term  municipality  has  a 
territorial  significance  broader  than  that  which  is  given 
it  in  the  United  States.  The  county  in  one  of  the  States 
of  the  Union  corresponds  to  the  municipality  in  Cuba. 
There  is  little  distinction  between  city  and  country  gov- 
ernment. The  city  and  county  of  New  York  answers  to 
the  municipality  of  Habana.  The  present  system,  in 
its  administrative  features,  dates  from  the  municipal 
law  of  1878.  After  the  enactment  of  that  law  the  mu- 
nicipal life  of  a Cuban  community,  whether  village  or 
urban,  underwent  little  change,  because  Spanish  admin- 
istration did  not  change  materially  with  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  statute.  But  the  system  had  a recognized 
legal  existence  which  is  the  existing  basis.  It  is  a 
good  working  basis,  too,  for  the  development  of  local 
self-government.  The  island  was  divided  into  132  ayun- 

m 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tamientos  or  municipalities.  In  the  United  States  it 
would  be  said  that  there  were  132  counties.  By  prov- 
inces, there  were  25  municipalities  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  37 
in  Habana,  23  in  Matanzas,  28  in  Santa  Clara,  5 in 
Puerto  Principe,  and  14  in  Santiago  de  Cuba.  The 
municipal  termino,  or  district,  is  the  extent  of  geo- 
graphical territory  over  which  the  administrative  action 
of  the  municipality  extends. 

For  the  creation  of  a termino  municipal  these  were 
the  exact  conditions : first,  not  less  than  two  thousand 
resident  inhabitants ; second,  territory  proportionate  to 
the  population ; third,  ability  to  sustain  the  obligatory 
municipal  expenses  out  of  the  resources  which  the  law 
authorized  to  municipalities.  Every  termino  munici- 
pal forms  part  of  a judicial  district  of  a province.  The 
census  of  population  determines  the  number  of  conce- 
jales — aldermen  or  county  commissioners — and  their 
division  is  into  the  two  classes  of  lieutenant  alcaldes,  or 
assistant  mayors,  and  regidores,  or  ordinary  council- 
men.  There  are  grades  of  municipalities  based  on 
population.  Cities  possessing  a population  of  forty 
thousand  and  upward  have  an  ayuntamiento  or  council 
composed  of  thirty  members,  and  this  is  the  maximum 
number.  Habana,  Matanzas,  and  Santiago  de  Cuba 
are  the  cities  of  this  class.  Under  the  statute  defini- 
tion, a municipality  is  the  legal  association  of  all  peo- 
ple who  reside  in  a termino  municipal  or  district. 

The  original  law  of  1878  also  provided  for  a body 
known  as  the  junta  municipal.  This  was  composed 
jointly  of  all  the  members  of  the  ayuntamiento  and  of 
vocales  or  special  delegates  in  equal  number  chosen  by 
the  electors.  This  junta  municipal  was  in  effect  an 

112 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


auditing  committee,  as  it  was  charged  with  the  revision 
and  censoring  of  the  ayuntamiento  accounts.  This 
form  of  organization  underwent  various  changes;  but 
the  junta  municipal  was  never  a real  factor  in  local  ad- 
ministration. The  members  of  the  ayuutamiento  were 
elected  theoretically  by  the  residents  who  possessed  the 
electoral  right,  which  was  based  on  both  property  and 
personal  taxes.  The  concejales  selected  three  of  their 
number,  from  among  whom  the  civil  governor  of  the 
province,  subject  to  the  Governor-General,  could  choose 
the  alcalde  or  mayor  if  it  so  pleased  him.  If  not,  he 
designated  some  one  else.  Generally  it  was  some  one 
else. 

The  grades  of  communities  still  recognized  are  ciua- 
des  or  cities,  villas  or  towns,  pueblos  or  villages,  and 
caserios  or  hamlets,  and  urban  districts  and  rural 
districts.  Aldea,  which  is  the  name  in  Spain  for  a 
small  village,  is  seldom  used  in  Cuba.  Lugar,  the 
Spanish  designation  of  a town  or  place,  is  rarely  heard. 
Bayamo,  with  a population  of  17,000,  is  a ciudad,  as 
are  Habana,  Cienfuegos,  Matanzas,  and  other  places. 
Bejucal,  with  8,000  inhabitants,  is  also  a city.  El  Ca- 
ney,  where  the  first  attack  was  made  by  the  American 
troops  in  seeking  entrance  to  Santiago,  is  a valla  or 
town.  Dos  Caminos,  with  500  inhabitants,  is  a pue- 
blo. Guani,  in  the  tobacco  country  around  Remedios, 
in  Santa  Clara  province,  has  200  inhabitants,  and  is  a 
caserio.  El  Cerro,  one  of  the  suburbs  of  Habana,  is  a 
barrio  urbano.  Guamo,  near  Bayamo,  has  700  or  800 
inhabitants,  and  is  a barrio  rural  or  country  district. 
Barrios,  rural  or  urban,  consist  of  territory  which  for 
any  reason  is  not  organized  into  a municipality.  Agua- 
8 113 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cate  is  a municipality  of  the  province  of  Habana  and 
belongs  to  the  judicial  district  of  Jaruco.  Its  area  is 
121  square  kilometres,  or  75  square  miles.  The  munici- 
pality is  divided  into  four  barrios  or  districts,  which  are 
the  pueblos  of  Aguacate,  Campastizo,  Reoj,  and  Zabaleta. 

The  pueblo  of  Aguacate  is  the  headquarters  of  the 
municipal  district  of  the  same  name.  It  has  600  or  700 
inhabitants,  and  is  a barrio  urban  or  town  ward  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a barrio  rural  or  country  township. 
The  pueblo  has  a municipal  judge.  Jaruco,  with  an 
area  of  253  square  kilometres — 157  square  miles — is  a 
partido  judicial  or  judicial  district  belonging  to  the 
province  of  Habana  and  to  the  audiencia  or  general 
court.  Jaruco  has  eight  municipal  districts  or  termi- 
nos,  including  that  of  the  same  name,  which  is  a ciu- 
dad  or  city.  The  officials  are  the  alcalde  and  members 
of  the  ayuntamiento,  a primary  judge  or  judge  of  the 
first  instance,  a municipal  judge,  and  a register  of  prop- 
erty. Batabano,  with  a population  of  8,000  and  an 
area  of  147  square  kilometres,  is  a municipality  of  the 
province  of  Habana,  belonging  to  the  judicial  district 
of  Bejucal.  It  has  six  barrios,  of  which  the  pueblo  of 
Batabano,  with  a population  of  1,700,  is  one.  It  has  a 
municipal  judge.  Bejucal  is  a judicial  district  in  the 
province  of  Habana,  and  depending  from  it  are  eight 
municipalities,  the  largest  of  which  is  the  municipal 
district  of  the  same  name,  which  has  a population  of 
7,900  and  an  area  of  400  square  kilometres.  The  mu- 
nicipality is  divided  into  four  urban  barrios  and  seven 
rural  barrios.  It  has  a judge  of  the  first  instance,  and 
also  a municipal  judge  and  a register  of  property. 

Other  illustrations  might  be  given,  but  these  may 

114 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


suffico  to  show  tho  geographical  basis  of  local  govern- 
ment in  Cuba.  Tho  municipalities,  as  stated,  corre- 
spond as  closoly  as  can  be  under  different  political 
systems  to  the  counties  in  tho  American  States.  Tho 
barrios  rural  are  the  townships.  Before  tho  insurrec- 
tion and  the  reconcentration  wiped  out  whole  communi- 
ties, there  wero  a dozen  more  than  700  barrios  rural  or 
townships  in  Cuba.  By  geographical  divisions  there 
are  still  that  number,  but  scores  and  scores  of  them 
are  without  a living  inhabitant.  The  official  statistics 
formerly  gave  600  caserios  or  hamlets,  but  these  have 
no  political  meaning.  Usually  tho  caserio  is  adminis- 
tratively part  of  the  barrio  rural.  In  perhaps  thirty 
instances  the  caserios  and  tho  rural  barrios  or  townships 
are  identical  in  boundaries,  but  in  the  general  sense  the 
caserio  may  bo  ignored  in  seeking  to  determine  the  basis 
of  home-rule  government.  The  whole  question  of  future 
local  administration  lies  in  these  700  townships  and  the 
100  or  more  city  districts  which  combined  form  the  132 
ayuntamientos  or  municipalities. 

Under  the  law  a census  of  the  inhabitants  of  each 
municipal  district  was  directed  to  be  taken  every  five 
years.  This  provision  was  rarely  observed.  The  con- 
cejales — aldermen,  or  members  of  the  county  board,  as 
they  would  be  called  in  some  parts  of  the  United  States 
— were  chosen  by  the  citizens  of  the  municipality  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  electoral  law.  As  before  explained, 
the  grouping  of  the  rural  population  was  into  barrios  or 
country  districts,  each  of  which  had  an  alcalde  or  town- 
ship governor  named  by  the  superior  authority.  It  was 
the  same  with  the  urban  barrios,  except  that  they  had 
celadors  or  police  magistrates. 

115 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Minority  representation  was  recognized  in  the  provi- 
sion that  when  three  concejales  were  chosen,  each  elec- 
tor should  vote  for  two  out  of  the  three,  for  three  out  of 
the  four,  four  out  of  six,  five  out  of  seven,  and  in  that 
proportion  up  to  the  limit.  Half  the  membership  of 
the  ayuntamiento  ceased  every  two  years.  The  mem- 
bers were  subject  to  fines  for  absence  from  the  ses- 
sions. In  actual  administration  it  was  not  common  for 
the  alcalde  named  by  the  aldermen  to  be  approved  by 
the  civil  governor  or  the  Governor-General  unless  the 
wishes  of  these  officials  had  been  ascertained  in  ad- 
vance. The  Governor-General  having  the  power  “ when 
he  believed  it  convenient  to  the  interests  of  the  local- 
ity,” often  rejected  the  entire  list  of  nominations  and 
named  an  alcalde  who  did  not  belong  to  the  munici- 
pality. In  the  larger  cities  the  teniente  alcaldes,  or 
assistant  mayors,  who  had  jurisdiction  as  municipal 
sub-rulers  over  different  districts,  were  named  from 
among  the  aldermen.  The  alcaldes  de  barrios,  or  town- 
ship rulers,  were  named  by  the  alcaldes  of  the  munici- 
palities from  the  territory  in  which  they  exercised  their 
functions. 

Sometimes  difficulty  was  encountered.  A notable 
case  was  that  of  the  municipal  alcalde  of  Mangas,  in  the 
province  of  Pinar  del  Rio.  He  refrained  from  naming 
alcaldes  in  the  rural  districts  of  Pueblo  Nuevo  and 
Guamanor  because  in  them  there  was  no  elector  who 
knew  how  to  read  and  write.  The  case  was  taken  up  to 
the  Governor-General’s  Council  of  Administration,  be- 
ing too  knotty  for  the  intermediate  authorities  to  settle. 
The  Council  of  Administration  found  no  precedent  and 
no  analogy.  After  mature  discussion  it  resolved  that 

116 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


there  being  no  electors  within  those  two  country  dis- 
tricts who  could  read  and  write,  the  alcaldes  could  bo 
selected  from  electors  who  could  not  read  and  write. 
The  decision  stood,  and  the  selections  were  made.  On 
the  part  of  the  central  authority  there  seems  to  have 
been  some  idea  that  the  office  of  alcalde  should  be 
considered  a non-partisan  one.  The  Madrid  decree  of 
1880  directed  the  governors  of  provinces  to  prohibit 
alcaldes  from  assisting  at  reunions  of  a political  char- 
acter, and  also  from  acting  as  editors  or  directors  of 
newspapers.  The  primary  application  of  this  order 
was  to  the  provinces  of  the  peninsula  rather  thau  to 
those  of  the  island. 

A visitor  to  any  rural  community  of  Cuba  is  im- 
pressed with  the  evidence  that  the  alcalde  is  the  local 
authority  and  the  only  authority.  He  is  so  clearly  the 
functionary  that  iuquiry  is  seldom  made  for  other  func- 
tionaries. It  is  he  who  receives  the  higher  officials, 
who  meets  the  stranger,  and  who  dispenses  the  honors 
of  the  town.  In  American  towns  due  regard  is  paid  the 
official  position  of  mayor,  but  he  is  not  allowed  to  mo- 
nopolize the  honors.  In  a Cuban  village  these  privi- 
leges are  conceded  unhesitatingly  to  the  alcalde  be- 
cause he  represents  political  power  commensurate  with 
them.  A beneficent  instance  of  this  power  may  be  seen 
in  the  proclamations  reducing  the  price  of  bread  when 
it  becomes  too  high.  His  proclamations  enforcing 
public  order  contain  frequent  references  to  the  culture 
and  good  name  of  the  people.  In  the  plays  at  the  the- 
atre w'hich  represent  Spanish  customs  the  alcalde  is 
always  a leading  character.  It  is  the  same  in  Cuba. 

The  governors  of  the  provinces  could  suspend  the 

117 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


alcaldes,  this  act  being  subject  to  the  approval  or 
disapproval  of  the  Governor-General.  Similarly  they 
could  suspend  the  assistant  alcaldes  and  the  regidores, 
or  ordinary  councilmen.  Regarding  the  superior  au- 
thority, it  was  specifically  declared  that  the  alcalde 
was  the  representative  of  the  state.  Being  so,  he  could 
not  be  the  representative  of  the  people  of  the  commu- 
nity. In  everything  relating  to  the  political  govern- 
ment of  the  municipality,  the  authority,  duties,  and 
responsibilities  of  the  alcalde  were  independent  of  the 
ayuntamiento.  Likewise  the  assistant  alcaldes  and  the 
alcaldes  of  the  country  districts  were  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  municipal  alcalde  as  the  representative  of  the 
government.  They  did  not  represent  the  people. 

Under  the  system  in  force  until  the  legislation  fol- 
lowing the  peace  of  El  Zanjon,  there  were  thirty-one 
gobiernos,  or  political  districts,  in  the  island,  each  of 
which  had  an  ayuntamiento ; while  the  villages  which 
were  the  heads  of  jurisdictions  had  local  councils  whose 
members  were  named  by  the  civil  governor  of  the  prov- 
ince and  were  nominally  responsible  to  him.  Actually, 
they  were  responsible  to  the  military  authority.  The 
elective  officials  in  the  larger  municipalities  were  jus- 
tices of  the  peace  and  collectors  of  fines  who  were  known 
as  syndics.  Besides  their  responsibility  to  the  military 
authority,  the  civil  governor,  and  the  Governor-General, 
the  auyuntamientos  had  also  a central  administration 
with  a jefe  or  chief  residing  in  Habaua.  The  main 
functions  of  this  central  administration  were  the  con- 
trol of  the  rural  police. 

In  spite  of  its  defects,  the  law  of  1878  was  in  one 
sense  a concession  to  popular  government.  Before  that 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


time  many  municipalities  had  consisted  simply  of  mili- 
tary districts  whose  absolute  rulers  were  the  military 
commanders.  And  the  commander,  though  described 
as  the  captain  of  the  district,  was  always  a lieutenant 
ruler  of  some  military  official  higher  in  power.  When 
he  was  a benevolent  and  energetic  despot  he  gave  a 
good  local  administration;  but  it  was  a military,  and  not 
a representative  one.  Where  the  military  commander 
was  a bad  or  an  indifferent  despot,  the  municipality 
reflected  his  character.  This  law  also  did  away  with 
the  regidores  perpetuales,  or  aldermen  who  held  their 
offices  for  life.  It  may  be  said  to  have  made  a clear- 
ing in  the  jungle  of  centralized  municipal  government. 
But  its  application  was  limited,  and  the  majority  of  the 
people  had  little  conception  of  the  system.  To-day  a 
question  put  to  intelligent  Cubans  or  Spaniards  regard- 
ing the  details  of  municipal  government  in  past  years 
is  usually  met  with  an  apology  for  ignorance.  They 
never  knew  much  about  it. 

The  attributes  and  functions  of  ayuntamientos  in- 
cluded the  usual  municipal  services : opening  of  streets 
and  parks,  enrolment  of  residents,  draining  and  sew- 
erage, bridges,  water  supply,  baths,  slaughter-houses, 
markets,  sanitation,  public  construction,  policing,  and 
local  public  works  generally,  including  the  roads.  Also 
charitable  institutions  and  hospitals  of  their  own  or  ad- 
ministered through  benevolent  societies.  Penalties  were 
provided  for  the  infraction  of  municipal  ordinances  by 
fines.  The  ayuntamiento  had  power  to  require  from  all 
males  between  the  ages  of  sixteen  and  fifty  not  to 
exceed  twenty  days’  labor  on  public  works.  This  is  in 
another  form  the  road  tax  of  many  of  the  States  in  the 

119 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


American  Union.  The  teniente  alcaldes  in  the  larger 
towns  and  cities  were  acting  mayors  in  the  absence  of 
the  alcaldes.  Each  also  had  a district  in  which  he 
exercised  the  administrative  municipal  functions  under 
the  direction  of  the  alcalde.  The  avuntamientos  se- 
lected from  their  own  numbers  one  or  two  members 
who  as  procuradores  sindicos,  or  attorneys,  represented 
the  corporation  in  all  legal  proceedings,  and  also  re- 
vised the  local  bills  and  estimates.  The  ayuntamientos 
named  their  employes.  The  income  of  the  municipal- 
ities came  from  goods  owned  by  them,  taxes  on  person- 
ality and  realty,  taxes  laid  for  maintaining  the  police, 
fines  for  violations  of  ordinances,  assessments  upon 
the  citizens  or  landowners,  and  imposts  upon  articles 
to  eat,  drink,  and  burn.  Where  the  town  was  large 
enough  to  maintain  a market,  that  was  owned  or  con- 
trolled by  the  municipality.  Generally  it  may  be  said 
that  the  chief  source  of  income  was  the  slaughter-house 
tax,  which  was  from  two  or  three  cents  a pound  on 
beef.  Habana  had  power  to  lay  other  imposts. 

A brief  critical  examination  of  the  municipal  law  of 
1878,  independent  of  its  administration,  is  sufficient  to 
show  that  under  it  there  could  be  little  growth  in  local 
self-government.  The  clear  statement  of  the  central- 
ized conception  appears  in  the  declaration  that  the  al- 
calde is  the  representative  of  the  central  government; 
that  in  everything  relating  to  the  political  government 
of  a municipality  his  authority,  powers,  and  responsi- 
bility are  independent  of  the  ayuntamiento.  The  ap- 
pointment of  the  alcaldes  by  the  Governor-General, 
frequently  not  residents  of  the  community,  was  the 
affirmation  of  this  fact.  A further  check  on  the  inde- 

120 


TO-MOEIIOW  IN  CUBA 


pendence  of  the  ayuntamientos  was  devised  in  their 
subjection  to  the  provincial  deputations  and  again  to 
the  civil  governors.  The  law  underwent  no  organic 
statutory  modification.  It  was  interpreted  and  con- 
strued in  the  first  place  by  royal  orders  and  decrees 
from  Madrid  applicable  to  the  municipalities  of  the 
peninsula.  Then  there  were  the  circulars  and  decrees 
of  the  Governor-General  construing  and  interpreting  it, 
often  in  contradictory  instructions.  The  saying  that 
Spanish  government  in  Cuba  was  government  by  decree 
found jts  aptest  illustration  in  the  municipal  adminis- 
tration. 

Under  the  Spanish  system  everything  came  from 
above  and  from  without.  Spain  began  its  administra- 
tion of  the  colonies  on  the  principle  that  they  should 
be  treated  as  directly  subject  to  the  throne,  commer- 
cially and  politically.  One  was  the  corollary  of  the 
other.  Columbus  memorialized  their  Catholic  Majes- 
ties for  permission  to  appoint  an  alcalde  in  each  group- 
ing of  population.  The  Council  of  the  Indies  and  the 
House  of  Trade  were  created  within  a few  years  after 
Columbus’  discovery  to  secure  and  insure  commercial 
monopoly.  They  exercised  all  the  functions  of  civil 
administration,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial.  In 
that  age  was  constructed  the  framework  of  the  Span- 
ish colonial  administrative  system,  which  endured  with 
little  fundamental  change  until  no  colonies  remained. 
This  power  began  with  the  viceroys  and  Captain-Gen- 
erals. It  ended  with  the  municipalities.  Captain- 
Generals  ruled  in  Cuba  for  four  hundred  years.  In 
the  beginning  they  nominated  governors  and  mayors. 
They  were  doing  the  same  thing  when  the  last  Captain- 

121 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


General  but  one  took  the  office  in  order  to  implant 
autonomy.  Obedience  to  tbe  superior  authorities  was 
exacted  as  rigorously  in  1897  as  in  1527,  and  with  less 
power  of  local  rule  to  the  municipalities. 

All  that  the  people  of  Cuba  knew  of  municipal  or  of 
rural  government  is  embodied  in  the  statute.  Less  of 
actual  knowledge  was  gathered  by  them  from  the  sys- 
tem in  operation  than  from  reading  the  law,  because  the 
application  was  at  the  will  of  the  Spanish  authorities. 
These  officials  contrived  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with 
their  own  ideas  of  administration.  Few  abuses  were 
corrected.  Elections  were  made  farces,  so  that  good 
citizenship  found  no  encouragement.  In  a municipal 
election  of  Guanabacoa  the  registry  list  was  posted 
up  as  required.  Three  electors  voted.  The  officials 
returned  the  whole  list  as  voted,  though  some  of  those 
whose  names  were  on  it  had  been  tenants  of  the  grave- 
yards for  months.  The  same  thing  was  done  elsewhere. 

The  Autonomist  constitution  made  important  changes. 

Instead  of  the  alcaldes  being  nominated  by  the  Gov- 
ernor-General or  the  civil  governor,  it  provided  that 
the  election  by  the  ayuntamientos  should  be  final,  and 
that  the  alcaldes  should  exercise  the  active  functions 
of  the  municipal  administration  as  executors  of  the 
ordinances  of  the  ayuntamientos  and  as  their  repre- 
sentatives. Instead  of  two  thousand  inhabitants  for  a 
termino  municipal,  the  municipal  organization  was 
made  obligatory  on  every  group  of  population  of  more 
than  one  thousand.  This  provision  was  never  carried 
into  effect.  The  Autonomist  legislation  is  useful  as 
suggesting  changes  which  may  be  made  on  a basis  of 
the  old  laws  for  genuine  local  self-government. 

122 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  American  military  authority  through  decroea 
of  Governor-General  Brooke  modified  and  enlarged 
the  sources  of  municipal  income.  They  abolished 
the  imposts  on  killing  cattle  which  were  known  as  tho 
slaughter-house  tax,  along  with  those  on  food  for  arti- 
cles of  consumption,  and  on  wood  and  charcoal  for 
burning.  That  is,  the  power  of  making  the  necessities 
of  daily  life  dearer  by  local  taxation  was  taken  away. 
In  recompense  the  municipalities  were  allowed  to  util- 
ize the  state  share  of  direct  taxes  upon  town  and  coun- 
try real  estate,  and  also  the  industrial  tax.  Some 
minor  sources  of  income  were  further  transferred  from 
the  central  authority  of  the  state  to  the  muncipalities. 
Tho  local  imposts  on  alcoholic  or  spirituous  beverages 
were  not  disturbed.  These  changes  were  necessarily 
provisional,  and  subject  to  the  readjustment  of  the  in- 
ternal fiscal  system  of  the  entire  island. 

Under  the  American  military  authority  a reappor- 
tionment of  the  municipalities  in  their  boundaries  and 
classifications  was  also  outlined.  Its  provisional  and 
temporary  diameter  renders  valueless  a detailed  exam- 
ination of  its  effect  on  the  local  political  organisms  of 
the  island.  To  a proper  understanding  of  the  future 
system  of  municipal  self-government  a knowledge  of 
their  relation  to  the  provinces  is  necessary. 


CHAPTER  YII 

Provinces  as  a Federal  Framework 

No  Identity  with  Municipalities — Municipal  Measures  of  Self-De- 
fence in  Past — Provinces  Not  Similar  to  American  States — Forms 
of  Civil  Authority — Governor  and  Deputation — Not  Genuine 
Local  Parliaments — Instruments  of  Central  Authority — Provin- 
cial Commissions  the  Real  Power — Deputations  Abolished  Under 
American  Administration — Judicial  Districts  as  Political  Units 
— Establishment  of  Supreme  Court — Registries  of  Property — 
Creation  of  Advisory  Cabinet — Changes  in  Boundaries  of  Prov- 
inces Not  Probable — What  Regionalism  Means — Remedy  for  It 
— Plans  for  Decentralization. 

Midway  between  local  administration  and  the  central 
authority  was  the  provincial  government.  It  will  be  of 
more  importance  in  the  future  of  Cuba  than  it  was  in 
the  past  of  Spain.  Its  former  relation  was  hardly 
definable.  The  provinces  were  facts  of  geography  and 
fictions  of  administration. 

They  did  not  grow  out  of  any  system  of  town  and 
country  government.  With  the  insight  afforded  into 
the  municipal  administration  of  Cuba,  and  even  with 
the  modifications  proposed  by  autonomy,  the  investiga- 
tor will  not  find  much  of  local  self-rule.  He  will  search 
in  vain  for  the  genesis  of  the  New  England  town  meet- 
ing. His  quest  for  something  resembling  the  newly 
formed  community  of  tire  West  in  the  pioneer  days, 
coming  together  by  natural  movement,  calling  itself 
into  being,  and  providing  for  the  management  of  its  own 

124 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


affairs,  would  be  barren.  One  reason  would  be  that 
Spanish  colonial  government  is  old  and  there  was  a 
precedent  for  every  condition  that  might  arise.  And  as 
the  precedents  were  not  favorable  to  the  self- ruling 
instinct,  the  ideas  which  would  be  encountered  on  this 
subject  would  be  primary,  hardly  rudimentary. 

Jaruco,  in  the  province  of  Habana,  has  a connected 
municipal  history  of  one  hundred  and  forty  years,  but 
there  is  no  record  of  a town  gathering  to  consider 
public  improvements  or  of  an  indignation  meeting  to 
protest  against  acts  of  public  officials.  Trinidad,  in 
Santa  Clara  province,  has  an  historic  banner  going 
back  almost  to  the  foundation  of  the  town  in  the  early 
part  of  the  sixteenth  century,  but  it  has  no  memorials 
of  local  government.  The  town  of  Villa  Clara  has  a 
history  filled  with  incident,  but  the  incidents  are  not 
of  the  community’s  management  of  its  own  local  affairs 
by  elections  and  by  free  discussion.  Matanzas  has  a 
municipal  organization  recorded  stage  by  stage  from 
the  opening  of  the  seventeenth  century  to  the  present 
day.  Its  leading  chapters  in  local  administration  are 
the  measures  it  organized  at  various  periods  for  de- 
fence against  the  pirates  and  the  filibusters.  Puerto 
Principe  tells  the  same  story,  and  its  most  luminous 
chapter  is  the  heroic  defence  of  the  alcalde  and  the  citi- 
zens against  the  land  incursion  of  Morgan  and  his  buc- 
caneers in  1GG8. 

Habana’s  early  history  is  filled  with  similar  inci- 
dents. When  the  English  assaulted  the  city  the  regi- 
dores,  or  aldermen,  were  in  charge  of  the  garrisons. 
Habana  at  that  time  was  a larger  city  than  the  Boston 
which  held  the  tea  party  or  the  New  York  which  a 

125 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


dozen  and  more  years  later  expelled  Lord  Howe.  It 
was  almost  as  large  as  the  Philadelphia  in  which  the 
Continental  Congress  met.  It  complained  righteously 
that  its  municipal  basis  had  continued  since  its  primi- 
tive creation  that  of  the  smallest  councils  in  the  penin- 
sula. In  the  first  quarter  of  this  century  it  remon- 
strated that  it  had  no  power  to  control  municipal 
government,  that  its  council  was  in  shackled  hands. 
There  was,  nevertheless,  more  local  or  municipal  lib- 
erty, though  not  of  free  discussion,  during  the  first  three 
centuries  of  Spanish  government  of  Cuba  than  during 
this  last  century.  The  need  of  measures  of  self-defence 
was  one.  The  Council  of  the  Indies  was  also  concerned 
with  the  commercial  benefits  arising  from  liberal  treat- 
ment of  the  municipalities,  and  the  dangers  of  political 
revolution  were  not  great.  But  in  those  times  the  prov- 
inces of  Cuba  did  not  exist  as  geographical  or  political 
divisions. 

Rising  from  the  subject  of  local  and  municipal  gov- 
ernment to  that  of  provincial  or  territorial  government, 
it  may  be  said  that  there  was  none  in  the  American 
sense.  The  provinces  did  not  have  that  degree  of  inde- 
pendence which  is  conceded  to  territories  in  the  United 
States.  There  was  nothing  that  approached  the  idea 
of  a provincial  legislature.  No  conception  of  such  a 
function  could  exist  in  a country  where  there  was  no 
national  legislature;  where  the  Cortes  across  the  sea 
legislated,  and  the  agents  of  the  crown  administered 
according  to  their  own  will.  For  a series  of  years  Cuba 
was  divided  politically  into  territorial  provinces  each 
with  a lieutenant-governor  appointed  by  the  Captain- 
General.  There  were  also  military,  judicial,  regional, 

126 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


maritime,  ecclosastical,  ami  economic  divisions.  Their 
spheres  and  functions  are  indicated  by  their  names, 
except  possibly  the  economic  division,  which  is  hotter 
described  as  the  real  hacienda,  or  royal  treasury.  It 
was  the  fiscal  department  of  the  island.  These  depart- 
ments interlaced  as  it  were  in  a network,  without  clear 
distinction  between  administrative  and  other  branches; 
but  since  the  Spanish  system  was  essentially  military, 
they  all  converged  in  the  Captain-General,  called  in  his 
civil  capacity  the  Governor-General. 

By  the  royal  decree  of  1878  the  provinces  of  the 
island  were  fixed  as  they  exist  to-day,  the  division  be- 
ing into  six  civil  jurisdictions,  which  took  their  names 
from  their  respective  capitals.  With  these  provinces 
in  mind,  the  other  divisions  into  maritime,  regional, 
ecclesiastical,  and  so  on  may  be  ignored.  The  admin- 
istrative authorities  of  each  province  were  the  governor, 
the  provincial  deputation,  and  the  provincial  commission 
or  junta.  The  governor  was  named  by  the  supreme  au- 
thority. He  had  a substantial  veto  on  the  acts  of  the 
avuntamientos  and  of  the  deputations.  He  supervised 
elections.  To  him  was  especially  intrusted  the  admin- 
istration of  public  order  in  the  province.  Genuine 
provincial  government  was  lost  somewhere  in  these 
centralized  functions  of  government  and  administration. 
To  find  it  again  and  restore  it  to  its  proper  place  and 
rightful  function  is  one  of  the  tasks  of  the  future. 

The  political  entity  of  the  province  was  recognized 
in  the  provincial  deputations.  Their  similarity  to  the 
same  bodies  in  the  peninsula  was  often  quoted  as  evi- 
dence that  Cuba  enjoyed  as  much  civil  liberty  as  did 
the  mother  country  herself.  Cuba,  it  was  declared, 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


had  local  parliaments,  and  could  ask  nothing  more  with- 
out placing  herself  on  a higher  plane  than  the  provinces 
of  the  peninsula.  But  the  parliamentary  character  of 
these  provincial  deputations  does  not  disclose  itself  on 
inquiry.  They  were  anachronisms.  They  were  merely 
another  check  on  local  self-government.  They  were 
neither  provincial  legislatures  nor  provincial  councils. 
The  deputation  was  composed  of  deputies  selected  by 
the  electors  wdio  voted  for  concejales.  Three  were 
chosen  from  each  judicial  district  of  the  province. 
Their  term  was  four  years.  The  deputation  was  es- 
pecially charged,  first,  with  the  improvement  of  the 
roads,  irrigation  canals,  provincial  public  works,  hospi- 
tals, and  instruction;  secondly,  with  the  administration 
of  provincial  funds  and  the  general  management  of  the 
fiscal  affairs.  Educational  establishments  might  be 
created  or  sustained  by  the  deputations,  subject  to  the 
general  law  regarding  public  instruction.  With  rela- 
tion to  the  municipalities  the  deputation  enjoyed  the 
faculties  conferred  upon  it  by  the  municipal  law,  which 
were  of  a general  supervisory  character. 

Then  there  was  the  provincial  commission,  which 
was  named  by  the  Governor-General  from  the  members 
of  the  deputation.  Its  membership  was  five.  The  com- 
mission was  assumed  to  hold  regular  sittings  at  the 
capital  of  the  province.  It  answered  to  the  Governor- 
General’s  Council  of  Administration.  Its  members 
were  lawyers,  and  they  gave  opinions  upon  the  laws 
and  regulations  submitted  to  them  by  the  governor  of 
the  province  or  by  the  Governor-General.  It  decided 
disputed  elections,  and  the  eligibility  of  deputies  when 
this  was  questioned.  It  acted  as  the  provincial  deputa- 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tion  in  emergencies  when  the  full  deputation  could  not 
bo  got  together.  In  practice  the  commission,  created 
out  of  the  body  of  the  deputation,  served  a useful 
purpose  as  instrument  of  the  central  authority.  By 
chance  or  by  neglect  it  would  sometimes  happen  that 
the  majority  in  a provincial  deputation  would  be  Au- 
tonomists. The  superior  power  would  feel  obliged  to 
check  their  too  dangerous  gropings  after  liberal  gov- 
ernment, and  their  tendency  to  exercise  to  the  limit 
the  narrow  prerogatives  which  the  statutes  gave  them. 
This  was  done  by  the  Governor-General  in  naming  the 
permanent  commission.  There  could  always  be  found 
live  or  six  members  who  would  be  subservient  to  the 
powers  above.  And  thus  what  little  good  was  in  the 
provincial  deputations  was  destroyed. 

The  provincial  commissions  underwent  an  organic 
change  in  the  law  of  1890,  but  the  change  is  not  impor- 
tant now.  Under  the  autonomous  constitution  of  1897 
they  were  declared  to  be  of  a permanent  character. 
They  were  given  essentially  judicial  functions.  The 
provincial  magistrates  of  the  audiencia,  or  general  court, 
were  to  preside  over  the  commissions,  which  were  to  be 
known  as  provincial  juntas.  These  juntas  were  to  be 
composed  of  fifteen  vocales,  or  delegates.  By  virtue  of 
their  being  provincial  deputies,  the  president  and  vice- 
president  of  the  deputation  and  the  oldest  ex-presi- 
dent were  to  be  vocales.  There  were  also  to  be  four 
tax-payers  chosen  by  lot  from  among  those  who  paid 
the  first  quota  of  the  industrial  tax,  four  from  among 
those  who  paid  the  first  quota  of  the  land  tax,  and  four 
citizens  who  had  official  titles  showing  their  profes- 
sional or  academic  standing. 

9 129 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  autonomist  decrees  made  the  deputations  auton- 
omous in  everything  relating  to  the  creation  and  dota- 
tion of  establishments  of  public  instruction,  charitable 
institutions,  provincial  rights  of  way,  maritime  or 
fluvial,  and  the  budget.  The  decrees  also  authorized 
both  the  municipalities  and  the  provinces  to  establish 
freely  the  taxes  to  cover  their  expenses  without  other 
limitation  than  that  these  should  be  compatible  with 
the  general  taxing  system  of  the  island.  The  resources 
for  taxation  of  a province  were  declared  to  be  indepen- 
dent of  the  municipal  resources.  In  the  election  of 
members  of  the  ayuntamientos  and  the  deputations, 
provision  was  to  be  made  for  minority  representation. 
From  these  provisions  some  hints  may  be  had  for 
the  future,  but  that  is  all.  The  provincial  deputations 
were  so  utterly  useless  that  they  were  abolished  by 
the  American  military  administration.  They  are  not 
likely  to  be  re-established  under  any  system  of  govern- 
ment that  may  be  adopted. 

In  describing  the  municipalities,  reference  has  been 
made  to  the  judicial  districts.  In  Spain’s  colonial 
administration  the  judicial  district  seems  to  have  been 
the  political  unit.  At  one  period  it  was  almost  synony- 
mous with  or  meant  the  same  as  the  military  partido, 
or  district.  The  laws  following  the  compact  of  El  Zan- 
jon  made  no  important  change  in  the  judicial  system  of 
the  island.  There  were  33  judicial  districts  then,  and 
the  number  has  been  increased  or  decreased  by  one  or 
two  at  different  times.  The  judicial  districts  in  the 
island  number  at  present  34.  They  are  divided  among 
the  provinces  as  follows : Pinar  del  Rio,  5 ; Habana,  7 ; 
Matanzas,  6;  Santa  Clara,  6;  Puerto  Principe,  3;  San- 

130 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tiago  do  Cuba,  7.  Each  judicial  district  is  tho  cabe- 
cera,  or  head,  of  a number  of  municipalities.  Some- 
times, as  in  the  case  of  the  city  of  Habana,  there  is 
only  one  municipality,  but  most  of  tho  districts  have 
included  in  their  jurisdiction  half  a dozen  municipali- 
ties. Each  district  has  a judge  of  the  first  instance, 
except  that  of  Habana,  which  necessarily  has  more 
than  one.  This  judge  of  the  first  instance,  or  primary 
judge,  might  be  designated  variously  as  a county,  dis- 
trict, or  circuit  judge.  Tho  judicial  partido  would  be 
known  in  the  United  States  as  a circuit  rather  than  as 
a district.  What  are  known  as  the  municipal  judges 
come  closer  to  the  definition  of  county  judges  and  jus- 
tices of  the  peace.  They  are  more  numerous  than  the 
judges  of  the  first  instance,  numbering  two  hundred. 
The  municipal  judges  have  the  ordinary  functions  of 
local  magistrates  and  possess  police  powers.  The 
judges  of  all  classes  were  appointed  by  the  higher 
authorities. 

The  audiencias,  or  general  courts,  as  commonly  un- 
derstood, w'ould  be  called  appellate  courts  in  most  of 
the  States  of  the  Union.  Under  Spanish  sovereignty 
the  final  appeal  was  to  the  courts  in  Madrid.  Origi- 
nally in  Cuba  justice  was  administered  from  the  ancient 
audiencia  established  in  Santo  Domingo.  When  that 
island  was  ceded  to  France  in  1795,  the  judicial  tribu- 
nal was  translated  to  the  city  of  Puerto  Principe  as 
the  most  midland  one  of  Cuba.  It  began  its  functions 
in  1S02.  In  1838  a second  audiencia  was  established  in 
Habana,  and  with  a pretorial  character  which  was  lack- 
ing in  the  Puerto  Principe  tribunal.  For  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  the  aim  wras  to  adapt  the  judicial 

131 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


districts  to  the  political  and  military  boundaries.  Till 
recently  Habana  constituted  the  superior  audiencia;  but 
Puerto  Principe  was  a royal  audiencia  to  which  per- 
tained civil  jurisdiction  over  Santiago  de  Cuba.  For- 
merly  the  division  was  into  twenty -six  judicial  districts, 
known  as  the  territory  of  the  royal  pretorial  audiencia, 
or  general  courts.  Each  of  these  judicial  districts  had 
an  alcalde  mayor  or  ordinary  judge  who  had  auxiliary 
alcaldes  or  local  judges.  The  appeal  lay  direct  from 
these  courts  of  conciliation  and  counsel  to  the  audiencia 
sitting  in  Habana. 

Each  province  of  the  island  is  a criminal  audiencia 
in  itself.  The  judgments  of  this  criminal  court  may  be 
appealed  to  the  criminal  section  of  the  Habana  audi- 
encia. The  audiencia  of  Habana  includes  the  province 
of  that  name  and  the  provinces  of  Pinar  del  Rio,  Ma- 
tanzas,  and  Santa  Clara.  While  each  municipality  is 
supposed  to  have  its  municipal  court,  there  are  some 
places  not  municipalities  which  have  their  municipal 
judge.  Habana  is  divided  into  districts  with  different 
branches  of  the  audiencia  having  jurisdiction.  Under 
the  American  military  authority,  a supreme  court  was 
established  to  take  the  place  of  the  Madrid  tribunals, 
which  were  the  courts  of  last  resort.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Cuba  consists  of  a chief-justice  and  six  asso- 
ciate justices.  An  independent  court  had  previously 
been  organized  in  the  province  of  Santiago  without  ref- 
erence to  the  former  pretorial  audiencia  of  Puerto  Prin- 
cipe, of  which  jurisdiction  it  was  part.  A question  was 
raised  whether  this  Santiago  court  was  final  in  its  decis- 
ions or  whether  they  could  be  appealed  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  island.  The  only  logical  answer  which 

132 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


could  be  given  to  this  question  was  given,  and  the  San- 
tiago tribunal  was  declared  a subordinate  one.  This 
sketch  of  the  administrative  organism  of  the  judicial 
system  is  presented  here  without  reference  to  the  laws 
themselves,  because  the  courts  are  a part  of  the  local 
and  the  provincial  regimes  as  of  the  general  govern- 
ment. 

Another  organism  is  that  of  the  registry  of  property. 
These  do  not  follow  the  lines  of  the  municipalities  or 
county  divisions,  as  is  customary  in  the  United  States, 
but  in  a general  way  follow  the  boundaries  of  the  judi- 
cial districts.  Actually  they  are  not  so  numerous.  By 
royal  decree  of  July  4th,  1871),  twenty-five  registries 
were  established  for  the  whole  island.  In  most  in- 
stances the  boundaries  are  coincident  and  coequal  with 
the  boundaries  of  the  judicial  districts;  but  Habana 
City  has  one  register  for  its  three  districts  and  for  its 
suburb  of  Marianao ; and  in  the  eastern  provinces  there 
are  also  consolidated  registries.  This  accounts  for  the 
number  of  registries  not  being  equal  to  that  of  the 
judcial  districts.  It  may  be  said  that  the  registries  of 
landownership  and  the  records  of  property  transfers 
are  well  kept.  Contrary  to  the  common  belief,  titles  in 
Cuba  are  easily  traced,  and  are,  if  anything,  more  secure 
than  in  the  United  States. 

From  what  is  and  what  has  been,  an  idea  may  be 
gained  of  what  the  internal  political  and  administrative 
framework  of  the  Cuba  of  the  future  may  be.  For  the 
present  it  is  not  of  moment  to  discuss  the  external 
aspects  of  the  prospective  state,  or  whether  it  shall  have 
departments  of  foreign  relations,  of  the  army,  and  of 
the  navy.  Cuba  may  be  considered  as  a federal  body 

133 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


with  central  authority  and  central  administration.  The 
difference  in  the  future  will  be  that  the  central  author- 
ity will  rest  on  a foundation  of  local  and  provincial 
government,  instead  of  the  provinces  and  municipalities 
depending  on  it  and  from  it.  The  old  conception  of 
centralized  authority  will  disappear.  Though  the  Cap- 
tain-General was  the  supreme  power,  even  before  the 
implantation  of  autonomy  he  had  his  Council  of  Ad- 
ministration which  advised  him  in  regard  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  colonial  statutes  and  their  application 
to  the  island,  or  to  its  provinces  and  municipalities. 
The  only  point  was  that  he  could  enforce  his  own  arbi- 
trary construction  whenever  he  chose.  This  freedom  of 
the  executive  from  responsibility  is  one  of  the  defects  of 
the  past  system  which  is  certain  to  be  remedied.  What- 
ever form  the  future  government  of  the  island  may 
take,  Cuba  will  have  a judiciary  department  coequal 
with  the  executive  branch.  It  has  seen  too  much  of 
the  subordination  and  the  prostitution  of  the  courts  ever 
to  consent  to  placing  them  on  a lower  plane  than  the 
executive  power. 

For  what  might  be  called  the  internal  federal  admin- 
istration, autonomy  made  little  change  in  the  outward 
system.  The  Autonomist  cabinet  in  practice  was  little 
more  than  raising  the  departments  of  the  treasury, 
public  works,  and  education  to  cabinet  positions,  with 
separate  functions  which  also  embraced  the  administra- 
tive features  of  the  courts  and  of  agriculture.  The  Ameri- 
can military  authority  created  a provisional  advisory 
cabinet  for  the  four  departments  respectively  of  the 
treasury,  of  state  and  government,  of  public  works, 
and  of  justice  and  education.  These  departments  are 

134 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  central  power  in  what  might  be  called  internal 
administration,  for  the  control  of  the  customs  was  kept 
so  largely  within  the  American  military  authority  that 
it  could  hardly  be  called  a part  of  the  actual  juris- 
diction of  the  provisional  treasury  department.  The 
department  of  state  is  a misnomer.  In  the  provisional 
arrangement  it  is  the  department  which  regulates  the 
relations  of  the  municipalities  and  provinces  to  the  gen- 
eral government.  In  the  evolution  of  the  common- 
wealth of  Cuba  its  functions  are  decidedly  the  most 
important  of  all  the  departments. 

The  six  provinces  will  probably  exist  in  the  future  as 
they  exist  to-day  geographically  and  politically.  Vari- 
ous suggestions  have  been  made  of  rearranging  their 
boundaries  and  consolidating  them.  The  natural  divi- 
sion would  be  into  the  eastern,  central,  and  western 
provinces.  The  Spanish  authorities  in  their  military 
and  judicial  divisions  split  the  island  into  two  districts. 
Pinar  del  Rio  was  also  at  one  time  joined  with  the 
province  of  Habana.  But  the  inhabitants  have  become 
accustomed  to  the  present  boundaries,  and  they  are  a 
people  who  cling  strongly  to  that  to  which  they  are 
accustomed.  Each  province  has  its  history,  its  local 
usages,  and  its  traditions.  Each  province  has  a capi- 
tal of  the  same  name.  When  General  J.  C.  Bates  fixed 
the  military  headquarters  of  his  department  at  Cienfu- 
egos,  a mere  military  convenience,  strong  feeling  was 
aroused  in  the  little  city  of  Santa  Clara,  which  under 
Spanish  sway  was  the  centre  of  both  political  and  mili- 
tary administration.  The  people  protested  against  the 
removal  of  the  ancient  capital  of  the  province.  Tri- 
fling as  was  the  incident,  the  intensity  of  the  protests 

135 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


showed  how  difficult  it  would  be  to  enter  upon  a series 
of  changes  which  upset  old  boundaries  and  did  violence 
to  ancient  memories. 

Some  of  the  Cuban  revolutionary  leaders  have 
worked  out  a plan  of  five  provinces  to  replace  the  exist- 
ing division.  The  first  Cuban  revolutionary  assembly 
divided  the  island  into  four  jurisdictions,  with  prefec- 
turas  and  sub-prefecturas  as  the  subordinate  adminis- 
trative districts.  But  this  was  for  the  military  opera- 
tions of  the  insurgent  troops,  and  never  came  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  They  are  at- 
tached to  the  present  divisions  and  may  be  depended 
on  to  oppose  a change. 

These  six  provinces  are  also  to  be  considered  as  six 
states  or  territories  within  a nation,  rather  than  as  six 
great  counties  within  a state.  But  this  is  within  defi- 
nite limitations.  The  wisest  among  the  Cuban  lead- 
ers already  appreciate  the  importance  of  nationalizing 
the  sentiment  while  decentralizing  the  administration. 
The  provinces  will  have  elective  civil  governors — that 
can  be  readily  foreseen.  The  uncertain  question  is 
how  much  further  they  will  go.  The  uselessness  of  the 
provincial  deputations  has  been  disclosed,  and  at  this 
day  there  is  little  disposition  to  revive  them.  A pro- 
vincial parliament  in  the  sense  of  a twofold  legislative 
body  corresponding  to  the  American  State  legislatures 
is  not  an  apparent  necessity  even  as  a part  of  the  edu- 
cation in  popular  government.  With  the  laws  uniform 
for  the  whole  island,  as  they  will  be,  there  does  not 
appear  to  be  a wide  sphere  for  provincial  lawmaking. 
The  administrative  functions  are  the  important  ones. 

It  may  be  that  the  doubt  will  ultimately  resolve  itself 

136 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


into  the  creation  of  councils  something  like  the  territo- 
rial councils  in  the  early  history  of  the  Western  territo- 
ries of  the  Union.  These  councils  may  possess  mixed 
executive  and  legislative  functions.  They  may  become 
the  general  board  with  reference  to  the  municipalities, 
but  not  in  the  sense  of  the  veto  power  possessed  by  the 
old  provincial  deputations.  An  understanding  of  the 
sentiment  as  it  exists  to-day  will  make  this  clear.  The 
people  of  the  various  communities  have  a real  longing 
for  home  rule.  They  may  not  know  much  about  the 
system  in  operation,  they  may  not  do  it  so  well  as 
higher  authority  w’ould  do  it  for  them,  but  they  have  a 
full  determination  to  do  it  themselves  without  the  veto 
of  provincial  assembly,  provincial  governor,  or  Gover- 
nor-General. Some  general  legislation  will  undoubt- 
edly be  enacted  which  will  simplify  their  work.  Prob- 
ably the  line  between  town  and  country  government  will 
be  drawn  more  distinctly,  so  that  the  confusing  term 
municipality — confusing  to  Americans — will  not  have 
its  present  wide  application.  But  the  organization  of 
either  country  grouping  or  of  town  inhabitants  will  be 
on  the  basis  of  self-government  within  the  administra- 
tive organism  of  the  province.  The  municipalities, 
whether  city  or  rural,  are  units  of  the  future  provincial 
administration.  The  provinces  are  the  units  of  the 
decentralized  federal  authority  that  is  to  be  evolved 
into  a commonwealth. 

The  physical  features  of  the  various  provinces  may 
be  said  to  have  a bearing  on  the  political  characteristics 
of  their  inhabitants;  yet  these  are  not  marked  enough 
to  develop  strong  differences.  Most  of  the  mineral 
wealth  is  in  the  eastern  section  of  the  island,  and  the 

137 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tobacco  districts  are  the  central  and  western  regions. 
Beyond  this  there  is  a general  similarity  of  products. 
No  dangerous  diversity  is  likely  to  spring  up  among 
people  who  follow  similar  pursuits.  Like  the  Span- 
iards in  the  island,  the  Cubans  have  their  distinctions 
of  localities.  With  the  blacks  of  Santiago  there  is  a 
slight  mixture  of  Jamaica  negroes,  while  Haiti  and 
Santo  Domingo  also  have  representation.  The  mulatto 
element  there  is  the  result  of  the  crossing  of  French 
blood.  Around  Baracoa  and  the  towns  on  the  north 
coast  are  yet  traces  of  the  habits  and  customs  of  the 
French  refugees  of  Santo  Domingo.  These  French  ref- 
ugees were  the  most  progressive  industrial  element  that 
ever  entered  into  the  life  of  Cuba.  The  Camagiieyans, 
the  inhabitants  of  the  central  province  of  Puerto  Prin- 
cipe, are  fond  of  calling  themselves  the  genuine  Cu- 
bans; and  in  this  part  of  the  island  it  must  be  con- 
fessed there  is  little  of  Spain,  though  sometimes  a trace 
of  Africa  appears  in  the  blood.  Santa  Clara,  more  par- 
ticularly the  eastern  part  of  the  province,  also  claims 
the  distinction  of  being  purely  Cuban.  As  with  the 
Camagiieyans,  its  men  are  superior  physically  to  those 
in  the  western  part  of  the  island.  From  Matanzas  west 
through  Habana  and  Pinar  del  Rio  there  is  more 
mezcla  or  reunion  of  Spanish  and  Cuban  blood. 

The  Spanish  writers  called  this  provincial  sentiment, 
when  applied  to  the  people  of  the  various  provinces 
of  the  peninsula,  regionalism.  It  might  be  translated 
into  English  by  the  word  sectionalism.  Whatever  dan- 
ger of  sectionalism  exists  is  in  the  two  eastern  prov- 
inces of  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  Puerto  Principe.  They 
were  in  constant  rebellion  against  Spanish  authority, 

138 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  the  query  is  whether  they  will  not  insist  on  having 
independent  governments  of  their  own  rather  than  be 
parts  of  a central  political  organism.  Santiago  prov- 
ince especially  is  credited  with  this  possible  ambition. 
The  city  of  that  name  in  a small  way  is  a rival  of  Ha- 
bana.  Tho  province  is  geographically  almost  discon- 
nected from  the  rest  of  the  island.  Symptoms  of  oppo- 
sition to  the  general  government  were  shown  under  the 
American  control.  At  regular  periods  protests  would 
bo  made  against  the  customs  receipts  being  distributed 
throughout  the  island,  instead  of  the  dues  received  at 
the.  Santiago  ports  boing  disbursed  exclusively  in  that 
province.  This  attitude  was  indirectly  encouraged  by 
the  American  officials  wrho  were  administering  the  af- 
fairs of  the  province  as  an  independent  department. 
Santiago,  as  it  happened,  came  under  the  American 
control  several  months  before  the  remaining  provinces. 
So  much  was  accomplished  there  under  the  wise  di- 
rection of  General  Leonard  Wood,  that  it  was  perhaps 
naturally  his  part  to  seek  the  fullest  freedom  of  admin- 
istration, as  though  the  eastern  end  of  the  island  were 
a separate  country. 

Should  the  popular  currents  run  for  annexation  when 
the  time  comes  to  determine  the  form  of  stable  govern- 
ment which  is  to  prevail,  a revival  of  this  feeling  may 
be  looked  for  in  the  request  of  Santiago  to  be  joined 
with  Puerto  Principe  and  be  erected  into  a separate 
state.  But  in  the  presumption  of  an  independent  isl- 
and government  too  much  stress  should  not  be  given 
temporary  outcroppings  of  regionalism  on  the  part  of 
Santiago  or  Puerto  Principe.  The  building  of  the  cen- 
tral or  backbone  railroad  will  draw  these  provinces  into 

139 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


closer  industrial  and  commercial  relation  with  the  west- 
ern provinces,  and  their  political  interests  are  in  any 
circumstance  identical  with  the  rest  of  the  island.  The 
free  institutions  for  which  all  aspire  are  the  same.  To 
check  the  spread  of  regionalism  or  sectionalism  all  the 
provinces  should  share  equitably  in  the  central  admin- 
istration. With  uniform  general  laws,  and  with  the 
municipalities  acting  as  independent  local  organisms 
within  the  provinces,  the  latter  will  have  a distinct 
function  in  the  commonwealth.  They  should  form  the 
administrative  federal  framework  on  a decentralized 
basis. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


The  Race  of  Color 

Scflor  Don  a Gentleman — Official  Definition  of  Civil  Status — Spanish 
Law  Affirmed  by  American  Authority — Nightmare  of  Black  West 
India  League — Analysis  of  Statistics  of  Population — Comparison 
with  Jamaica — Relative  Decrease  of  Blacks — Temporary  Relative 
Increase  as  the  Result  of  Reconcentration — Colonization  Improb- 
able— Value  of  Negro  Labor  on  Plantations — Higher  Industrial 
Plane  than  in  the  United  States — No  Color-Line — Dispropor- 
tionate Number  of  Criminals — Sfafiigoisin  a Misleading  Term 
for  Crime — Advance  of  Blacks  Under  the  Spanish  Civilization 
— Future  Standing  that  of  Political  and  Industrial  Equality. 

A staring  interrogation  is  better  answered  when  first 
met.  What  of  the  black  race?  The  question  cannot 
be  evaded.  The  existence  of  the  blacks  must  be  reck- 
oned with  in  every  phase  of  the  reconstruction  of  the 
island.  Consequently  their  standing  and  their  pros- 
pects are  now  discussed  with  the  simple  reminder  that 
Cuba  has  social  and  economic  problems  to  solve  as 
well  as  political  ones.  The  African  population  has  a de- 
fined status  socially,  industrially,  and  politically.  The 
black  race  has  no  future  separate  from  that  of  the  other 
inhabitants  of  Cuba.  It  is  essentially  and  integrally  a 
part  of  that  future. 

The  negro  or  the  mulatto  may  call  himself  “Don,” 
and  ask  that  others  use  the  prefix  in  addressing  him. 
This  is  more  than  the  simple  “ Mister  ” of  American  fa- 

141 


TO-MOKKOW  IN  CUBA 


miliarity.  “Senor”  answers  to  that  meaning.  “Don” 
is  the  “Esquire,”  the  old  English  designation  for  gen- 
tleman, the  title  of  courtesy,  and  it  is  translated  by 
the  dictionaries  as  the  Spanish  name  for  gentleman. 
The  colored  man  is  not  simply  Senor  So-and-So:  he 
is  Senor  Don  So-and-So.  The  prefix  was  the  posses- 
sion of  the  proudest  grandees  of  Spain,  and  it  is  still 
supposed  to  carry  with  it  a certain  dignity.  The  Cap- 
tain-General of  Spain,  whose  titles  filled  half  a page, 
was  always  “ Don  ” in  the  beginning  of  his  official  dig- 
nities and  honors.  And  under  Spanish  law,  by  formal 
resolution  of  a Captain-General,  the  humblest  negro  in 
Cuba  was  decreed  as  rightfully  using  the  same  prefix. 

The  distinct  recognition  of  the  civil  status  of  the 
African  race  under  the  Spanish  law  was  formally  pro- 
claimed by  Captain-General  Calleja  in  1893.  It  was, 
in  effect,  the  interpretation  and  indorsement  given  by 
the  Council  of  Administration  in  affirming  previous  de- 
crees. This  action  is  sometimes  described  as  a mere 
authorization  of  the  blacks  to  use  the  title  of  “Don.” 
In  reality  it  was  far  more.  The  story  of  this  definition 
of  the  civil  rights  of  the  race  of  color  under  Spanish 
law  is  instructive.  Various  societies  of  blacks  peti- 
tioned the  superior  authorities  that  they  direct  the 
governors  of  the  provinces  and  the  presiding  judges  and 
fiscals,  or  prosecuting  attorneys,  of  the  courts  to  com- 
municate to  their  subordinates  the  decrees  and  official 
dispositions  previously  made  affirming  the  right  of  the 
colored  classes  to  enjoy  equal  rights  with  the  white 
classes,  and  prohibiting  the  establishment  of  distinc- 
tions by  reason  of  color.  The  official  dispositions  pre- 
viously made  forbade  the  proprietors  of  cafes  or  sirni- 

142 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


lar  public  places  to  discriminate  against  persons  of 
color,  and  affirmed  the  privilege  of  the  blacks  to  travel 
on  the  railways  on  the  same  terms  as  the  whites. 

The  Council  of  Administration  under  Captain-General 
Calleja  did  not  consider  instructions  to  the  courts  nec- 
essary, but  it  granted  the  other  requests  of  the  colored 
societies.*  The  basis  which  it  affirmed  was  an  official 
disposition  made  by  the  governor  of  the  province  of 
Pinar  del  Rio  in  1885.  A negro  complained  that  the 
proprietor  of  a cafe  refused  to  serve  him  because  of  his 
color.  The  government  thereupon  issued  an  order 
directing  that  the  penalties  bo  enforced  and  that  the 
discrimination  cease.  This  order  recited  that  “ if  cus- 
toms were  the  fruits  of  the  ideas  which  inspired  the 
laws,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  supreme  authority,  mindful 
of  its  own,  to  combat  the  prejudices  in  the  minds  of  the 
people  from  usages  and  opinions  born  of  times  which 
had  disappeared,  never  to  return.  For  the  success  of 
such  important  ends  it  was  competent  for  the  superior 
authority  to  consecrate  itself  to  the  maintenance  and 
the  respect  of  the  rights  which  the  Spanish  constitution 
guaranteed  to  every  Spanish  citizen,  and  which  reposed 
in  the  principle  of  equality.”  This  declaration  stands 
unchanged.  Under  the  Spanish  rule  few  instances 
arose  in  which  this  enforcement  was  necessary. 

After  the  American  occupation  a mulatto  chief  of  the 
insurrection  was  refused  entertainment  in  a cafe  kept 
by  Americans.  The  Spanish  code  of  civil  rights,  cited 
above,  was  invoked  and  was  enforced.  However  dis- 
tasteful it  may  be  to  American  prejudices,  the  code  will 
be  enforced.  Nor  will  there  ever  be  discrimination 

* Gaceta  de  la  Habana,  December  19th,  1893. 

143 


TO-MORKOW  IN  CUBA 


on  account  of  color  in  the  privileges  of  railroad  travel. 
The  American  military  authorities  from  the  outset 
showed  a scrupulous  regard  for  the  civil  rights  of  the 
blacks.  So  far  as  their  official  acts  went,  they  studi- 
ously ignored  the  color-line  and  discouraged  race  prej- 
udice. The  social  toleration  which  was  so  natural  for 
Spaniards  and  white  Cubans  did  not  prove  difficult  for 
the  military  commanders.  But  their  example  was  not 
always  followed  by  their  own  countrymen. 

The  idea  of  a black  West  India  republic  has  been 
both  a dream  and  a nightmare.  It  haunted  the  Eng- 
lish historian,  James  Anthony  Froude,  like  a spectre, 
and  conjured  up  for  him  visions  of  a mongrel  nation  of 
negroids.  In  moments  of  despair  American  states- 
men have  dreamed  it  a3  the  solution  to  the  problem 
of  the  African  race  in  the  United  States.  To  more  of 
them  it  has  been  a nightmare,  a fear  that  the  Antilles 
would  become,  if  not  a menace,  at  least  a bar  to  the 
civilization  of  the  continent.  Haiti,  on  the  map  hardly 
bigger  than  a man’s  hand,  in  the  Antillian  sky  became 
a portentous  cloud.  The  cloud  is  a psychic,  not  a physi- 
cal phenomenon.  It  disappears  on  analysis.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  century,  when  Humboldt  * began  to 
differentiate  the  population  of  the  West  Indies,  the 
blacks  in  Cuba  were  in  excess  of  the  whites.  The  fig- 
ures as  then  collated  were  as  follows : 

* After  Humboldt,  the  most  complete  analyses  were  given  by  Ar- 
boleya  in  his  “Manual  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba,”  published  in  1859,  and 
by  Pezuela  in  the  “ Diccionario  de  la  Isla  Cuba,”  published  in 
1863.  The  fullest  analysis  of  the  subsequent  censuses  may  be  found 
in  “La  Revista  Cubana”  in  a series  of  articles  by  Seiior  Coppinger. 
While  perplexed  by  confusing  figures  and  unreliable  official  statis- 
tics, all  the  authorities  substantially  agree  in  their  conclusions. 

144 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


1811.  1817.  1825. 

Whites.... 274, OIK)  290,000  .125,000 

Blacks  330,000  340,208  300, 000 


Total 010,000  030,208  715,000 


A discrepancy  between  the  statistics  of  1811  and 
1817  is  chargeable  to  imperfect  census-taking.  It  is 
also  noted  that  from  1811  to  1825  the  jurisdiction  of 
Habana  received  185,000  negroes  brought  by  the  slave 
traders  from  Africa.  With  respect  to  other  countries  in 
1825,  the  population  of  Cuba  was  almost  double  that  of 
Jamaica.  By  color,  thus : 


White.  Black. 

Cuba 40  per  cent.  54  per  cent. 

Jamaica 6 “ 94  “ 


Taking  the  greater  Antilles  as  a group,  Humboldt 
found  that,  excluding  fractional  percentages,  the  pure 
blacks  were  G8  per  cent,  the  mixed  blacks  15  per  cent, 
the  whites  17  per  cent.  These  estimates  are  simply 
relative,  the  exact  proportion  not  being  determined.  A 
generation  may  be  passed  over  without  special  observa- 
tion, and  the  statistics  gathered  in  1855  be  analyzed. 
During  those  thirty  years  the  slave  trade  had  not  been 
seriously  restricted,  though  Spain  was  party  to  the 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  for  its  abolition.  Here  is  the 
relation  of  the  two  races  in  Cuba  in  1855 : 

Whites 498,752  47.65  per  cent. 

Blacks 645,433  52.35  “ 

Total 1,044,185  100.00  per  cent. 

A fractional  reduction  of  the  black  percentage  and  a 
corresponding  increase  of  the  white  percentage  appear, 
10  145 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


yet  so  slight  as  to  indicate  no  real  change  in  the  rela- 
tive position  of  the  two  races.  Arboleya,  taking  the 
years  1827  and  1854,  analyzed  the  statistics  which  he 
considered  trustworthy  a little  differently.  He  placed 
the  percentage  of  whites  in  1827  at  44,  and  of  blacks  at 
56.  In  1854  he  made  it,  whites  47  per  cent,  and  blacks 
53.  Another  ten  or  twelve  years,  and  the  change  had 
begun  which  has  since  continued.  The  census  of  1867, 
taken  a twelvemonth  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Ten- 
Tears’  war,  and  before  the  gradual  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  commenced,  shows : 


Whites 764,750  65.09  per  cent. 

Blacks 605,461  44.91  « 

Total 1,370,211  100.00  per  cent. 


Here  is  an  apparent  increase  in  the  number  of  wThites 
of  326,000,  while  the  increase  of  the  blacks  is  only 
60,000.  Actually  it  was  less,  because  the  Chinese, 
vaguely  enumerated,  were  included.  In  1877  the  total 
population  had  grown  to  1,509,291.  Leaving  out  40,000 
Asiatics  and  8,400  foreigners,  and  making  the  correction 
of  the  Madrid  statistics  for  transients  and  absent  resi- 
dents, we  have  a difference  of  7,000. 

Whites 973,725  67  per  cent. 

Blacks 480,166  33  “ 

Total  whites  and  blacks 1,453,891  100  per  cent. 

These  figures  show  an  actual,  as  well  as  a relative 
decrease  in  the  number  of  blacks.  It  is  so  large  as  to 
be  puzzling.  The  Spanish  statisticians  explain  it  on 
the  ground  of  imperfect  census-taking.  This  is  always 
a justifiable  explanation  in  dealing  with  Spanish  statis- 

146 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tics.  It  does  not  alter  the  known  fact  that  the  relative 
decrease  of  tho  blacks  had  begun,  and  that  a largo  in- 
crease of  tho  whites  was  taking  place,  partly  from 
immigration  and  partly  from  natural  development. 
Coming  to  1887,  tho  last  regular  census  that  was  taken, 
the  results  show : 


Whites 1,102,889  69.40  per  cent. 

Blacks 484,987  30.54  “ 

Total 1,687,870  100.00  per  cent 

Asiatics 43,811 

Grand  total 1,031,087 


Foreigners,  who  had  grown  to  exceed  32,000,  are  in- 
cluded among  the  whites.  They  wero  relatively  so 
large  an  element  that  they  may  properly  bo  considered 
in  balancing  the  races. 

Here  is  an  actual  decrease  in  the  percentage  of  the 
blacks  during  tho  ten  years.  If  the  figures  are  in 
error,  it  is  possible  to  accept  the  conclusion  that  the 
blacks  were  stationary  while  the  whites  were  progress- 
ing. There  -was  a large  increase  by  white  immigration 
from  Spain  during  this  period.  This  steady  decrease 
of  the  negroes  under  the  most  favored  conditions  seems 
to  be  conclusive  as  to  the  natural  ascendency  of  the 
whites  by  force  of  numbers.  It  is  true  that  the  cen- 
suses taken  were  all  based  on  slave  conditions ; but  the 
emancipation  of  the  negroes  had  been  going  on,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  increase  of  population 
has  been  larger  during  the  years  of  freedom.  In  the 
first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  54  per  cent  of 
Cuba  was  black  blood,  46  per  cent  white  blood.  In  the 

147 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


middle  of  the  century  practically  the  same  conditions 
obtained.  At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century 
relatively  30  per  cent  black  and  70  per  cent  white  blood 
is  the  proportion. 

The  census  of  to-day  may  show  a larger  percent- 
age of  negroes  and  mulattoes,  due  to  artificial  causes. 
Every  observer  noted  during  the  period  of  reconcentra- 
tion that  the  black  victims  of  Weyler’s  policy  stood  it 
better  than  the  whites.  The  blacks  formed  the  larger 
element  of  the  surviving  country  population.  But  this 
is  a temporary  condition  only.  The  broad  fact  can  be 
stated  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  black  population  of  Cuba  was  54  per  cent  and  of 
Jamaica  94  per  cent.  At  the  end  of  that  century  nor- 
mally it  would  not  be  greatly  in  excess  of  30  per  cent. 
Actually,  as  a result  of  the  reconcentration,  it  may 
prove  to  be  40  per  cent.  In  Jamaica  it  is  99  per  cent. 
In  Cuba,  two  whites  for  one  black;  in  Jamaica,  99  blacks 
for  every  white.  Some  writers  classify  the  blacks  in 
Cuba  into  various  divisions  of  natives,  Africans,  and 
mulattoes  or  mixed  blood.  Spaniards  and  Cubans  do 
not  talk  of  the  black  race.  With  them  it  is  the  race  of 
color.  In  some  of  the  censuses  taken,  distinction  of 
mulattoes  and  blacks  is  drawn;  but  it  is  not  necessary 
in  determining  the  number  of  whites.  Whether  of  the 
Latin  race  born  in  Spain  or  born  in  Cuba,  the  propor- 
tion of  white  to  colored  blood  is  as  two  to  one. 

The  mixture  may  be  traced  through  all  grades  and 
through  a wilderness  of  statistics  in  slavery  and  since 
slavery,  but  for  half  a century  there  is  the  steady  de- 
crease of  the  African  race  relatively  to  the  white  race. 
Superficial  observation  is  so  often  relied  on  to  settle 

143 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


this  question,  anil  the  conclusions  drawn  from  this 
observation  are  put  forth  with  such  positiveuess,  that  it 
is  fair  to  measure  these  conclusions  by  the  history  of 
a century  as  shown  in  the  census  statistics.  Before 
them,  assumption  falls  to  the  ground.  Unless  artificial 
conditions  arise,  the  history  of  the  last  fifty  years 
seems  to  show  that  Cuba  is  in  no  danger  of  becoming  a 
negroid  nation,  whicli  means  a preponderance  of  black 
and  yellow  blood. 

The  possibility  of  an  artificial  movement  can  be 
judged  in  the  light  of  what  has  happened.  For  a 
quarter  of  a century  there  has  been  a free  movement  of 
the  blacks  throughout  the  West  Indies.  They  could 
come  to  Cuba  from  Jamaica,  from  Haiti,  from  Santo 
Domingo,  and  from  the  Bahamas.  A sprinkling  of  all 
these  classes  of  blacks  was  found  among  the  insur- 
gents— the  Bahamas  and  Santo  Domingo  furnishing 
the  greater  number  of  them.  This  free  movement  will 
doubtless  continue,  though  after  the  American  occupa- 
tion it  was  temporarily  checked  by  the  application  of 
the  immigration  law’s  of  the  United  States.  This  was 
due  to  exceptional  circumstances  in  the  eastern  end  of 
the  island.  It  prevented  the  influx  of  idle  blacks  from 
Jamaica. 

No  reason  exists  for  thinking  that  the  free  movement 
of  the  West  Indian  population  will  have  a greater  influ- 
ence in  the  future  than  in  the  past.  The  industrial 
conditions  may  call  for  harder  work,  and  that  assur- 
edly W'ill  not  invite  a heavy  immigration  from  the  other 
islands.  It  is  evident  that  the  black  population  of 
Cuba  can  only  be  swelled  by  colonization  or  immigra- 
tion on  a colossal  scale.  Both  whites  and  blacks  are 

149 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


opposed  to  negro  colonization.  If  a heavy  black  immi- 
gration is  to  be  sought,  it  can  only  come  from  the 
United  States.  Such  a thing  might  happen  as  a mil- 
lion or  more  American  negroes,  wearied  over  the  con- 
tinued denial  of  their  political  rights,  taking  their 
flight  across  the  Florida  straits,  but  it  is  not  an  hy- 
pothesis based  on  probability.  The  American  negroes, 
as  a class,  have  not  given  up  their  destiny  in  the 
United  States.  Small  projects  of  colonization  may  be 
attempted ; some  negroes  in  the  Southern  States  will 
inevitably  drift  to  Cuba ; but  the  physical  surroundings 
will  not  be  substantially  different  from  the  cane-fields 
and  the  cotton-fields  of  the  South.  Moreover,  while 
they  will  find  themselves  among  people  of  their  own 
color,  the  tongue  will  be  a strange  one  to  them.  No- 
body who  knows  the  habits  of  the  Southern  negro  and 
his  sociable  nature  believes  he  will  long  endure  this 
isolation.  The  scheme  of  negro  colonization  has  been 
broached  in  the  United  States,  but  the  American  ne- 
groes have  shown  little  disposition  to  encourage  it,  and 
it  finds  no  support  among  their  race  in  Cuba. 

In  the  industrial  sense  the  value  of  negro  labor  in 
Cuba  has  not  had  full  justice  done  to  it.  Agricultu- 
rally, it  is  essentially  of  the  sugar  plantation.  Admit- 
tedly the  black  does  not  do  well  at  fruit-raising,  and 
the  intricacy  of  tobacco  cultivation  is  too  great  for  him 
to  become  a successful  veguero,  or  tobacco  farmer.  In 
the  cane-field  he  is  at  his  best  as  a laborer.  The  right 
arm  that  wielded  the  machete  in  cutting  cane  was  more 
feared  by  the  Spanish  troops  than  the  arm  which 
sighted  the  Remington  rifle.  The  estimates  of  the 
sugar  planters  vary,  but  out  of  a sheaf  of  such  esti- 

150 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


mates  it  is  possible  to  form  the  conclusion  that  fully 
one-half  of  the  plantation  laborers  are  black.  On  some 
estates  they  have  remained  with  little  change  since  slav- 
ery times.  They  do  not  work  hard  enough  and  long 
enough  in  tho  sun  to  suit  the  plantation  owner,  espe- 
cially if  he  be  an  American  or  Englishman.  Labor, 
whether  white  or  black,  in  tho  tropics  will  never  sweat 
quite  enough  to  please  capital.  Knowing  tho  wealth 
of  the  soil,  the  capitalist  frets  at  his  inability  to  gather 
the  fullest  fruits  of  its  fertility. 

The  negro  field-hand  is  not  always  willing  to  work 
six  days  out  of  the  seven,  though  the  oxen  which  may 
be  his  own  and  the  cart  which  is  his  would  lend  their 
aid  to  continuous  productiveness.  His  traits  in  this 
respect  are  not  dissimilar  to  those  of  the  negro  in  the 
South  and  of  the  white  laborer  everywhere  under  the 
burning  sun  of  the  tropics.  But  under  sympathetic 
management  the  race  is  fairly  industrious.  The  Cuban 
negro  has  a marked  trait  in  the  instinct  of  landowner- 
ship.  It  is  one  of  the  standard  complaints  of  the  sugar 
planters  that  he  clings  to  his  cabin  and  his  patch  of 
ground  to  the  detriment  of  successful  cane-raising.  He 
does  not  care  to  be  swallowed  up  in  the  big  plantation, 
and  usually  his  wish  for  a bohio  or  palm-hut  of  his 
own  in  preference  to  quarters  in  the  plantation  bar- 
racks has  to  be  gratified.  Under  encouraging  circum- 
stances this  drawback  may  be  surmounted.  The  way 
lies  open.  It  is  to  increase  the  negro’s  wants  by  edu- 
cating him  up  to  a higher  standard  of  consumption. 
Then  he  will  exert  his  strength  more  in  order  to  meet 
that  standard.  It  is  also  worth  noting,  as  every  trav- 
eller in  the  West  Indies  does  note,  that  the  Cuban  ne- 

151 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


gro  supports  liis  family.  The  negro  women  do  not 
work  on  the  roads  and  in  the  fields  as  in  Jamaica. 
The  men  perform  that  labor.  The  women  care  for  the 
children — always  a numerous  brood. 

In  the  industrial  life  of  the  towns  and  cities  the 
Cuban  negro  is  on  a higher  plane  than  is  his  brother 
in  the  United  States.  It  may  be  that  the  African  has 
no  aptitude  for  the  mechanical  arts.  Cuba  is  hardly 
the  field  for  determining  that  question,  because  it  is  not 
a manufacturing  country ; but  in  such  light  manufac- 
tures as  it  has,  the  negro  works  on  an  even  plane  with 
the  white  man  of  the  border  tropics.  The  cigar  facto- 
ries of  Habana  attest  this  fact.  Between  twenty  and 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  cigar-makers  are  blacks. 
They  work  at  the  same  bench  with  the  whites.  They 
receive  the  same  pay.  They  have  the  same  voice  and 
the  same  influence  in  the  labor  unions.  In  the  shoe 
shops  there  is  the  same  equality  in  labor.  The  white 
lad  and  the  black  lad  work  side  by  side.  The  negroes 
are  found  in  the  tanneries  and  in  the  shops  where  sad- 
dles are  made.  They  are  in  the  building  trades,  many 
of  them  as  masons  and  painters.  No  complaint  is  heard 
that  the  black  artisans  do  less  work  than  the  whites. 
They  hold  their  own  in  the  less  skilful  grades  of  labor. 
A fair  proportion  are  also  clerks.  The  broad  general- 
ization can  be  made  and  confirmed  by  observation  that 
in  the  industrial  life  of  Cuba,  whether  agricultural  or 
mechanical,  the  negro  shows  an  equal  aptitude  with  the 
white  man. 

The  outlino  which  has  been  given  of  the  industrial 
condition  of  the  blacks  and  the  mulattoes  has  iuferen- 
tially  carried  with  it  a statement  of  their  position  in  the 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


social  organization.  That  there  is  no  color-line  is  re- 
marked by  every  traveller.  Caste  feeling  is  not  absent, 
social  equality  does  not  exist,  but  there  is  social  tolera- 
tion. The  presence  of  the  negro  is  not  an  offence  to 
the  whites.  Race  prejudice  is  not  rabid.  It  is  further 
noted  that  the  African  race  in  Cuba  is  homogeneous. 
The  mulattoes  are  not  antagonized  by  the  blacks.  The 
military  leaders  who  gave  the  race  its  share  in  the 
honors  of  the  insurrection  were,  with  few  execptions, 
mulattoes.  The  pure  black  knows  that  he  shares  their 
honors,  and  is  content. 

This  sketch  of  the  position  of  the  negro  in  Cuba 
would  be  incomplete  and  misleading  if  it  failed  to  note 
the  blemishes.  A controversial  literature  exists  in 
which  Spanish  and  Cuban  authors  discuss  the  relative 
statistics  of  crime  with  reference  to  peninsulars  and 
insulars.  With  the  African  race  such  a discussion  is 
not  necessary.  A disproportionate  number  of  crimi- 
nals are  black.  The  chain-gang  which  may  be  seen 
daily  going  through  the  streets  of  the  cities  under 
armed  guard  is  made  up  of  blacks.  The  Nanigoes, 
frequently  cited  as  a society  of  banded  criminals,  are 
chiefly  of  blacks.  Nevertheless  it  is  doubtful  if  these 
Nanigoes  are  as  entirely  criminal  as  is  generally  as- 
sumed. The  Spanish  authorities  made  it  out  so  for 
their  own  convenience.  The  American  police  officials 
who  organized  the  Habana  police  force  did  not  describe 
the  organization  as  a distinctly  criminal  one.  What 
they  found  was  that  criminals  of  all  classes  and  of  all 
colors  took  refuge  under  the  shadows  of  the  Naiiigoes. 
Whenever  a crime  was  committed,  it  was  said  to  be  by 
the  Nafiigoes.  Originally  the  society  had  no  criminal 

153 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


element  in  it.  It  was  formed  by  the  Africans  brought 
as  slaves  from  the  regions  tributary  to  the  Gulf  of 
Guinea.  Bryan  Edwards,  in  his  volume  on  the  British 
West  Indies,  published  a century  ago,  notes  a similar 
society  in  Jamaica.  The  classes  who  were  most  promi- 
nent in  its  formation  were  from  the  districts  of  Africa 
known  as  Carabali.  They  brought  the  superstitions 
of  their  tribes  with  them. 

The  first  organization  of  the  slaves,  in  1836,  as  Naiii- 
goes  was  permitted  by  the  masters  as  something  en- 
tirely harmless.  The  rites  of  Yoodooism  were  prac- 
tised, and  natives  not  born  in  Africa  were  not  admitted. 
Subsequently  separate  societies  of  Cuban-born  ne- 
groes were  formed,  but  not  on  the  same  plane  as  the 
ones  born  in  Africa.  These  various  societies  were 
known  as  Juegos.  They  had  their  ceremonies  of  initi- 
ation and  of  burial — grotesque  and  superstitious.  In 
time  these  Juegos  became  imbued  with  the  criminal 
element,  and  personal  vengeances  were  executed.  Ulti- 
mately Juegos  of  white  Naiiigoes  were  also  formed. 
As  it  existed  in  its  greatest  vigor,  the  society  had  no 
central  organization.  JEach  Juego  was  independent. 
These  Juegoes  were  sometimes  at  war  with  one  an- 
other. The  Spanish  police  claimed  that  the  Naiiigoes 
had  a ritual  of  crime  and  assassination,  that  the  cere- 
monies provided  for  the  commission  of  crime  as  a 
condition  of  initiation.  The  Naiiigoes  had  seals  or 
signs  for  each  Juego  or  society.  This  was  tattooed 
on  the  wrist,  while  the  Naiiigo  mark  was  tattooed  on 
the  shoulder.  A society  of  professed  criminals  would 
hardly  take  this  means  of  identifying  its  members. 

At  a period  when  crime  was  prevalent  in  Habana, 

154 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


assassinations  and  robberies  of  daily  and  nightly  oc- 
currence wore  attributed  to  the  Nanigoes.  Punish- 
ment was  difficult,  because  it  was  said  that  many  of 
the  officials  charged  with  administering  the  laws  had 
been  in  their  youth  Nanigoes  and  were  fearful  of  the 
vengeance  of  the  society  to  which  they  belonged.  The 
more  probable  explanation  was  that  the  criminals,  un- 
derstanding the  process  of  the  Spanish  justice,  bought 
immunity  from  the  magistrates.  During  his  rule,  Cap- 
tain-General Weyler  gathered  up  all  the  criminal  classes 
of  Habana,  and  deported  them  as  Nanigoes.  By  this 
means  he  was  enabled  to  exile  hundreds  of  non-criminal 
Cubans  suspected  of  complicity  in  the  insurrection. 

After  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment returned  the  criminal  classes  of  Cuba  from 
the  penal  settlements  of  Africa.  Some  of  these  were 
undoubtedly  Nanigoes,  but  the  majority  were  ordinary 
criminals,  without  membership  in  any  criminal  society. 
A few  of  the  Juegos  were  formed  again  after  the  return 
of  the  deported  criminals.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
these  societies  are  as  criminal  as  represented.  They 
are  as  likely  to  bo  groupings  of  the  superstitious  ne- 
groes in  whom  the  rites  and  practices  of  their  ances- 
tors have  not  been  effaced.  Cabildos,  or  processions  of 
Africans,  were  forbidden  in  the  days  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  American  occupation.  In  olden  times  these 
cabildos  often  carried  a snake  as  a symbol.  They  are 
never  without  their  drums.  The  African  dance  is 
also  a feature  of  Cuban  life.  All  these  things  go  to 
show  that  inherited  superstitions,  and  practices,  and 
ignorant  customs,  and  usages  have  not  been  completely 
uprooted.  But  it  gives  an  unfair  idea  of  the  Cuban 

155 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


negroes  to  identify  Nanigoes  solely  with  them,  and  to 
assume  that  all  crime  is  committed  by  organized  and 
banded  negro  criminals.  Nahigoism  has  come  to  be 
the  general  term  for  crime.  This  should  be  borne  in 
mind  whenever  the  doings  of  the  Nanigoes  are  reported 
from  Cuba. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  enter  into  a full  discussion 
of  the  future  political  standing  of  the  race  of  color  in 
Cuba.  Their  place  in  the  industrial  element  is  of  infi- 
nitely greater  consequence,  but  it  is  worthy  of  recording 
that  the  industrial  progress  has  been  coincident  with 
social  toleration  and  civil  recognition.  The  blood  of 
the  Latin  races  does  not  repel  the  African  blood  so  vio- 
lently as  that  which  runs  in  the  veins  of  their  fellow- 
Caucasians  of  the  Saxon  stock.  Amid  the  ruins  of 
Castilian  empire,  Spanish  civilization  has  left  one  en- 
during monument  in  the  Antilles.  It  has  not  denied 
opportunity  to  the  black  man,  and  the  black  man  has 
risen  to  his  opportunity.  He  has  assimilated  to  the 
toleration  of  the  Latin  civilization,  and  his  position  to- 
day is  a refutation  of  the  theories  of  the  pessimists. 

It  is  probable  that  after  a few  years,  when  the  cur- 
rents of  immigration  flow  in  natural  channels,  the  rela- 
tive importance  of  the  race  of  color,  black  or  blended, 
will  decrease,  because  relatively  the  proportion  of  the 
colored  population  will  decrease.  The  culmination  of 
their  influence  may  be  marked  in  the  calendar  of  to- 
day. But  this  is  not  the  end  of  opportunity.  Unless 
an  overwhelming  wave  of  Americanism  with  race  preju- 
dice on  the  crest  sets  in,  the  future  opportunities  will 
continue  as  in  the  present  and  as  in  the  past.  That 
there  is  distrust  at  this  period  is  undeniable.  It  has 

156 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


been  created  by  Americans  urging  their  own  ideas  of 
inferiority,  and  telling  the  white  Cubans  that  the  only 
hope  for  them  is  in  ignoring  the  African  race.  Towards 
this  aggresive  movement  the  blacks  and  the  mulattoes 
have  shown  a natural  resentment. 

On  the  resumption  of  peaceful  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  the  Cuban  blacks  manifested 
no  antagonism  to  the  American  authority.  Their  lead- 
ers complained  that  they  showed  too  groat  an  indiffer- 
ence to  their  own  futuro  in  the  island  whoso  freedom 
they  had  helped  to  win.  The  mulatto  insurgent  General 
Eligio  Ducasse,  issued  an  address  in  which  he  regretted 
the  indifference  of  the  race  of  color,  which  was  due,  he 
said,  to  the  lack  of  civic  valor.  It  was  necessary  for 
them  to  turn  their  faces  to  the  light.  Ho  urged  upon 
them  the  indefatigable  propaganda  of  democratic  the- 
ories, and  proposed  that  they  form  a group  and  unite  in 
order  to  work  in  accord  with  the  white  Cuban  element. 

This  appeal  and  similar  ones  met  with  little  response 
until  the  American  newcomers,  most  of  them  of  the 
kind  without  influence  at  home,  raised  the  color-line. 
Then  the  solidarity  of  the  race  of  color  began  to  show 
itself.  It  might  be  converted  into  a harmful  influence, 
for  while  not  dominating  the  whole  island,  there  are 
sections  in  which  the  blacks  are  numerically  prepon- 
derant. In  Santiago  province,  in  the  period  from  1877 
to  1887,  the  blacks  increased  four  per  cent,  and  in 
Puerto  Principe  two  per  cent,  though  they  decreased  in 
the  other  parts  of  the  island.  This  is  one  reason  why 
the  white  element  in  Santiago  is  to-da}r  fearful  of  the 
experiment  of  independence.  But  with  the  understand- 
ing of  the  purposes  of  the  United  States  Government 

157 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  the  knowledge  that  individuals  who  seek  to  raise 
the  color-line  do  not  reflect  the  views  of  the  American 
people,  this  solidarity  of  the  race  of  color  will  not  con- 
tinue. It  is  defensive  rather  than  antagonistic. 

The  figment  of  a black  republic,  of  a West  Indian 
league,  vanished  in  the  air  when  Antonio  Maceo  fell  at 
Punta  Brava.  When  the  news  of  his  death  was  con- 
firmed, the  Spanish  authorities  in  Habana  sent  up 
rockets  as  signals  of  rejoicing.  Every  rocket  was  a 
dart  which  pierced  the  hearts  of  the  Cuban  patriots  in 
the  city.  Yet  in  their  anguish  the  wisest  of  them  felt 
that  it  was  an  agony  not  in  vain.  Maceo  brought  to 
the  revolution  the  support  of  his  race.  Under  him 
the  Santiago  blacks  fought  their  way  across  the  island. 
They  were  enlisted  to  extermination  against  Spanish 
rule.  In  their  leader  were  the  military  potencies  of  the 
African  race.  Had  he  lived,  the  notion  of  a black 
league  might  have  grown  and  spread.  Maceo  died 
sword  in  hand,  and  the  blacks  fought  on  as  part  of  the 
insurgent  forces,  looking  for  their  share  in  the  future 
government  of  Cuba  that  was  to  come  out  of  the  chaos 
of  revolution.  Those  who  feared  and  doubted  lest 
negro  supremacy  might  succeed  were  encouraged  to 
fight  by  the  side  of  the  blacks.  There  was  no  color- 
line in  the  revolution,  there  need  be  none  in  peace.  A 
monument  will  be  raised  to  Maceo.  His  deeds  will  be 
celebrated  by  the  Cubans  not  as  whites  or  blacks,  but 
as  Cubans.  His  memory  will  be  cherished  by  the 
blacks  as  one  of  their  own  heroes.  Ho  raised  them  to 
his  own  level.  Their  political  and  their  industrial 
standing  in  Cuba  for  all  time  to  come  is  that  of  equal- 
ity. 


158 


CHAPTER  IX 


The  Spanish  Colony 

Strangers  in  the  Country  of  Yesterday — Description  of  Themselves 
by  Spanish  Classes — Composition  of  Colony — Madridlefios  and 
Andalusians — Catalans  the  Masterful  Latin  Element — Asturians 
the  Town  Population — Castilian  Yankees — Gallegos  Widely  Dis- 
tributed— Other  Provincials — Benevolent  Societies — Instinct  of 
Nationality — Change  in  Feeling  Towards  United  States — Recip- 
rocal Relations  of  Cubans  and  Spaniards — Present  Political 
Attitude,  the  Retraimiento — Temporary  Isolation — Status  Under 
Treaty  of  Paris — Strangers  in  the  Cuba  of  To-morrow. 

Strangers  in  the  country  of  yesterday.  Thus  in  bit- 
terness and  in  anguish  the  intense  Spaniards  described 
themselves  when  the  flag  which  for  four  centuries  had 
floated  over  Cuba  was  lowered  forever. 

Though  they  called  themselves  strangers,  the  Span- 
ish classes  did  not  care  to  be  known  as  aliens.  That 
would  be  too  great  humiliation.  It  would  convey  a 
false  impression  of  their  affection  for  this  Antillian 
land  and  of  their  concern  in  its  future.  They  meant 
that  they  were  strangers  to  the  new  surroundings  and 
the  new  institutions.  They  chose  to  treat  themselves 
as  guests  of  the  United  States  accepting  its  protection. 
No  longer  masters,  they  would  not  be  the  servants  of 
the  natives  of  the  island.  By  a natural  impulse  they 
formed  into  the  Spanish  colony.  In  places  they 
grouped  themselves  into  an  organization  under  this 

159 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA 


name.  In  other  sections  they  kept  the  old  name  of 
the  Casino  Espanol,  or  Spanish  club  or  circle;  but 
whether  they  formed  into  societies  or  not,  they  took 
the  designation  of  foreign  subjects.  Cuba  was  no 
longer  a territorial  possession  of  Spain,  and  they  as- 
sumed the  attitude  of  a colony  in  a foreign  territory. 

The  Spanish  colony  was  a spontaneous  development. 
It  w7as  the  outgrowth  of  the  instinct  of  nationality.  It 
reflects  the  sentiment  and  the  aspirations  of  a peo- 
ple rather  than  of  a class.  Its  members  have  the  com- 
mon basis  of  language,  usages,  tradition,  and  religion. 
They  all. have  kin  across  the  sea.  Since  this  Spanish 
element  is  to  be  for  a time  a separate  unit,  its  compo- 
sition is  worthy  of  analysis.  First  are  the  natives  of 
Catalonia,  then  Galicia,  and  Asturias.  After  them  the 
people  from  the  adjoining  districts  of  the  Cantabrian 
Mountains,  as  also  from  the  Basque  provinces  on  the 
slopes  of  the  Pyrenees,  the  Montaiieses  from  Santander, 
the  Aragonese  from  Aragon.  Spanish  officers  and  sol- 
diers who  settled  in  the  island  gave  all  of  the  provinces 
of  the  peninsula  representation ; but  these  did  not  affect 
the  main  tide  from  the  northern  provinces. 

The  provincial  customs  of  the  peninsula  are  still  seen 
in  all  their  literalness,  and  the  proverbs  which  describe 
the  usages  and  peculiarities  are  heard  as  in  Spain. 
The  Madridlehos  were  the  most  cultured  class.  They 
were  the  office-holders,  the  bureaucrats,  the  leeches 
and  the  locusts.  They  were  strong  because  of  their 
intrigues  and  their  influence  with  the  government  in 
Madrid.  Almost  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  Andalu- 
sians. They,  too,  lived  on  the  offices  and  were  leeches 
and  locusts.  At  one  time  they  had  a society  of  natives 

160 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  the  province.  It  was  not  strong  in  numbers,  but  its 
membors  included  the  violent  and  irreconcilable  Span- 
iards who  opposed  overy  concession  to  popular  govern- 
ment in  Cuba  because  popular  government  threatened 
their  privileges.  Until  an  immigration  movement  sets 
in,  the  Andalusian  element  in  the  Spanish  colony  in 
Cuba  is  not  likely  to  be  of  moment.  The  natives  of 
Andalusia  are  the  scorn  of  the  other  provincials.  “ As 
lazy  as  an  Andalusian “ an  Andalusian  said  it  ” (mean- 
ing a doubtful  statement);  “the  women  for  beauty, 
the  men  for  wit,  and  all  Andalusians  for  lying;” — 
these  are  the  proverbs  most  commonly  heard.  They 
show  the  estimation  of  the  Andalusians  by  their  fellow- 
peninsulars. 

The  Aragonese  are  numerically  not  a large  element, 
but  they  are  a good  one  industrially.  They  carried 
their  hard  heads  and  their  stubbornness  from  Spain  to 
Cuba.  Runs  the  saying  in  the  island,  “ when  an  Ara- 
gonese says  two  and  two  make  five,  don’t  dispute  it; 
for  in  Aragon  two  and  two  make  five.”  The  natives  of 
Vasco-Navarre  are  also  a small  numerical  element  who 
brought  their  customs  unchanged  to  the  island.  They 
are  seen  on  holidays  in  the  red-and-blue  caps  of  their 
province.  Formerly  they  possessed  political  influence 
which  came  from  their  clannishness.  The  natives  of 
Castile  and  Leon  have  sought  to  preserve  their  iden- 
tity under  the  designation  of  Castilians.  At  one  time 
they  had  a society,  but  it  was  not  influential.  They 
were  mostly  poor  people,  neither  strong  in  numbers  nor 
aggressive  in  public  affairs. 

Following  the  natives  of  the  provinces  back  to  their 
birthplaces,  it  will  be  seen  that  Catalans,  Asturians,  and 
U 161 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Gallegos  have  lost  little  of  their  individuality.  Their 
charitable  societies  in  all  parts  of  the  island  are  monu- 
ments to  their  spirit  of  union  and  to  their  thoughtful- 
ness for  their  own.  The  memorial  chapels  to  their 
patroness  are  evidences  of  their  religious  fervor  and 
their  devotion  to  Catholicism.  The  Catalans  are  the 
masterful  Latin  element  in  trade  and  in  politics.  They 
are  synonymous  with  commercial  enterprise.  Of  all 
the  provinces  of  the  peninsula  they  have  left  the  deep- 
est impress  on  the  island  of  Cuba.  In  many  places  the 
Catalan  is  still  spoken  of  when  a Spaniard  is  meant. 
Some  of  the  colloquialisms  of  the  Proven  gal  tongue  are 
preserved  among  them.  They  have  always  been  the 
most  independent  politically,  and  their  demands  on  the 
peninsula  for  legislation  in  the  interest  of  Barcelona 
have  always  been  heeded.  In  government  administra- 
tion they  have  been  prominent  more  for  their  influence 
in  shaping  economic  policies  than  for  holding  office. 
In  that  respect  the  difference  between  them  and  the 
Madridlenos  and  Andalusians  has  been  a radical  one. 
They  have  been  the  intellectual  life  of  the  Spanish  ele- 
ment in  the  island,  and  have  dominated  in  journalism 
and  in  the  Church.  From  them  have  also  come  sug- 
gestions of  political  anarchy  and  of  labor  proletari- 
atism. 

The  Catalan  peasant  is  as  sturdy  in  the  labor  of  the 
fields  and  towns  as  his  fellow-Catalans  of  higher  grade 
are  in  commerce  and  in  public  affairs.  He  has  the 
same  traits  of  dogged  perseverence  and  of  unyielding 
opinions.  In  spite  of  these  strong  traits,  the  Catalans 
have  been  numerically  a decreasing  class  in  Habana 
and  the  western  part  of  the  island  for  the  last  score  of 

162 


TO-MORROTV  IN  CUBA 


years.  The  opportunities  in  trade  and  in  commerce 
have  not  been  wide  enough  for  them.  Their  influence 
and  their  numbers  have  not  been  impaired  in  the  east- 
ern provinces.  In  Santiago  de  Cuba  they  are  still  the 
dominating  force,  and  their  enterprising  and  adventu- 
rous character  has  found  full  play  there.  The  Santiago 
Catalans  gave  some  recruits  to  the  insurrection. 

Aside  from  the  commercial  privileges  which  made  the 
Catalans  aggressivo  Spaniards,  they  have  shown  them- 
selves possessed  of  progressive  and  liberal  ideas.  They 
yet  dominate  the  Spanish  press  of  the  island.  The  Cen- 
tral Union  and  various  other  societies  in  Habana  had  at 
one  time  ten  thousand  members,  with  branches  in  other 
cities.  In  Matanzas  tho  votive  chapel  to  the  Virgin 
of  Monserrate  is  a testimonial  of  their  devotion.  In 
Habana  an  hermitage  or  memorial  to  tho  patroness  of 
the  province  was  projected,  but  never  finished.  In 
whatever  concerns  the  Spanish  colony  of  Cuba  the  Cata- 
lan influence  will  be  strong,  but  its  independent  char- 
acter will  be  preserved.  It  has  shown  no  disposition 
to  yield  the  field  of  commerce  and  industry  wrhich  it 
has  held.  Instead  of  bowing  to  American  competition, 
the  Barcelona  merchants  prepared  to  meet  it  on  the 
even  ground  of  Cuba  instead  of  in  the  unequal  territory 
of  Spain.  They  will  not  give  up  what  is  theirs  with- 
out a struggle. 

The  Asturians  are  tho  most  numerous  element  of 
peninsulars  in  Cuba.  It  was  they  who  crowded  the 
Catalans  in  Habana  and  the  western  provinces.  They 
are  estimated  to  form  forty  per  cent  of  the  Spanish- 
born  population.  They  were  the  most  loyal  of  loyalist 
Spaniards,  and  their  sentiments  have  undergone  little 

163 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


change.  When  the  insurrection  broke  out,  of  63,000 
enrolled  volunteers  in  Cuba,  26,000  were  born  in  Astu- 
rias. The  Asturians  have  the  largest  and  most  power- 
ful provincial  society  in  the  island.  It  is  known  as  the 
Centro-Asturiano  of  Habana,  and  has  branches  in  Car- 
denas, Cienfuegos,  Matanzas,  Sancti  Spiritus,  Camaju- 
nani,  Pinar  del  Rio,  and  other  places.  The  society  of 
clerks  known  as  La  Sociedad  de  los  Dependientes  de 
Comercio  is  also  made  up  largel}'  of  Asturians.  It  is 
within  the  last  twenty  years  that  they  have  gained  such 
power.  Originally  they  were  engaged  chiefly  in  the 
retail  business;  but  they  soon  mounted  to  wholesale 
trade,  and  gained  a strong  foothold  in  the  tobacco  in- 
dustry and  in  financial  enterprises.  In  recent  years  they 
have  had  many  influential  men  who  have  divided  political 
and  commercial  influence  with  the  Catalans. 

The  Asturians  are  essentially  a town  population. 
Barely  a fraction  of  them  are  engaged  in  agricultural 
pursuits.  They  are  the  most  potent  and  the  most 
representative  Spanish  class.  Their  patriotism  is  the 
patriotism  of  ignorance.  The  majority  are  also  zealous 
churchmen.  Our  Lady  of  Covodanga,  the  j)atroness  of 
the  province,  has  a splendid  memorial  chapel  in  Haba- 
na, and  in  the  smaller  towns  there  are  also  memorials. 
The  Asturians  have  transplanted  all  their  Spanish  tra- 
ditions. Gil  Bias  would  be  as  much  at  home  among 
them  as  among  his  kinsfolk  in  Oviedo.  Their  charac- 
teristics are  thrift  and  trustworthiness.  For  this  rea- 
son they  make  good  clerks  and  tradesmen.  They  also 
furnish  the  largest  criminal  element  among  the  penin- 
sulars in  the  island.  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
they  are  inhabitants  of  the  towns.  Several  years  ago 

164 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


when  a Scotch  sociologist  made  systematic  inquiries 
regarding  tho  inmates  of  the  jails,  the  number  of  Astu- 
rians was  reported  as  exceeding  all  the  other  natives  of 
the  peninsula. 

The  Asturians  are  also  moro  given  to  drink  than  their 
brother  Spaniards.  Drunkenness  is  so  rare  that  it 
seems  invidious  to  single  out  any  class;  but  the  Span- 
iard of  whatever  province  will  say  that  the  Asturians 
are  the  drunkards  of  their  race.  In  trade  they  have 
sometimes  been  called  tho  Yankees  among  tho  Span- 
iards. A nasal  twang  in  their  speech  has  been  cited  as 
further  evidence  of  their  kinship  with  New  England. 
The  major  portion  of  tho  shops  and  stores  in  Habaua 
are  owned  by  Asturians.  This  ownership  is  advertised, 
and  the  patronage  of  the  natives  of  the  province  is  solic- 
ited and  secured  on  these  grounds.  The  Asturians  are 
gorged  with  Spanish  pride.  They  are  at  present  the 
most  compact  element;  but  being  townspeople,  they  are 
not  likely  to  increase  in  numbers  by  immigration  until 
conditions  change.  They  are  tenacious  of  their  trade 
and  will  not  readily  be  driven  out  by  American  compe- 
tition. Their  thrift  and  industry  make  them  a most 
useful  factor  in  the  industrial  ranks  of  the  island. 

The  Gallegos  are  next  to  the  Asturians  in  numbers. 
They  are  widely  distributed  in  both  town  and  country. 
Commercially  they  have  little  foothold,  and  are  not 
to  be  considered  on  the  same  plane  as  the  Catalans 
and  the  Asturians.  Their  acquisitive  instincts  are  not 
marked,  and  they  have  not  exercised  a controlling  in- 
fluence in  either  trade,  politics,  or  in  the  army.  Appar- 
ently they  have  fewer  material  interests  in  Cuba  than 
the  Catalans  and  the  Asturians.  In  the  towns  their 

165 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


labor  is  what  would  be  called  unskilled.  In  the  coun- 
try they  work  in  the  fields.  They  are  employed  in  all 
the  shipping  ports.  Most  of  the  boatmen  in  the  Haba- 
na  harbor  are  Gallegos.  Many  of  the  inhabitants  of 
this  northwest  corner  of  Spain  drifted  from  the  mer- 
chant marine  of  the  peninsula  to  the  shipping  trade  of 
the  island.  The  Gallegos  are  also  employed  in  the 
mines  of  Eastern  Cuba.  They  have  been  called  dull  in- 
tellectually, but  this  may  be  because  of  their  indiffer- 
ence to  material  comforts,  for  to  a stranger  they  seem 
quick-witted.  The  Gallegos  have  shown  the  same  ten- 
dency towards  organization  as  their  brothers  from  other 
provinces.  The  central  society  in  Habana  is  an  un- 
usually good  one,  and  has  been  noted  for  its  efforts 
to  popularize  education.  The  probability  is  that  the 
Gallegos  will  continue  to  increase  in  numbers,  though 
they  suffered  greatly  during  the  insurrection  and  the 
war,  and  lost  some  of  their  unity.  They  show  less  re- 
gard for  the  past  and  greater  adaptability  to  new  condi- 
tions than  the  other  natives  of  the  peninsula. 

The  Canary  Islanders,  the  Islenos,  are  called  Span- 
iards, for  their  speech  is  that  of  Spain  and  many  of 
them  were  born  in  the  peninsula.  Nevertheless  they 
have  been  less  Spanish  than  the  other  Castilians.  It 
might  be  said  that  their  feelings  were  neutral  as  be- 
tween the  peninsulars  and  insulars.  The  similarity  of 
the  climate  of  the  Canaries  to  that  of  Cuba  induced 
an  immigration  which  was  assisted  for  selfish  reasons. 
During  the  slave  times,  when  England  was  in  the  habit 
of  reminding  Spain  of  its  obligations  to  suppress  the 
traffic,  Spaniards  in  Cuba  were  wont  to  retort  that  Brit- 
ish shipmasters  were  engaged  in  a system  of  white  slave 

ICC 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


traffic  from  the  Canary  Islands.  The  Isleiios  had  a so- 
ciety in  Habaua  which  was  charitable  and  useful.  Most 
of  the  haughty  Spaniards  looked  down  with  contempt 
on  the  Canary  Islanders,  who  were  engaged  in  minor 
employments,  such  as  peddling  and  raising  vegetables. 
Iu  the  tobacco  country  of  the  Yuelta  Aba  jo,  the  Canar- 
ians are  admittedly  the  best  industrial  element.  They 
have  never  been  a compact  political  force.  They  mako 
good  laborers  in  the  fields,  and  many  of  them  have 
small  tobacco  farms  of  their  own.  Every  year  the  large 
tobacco  plantations  bring  laborers  from  the  Canaries, 
who  return  when  the  crop  is  over.  Iu  the  future  the 
effort  will  be  to  keep  these  islanders  in  Cuba.  There  is 
work  for  them  on  the  sugar  plantations  as  well  as  on  the 
tobacco  farms. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  various  societies  of  the 
provinces  have  their  newspapers.  These  are  not  politi- 
cal journals,  yet  while  maintaining  the  traditions  of  the 
province  they  contribute  powerfully  to  preserve  the  idea 
of  Spanish  nationality.  They  are  given  up  chiefly  to 
news  from  Spain.  They  tell  what  is  going  on  iu  Coru- 
na, in  Barcelona,  in  Oviedo,  or  in  Santander,  as  the  case 
may  be.  That  is  to  say,  they  keep  the  people  informed 
of  what  is  happening  in  their  old  homes.  Some  of  them 
also  give  space  to  the  literature  of  the  provinces.  This 
is  especially  true  of  the  Galician  newspapers.  After  the 
conclusion  of  war  with  the  United  States  some  of  these 
journals  voiced  very  accurately  the  conditions  in  Spain. 
They  contained  articles  which  the  censorship  would  not 
have  permitted  iu  the  journals  published  at  home,  but 
which  showed  the  real  feelings  in  the  provinces. 

The  reciprocal  relations  of  Cubans  and  Spaniards 

167 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cannot  be  fully  determined  in  a single  year.  In  the 
past,  the  animosity  and  the  antagonism  have  been  undeni- 
able. It  was  a psychological  problem  to  determine  just 
when  this  antagonism  of  two  classes  of  the  same  race 
began  to  develop.  In  Cuba  all  persons  born  on  the 
island,  whether  white  or  black,  of  native  or  of  foreign 
parentage,  are  Criollos  or  Creoles.  The  child  of  a 
Spanish  father  born  of  a Cuban  mother  was  a Cuban 
from  the  cradle.  The  child  of  Spanish  parents  born 
in  the  island  sometimes  became  a Cuban  in  the  first 
generation.  General  Calixto  Garcia  was  born  of  Span- 
ish parents. 

Commonly  two  generations  would  pass  before  the 
Spanish  offspring  ceased  to  be  a Spaniard.  Invariably 
in  the  third  generation  the  offspring  would  be  Cuban  in 
sentiments  and  aspirations.  The  Spaniard  was  wont  to 
say : “ What  is  best  in  Cuba  is  our  work.  See  us.  We 
are  hard-working,  frugal,  thrifty,  peaceable,  developing 
the  riches  of  the  soil,  conserving  its  productiveness  for 
other  generations,  sowing  that  which  the  spendthrift 
Cubans  may  cast  to  the  winds.  And  we  pay  our  debts.” 
Retorted  the  Cuban : “ See  yourselves.  You  labor  but  it 
is  not  in  the  fields.  The  Spaniard  works  in  the  shade. 
You  grow  rich  on  the  labor  of  others.  Your  government, 
which  is  not  our  government,  gives  you  the  advantages. 
You  save  that  you  may  spend  away  from  the  island 
that  which  you  have  drawn  from  it.  You  do  not  bring 
your  families.  You  demoralize  our  morals.  You  are 
birds  of  passage  who  would  carry  away  the  seeds  of 
prosperity.  We  are  the  true  economists,  for  we  both 
produce  and  consume.” 

As  in  most  disputes,  the  truth  was  midway.  The 

168 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Spaniard  unquestionably  was  the  middleman.  He 
monopolized  the  shipping  trade  partly  by  reason  of  his 
inclination  for  commerce  and  partly  by  official  favorit- 
ism. The  trade  conditions  in  Cuba  had  their  begin- 
nings in  the  old  monopolies  granted  by  the  Council  of 
the  Indies  to  Cadiz  and  Seville.  Barcelona’s  heritage  of 
these  monopolies  was  a natural  one;  but  in  the  retail 
trade  it  cannot  be  said  that  a Spaniard  became  the  mer- 
chant through  special  privileges.  His  superior  ability 
as  a trader  placed  him  in  that  position.  With  the 
end  of  Spanish  sovereignty  the  commercial  conditions 
changed  along  with  the  political  system.  The  Cuban 
is  on  an  equal  plane  with  the  Spaniard  in  everything 
that  belongs  to  industrial  enterprise,  and  politically  he 
is  a little  higher  up.  Cubans  and  Catalans  in  the  new 
circumstances  may  be  left  to  assimilate  the  industrial 
virtues  which  they  have  in  common.  I shall  have  occa- 
sion to  write  of  the  industrial  phases  with  reference 
to  the  Spanish  element  in  discussing  prospects  and 
sources  of  immigration.  The  position  of  the  Spanish 
colony  as  an  influence  apart  and  by  itself  is  of  present 
concern. 

When  the  Spaniards  in  Cuba  declared  themselves 
strangers  in  the  country  of  yesterdays  they  had  been 
for  six  months  aware  of  their  condition.  In  the  first 
burst  of  passion  following  the  conclusion  of  peace  they 
turned  to  the  conquering  nation.  They  would  owe  al- 
legiance to  the  United  States  rather  than  to  a govern- 
ment of  Cubans.  If  opportunity  had  been  given  to 
declare  themselves  they  would  have  been  unanimously 
American  because  that  was  the  only  means  of  being 
anti-Cuban.  Then  came  the  American  military  occu- 

169 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


pation  and  a change  of  feeling.  The  Spanish  classes 
liked  the  Americans  less  among  them  than  at  a distance. 
They  began  to  doubt  whether  they  could  get  along  better 
with  them  than  with  their  own  Latin  blood. 

At  this  period  the  feeling  of  resentment  and  revenge 
was  very  strong  among  the  Cubans.  A voice  came 
from  the  woods  which  stilled  it  temporarily.  Maximo 
Gomez  risked  his  popularity  and  challenged  the  radi- 
cal elements  by  preaching  peace  and  concord.  He  ac- 
cepted invitations  from  the  Spanish  casinos,  declared 
that  the  insurgents  had  fought  against  the  Spanish 
Government  and  not  against  the  Spanish  people,  and 
that  all  classes  must  join  together  in  the  industrial 
reconstruction  of  the  country.  This  was  not  new  doc- 
trine with  him.  He  had  preached  it  in  the  height  of  the 
insurrection.  His  words  were  received  gratefully  by 
the  Spaniards  and  respectfully  by  the  Cubans. 

Afterwards  there  were  periods  of  proscriptive  agita- 
tion against  the  Spanish  classes  and  of  demands  for 
them  to  leave.  Some  left;  but  it  must  be  taken  into 
account  that  the  parasites  of  Spanish  bureaucracy  and 
militarism  were  numerous.  They  could  not  all  get  away 
when  the  troops  left.  Others  went  because  they  felt 
there  was  no  opportunity  remaining  for  them  in  Cuba; 
yet  in  estimating  the  departures  for  Spanish  ports 
regard  must  be  had  for  the  arrivals  in  Cuba  from  Span- 
ish ports.  The  mass  of  the  Spanish  population  in  the 
island — the  Asturians,  the  Catalans,  and  the  Gallegos 
• — have  not  made  up  their  minds  to  leave  for  good,  and 
the  streams  of  immigration  have  already  begun  to  flow 
back.  It  is  a simple  explanation.  The  opportunities 
are  better  in  Cuba. 


170 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


In  present  conditions  a numerical  estimate  of  the 
number  of  Spaniards  who  remain  in  Cuba  could  only 
be  a guess.  Without  making  that  guess,  it  is  enough 
to  know  that  the  number  is  considerable.  Spanish 
newspapers  all  over  the  island  reflect  the  existence 
of  the  Spanish  colony.  The  financial  and  commercial 
classes,  the  merchants  and  the  planters  who  socrotly 
sought  American  intervention  when  Spain  was  trying 
to  implant  autonomy,  want  annexation  or  indefinite 
military  occupation,  which  they  look  upon  as  the  same 
thing.  Nothing  is  likely  to  change  their  views.  Some 
of  them  have  been  encouraged  in  the  belief  that  though 
Spain  has  ceased  to  govern  Cuba,  the  island  will  con- 
tinue to  be  governed  for  the  benefit  of  Spaniards.  Oth- 
ers simply  fear,  and  fear  sincerely,  that  a Cuban  gov- 
ernment wrould  be  a failure,  and  they  are  not  willing 
that  the  experiment  shall  be  tried  within  their  own 
lifetime. 

While  this  is  the  feeling  of  the  distinctively  commer- 
cial element,  I have  never  been  able  to  discover  by  what 
process  of  reasoning  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
it  was  anything  like  the  unanimous  sentiment  of  the 
Spanish  classes  as  a whole.  It  is  encouraged  politically 
by  some  of  the  old-time  Reformists,  weathercocks  as 
ever,  who  have  tried  to  create  a Spanish  party.  But  as 
in  the  days  of  the  Autonomist  agitation,  followers  are 
needed  to  build  up  a political  organization,  and  the 
former  Reformists  are  lacking  in  that  respect.  The 
Spanish  element  is  not  to  be  judged  by  a few  men. 
The  bodegueros — the  grocery  keepers  and  retail  mer- 
chants— and  their  clerks  are  a distinct  power.  They 
have  had  violent  spasms  against  even  the  temporary 

171 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


presence  of  the  American  troops.  They  have  been  the 
most  passionate  in  their  opposition  to  the  change  in 
forms  of  government  and  in  laws.  They  stand  for  old 
customs  and  usages,  whether  good  or  bad.  The  appeal 
to  preserve  the  Latin  civilization  from  the  brutal  ag- 
gression of  Anglo-Saxonism  is  addressed  to  them,  and 
they  are  responsive  to  it.  Their  Spanish  national- 
ism is  sincere  and  intense. 

The  present  attitude  of  the  majority  of  the  Spanish 
classes  is  their  favorite  one,  that  of  the  “Retraimi- 
ento,”  the  drawing  within  the  shell  and  disclaiming 
responsibility  for  whatever  may  happen.  They  ac- 
knowledge their  debt  to  that  portion  of  the  Cuban  press 
which  combats  the  intolerant  tendencies  of  the  rabid 
Cubans.  They  declare  their  faith  that  the  policy  of 
peace  and  concord  and  union  of  all  the  Latin  elements 
will  ultimately  prevail.  But  they  are  not  willing  to 
trust  themselves  to  it  just  yet.  And  from  their  “ Re- 
traimiento,”  despite  the  representations  of  individuals, 
the  majority  of  the  Spanish  classes  still  look  with  dis- 
trust on  American  influence.  They  want  to  be  with- 
drawn from  it  as  much  as  from  Cuban  politics. 

Out  of  this  retreat  there  is  only  one  path.  It  majr  be 
regretted,  but  that  does  not  affect  the  controlling  forces. 
It  leads  to  the  temporary  isolation  of  the  majority  of 
Spaniards  in  Cuba  in  so  far  as  relates  to  the  policies 
which  are  to  be  determined.  Some  of  the  newspapers 
hint  at  political  action  as  a means  of  annexation,  but 
these  hints  are  received  coldly.  For  a while  the  idea 
prevailed  that  they  could  elect  to  remain  Spanish  sub- 
jects and  yet  have  a voice  in  establishing  the  govern- 
ment which  is  to  obtain  in  Cuba.  It  grew  until  the 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


belief  became  a delusion  that,  though  Spanish  sover- 
eignty was  gone,  the  Spanish  classes  would  continue 
to  rule  Cuba  through  the  United  States.  But  with 
the  understanding  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Paris 
this  vanished. 

All  peninsular-born  inhabitants  of  the  island  now 
know  that  by  April,  1900,  they  must  decide  whether 
they  shall  renounce  their  nationality,  because  that  will 
end  the  year  from  the  time  of  interchanging  the 
treaties.  The  certainty  is  the  creation  of  a Spanish 
colony  in  Cuba  similar  to  that  which  exists  in  Mex- 
ico and  in  the  countries  of  South  America.  The  reg- 
istry of  Spaniards  as  subjects  of  Spain  will  not  be 
universal.  Some  prominent  ones  among  them  will 
elect  to  take  the  uncertainties  of  the  immediate  future 
in  the  belief  that  the  authority  of  the  United  States  will 
ultimately  prevail.  Others  of  the  bodeguero  class  and 
of  small  landowners  in  the  country  will  cast  their 
lot  with  the  Cubans.  But  the  majority  of  the  Span- 
ish residents  will  elect  to  continue  their  allegiance  to 
the  peninsula.  On  the  part  of  the  commercial  and 
professional  classes  of  Spaniards  this  will  be  simply 
the  affirmation  of  the  position  they  have  always  held. 
They  came  to  the  island  to  better  their  fortunes  and 
then  return  to  Spain.  Permanent  residence  has  never 
been  their  intention.  The  paucity  of  registrations  after 
the  Spanish  consul-general  opened  the  registry  for 
Spanish  subjects  should  not  mislead.  The  majority 
of  them  will  wait  until  the  last  month. 

What  the  course  of  the  Spaniards  may  be  in  the 
years  to  come,  when  the  political  incertitude  is  ended 
and  possibly  immigration  is  flowing  from  the  penin- 

173 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


sula,  is  conjecture  not  worth  wasting  time  on  now.  In 
the  formative  period  of  the  future  government  of  Cuba 
their  attitude  is  that  of  the  Retraimiento.  The  begin- 
ning of  American  sovereignty  in  trust  found  them,  by 
their  own  characterization,  strangers  in  the  country  of 
yesterday.  By  their  own  choice  the  members  of  the 
Spanish  colony  remain  strangers  in  the  Cuba  of  To- 
morrow. 


CHAPTER  X 


Immigration  and  Colonization 

Prospective  Greatness  of  Ilabana — Agricultural  Population  the  Basis 
— Economic  Epitome  of  the  Reconcentration — Acclimatization 
of  White  Men  in  Border  Tropics — Spanish  Immigrants  Not  from 
Southern  Provinces — Comparison  of  Latitudes — Madrid  Govern- 
ment’s Policy  of  Encouragement — Drawback  in  Political  Insti- 
tutions— Failure  of  Plans  to  Keep  Spanish  Soldiers  in  Cuba — 
Little  Prospect  of  Farm-Hands  from  the  United  States — Evils  of 
Proposed  Systems  of  Colonization — Former  Experiments — His- 
tory of  Chinese  Coolies — Probability  of  Exclusion  Measures — 
Treaty  Between  Spain  and  China — Family  Immigration  for  the 
Future. 

Of  the  people  who  once  were  in  Cuba  it  is  not  dif- 
ficult to  write.  Of  those  who  remain  it  is  even  less 
difficult,  for  they  are  fewer.  Of  the  race  that  will  be,  it 
is  too  early  to  write  comprehensively.  But  an  explo- 
ration must  be  made  in  search  of  those  who  shall  till 
the  fields. 

Whatever  race  and  national  characteristics  are  devel- 
oped, the  leading  traits  must  always  be  those  of  an 
agricultural  people.  Habana  will  become  a greater  and 
a more  magnificent  commercial  mart.  It  will  show 
the  possibilities  of  the  civilization  of  commerce  in  the 
tropics.  Seventy-five  years  ago  Humboldt  placed  it 
with  Rio  Janiero  as  one  of  the  five  great  tropical  cities 
of  the  world.  The  Cuban  metropolis  then  had  100,000 

175 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


inhabitants;  Rio  Janiero,  135,000.  Habana  lies  in 
north  latitude  22  °.  The  parallel  of  south  latitude 
22°  passes  close  to  Rio  Janiero.  The  latter  city  has 
in  this  day  a population  in  excess  of  600,000.  Habana 
rises  a little  above  200,000.  Yet  with  the  establish- 
ment of  a stable  government  it  is  possible  to  look  for- 
ward to  a day  not  so  far  distant  when  the  commercial 
capital  of  the  Antilles  will  equal  in  size  and  import- 
ance the  metropolis  of  Brazil.  With  its  progress 
other  ports  will  grow’  and  spread,  and  Cuba’s  coasts 
will  be  lined  with  as  many  flourishing  ports  as  once 
lined  the  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean. 

The  basis  of  these  entrepots  of  trade  will  be  the 
land,  because  Cuba  is  so  essentially  an  agricultural 
country.  Its  development  will  be  such  as  comes  from 
the  harvests  of  the  soil.  The  mines  w’ill  give  up  their 
wealth.  The  forests  will  be  cleared.  And  when  it  is  all 
done  the  island  will  be  more  than  ever  before  the  land 
of  the  farmer.  Light  manufactures  w’ill  spring  up,  and 
they,  too,  w’ill  lean  on  the  soil,  not  as  a crutch,  but  as 
a prop.  It  is,  then,  of  an  agricultural  people,  and  of 
the  commerce  and  trade  wdiicli  develop  from  agricul- 
ture, that  the  future  must  be  written.  Hence  the  initial 
question  is  of  field-labor  immigration. 

There  is  in  the  first  place  an  artificially  created  gulf 
to  be  closed.  It  is  the  void  that  exists  in  the  produc- 
tive agencies  of  the  island — the  void  that  w’ill  be  years 
in  filling.  I wish  to  write  here  of  the  reconcentration 
only  in  its  economic  effects.  It  was  meant  to  extirpate 
the  people  from  the  soil  in  which  they  had  taken  root. 
The  rooting  out  was  partially  successful.  The  victims 
included  the  heads  of  families,  the  children  w’hose  arms 

176 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


would  have  beeu  bent  within  a few  years  to  the  tilling 
of  the  land,  and  the  women  who  would  have  borne 
other  children.  The  strongest,  if  not  the  fittest,  sur- 
vived. Probably  in  the  eye  of  political  economy  they 
were  the  fittest.  More  women  than  men  also  survived — 
not  exactly  the  reconcentration,  but  the  events  leading 
up  to  reconcentration,  because  many  of  the  husbands, 
fathers,  and  brothers  were  killed  by  the  Spanish  gue- 
rillas. Two  illustrations  from  widely  separated  points 
may  suffice.  In  the  six  months  from  July  1st  to  De- 
cember 31st,  1897,  in  the  community  of  Sancti  Spiri- 
tus,  in  Santa  Clara  province,  the  births  were  202  and 
the  deaths  1,944.  In  the  rich  agricultural  district  of 
Giiines,  in  the  province  of  Habana,  within  defined  limits 
the  population  was  15,000.  In  the  two  years  from  Jan- 
uary 1st,  1897,  to  January  1st,  1899,  the  deaths  were 
9,802,  the  births  319;  the  excess  of  deaths  over  births, 
9,483.  This  page  from  the  story  of  Giiines  is  the  eco- 
nomic epitome  of  the  reconcentration. 

Recent  discussion  has  reopened  the  whole  question 
of  the  acclimatization  of  the  white  man  in  the  equato- 
rial regions  and  in  the  border  tropics.  Assumption 
has  given  way  to  investigation.  Distinguished  natu- 
ralists, among  them  Alfred  Russell  Wallace,  have  chal- 
lenged assumption  in  the  light  of  experience.  Special- 
ists in  medical  science  have  also  challenged  it.  Its 
latest  exponent*  may  find  it  necessary  to  go  beyond 
generalizations  in  upholding  his  theory.  The  effect 
of  Cuba’s  climate  cannot  be  fairly  demonstrated  until 
modern  sanitation  has  cleared  away  the  artificial 
hindrances.  When  the  yellow  fever  becomes  in  Cuba 
* Benjamin  Kidd,  “The  Control  of  the  Tropics.” 

12  177 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


no  more  an  epidemic  than  pneumonia  in  the  United 
States,  the  experiment  of  acclimating  the  white  man  in 
the  border  tropics  will  be  fairly  entered  upon.  Mala- 
ria will  always  exist  there,  just  as  it  exists  in  immense 
regions  of  the  United  States.  Calentura  or  breakbone 
fever  will  not  be  destroyed  any  more  than  ague  can  be 
destroyed  in  the  United  States.  But  medical  science 
may  continue  to  check  it  and  mitigate  it  in  Cuba  as  in 
the  United  States. 

Applied  to  Cuba,  two  criterions  may  be  set  up  with- 
out intricate  analysis.  They  are  experience  and  com- 
mon sense.  The  natives  of  the  Iberian  peninsula  are 
of  the  white  race.  They  have  shown  that  they  can 
work  in  the  fields  with  equal  endurance  with  the  blacks. 
The  Spanish  soldiers  who  have  settled  on  the  island 
have  always  proved  good  laborers.  The  peasants  from 
Catalonia  and  Galicia  are  admittedly  of  the  best  class 
of  laborers.  And  in  spite  of  all  the  talk  the  descend- 
ants of  the  Spanish  peasants,  the  Cuban  peasantry,  are 
hard  workers  in  the  field. 

In  describing  the  Spanish  colony  in  Cuba  I have 
stated  that  it  was  composed  substantially  of  the  na- 
tives of  the  three  provinces  of  Catalonia,  Asturias,  and 
Galicia.  Those  who  have  not  studied  the  subject  will 
be  surprised  when  they  take  their  geographies  and  fol- 
low the  streams  of  immigration  to  the  source.  Though 
the  Council  of  the  Indies  sat  in  Seville  and  in  Cadiz, 
giving  those  towns  the  monopoly  of  the  trade,  Andalu- 
sia did  not  people  Cuba.  Nor  has  the  immigration 
tide,  whether  at  ebb  or  at  flood,  been  from  that  prov- 
ince of  olives  and  oranges  to  the  land  of  palms  and 
oranges.  The  fertile  regions  of  Southern  Spain  were 

178 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

not  deserted  for  the  more  fertile  lands  of  Cuba.  The 
industrial  immigration  came  from  the  northern  prov- 
inces. Allowing  for  the  moderating  influences  of  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  the  inhabitants 
of  the  peninsula  who  settled  in  Cuba  came  from  regions 
which,  nevertheless,  cannot  be  called  tropical.  The 
damp  and  cold  mountain-lands  of  Northern  Spain,  the 
high  plains  which  are  swept  by  the  cold  winds,  have 
contributed  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish  inhabitants  in  Cuba. 
First  they  camo  from  tho  commercial  mart  of  Barcelona 
and  from  the  surrounding  districts  of  Catalonia.  Later 
they  came  from  Asturias,  Galicia,  and  the  mountainous 
provinces  of  the  north. 

The  beginning  of  immigration  from  Galicia  in  a sys- 
tematic manner  was  half  a century  back,  when  the 
great  poverty  prevailing  among  the  inhabitants  of  the 
province  caused  measures  to  be  taken  to  assist  some  of 
them  to  emigrate.  Now  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Cata- 
lonia lies,  roughly  speaking,  between  north  latitude 
40.5°  and  42.5°,  that  Aragon  extends  from  the  parallels 
of  40°  and  43°,  and  that  Asturias  and  Galicia  are  north 
of  43°.  They  are  in  tho  latitude  of  Middle  New  Eng- 
land, New  York,  Northern  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indi- 
ana, Illinois,  and  Iowa.  Allowing  for  the  softening 
influence  of  the  Mediterranean  on  the  bordering  prov- 
inces, the  broad  deduction  remains  unchanged.  A line 
drawn  laterally  from  continent  to  continent  shows  that 
the  bulk  of  the  white  immigration  to  Cuba  has  come 
from  north  of  latitude  41°,  and  latitude  41°  takes  in  the 
great  wheat-growing  regions  of  the  American  continent. 
There  is  no  wheat  to  be  grown  in  Cuba,  and  the  ques- 
tion becomes  one  of  how  far  people  from  the  wheat- 

179 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA 


growing  latitudes  can  raise  products  in  the  tropics. 
The  answer  is  given  iu  the  agricultural  development  of 
the  island.  The  laborers  who  have  been  a leading  ele- 
ment in  it  have  come  from  the  wind-swept  plains  and 
the  barren  mountain  regions  of  the  north  of  Spain. 

In  a blind  way  the  Madrid  Government  encouraged 
Spanish  immigration  to  the  Antilles.  It  was  the  one 
instinct  of  national  polity  which  it  showed.  The  voy- 
ager in  the  waters  of  the  West  Indies  sometimes  puts 
into  Man-o’-War  Bay  at  Great  Inagua  Island,  midway 
between  Eastern  Cuba  and  Haiti.  The  English  customs 
officer,  who  receives  him  courteously,  tells  him  that 
there  are  four  white  families  on  the  island  who  admin- 
ister the  affairs  of  the  fifteen  hundred  black  inhabitants. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  Bahamas  and  the  other  British 
West  Indies.  England  has  never  sought  to  people  these 
islands  with  her  own  colonists ; or  when  she  has  done  it, 
has  given  up  in  dismay.  Jamaica  is  the  most  striking 
instance.  The  development  of  the  future  will  show  the 
defect  of  this  policy,  strong  in  its  administrative  feat- 
ures and  weak  in  its  economic  basis.  Spain,  in  the 
midst  of  unutterable  errors  and  deficiencies  of  political 
administration,  did  manage  to  avoid  the  economic  error. 
A progressive  government  would  have  given  the  island 

5.000. 000  inhabitants  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth 
century,  four-fifths  of  them  of  Spanish  blood.  An  unpro- 
gressive government  managed  to  insure  a population  of 

1.600.000,  two-thirds  of  Spanish  blood.  The  instinct  was 
correct.  The  drawback  was  bad  political  institutions. 

When,  during  the  decade  from  1880  to  1890  the  tide 
of  immigration  from  the  peninsula  to  the  Argentine 
Eepublic  and  other  South  American  countries  alarmed 

lbO 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  Madrid  ministry,  various  explanations  were  sought 
for  it.  One  Spanish  writer  said  the  potent  roason  was 
that  tho  emigrants  from  the  peninsula  were  seeking  new 
institutions  rather  than  a new  country.  Ho  declared 
they  would  have  gone  to  Cuba  in  preference  if  it  were 
not  that  they  would  encounter  their  own  bad  govern- 
ment in  even  worse  form  than  at  home.  At  this  time 
there  was  an  actual  halt  in  tho  immigration  to  the 
Antillos,  and  for  a while  more  people  were  returning  to 
Spain  from  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  than  were  coming  to 
those  islands.  This  was  in  one  sense  the  climax  of  the 
system  which  did  not  settle  Spaniards  in  the  island 
permanently,  but  only  to  draw  from  it  wealth  enough 
to  return  in  comfort  and  ease  to  Spain.  WThile  the 
bureaucratic  policy  of  the  Government  upheld  this  sys- 
tem, it  nevertheless  groped  abotit  for  a means  of  feed- 
ing the  industrial  deficiencies  by  immigration.  The 
various  provincial  societies  also  aided  immigration. 
The  Cuban  and  Spanish  authors  who  in  multitudinous 
array  have  written  of  the  island  have  differed  radically 
regarding  political  liberty  and  administrative  govern- 
ment, but  they  have  always  agreed  that  the  number  of 
inhabitants  was  never  sufficient  to  utilize  the  natural 
richness  of  the  soil.  This  phrase,  “the  natural  rich- 
ness,” is  found  in  all  their  writings. 

W7hen  the  movement  of  population  to  the  South 
American  countries  was  at  its  height,  the  Government 
issued  various  decrees  relating  to  immigration  which 
had  for  their  object  the  encouragement  of  immigrant 
families  settling  in  Cuba.  State  aid  was  advanced,  and 
privileges  were  given  families  similar  to  those  which 
were  granted  to  soldiers  whose  time  expired  and  who 

181 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


settled  on  the  island.  Immigration  was  stimulated 
somewhat,  yet  not  in  great  degree,  because  of  the  fa- 
tal defect  in  Spanish  administration,  which  is  its  lack 
not  of  formulating,  but  of  executing  national  policies. 
With  it,  “la  inertia”  is  what  “la  guillotine”  was  to 
the  French  people  at  a period  of  their  history 
The  future  coming  of  Spanish  immigrants  to  Cuba  in 
the  first  instance  will  be  dependent  on  the  government 
which  is  set  up  in  the  island.  The  hypothesis  of  polit- 
ical stability  is  necessary  to  all  discussion  of  economic 
and  industrial  prospects.  If  the  policy  of  peace  and 
concord  succeeds,  and  the  Spanish  who  remain  in  Cuba 
are  well  treated,  there  is  encouraging  probability  that 
the  Spanish  peasants  will  come  in  numbers.  They  will 
gain  advantages  which  cannot  be  secured  to  them  at 
home.  If  the  Cuban  government  proves  stable  and 
liberal,  they  will  find  both  new  institutions  and  a new 
country  in  which  they  will  not  be  strangers,  because 
they  will  be  among  people  of  their  own  tongue  and 
their  own  race.  Galicia  has  100  inhabitants  to  the 
square  kilometre.  The  land  is  poor  and  thin.  In 
years  past  its  inhabitants  have  spread  into  Portugal, 
and  even  to  Andalusia  and  the  southern  provinces, 
competing  with  the  laborers  there,  and  under  this  com- 
petition doing  better  than  they  could  do  at  home. 
And  in  Andalusia  the  laborer’s  wages  are  rarely  more 
than  20  cents  a day.  The  Gallegos  have  also  gone 
by  the  tens  of  thousands  to  South  America.  Cuba 
offers  them  far  greater  inducements  in  soil  and  oppor- 
tunities. They  have  shown  their  capacity  for  every 
kind  of  labor — in  the  fields,  the  mines,  and  in  the  mer- 
chant marine. 


182 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


Asturias,  from  the  fact  that  it  contributes  a town  pop- 
ulation instead  of  farmers  and  field  laborers,  is  not  apt 
to  bo  a source  of  immigration  for  many  years  to  come. 
But  Catalonia  is  a fountain  of  agricultural  and  com- 
mercial industry,  and  the  prospect  is  for  an  increased 
immigration  from  that  province.  Tho  island  can  re- 
ceive no  more  valuable  contributions  than  these  sturdy 
and  independent  Catalans.  Probably  the  earliest 
source  will  be  the  Canary  Islands,  because  the  move- 
ment of  immigration  and  settlement  from  them  is  al- 
ready under  way.  But  the  Canaries  have  a total  pop- 
ulation of  only  250,000  inliabtants,  and  from  that  cannot 
be  drawn  a heavy  increase  for  Cuba.  When  the  insur- 
rection broke  out  immigration  had  been  started  from  the 
Basque  provinces  to  renew  the  labor  of  the  sugar  planta- 
tions. The  men  were  strong  and  excellent  laborers. 
This  experiment  was  promising.  It  may  be  renewed 
under  more  favorable  conditions.  It  is  also  possible  to 
look  for  a permanent  and  steady  immigration  from 
Andalusia  in  place  of  the  scattering  settlement  that  has 
heretofore  taken  place.  The  similarity  of  climate  and 
products  affords  a natural  economic  basis.  It  may  be 
that  within  a few  years  the  olive,  which  heretofore  has 
not  been  cultivated  for  commercial  purposes,  will  be 
under  cultivation  by  thousands  of  Andalusian  peasants 
and  farmers  in  Cuba. 

When  the  Spanish  troops  were  evacuating  the  island 
a prospect  was  held  out  that  a definite  number  of  tho 
soldiers,  sometimes  placed  as  high  as  20,000,  would 
secure  their  discharges  and  remain.  They  were  of  the 
classes  whose  terms  of  military  service  expired  during 
that  period.  These  soldiers  would  have  been  an  im- 

183 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA 


mense  addition  to  the  depleted  labor  population  of  the 
island.  They  were  from  all  the  provinces  of  the  penin- 
sula, and  belonged  to  the  soil.  But  it  was  found  that 
the  promises  made  them  of  their  pay  would  prove 
worthless  if  they  stayed  in  Cuba.  The  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment, which  at  first  had  been  well  disposed  to  the 
plan,  became  indifferent,  and  various  causes  contributed 
to  its  failure.  A few  hundred  Gallegos  went  to  the 
mines  in  Santiago,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  2,000  Spanish 
soldiers  remained  on  the  island.  So  the  problem  of 
immigration  from  the  peninsula  has  to  be  taken  up  as 
a new  question. 

It  may  be  asked  where  the  encouragement  for  immi- 
gration from  the  United  States  is  to  come  from  if  the 
labor  is  to  be  drawn  from  the  provinces  of  Spain.  I 
am  not  one  of  those  who  look  to  see  Cuba  Americanized 
in  that  sense.  It  is  my  belief  that  climate  will  not  be  a 
bar  to  the  men  of  the  temperate  zone  seeking  homes  in 
the  island.  The  wiser  ones  will  push  aside  all  fancy 
schemes  and  seek  a stake  in  the  land.  A fair  number 
of  American  farmers  will  undoubtedly  engage  in  fruit- 
raising successfully.  They  are  certain  to  work  into 
tobacco  cultivation  as  into  coffee  plantations.  In  time 
the  readjustment  of  the  sugar  industry  will  be  likely  to 
find  many  Americans  raising  sugar-cane  extensively  on 
their  own  capital  for  the  central  mills  to  grind. 

This  may  happen  without  changing  the  prospects 
as  a whole.  It  is  not  probable  that  the  farm-hand 
from  an  American  wheat-field  or  corn-field  will  seek  em- 
ployment in  cutting  cane  in  Cuba.  That  labor  can  be 
drawn  from  the  blacks  and  from  the  Spanish  peasantry. 
Agricultural  labor  will  be  leavened  by  what  it  receives 

184 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


from  the  United  States,  as  will  other  industrial  ele- 
ments; but  this  does  not  alter  the  probability  that  the 
labor  supply  of  the  fields  as  a mass  and  in  a mass  will 
be  drawn  from  other  sources.  It  is  the  fashion  to  talk 
otherwise,  to  assume  that  in  a few  years  American  farm 
laborers  and  unskilled  town  laborers  will  be  spread 
over  the  island  like  the  industrious  ants ; but  there  is 
little  ground  for  this  talk.  Of  the  35,000  American 
soldiers  W’ho  wrere  stationed  in  Cuba  during  the  win- 
ter months,  and  who  therefore  saw  it  under  the  most 
favorable  conditions,  a percentage  which  cannot  yet  be 
guessed  will  gather  together  what  resources  they  have 
and  return  to  settle  there.  Others  will  follow,  but  not 
as  hired  hands,  and  the  bulk  of  immigration  to  Cuba 
for  a long  series  of  years  must  be  that  of  farm-hands. 

Colonization  differs  from  immigration.  As  applied 
to  the  present  and  future  needs  of  Cuba,  it  is  undesir- 
able, for  it  contemplates  a continuance  of  the  old  evils  in 
disguise.  These  were  the  treatment  of  Cuba  as  a tem- 
porary settlement  incapable  of  maintaining  a perma- 
nent population  on  a high,  civilized  plane.  Some  pros- 
pective employers  of  labor  have  looked  longingly  to 
Chinese  colonization.  They  have  imagined  the  em- 
ployment of  coolies  to  be  the  solution  of  the  industrial 
problem.  If  the  island  could  be  treated  as  an  immense 
farm  or  plantation  to  be  farmed  by  aggregation  of  capi- 
tal from  the  outside,  this  might  be  possible.  But  such 
a plan  will  never  succeed.  It  finds  lodgment  with 
many  unthinking  Americans  who  have  only  this  notion 
of  labor  in  its  impersonal  sense,  and  who  do  not  know 
the  real  conditions.  They  have  the  idea  that  labor 
might  be  imported  and  exported  like  any  commodity. 

135 


TO-MORROW  m CUBA 


This  idea  was  held  by  some  Spanish  publicists. 
Half  a century  ago  Don  Urbano  Sotomayor,*  a great 
landowner  and  capitalist,  planned  an  extensive  scheme 
of  the  kind.  It  was  at  the  time  that  the  Gallegos 
at  home  were  suffering  the  keenest  industrial  distress, 
and  in  a small  way  were  being  aided  to  emigrate  to 
Cuba.  Don  Urbano  Sotomayor  looked  on  Cuba  as  an 
immense  plantation  with  only  a transient  population 
convenient  to  Spain  and  the  island.  He  was  a very 
patriotic  and  loyal  Spaniard,  and  he  rejected  with 
horror  the  idea  of  a permanent  settlement  because, 
though  it  might  be  of  Spanish  origin,  he  saw  that  ulti- 
mately it  would  breed  rebellions  subjects.  So  he  pro- 
posed that  the  island  should  be  forever  an  enormous 
farm  with  gangs  of  men  brought  from  the  peninsula  to 
work  it,  and  then  returned  at  intervals  of  five  years, 
while  their  places  should  be  taken  by  fresh  gangs.  He 
rejected  absolutely  the  idea  of  bringing  men  to  stay  or 
women  to  raise  families.  His  plan  was  the  formation 
of  a patriotic  mercantile  society  which  should  bring  the 
Gallegos  and  natives  of  the  other  provinces  under  con- 
tract, and  should  return  them  in  as  good  condition  as 
they  were  brought.  Don  Sotomayor  believed  in  white- 
race  colonization  because  of  the  slave  traffic  then  being 
interdicted  and  labor  importation  being  necessary  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  agriculture.  His  delusion 
as  to  the  probability  of  enforcing  this  scheme  of 
transient  labor  population  was  no  greater  than  that 
of  some  Americans  of  to-day.  Don  Sotomayor  also 
declared  that  Chinese  immigration  was  not  a success. 
He  had  tried  it,  and  had  reached  the  conclusion  that 
* “ Iumigracion  de  Trabajadores  Espaiioles,”  Habaua,  1853. 

186 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

the  social,  hygienic,  and  economic  objections  were 
fatal. 

This  Chinese  immigration  was  begun  in  1847.  It 
was  part  of  a corrupt  and  money-making  scheme  by 
Spanish  officials  in  Madrid  and  in  Habana.  The  Chi- 
nese coolies  were  brought  under  contract,  but  it  was 
virtual  slavery.  In  the  beginning  many  came  from 
the  Philippines,  and  all  the  immigration  was  from  the 
ports  of  Southern  China.  Many  of  the  coolies  were 
kidnapped.  China  and  Spain  still  have  an  unsettled 
diplomatic  controversy  growing  out  of  the  claims  of 
Chinese  subjects  who  were  thus  abducted.  In  1860 
there  were  16,000  Chinese  in  Cuba.  The  Madrid  Gov- 
ernment at  that  time  took  measures  for  facilitating  the 
importation  of  the  coolies,  and  in  1877  the  Chinese 
on  the  island  numbered  40,000.  Ten  years  later  their 
numbers  were  43,000.  Their  introduction  was  contin- 
ued through  government  corruption  in  the  face  of  warn- 
ings of  the  bad  effect  of  this  element. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Chinese  immigrants  were 
worthless.  They  were  a fair  agricultural  population, 
and  contributed  their  share  of  employment  in  other 
occupations.  They  also  made  a little  headway  in 
trade,  and  the  Chinese  genius  for  conquering  the  civ- 
ilization of  the  conqueror  began  to  manifest  itself. 
They  did  not  spread  over  the  whole  island,  but  were 
massed  in  Habana,  in  Cdrdenas,  and  other  sugar- 
growing regions  on  the  north  and  south  coasts.  In 
some  places  they  became  numerous  enough  to  form 
a social  element  of  their  own.  They  erected  casinos 
or  clubs.  In  Habana  they  still  have  a line  casino  and 
theatre. 


187 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  Chinese  suffered  greatly  by  the  insurrection. 
They  were  a neutral  class,  with  the  friendship  of  neither 
the  Spaniards  nor  the  insurgents.  They  lost  heavily 
by  deaths,  and  those  who  were  able  to  do  so  got  away 
from  the  island.  A population  of  43,000  dwindled,  ac- 
cording to  the  estimate  of  the  consulate,  to  less  than 
20,000.  While  the  Chinese  as  an  industrial  element 
were  fair,  the  moral  results  were  inevitably  bad,  be- 
cause the  immigration  from  the  beginning  was  one  of 
males.  The  criminal  population  among  them  was  also 
unusually  heavy,  and  in  the  present  day  they  have  a 
very  large  proportion  of  beggars.  This,  however,  is 
declared  to  be  solely  the  outgrowth  of  the  war,  because 
formerly  a Chinese  beggar  was  rare.  The  Chinese 
quarter  in  Habana  was  not  as  bad  as  Chinatown  in  San 
Francisco,  even  in  these  enlightened  days.  Before  the 
thoroughfare  was  purified  bjr  the  American  authorities, 
the  stranger  might  stroll  along  Zanja  Street  and  some- 
times catch  the  fumes  of  opium  or  peer  into  rooms  and 
see  shocking  sights.  But  with  the  exception  of  the 
opium-smoking  he  could  see  equally  shocking  sights  in 
other  quarters  of  the  city. 

Spanish  civilization  made  no  impress,  one  way  or 
another,  on  the  Chinese  in  Cuba.  In  few  instances  the 
Chinese  contracted  regular  matrimonial  alliances,  and 
the  offspring  of  these  alliances  have  not  proved  a 
vicious  class.  But  naturally  the  bulk  of  the  alliances 
were  illicit.  Many  of  the  Chinese  who  left  Habaua 
managed  to  find  shelter  in  the  United  States  in  spite 
of  the  exclusion  law.  The  tendency  among  those  who 
remained  is  yet  to  seek  this  stealthy  shelter;  but  an 
effort  has  been  made  to  revive  the  immigration  into 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Cuba  of  contract  laborers.  Inevitably  whatever  Cuban 
government  is  established  will  antagonize  these  at- 
tempts. 

The  agitation  in  the  United  States  which  resulted  in 
the  Chinese  exclusion  laws  of  1889  and  1890  found  a 
reflex  in  Cuba  among  Spaniards  and  Cubans  alike,  but 
no  legislation  was  enacted.  The  rights  of  the  Chinese 
in  Cuba  under  Spanish  sovereignty  were  jjrotected 
by  the  treaty  of  1864,  which  was  fairly  liberal  in  its 
provisions.  Though  Cuba  was  regarded  as  foreign  ter- 
ritory under  American  military  control,  the  exclusion 
laws  of  the  United  States  were  not  enforced  against 
the  coming  of  small  groups  of  Chinese.  The  immigra- 
tion rules  of  the  Treasury  Department,  which  are  of  a 
general  character,  were  applied  without  reference  to  the 
nationality  of  the  objectionable  immigrants. 

The  possibility  of  an  influx  of  coolies  excited  the 
cupidity  of  the  speculators.  Some  stejjs  were  taken  to 
replace  the  depleted  Chinese  population.  Immigration 
of  this  kind,  for  a year  or  so,  will  do  no  lasting  harm. 
It  will  bring  back  to  the  wasted  industrial  fabric  of 
the  island  good  working  blood.  But  when  a permanent 
and  unrestricted  movement  is  indicated,  the  question 
becomes  a momentous  one.  In  the  temporary  status 
of  Cuba  some  delicate  international  questions  are  in- 
volved. The  consul-general  of  China  sought  to  have 
the  treaty  of  1864  recognized  by  the  American  authori- 
ties. That  treaty  was  a reciprocal  engagement  between 
Spain  and  China.  While  the  United  States  inherited 
the  obligation  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  Chinese  in 
Cuba,  it  did  not  inherit  the  commercial  privileges  and 
advantages  granted  to  Spain.  The  ground  on  which 

189 


TO-MOKROW  IN  CUBA 


it  can  be  asked  to  continue  this  treaty  in  force  is  not 
clear.  Tlie  clause  relative  to  emigration  permitted 
Chinese  subjects  to  make  contracts  with  Spanish  sub- 
jects for  labor  in  the  Spanish  colonial  possessions  and 
to  embark  from  designated  ports  of  China.  Many  of 
the  Chinese  having  come  direct  from  the  Philippines, 
this  provision  was  not  necessary  to  them. 

"Whatever  form  of  Cuban  government  is  established, 
a restrictive  treaty  or  an  exclusion  law  undoubtedly 
will  be  enacted.  This  will  not  grow  out  of  racial 
hostility,  for  there  is  little  of  that  among  either  the 
Cubans  or  the  Spaniards.  It  will  grow  out  of  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  and  of  national  advance- 
ment. Chinese  immigration  to  Cuba  must  always  be 
an  immigration  of  males.  Its  nature  was  disclosed  in 
the  census  of  1877,  which  gave  77  females  among  a total 
of  40,000  Asiatics.  That  is  why  Chinese  colonization  in 
Cuba  on  a grand  scale  will  be  discouraged.  If  the  civil- 
ization of  the  millions  of  Caucasians  on  the  Pacific  coast 
was  threatened  by  Asiatic  irruption,  the  probable  effect 
on  the  mixed  races  of  Cuba  can  be  judged.  The  reason 
for  restriction  is  a thousandfold  stronger.  The  indus- 
trial gain  would  be  lost  in  the  social  demoralization.  Be- 
cause of  its  social  and  political  bearing,  Chinese  coolie 
colonization  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  a means  of  supply- 
ing workers  in  a mass.  At  the  most  it  will  be  simply 
a help,  and  not  a source  of  labor  supply. 

With  this  fully  understood,  the  Sugar  Planters’  Asso- 
ciation, which  knows  the  agricultural  needs  of  the 
country,  has  held  steadily  to  white  immigration.  The 
Autonomist  party  in  its  first  declaration  of  principles 
was  specifically  for  white  immigration.  And  the  few 

190 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


enlightened  Spanish  leaders  who  gave  the  subject  at- 
tention took  the  same  ground.  In  no  case  was  the 
hostility  to  tho  race  of  color  the  reason.  The  relation 
between  whites  and  blacks  was  proof  of  the  lack  of 
hostility  as  a motive.  Tho  governing  cause  was  the 
fear  that  with  the  incoming  of  blacks  and  without  white 
immigration  the  whites  would  be  absorbed  by  the  race 
of  color,  and  that  the  common  level  would  sink.  With 
the  white  immigration  kept  preponderant,  Latin  civili- 
zation has  brought  the  African  race  up  to  a high  stand- 
ard. In  a previous  chapter  I have  indicated  the  be- 
lief that  no  scheme  of  negro  colonization  in  Cuba  will 
lower  it. 

But  whatever  the  color  of  tho  laborers,  the  people  of 
the  island  realize  that  the  hope  of  the  country  for  to- 
morrow lies  only  in  the  immigration  that  is  based  on 
the  family.  They  will  bo  true  to  that  instinct,  though 
it  may  disappoint  projects  of  venturesome  and  impa- 
tient capital.  They  will  be  exercising  the  principles 
of  the  broadest  statesmanship  and  the  most  enlight- 
ened patriotism  in  whatever  measures  they  may  enact 
to  protect  themselves  from  an  immigration  that  does 
not  bring  with  it  the  family  of  the  immigrant. 


CHAPTER  XI 


Sugar  and  Tobacco — Other  Products 

Shadow  of  Beet-Root  Competition  Not  New — Comparison  with  Cane 
Production — Cost  of  Labor — Effect  of  Hawaii’s  Free  Market — 
Local  Conditions  of  Cuban  Industry — Modern  Methods  in  Use — 
Latest  Crop — System  of  Colonos — Improvement  Probable— Large 
Capital  Requisite  for  Growing  Cane-Sugar — Contrast  of  Tobacco 
Production — Field  for  Small  Capitalists — Family-Group  Labor 
— Control  of  Crop  Not  Likely — Statistics  of  Exports — Prospec- 
tive Revival  of  Coffee  Cultivation — Fruit  Raising  and  Its  Op- 
portunities— Commercial  Productiveness  of  Soil — Mineral  Re- 
sources— Value  of  Forests — Stock  Raising  a Profitable  Field — 
Extent  of  Small  Landownersbip. 

Revolutions  of  government  do  not  revolutionize  the 
soil.  Industrial  ruin  was  the  inevitable  consequence 
of  the  Cuban  insurrection.  In  the  distress  which  fol- 
lowed, the  prophets  of  dismay  declared  that  the  stricken 
cane-sugar  industry  never  could  meet  the  new  condi- 
tions of  competition  and  production  which  were  arising. 
Nevertheless,  Cuba  is  the  greatest  natural  sugar  planta- 
tion in  the  world. 

The  decadence  of  the  cane-sugar  industry  is  not  a 
new  topic.  In  the  year  1812  a.d.,  cane  was  the  subject 
of  a series  of  vaticinations,  and  a dozen  years  pre- 
viously it  was  observed  that  the  introduction  of  the 
beet-root  plant  in  Germany  was  a menace  to  the  sugar- 
growing islands  of  the  West  Indies.  The  industry  was 

192 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


bo  profitable)  that  during  the  first  half  of  the  century 
the  change  from  coffee  raising  to  sugar  planting  began — 
a change  which  continued  steadily,  and  roduced  the 
coffee  production  to  a comparatively  small  number  of 
cafetales,  or  plantations,  in  the  eastern  end  of  the  is- 
land. Yet  the  shadow  of  the  beet  root  lengthened,  for 
the  stalk  was  growing.  In  the  ’fifties  it  was  the  beet 
root,  not  in  Germany,  but  in  France,  that  was  causing 
concern.  Pezuela,  the  learned  and  laborious  author  of 
the  “Dictionary  of  the  Island  of  Cuba,”  writes  of  it  as 
a “prejudicial  rivalry.”  The  complaint  was  that  this 
“ prejudicial  rivalry  ” had  begun  in  1828,  when  the 
sugar  of  Cuba  was  preparing  to  take  greater  value.  At 
that  time  France  had  ninety  refineries  of  her  own  and 
supplied  tho  whole  French  consumption.  Pezuela  also 
remarks  that  as  an  offset  to  losses  in  the  French  mar- 
ket, Cuba  gained  by  the  decline  of  the  sugar  production 
in  Jamaica  which  the  freeing  of  the  slaves  caused. 
Little  note  is  taken  of  the  steadily  increasing  consump- 
tion in  the  United  States,  and  the  market  which  was 
then  widening  for  Cuba  as  an  offset  to  the  European 
exclusion. 

In  1830,  when,  in  spite  of  the  French  beet-root  com- 
petition, the  development  of  the  cane-sugar  industry  in 
Cuba  really  commenced,  a negro  plantation-hand  was 
accounted  worth  $400,  a yoke  of  oxen  $135,  and  a 
horse  or  a mule  $G0.  The  negro  cotton-hand  on  a 
plantation  in  the  United  States  had  a greater  worth. 
In  1857  Pezulea  estimated  the  value  of  the  2,000  sugar 
plantations  on  the  island  at  $239,000,000,  of  which 
the  land  was  figured  at  $80,000,000  and  150,000  slaves 
at  $105,000,000.  The  balance  was  made  up  of  the 
13  193 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


plantation  animals  and  implements.  New  inventions 
were  also  utilized  to  increase  the  production.  The 
number  of  separate  ingenios,  or  plantations,  diminished 
by  absorption  into  larger  ones. 

In  1860  the  production  of  cane-sugar  in  Cuba  was 
1,127,848,750  pounds.  The  aguardiente,  or  cane- 
brandy,  and  other  by-products  also  had  to  be  taken 
into  account.  In  that  year  the  production  of  cane- 
sugar  in  all  countries  of  the  world  was  2,750,496,950 
pounds.  The  beet-sugar  production  was  449,999,943 
pounds,  divided  between  France  and  Germany  in  the 
relative  proportion  of  two-fifths  to  three-fifths.  Com- 
ing down  to  a later  period  without  intermediate  anal- 
ysis, the  situation  may  be  seen  at  a glance,  and  the 
changes  that  have  taken  place  be  understood  by  the 
following  comparative  figures  of  cane  and  beet  root : 


Cane.  Beet. 

1887-88 2,541  tons  2,407  tons. 

1896-97 2,452  “ 4,772  “ 


Cuba’s  quota  had  fallen  abnormally  on  account  of 
the  insurrection,  and  the  percentage  of  cane  production 
was  therefore  not  trustworthy.  But  this  deficiency  did 
not  obscure  the  steady  increase  of  beet  production. 
Since  then  some  further  changes  have  taken  place,  due 
largely  to  the  tariff  legislation  of  the  United  States 
intended  to  foster  its  own  beet-sugar  industry.  Cuba’s 
future  must  be  examined  in  the  light  of  all  these 
changed  circumstances. 

During  the  worst  years  of  the  insurrection  the  Cuban 
sugar  planters  were  confident  that  when  peace  should 
be  re-established  they  would  be  able  to  meet  the  beet- 
sugar  competition.  They  never  feared  that  the  cane  of 

194 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

Cuba  would  lose  its  market.  All  their  hopes  were  de- 
pendent on  the  United  States.  This  is  so  obviously 
the  correct  view  that  it  does  not  need  elaboration.  The 
United  States  is  fostering  beet-root  production  by  a 
relatively  high  protective  tariff.  The  growth  of  the 
industry  has  not  yet  reached  the  proportions  which 
justify  the  belief  that  the  Western  farmers  will  'go  into 
its  production  extensively  rather  than  to  continue  rais- 
ing bread-stuffs  for  the  sugar-producing  West  Indies. 

Investigations  made  by  the  United  States  Agricultu- 
ral Department  show  that  in  Puerto  Rico  cane-sugar 
can  be  raised  for  two  cents  a pound  of  the  same  stand- 
ard that  it  will  cost  the  producer  of  the  United  States 
three  and  one-quarter  cents  a pound  to  produce  beet 
root.  The  limit  of  production  in  Puerto  Rico  is  so 
small,  being  not  over  three  per  cent  of  the  total  con- 
sumption of  the  United  States,  that  it  is  not  an  impor- 
tant factor.  In  Cuba  it  is  different.  A careful  exami- 
nation will  show  that  in  the  new  conditions  cane-sugar 
cannot  be  produced  there  much  below  two  cents  a 
pound.  The  margin  may  be  one  cent  a pound  between 
that  and  the  beet-root  production  in  the  United  States 
when  beet-root  production  cheapens.  The  cost  of  labor 
is  relatively  high.  This  cost  will  increase  rather  than 
diminish  in  the  future,  because  the  Cuban  plantation 
laborers  are  likely  to  reach  a higher  standard  of  living. 
Cane-sugar  production  in  Cuba  at  one  and  one-half 
cents  a pound  is  due  to  exceptional  advantages.  It  is 
not  general.  It  is  probable  that  in  its  elementary 
stages  the  beet-root  industry  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Louisiana  interests  will  prevent  the  free  intro- 
duction of  Cuban  sugar.  They  will  not  be  able  to  pre- 

195 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


vent  that  liberal  reciprocity  which  is  so  essential  to 
the  Cuban  cane  production,  especially  since  a conces- 
sion has  been  made  to  the  British  West  Indies.  The 
steady  increase  in  consumption  in  the  United  States 
will  justify  broad  reciprocity.  A spoonful  of  beet  root 
for  the  morning  coffee  from  the  home  product,  a sau- 
cerful from  Cuba  for  other  household  purposes,  will  be 
the  relative  proportions  for  many  years  to  come. 

Hawaii  has  the  advantage  of  the  free  market  forever 
secured  by  annexation.  Its  production  is  undergoing 
an  abnormal  stimulus.  No  reason  exists  for  placing 
the  ultimate  Hawaiian  production  beyond  300,000  tons 
annually.  Under  the  free  market  afforded  by  reci- 
procity the  greatest  annual  output  was  237,000  tons. 
All  the  economies  of  production  and  new  methods  have 
been  utilized  in  Hawaii  for  years  past.  The  area  of 
soil  suitable  for  cultivation  is  limited.  Because  Ha- 
waii once  thought  100,000  tons  the  limit  of  her  produc- 
tive capacity  does  not  prove  that  300,000  is  not  the 
limit. 

Jamaica  and  the  British  West  Indies,  under  the  pres- 
ent policy  of  the  British  Empire,  are  not  apt  to  see  the 
revival  of  their  cane-sugar  industry.  The  British  im- 
perial policy  changes  slowly.  Grants-in-aid  are  far- 
things tossed  to  a ragged  beggar.  Though  Jamaica 
has  secured  partial  reciprocity  with  the  United  States, 
her  recuperation  must  be  slower  than  that  of  Cuba 
because  the  conditions  of  the  recuperation  are  not  so 
favorable.  Cuba  has  more  to  fear  fi'om  the  develop- 
ment of  cane-sugar  in  Mexico  and  perhaps  in  the  Phil- 
ippines than  from  the  reconstruction  of  the  industry 
in  Jamaica  and  Barbadoes. 

196 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


These  are  what  may  ho  called  the  external  condi- 
tions affecting  sugar  production  in  Cuba.  They  givo 
fair  basis  for  the  assumption  that  a profitable  market 
may  bo  assured  for  the  next  few  years,  possibly  until 
the  former  production  of  1,000,000  tons  annually  is 
reachod.  Iu  the  mean  time  the  conditions  under  which 
this  production  must  go  forward  become  important. 
Sugar  planters  in  debt,  with  years  of  non-production 
and  of  wreck  and  ruin  behind  them,  were  not  in  posi- 
tion to  make  a vigorous  start.  Probably  many  of  the 
mortgaged  plantations  will  pass  into  other  hands.  But 
the  soil  is  there,  and  if  the  American  market  can  be 
assured  the  redevelopment  will  come,  first  to  the  plan- 
atious  closest  to  the  sea-coast,  then  of  those  fai’ther 
back  in  the  interior,  and  finally  there  will  bo  new  plan- 
tations. In  this  development  the  revolution  iu  methods 
of  production  which  has  been  going  on  will  be  con- 
tinued. Already  machinery  has  effected  a saving  of 
twenty  per  cent  iu  production.  The  economic  basis  of 
production  may  be  modified,  so  that  there  will  be  prac- 
tically no  wastage,  and  these  new  processes  must  serve 
as  the  compensation  for  the  relatively  high  cost  of 
labor.  One  fact  seems  to  stand  out.  This  is  that 
while  capital  will  be  cautious,  it  will  not  find  the  beet- 
sugar  competition  too  dangerous  to  prevent  investment 
in  Cuba.  In  1905  the  Queen  of  the  Antilles  may  be 
producing  as  large  a quantity  of  cane  as  she  produced 
in  1895,  but  under  different  conditions  and  at  a less 
relative  cost  of  production. 

It  is  a common  mistake  that  the  prodigality  of  nature 
destroyed  systematic  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  in  Cuba. 
Pen  pictures  of  the  planters  spending  the  riotous  earn- 

197 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ings  of  their  cane-lands  in  Saratoga  and  Paris  while  the 
plantations  produced  and  reproduced  without  manage- 
ment were  often  drawn.  These  pictures  gave  a false 
idea.  Some  of  the  Cuban  planters  were  as  extravagant 
and  as  improvident  as  those  of  Louisiana  in  former 
days.  In  time  the  mortgages  ate  the  substance  of  the 
soil,  and  the  plantation-owners  were  ruined.  It  was 
also  true  that  they  did  not  act  together  as  one  body  in 
establishing  a scientific  basis  of  production  as  the  Ha- 
waiian planters  have  done.  The  latter  by  their  organ- 
ization have  brought  cane  cultivation  to  an  exact  science 
which  assures  the  fullest  return  of  natural  wealth  from 
every  acre  of  land. 

But  improvidence  was  not  true  of  the  whole  class  of 
Cuban  planters.  After  visiting  the  few  estates  which 
were  enabled  to  plant  and  grind  during  the  worst  pe- 
riod of  the  insurrection,  it  came  to  me  to  visit  the 
leading  plantations  in  the  islands  of  the  Hawaiian 
group  and  to  observe  the  methods  of  production. 
During  a subsequent  stay  in  Cuba  further  opportunity 
was  given  to  study  the  cultivation  there  when  peace- 
ful industry  reigned.  I did  not  find  a single  process 
in  Hawaii,  with  the  admitted  perfection  to  which  the 
use  of  improved  machinery  has  been  brought  and  the 
economic  devices  for  preventing  waste,  that  was  not 
understood  and  practised  in  Cuba.  The  progressive 
planters  of  the  Antilles  knew  how  to  utilize  every  prod- 
uct of  the  sugar-cane.  The  difference  was  that  while 
the  rule  of  scientific  production  in  Hawaii  was  uni- 
versal, in  Cuba  it  was  followed  simply  by  individual 
planters.  Needless  to  say  it  must  become  universal  in 
Cuba  also  before  the  sugar  industry  can  recuperate  on 

198 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


a lasting  basis.  The  day  of  the  prodigal  planter  is 
gone.  I might  add  that  he  was  not  always  a Cuban. 
In  the  province  of  Habana  the  plantation  which  is 
usually  cited  as  an  example  of  modern  methods  and  of 
keen  business  administration  is  owned  and  managed 
by  Cubans.  In  Santa  Clara  province  a magnificent 
estate  which  may  fairly  claim  to  be  one  of  the  finest 
sugar  plantations  in  the  world  is  the  property  of  a 
noted  Cuban  family.  The  supposedly  prudent  Eng- 
lishman in  the  role  of  a planter  ruined  by  his  own 
extravagance  is  too  often  seen  iu  the  West  Indies  to 
charge  that  quality  solely  to  the  Latins. 

The  sugar  crop  of  1898-99  was  a disappointment  to 
unthinking  persons.  They  imagined  that  with  the 
return  of  peace  the  scorched  cane-stalks  which  spread 
for  hundreds  of  miles  over  the  island  would  at  once 
bear  sap.  The  net  production  for  the  year  was  304,- 
360  tons  of  2,240  pounds  against  290,028  tons  the  pre- 
vious year.  Eighteen  months  are  necessary  from  the 
time  the  cane  is  planted  until  the  first  crop  is  ready  for 
grinding.  Then  the  soil  produces  seven  years  with- 
out renewal.  The  planters  needed  first  of  all  oxen, 
then  laborers,  then  money  for  machinery,  and  all  the 
time  money  for  interest  on  the  accumulated  mortgages. 
Some  of  them  by  the  closest  figuring  of  which  they 
were  capable  declared  they  could  not  replant  their 
ruined  estates  under  $30  an  acre.  Others  in  favored 
localities  thought  they  could  do  it  for  $15  an  acre. 
The  owner  of  a small  estate  of  1,700  acres  which  came 
within  my  notice  said  he  could  replant  for  $23,000,  or 
a little  less  than  $14  an  acre.  He  had  the  seed-cane 

available,  and  this  was  not  included  in  the  estimate. 

190 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


With  a proper  understanding  of  cane-sugar  cultivation, 
no  one  will  look  for  a heavy  increase  in  the  crop  before 
the  season  of  1901.  By  that  time  an  output  of  500,000 
tons  may  be  in  sight.  One  general  fact  must  be  kept 
in  mind.  A maximum  of  two  cents  per  pound  must  be 
allowed  for  production.  The  profit  is  in  the  fraction 
below  that  figure.  Ultimately  this  fraction  will  be  as- 
sured in  the  reciprocity  granted  by  the  United  States  as 
a compromise  between  the  pressure  of  the  sugar-refining 
interests  for  free  raw  product  and  the  opposition  of  the 
beet-sugar  producing  interests  to  any  lowering  of  the 
duty. 

Whether  the  system  of  colonos  will  remain  is  a prob- 
lem. In  the  beginning  it  seemed  an  ideal  system.  A 
large  plantation,  in  addition  to  the  land  worked  by  the 
owner,  would  have  a dozen  or  more  tenant  producers. 
The  cost  of  production  was  largely  lessened  by  having 
one  great  central  mill  grind  for  the  surrounding  coun- 
try. Machinery  which  on  separate  plantations  would 
cost  $2,000,000,  on  a single  plantation  at  an  investment 
of  $500,000  could  do  the  same  work.  Production  was 
unquestionably  cheapened.  It  is  certain  that  the  cane 
wTill  continue  to  be  ground  by  the  central  mill.  The 
practical  difficulty  is  in  the  adjustment  of  the  relations 
of  the  plantation-owners  and  the  colonos,  or  tenants. 
Under  the  old  system,  on  a big  plantation  in  return 
for  so  many  tons  of  sugar-cane  brought  to  the  cen- 
tral mill  the  plantation-owner  would  return  to  tho 
colono  a definite  quantity  of  raw  sugar.  The  profit 
to  the  mill  lay  in  the  amount  or  quantity  of  sugar 
taken  as  compensation  for  the  grinding.  Naturally 
tho  colonos  claimed  that  the  mill  wanted  too  large  a 

200 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


proportion.  That  is  a difference  of  opinion  which 
will  always  exist. 

The  real  difficulty  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  colonos 
leased  the  lands  from  the  plantation-owners.  The  lat- 
ter were  always  large  borrowers,  and  in  return  they 
made  advances  of  money  to  the  colonos.  With  a debtor 
loaning  to  another  debtor,  the  unsatisfactory  results 
were  certain  to  follow.  But  the  system  is  clearly  capa- 
ble of  improvement.  It  is  possible  to  imagine  a time 
when  the  central  mills  will  grind  the  product  of  sugar- 
farms  which  vary  in  area  from  a caballeria  to  two  hun- 
dred acres,  the  land  either  owned  or  leased  by  the  far- 
mer, who  can  raise  enough  farm  products  for  the  support 
of  his  family,  and  devote  the  rest  of  the  land  to  the  cul- 
tivation of  cane  to  be  ground  at  the  central  mill.  On 
the  larger  scale  the  colono  system  w'ill  also  be  developed. 
An  ambitious  American  may  lease  2,000  acres  and  up- 
wards for  a period  of  five  or  six  years.  If  he  has  his 
own  capital  with  which  to  do  that  and  can  secure  his 
own  labor,  the  central  mill  will  become  his  servant  and 
not  his  master. 

Though  the  great  planters  are  not  encouraged  with 
this  prospect,  and  though  the  sugar  industry  in  Cuba 
must  always  be  dependent  on  large  investments  of  capi- 
tal, the  failure  of  the  colono  system  cannot  be  affirmed. 
It  demands  a new  trial  under  new  conditions.  The 
planters  apparently  have  not  considered  the  probability 
of  the  industry  shifting  to  a new  basis.  The  amount 
of  capital  required  to  be  invested  in  a central  mill 
is  large,  ranging  sometimes  from  $500,000  upwards  for 
the  machinery.  There  seems  to  be  no  inherent  obstacle 
to  the  mills  representing  capital  independent  from  that 

2oi 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


which  controls  the  plantations,  just  as  the  great  flour- 
mills of  the  Northwest  are  independent  of  the  wheat- 
fields.  In  some  form  it  is  an  industrial  possibility. 

In  the  economic  history  of  the  island  the  old  writers 
note  that  cane-sugar  became  a profitable  industry  when 
negro  slaves  were  introduced  in  numbers.  They  re- 
marked the  progress  made  during  the  short  period  of 
English  occupation  in  1763,  when  5,000  slaves  were 
added  to  the  stock  of  human  blood  which  the  island 
already  possessed.  The  slaves  came  from  Jamaica  and 
the  other  adjacent  islands.  The  English  went,  but  the 
Africans  remained.  The  slaves  whom  the  English  left 
gave  a marked  impetus  to  the  sugar  plantations.  This 
growth  continued  until  the  beet  root  caused  inquietude 
and  until  the  prophecies  were  made  on  the  prospective 
ruin  of  the  industry.  The  beet  root  did  not  cause  the 
fears  of  the  planters  to  be  realized.  Sugar-cane  con- 
tinued to  add  to  the  wealth  of  the  Pearl  of  the  Indies. 
The  aggregate  of  slave  labor  increased,  keeping  pace 
with  the  increase  of  sugar  production. 

When  the  African  slave  trade  was  restricted  under 
treaty  agreement  and  failed  to  fill  the  void,  Chinese 
coolies  were  introduced.  This  experiment  was  not  a 
promising  success.  The  influence  of  the  Chinese  im- 
migration is  discussed  elsewhere,  but  the  fallacy  of  the 
slave-labor  necessity  was  shown  after  the  Ten-Years’ 
war,  when  the  progressive  emancipation  of  the  blacks 
was  in  operation  and  sugar  production  increased.  It 
was  a demonstration  again  of  the  greater  productiveness 
of  free  labor  over  servile  labor.  The  years  of  greatest 
production  were  those  following  1886,  when  the  remnant 
of  slavery  was  abolished. 


202 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


This,  however,  may  be  said  to  be  shifting  the  labor 
issue  instead  of  meeting  it.  The  question  to  be  met  is 
whether  sugar  production  can  continue  on  a profitable 
scale  under  conditions  which  are  not  substantially  ser- 
vile labor.  The  coming  industrial  life  of  Cuba  is  so 
largely  one  of  immigration  that  the  bearing  of  immi- 
gration on  sugar  production  calls  for  a word.  It  may 
be  taken  as  a maxim  that  white  labor  from  the  United 
States  is  not  going  to  work  in  the  cane-fields.  Western 
farm-hands  who  show  little  willingness  to  exchange 
the  freedom  of  the  wheat  and  corn  fields  for  the  more 
tedious  labor  of  beet-root  cultivation  will  not  transfer 
themselves  to  the  cane-fields  of  the  Antilles.  The  labor 
of  the  cane  plantations  in  the  future  will  be  drawn  from 
the  same  sources  as  in  the  past.  It  will  be  made  up  of 
black  and  white  Cubans  and  Spanish  peasants.  Capi- 
tal will  find  the  means  of  securing  labor,  and  the  island 
will  benefit  in  the  collateral  branches  which  come  from 
handling  the  sugar  crop.  If,  however,  the  future  of 
Cuba  were  for  it  to  be  simply  a huge  sugar-cane  plan- 
tation, that  future  would  be  dark  politically,  socially, 
and  economically.  Happily  the  promises  for  develop- 
ment are  along  other  lines  which  will  be  parallel  with 
its  sugar  production  and  will  offset  its  drawbacks. 

The  smoke  of  the  Vuelta  Abajo  curls  upwards  from 
millions  of  cigars  in  Europe  and  the  United  States  and 
in  every  corner  of  the  known  world.  The  conditions  of 
the  tobacco  industry  in  Cuba  are  not  limited  by  the 
uncertainty  of  tariff  duties.  The  effect  of  these  must 
be  weighed,  but  they  do  not  permanently  restrict  the 
output.  It  might  also  be  said  that  the  production  of 
cheaper  tobacco,  following  the  laws  of  natural  econ- 

203 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


omy,  has  not  reached  its  limit.  Its  growth  will  be 
accompanied  with  greater  economic  developments  and 
with  fewer  drawbacks  than  the  redevelopment  of  the 
sugar-cane  production.  It  benefits,  too,  the  artisans  of 
the  island  as  well  as  the  agricultural  laborers.  With 
the  increase  of  tobacco  production,  the  number  of  cigar 
factories  in  Habana  is  certain  to  increase.  This  is  the 
kind  of  light  manufacturing  suitable  to  the  tropics.  It 
pays  to  have  an  Habana  brand  on  the  tobacco  of  the 
Yuelta  Abajo  and  Partidos  districts.  Remedios,  in  the 
central  part  of  the  island,  may  ship  its  strong  products 
to  the  United  States,  and  the  poorer  grades  raised  in  San- 
tiago may  go  to  Germany  without  affecting  this  fact. 

Centuries  of  privilege  did  not  destroy  the  Government 
monopoly  of  tobacco  which  Spain  enforced.  From  the 
time  when  the  Government  factory  was  established  in 
Seville  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies  to  the  end  of  Spanish 
sovereignty  in  the  island,  both  production  and  distribu- 
tion were  regulated  by  the  authorities.  When  the  royal 
decree  of  1817  was  promulgated,  it  showed  the  reluctance 
which  the  Spanish  Government  yet  preserved  to  making 
the  cultivation  and  manufacture  of  tobacco  entirely  free. 
During  the  insurrection  the  export  duties  were  moulded 
to  suit  the  Barcelona  monopoly.  Under  an  independent 
government  or  an  American  protectorate  they  will  be 
shaped  so  as  to  lighten  the  burden  of  the  producer. 

The  leading  characteristic  of  tobacco  production  in 
contrast  with  sugar-cane  is  that  it  is  emphatically  an 
industry  for  the  small  capitalists  and  farmers.  The 
island  is  in  little  probability  of  becoming  a vast  tobacco 
plantation  controlled  by  a trust  or  syndicate  with  the 
power  to  regulate  production.  Capital  in  this  form  or 

204 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


in  other  forms  is  of  immense  benefit  to  Cuba,  but  it 
has  its  limitations.  The  tobacco  industry  may  become, 
in  the  regions  which  have  tobacco  soil,  an  immense 
grouping  of  small  farms.  The  uncertainty  of  the  crop, 
the  difference  in  grades,  the  necessity  of  manufacturers 
having  a variety  from  which  to  choose,  militate  against 
a monopoly  of  production.  To  control  the  production 
of  potatoes  in  the  United  States  would  be  as  simple  as 
to  control  tobacco  production  in  Cuba.  While  the  syn- 
dicates or  companies  which  own  the  factories  may  also 
own  large  plantations,  the  conditions  of  production  are 
such  that  it  does  not  pay  them  to  work  the  plantations 
as  a single  tract. 

Experience  may  be  needed  to  demonstrate  this  fact. 
The  vegas  or  small  farms,  whether  leased  to  the  pro- 
ducers or  owned  by  them,  are  to  the  interest  of  the  fac- 
tories as  well  as  to  the  producers.  Where  the  veguero 
needs  money,  the  amount  is  small  compared  with  that 
which  the  sugar  planter  must  advance  to  the  colono,  and 
the  risk  of  losing  its  return  is  less.  In  1858  there  were 
8,250  caballerias  of  tobacco  land  under  cultivation,  and 
the  production  was  1,700,000  arrobas  of  25  pounds. 
In  1894  the  number  8,875  was  given  as  plantations, 
rather  than  as  caballerias.  The  number  of  people  em- 
ployed directly  and  indirectly  by  the  industry  was 
80,000.  Of  these  there  were  in  Pinar  del  Rio — the 
Vuelta  Abajo  district — 20,000  men  and  10,000  women 
and  children.  Aside  from  its  economic  and  industrial 
value,  tobacco  raising  will  be  of  great  worth  in  the  tran- 
sition of  political  conditions  and  in  its  effect  on  rural 
prosperity.  Its  labor  is  of  the  highest  type,  which  is 
that  of  family-group  labor. 

205 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Ordinarily  four  or  five  years  are  needed  to  learn  the 
science  of  tobacco  growing.  It  is  also  an  art.  One 
man  may  grow  nine  bales,  or  about  1,000  pounds,  of 
tobacco.  The  plants  are  placed  in  the  ground  from  Oc- 
tober to  January,  and  the  harvest  is  from  January  to 
April.  The  first  cutting  is  for  wrappers  and  the  later 
cuttings  are  for  fillers.  Tobacco  is  thus  a three-months’ 
crop.  When  it  is  in  the  drying-house,  corn  or  some 
other  cereal  is  planted  and  a crop  had  from  the  same 
soil. 

The  foreign  demand  for  Habana  cigars  and  Cuban  leaf 
tobacco  is  not  likely  to  be  met  for  a long  while  because 
the  consumption  grows  steadily.  The  prohibition  of 
exports  and  the  lack  of  leaf  for  local  manufacture  dur- 
ing the  insurrection  make  an  accurate  comparison  im- 
practicable, but  a general  idea  may  be  gained  from  the 
cigars  and  the  leaf  tobacco  exported  for  a ten-years’ 
period.  This  is  afforded  by  the  following  table : 


Year. 

Cigars. 

Tobacco. 

Pounds. 

1889  

250,000,000 

30,000,000 

1890  

. . ..212,000,000 

1891 

197,000,000 

17,000,000 

1892  

167,000,000 

16,000,000 

1893  

147,000,000 

18,000,000 

1894  

134.000,000 

22,000,000 

1895  

159,000,000 

23,000,000 

1896  

186,000,000 

30,000,000 

1897  

123,000,000 

Prohibited. 

1898  

98,000,000 

9,000,000 

Coffee  promises  to  become  what  it  was  in  the  early 
years  of  the  century,  a staple  for  all  sections  of  the 
island.  At  present  its  cultivation  is  limited  to  the  east- 
ern province,  and  the  excellence  of  the  plantations 

206 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


around  Guantanamo  is  well  known.  The  French  refu- 
gees from  Santo  Domingo  who  established  the  industry 
there  also  carried  it  to  the  western  end.  Until  they 
were  abandoned  for  cane  growing,  the  cafetales  in  Ha- 
bana  province  were  very  productive.  Their  re-establish- 
ment is  probable.  Uplands  from  1,000  to  2,500  feet 
above  sea-level  abound  in  Matanzas,  and  also  around 
Alquizar  and  Artemisa  in  Habana,  and  this  height  in- 
sures a good  crop.  The  capital  invested  in  coffee  pro- 
duction must  wait  four  and  possibly  five  years  for  its 
full  return.  The  field  is  not,  therefore,  one  for  the  pell- 
mell  investment  which  wants  one  hundred  per  cent, 
within  a twelvemonth ; but  when  the  fever  of  this  kind 
of  speculation  passes  away  and  normal  inducements  are 
followed,  the  increase  in  plantations  will  be  seen.  The 
coffee  industry  has  a great  advantage  in  that  it  does  not 
require  large  capital,  and  while  a plantation  is  being 
brought  to  the  point  of  market  productiveness  the  land 
affords  other  means  of  support  for  those  who  cultivate 
it.  With  a coffee-consuming  population  such  as  the  in- 
habitants of  Cuba  will  always  be,  and  with  a soil  capa- 
ble of  producing  almost  unlimited  crops,  the  importa- 
tion of  coffee  from  Puerto  Rico  and  the  United  States 
is  bound  to  cease.  A better  quality  can  be  produced  at 
a cheaper  price  than  it  can  be  imported.  The  Santiago 
grade  commands  a premium  in  the  markets  of  the  isl- 
and. In  a few  years  Habana  will  probably  be  supply- 
ing its  local  consumption  from  the  cafetales  within  forty 
or  fifty  miles  of  the  city. 

Fruit  raising  may  be  engaged  in  earlier  than  coffee 
production.  American  interests  are  understood  to  be 
supplementing  their  successful  development  of  fruit 

207 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


growing  in  Jamaica  by  purchases  of  land  in  Eastern 
Cuba,  where  Banes  and  Baracoa  are  the  ports  of  export. 
There  is  opportunity  for  the  small  fruit  farmer  also. 
Sugar  planters  are  discovering  that  the  raising  of  bana- 
nas, pineapples,  cocoanuts,  and  oranges  may  be  carried 
on  in  connection  with  sugar  production.  Those  who 
are  in  a position  to  do  so  are  willing  to  try  the  experi- 
ment. This  does  not  mean  that  oranges  will  cease  to 
grow  in  Florida.  It  means  that  the  productiveness  of 
the  Cuban  soil  is  likely  to  be  further  diversified  in  such 
products  as  find  at  their  door  the  markets  of  the  United 
States. 

The  fertility  of  the  soil  of  Cuba  is  so  boundless  that 
exaggerated  estimates  of  what  is  worth  producing  are 
sometimes  made.  The  tables  of  the  leading  authorities 
on  industrial  subjects  are  taken  in  their  literal  meaning 
as  though  applicable  to  all  the  cultivators  of  the  soil. 
But  this  is  not  the  commercial  productiveness.  Their 
figures  show  the  limit  of  capacity  of  a caballeria,  or 
33  £ acres,  and  the  number  of  families  which  may  be 
supported  from  that  area  of  land.  Sugar,  coffee,  to- 
bacco, cocoa,  corn,  hay,  potatoes,  rice,  yucca,  or  starch- 
plant — which  stayed  the  hunger  of  Columbus  and  his 
mariners — even  wheat,  cotton,  bananas,  and  other 
fruits  may  all  be  raised  on  one  farm,  besides  the  pigs 
and  the  poultry  which  can  be  fed ; but  the  limitation  of 
this  productiveness  in  practice  must  be  noted.  Cot- 
ton grows  on  trees  instead  of  bushes,  but  it  is  not  going 
to  be  produced  in  Cuba  to  compete  with  that  raised  in 
the  Southern  States ; nor  will  wheat  be  coaxed  from  the 
ground  when  it  is  cheaper  to  ship  sugar  and  fruits  to 
the  Mississippi  Valley  and  import  flour  and  cotton  goods 

208 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


in  return.  The  diversity  of  products  is  great,  but  in  the 
lifotirue  of  the  producers  of  to-day  they  will  not  bo  pro- 
ducing everything  that  they  want  to  eat.  Corn  alter- 
nates with  tobacco  beneficially  to  the  soil,  and  other 
crops  rotate  with  advantage ; but  they  do  not  reduce  cul- 
tivation to  a minuteness  vastly  greater  than  that  of  the 
farm  lands  in  many  portions  of  the  United  States. 

Homely  calculations  have  been  made  of  the  increased 
area  which  was  brought  uuder  cultivation  on  American 
farms  when  the  barbed-wire  fences  straightened  out  the 
corners  lost  in  the  elbows  of  the  rail  fences.  The  esti- 
mate of  the  wheat  and  corn  and  vegetables  which  might 
be  raised  on  all  the  railroad  rights  of  way  would  be  an 
interesting  one.  In  the  same  way  the  generalization 
might  be  made  of  the  increase  in  production  when  every 
caballeria  of  Cuban  land  is  under  cultivation  of  crops  di- 
versified scientifically  and  mathematically  ; but  it  would 
have  no  present  bearing.  The  thing  to  be  known  about 
the  soil  of  Cuba  is  that  its  cultivators  need  never  be 
dependent  on  one  staple,  as  the  Western  farmers  are  de- 
pendent on  wheat  and  corn.  The  value  of  this  condition 
is  in  the  probability  that,  while  sugar-cane  will  not  lose 
its  supremacy,  agricultural  industry  will  be  diversified 
by  the  increase  of  lesser  farming. 

The  mineral  wealth  of  Cuba  has  been  prospected  with 
passable  thoroughness.  Imberno,*  one  of  the  best  of 
recent  authorities,  says  that  besides  the  country  imme- 
diately adjacent  to  the  city  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  there 
is  iron  in  the  region  around  Holguin  and  Baracoa  in  the 
same  province,  in  various  parts  of  Santa  Clara,  near 
Jaruco  in  the  northeastern  part  of  Habana  province, 
* Guia  Geogrdlica  y Administrativa. 

14  209 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  especially  near  the  coast  along 
Bahia  Honda.  Coj)per  he  locates  chiefly  in  Santiago, 
but  he  refers  to  the  deposits  near  Minas  in  Habana. 
These  deposits  are  now  owned  by  Americans.  Plum- 
bago, he  says,  is  found  with  iron  in  Santiago,  and  anti- 
mony with  lead  in  the  Holguin  district.  Coal  he  lo- 
cates in  the  region  of  Consolacion,  del  Sur  in  Pinar  del 
Rio  and  in  Matanzas  province;  gypsum  in  Pinar  del 
Rio,  magnetic  ore  around  Guanabacoa,  which  is  across 
the  bay  from  Habana,  in  the  hills  of  Trinidad,  around 
El  Caney  near  Santiago,  and  in  other  districts.  The 
marble  in  the  Isle  of  Pines  is  extensive,  but  it  is  of 
inferior  quality. 

The  best  report  on  the  asphalt  and  bituminous  oil 
deposits  was  made  by  the  Spanish  official  engineer, 
Pedro  Saltarian,  in  1883.  He  located  bituminous  wells 
in  various  sections  of  Santa  Clara  province,  and  the 
asphalt  beds  in  the  Cdrdenas  district  as  well  as  several 
in  Pinar  del  Rio  were  described  by  him.  Some  of 
these  have  been  partially  worked  with  divergent  opin- 
ions as  to  their  commercial  value. 

Americans  who  prospected  in  Eastern  Cuba  thought 
they  saw  the  greatest  possibilities  in  the  manganese 
and  copper  mines,  with  some  encouragement  for  lead 
deposits.  Discoveries  of  this  kind  became  as  common 
as  the  location  of  silver  mines  in  the  Western  States. 
Some  of  the  prospectors  were  doubtless  mistaken;  yet 
the  authorities  who  are  competent  to  judge  do  not  differ 
in  their  opinions  regarding  the  value  of  the  copper 
deposits  and  the  uncovered  wealth  of  the  Sierra  Maes- 
tro range  of  mountains  in  Santiago. 

Trustworthy  information  concerning  the  iron  ore 

210 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


deposits,  the  Bessemer  hematite,  is  given  by  the  large 
amount  of  duties  paid  into  the  United  States  treasury 
by  the  American  companies  which  work  these  mines. 
Of  recent  years  they  have  been  shipping  ore  also  to 
Europe.  The  following  table  shows  the  productiveness 
of  iron  ore  in  Santiago  by  tons : 


Year.  Tons. 

1884 23,907 

1886  80,095 

1880 110,880 

1887  94,810 

1888  204,475 

1889  255,400 

1890  356,000 

1891  261,620 

1892  320,869 

1893  346,341 

1894. 153,050 

1895  377,041 

1896  405,071 

1897  452,559 


Total 3,443,404 


It  is  a question  whether  there  are  the  10,000,000 
acres  of  virgin  forests  in  Cuba  that  have  been  vaguely 
estimated.  Sometimes  the  innumerable  groves  of  royal 
palms,  the  most  useful  tree  known  to  the  tropics,  are 
included  in  this  guess.  Experienced  Americans  who 
for  a year  travelled  over  the  island  seeking  to  deter- 
mine the  most  valuable  timber  locations  became  doubt- 
ful of  the  extent  of  the  wooded  area,  though  the  eastern 
province  seemed  to  them  a single  forest.  But  the  area 
is  great  enough  to  take  many  years  to  clear  it.  The 
cedar  from  which  the  cigar-boxes  are  made  is  found  in 
Pinar  del  Rio  as  well  as  in  Santiago.  The  mahogany 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


close  to  tlie  coast  has  been  thinned  out,  but  further  in 
the  interior  it  is  untouched.  The  other  hard  woods  are 
of  great  variety.  Their  commercial  value  is  uncertain 
until  systematic  lumbering  as  known  in  Michigan  and 
Wisconsin  is  developed.  In  the  building  of  railroads 
the  ties  may  be  taken  from  the  woods  which  it  will  be 
necessary  to  clear. 

Stock  raising  in  Cuba  offers  one  of  the  most  profit- 
able fields  for  a quick  return  on  invested  capital.  The 
high  rolling  land  which  begins  in  Santa  Clara  and 
extends  into  Santiago  affords  the  best  ranges.  Much 
of  this  grazing  land  is  capable  of  sugar  cultivation,  but 
many  years  must  pass  before  this  can  be  engaged  in  to 
advantage.  The  central  province  of  Puerto  Principe  is 
a vast  grazing  region.  Its  Cuban  name,  Camagiiey, 
means  a cattle-pasture.  Hundreds  of  thousands  heads 
of  cattle  disappeared  during  the  insurrection.  To-day 
the  traveller  may  journey  from  sunrise  to  sunset  and 
see  no  signs  of  live  stock ; but  this  barrenness  will  not 
last.  The  grazing  ranges  are  bound  to  be  restocked  not 
only  with  cattle,  but  also  with  horses.  Animals  from 
the  United  States  may  be  imported  to  help  restock 
them.  Heretofore  they  have  been  imported  simply  as 
live  beef  for  daily  consumption.  The  supply,  however, 
will  not  be  solely  from  the  United  States.  In  securing 
oxen  for  the  sugar  plantations  it  is  found  that  Mexico, 
Venezuela,  and  Honduras  are  the  main  sources.  Live 
stock  from  the  United  States  will  have  to  be  crossed 
with  animals  from  those  countries  and  with  the  native 
stock.  It  is  the  common  experience  that  the  stock  runs 
out  in  three  generations  unless  it  is  renewed  by  breed- 
ing with  imported  animals. 

212 


TO-MOftROW  IN  CUBA 


Tho  landownership  instinct  is  very  strong  with  the 
mass  of  tho  Cuban  population.  This  moans  that  it 
was  strong  with  their  Spanish  progenitors  and  will 
be  strong  with  the  Spanish  immigrants  of  the  future. 
This  is  shown  in  tho  government  reports,  which  were, 
for  Spanish  statistics,  fairly  trustworthy  because  on 
them  were  based  the  taxes.  Tho  last  enumeration 
which  was  made  before  tho  insurrection  broke  out 
showed  that  in  the  whole  island  there  were  1,119  sugar 
plantations,  4,214  stock  farms,  375  haciendas  or  large 
country  estates,  188  coffee  plantations,  8,485  vegas  or 
tobacco  farms,  and  22,224  sitios  or  estancias.  A sitio 
is  simply  a place,  and  an  estancia  is  a small  farm.  The 
number  of  city,  town,  and  village  real-estate  holdings 
was  76,402.  These  fincas  urbanos,  as  they  were  called, 
shaded  off  into  laud-holdings  capable  of  cultivation.  It 
will  be  several  years  until  an  exact  estimate  can  be  had 
of  the  products  of  small  farming  in  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  XII 


Trade  and  Taxation  — Railways  and  Internal  De- 
velopment 

Some  Primary  Principles — Adjustment  of  Purchasing  Power  of  Prod- 
ucts by  Reciprocity — Tariff  Dues  and  Their  Capabilities — New 
Sources  of  Reveuue — Decay  of  Spanish  Shipping — American 
Markets  for  Tropical  Products — Unwarranted  Expectations  of 
Merchants — Railway  Building  and  Its  Limitations — Systems  in 
Operation — The  Backbone  Line — Value  of  Existing  Railroad 
Property — English  Ownership — Water-Way  Competition — Har- 
bor Improvements — Good  Roads  the  Coming  Question — Cheap 
Labor  Not  Found — Prospect  for  Agricultural  Banks — Strikes  Not 
a Recent  Development — Artificial  Monetary  Basis — Ultimate 
Supremacy  of  American  Financial  System. 

Trade  and  taxation  in  Cuba  may  be  reduced  to  a few 
simple  formulas.  The  elaboration  of  these  formulas 
into  economic  treatises  is  not  difficult.  When  the  elab- 
oration becomes  wearisome  and  confusing  the  return 
to  the  starting  point  is  easy.  There  is  really  little  need 
of  wandering  far  away  from  it  into  the  wilderness  of 
speculative  economics. 

The  island  for  all  time  will  have  to  supply  the  wants 
of  its  inhabitants  by  what  they  can  get  in  exchange  for 
a bag  of  sugar,  a bale  of  tobacco,  a sack  of  coffee,  and 
a cargo  of  fruits  and  nuts.  The  adjustment  of  this  pur- 
chasing power  of  sugar,  coffee,  tobacco,  and  fruits  so 

214 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


as  to  bring  back  tlie  largest  quantity  of  flour,  lard,  and 
bacon,  tlie  greatest  amount  of  agricultural  machinery, 
and  the  most  extensive  assortment  of  cotton  and  other 
dress  goods  is  the  problem  of  trade  and  also  of  tariff 
taxation.  The  United  States  consumes  everything  the 
island  produces.  It  produces  everything  that  Cuba 
consumes.  The  doors  open  one  to  the  other.  There  is 
the  whole  question  of  Cuban  commerce,  and  its  basis  is 
reciprocity. 

It  is  shown  since  the  American  control  of  the  cus- 
tom houses  that  an  impoverished  people  not  number- 
ing much  more  than  1,000,000  can  pay  $1,000,000 
monthly  in  customs  duties.  This  is  done  by  light 
rates  on  articles  of  commerce  and  consumption.  With 
the  restoration  of  prosperity  the  rates  can  be  further 
shifted  to  articles  of  luxury,  because  the  Latin-Ameri- 
can’s  fondness  for  luxuries  when  able  to  gratify  itself 
pays  tariff  tribute  wullingly. 

A hitherto  untouched  source  of  internal-revenue  taxa- 
tion exists.  It  is  ample  enough  to  supplant  most  of 
the  present  unsatisfactory  internal  taxes.  This  source 
of  revenue  is  in  the  tobacco  that  is  consumed  in  Cuba 
and  in  the  by-product  of  sugar  known  as  aguardiente  or 
cane-brandy.  Everybody  in  the  Antilles  smokes,  and 
smokes  countless  cigars  and  packages  of  cigarettes. 
Under  the  Spanish  system  the  wax  tapers  which  were 
used  for  lights  paid  an  internal-revenue  duty,  but  the 
infinitely  greater  income  from  cigars  and  cigarettes  was 
neglected.  The  aguardiente,  besides  its  use  as  a bev- 
erage, is  employed  in  a variety  of  household  ways.  It 
takes  the  place  of  a score  of  toilet  articles  which  in 
the  United  States  pay  an  internal-revenue  tax.  Inter- 

215 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


nal  taxation  of  this  kind  would  easily  replace  the  in- 
come lost  b}r  the  prohibition  of  the  lottery  and  would 
also  replace  the  vexatious  industrial  tax,  which  was 
literally  an  impost  on  progressive  industry  and  enter- 
prising commerce. 

When  the  Blaine  reciprocity  provisions  were  in  force, 
the  harbors  of  Cuba  were  filled  with  vessels  flying  the 
American  flag  almost  to  the  exclusion  of  the  ships  of 
other  nations.  After  Spanish  sovereignty  ceased,  ships 
continued  to  enter  Cuban  ports  under  its  flag,  but  the 
cargoes  they  carried  were  small.  With  the  artificial 
restrictions  removed  the  peninsula  had  little  to  sell 
to  the  island,  but  it  was  not  itself  independent  of  the 
products  of  the  Antilles.  Its  exports  dropped  to  a 
cipher.  That  may  not  be  a permanent  nothingness. 
Cuba  will  buy  some  things  of  Spain,  and  the  traffic  from 
Barcelona  to  Buenos  Aires  by  way  of  Habana  may  not 
entirely  cease.  The  Barcelona  merchants  are  already 
making  an  aggressive  struggle  to  keep  their  Antillian 
trade.  But  with  no  discriminating  tonnage  dues,  and 
with  no  preferential  tariff  forcing  Cuba  to  receive  the 
products  of  the  peninsula  at  a low  rate  while  its  own  pro- 
ducts pay  a high  import  duty  into  the  peninsula — that 
was  the  basis  of  the  Spanish  system — Spanish  shipping, 
it  might  be  said  European  shipping,  must  remain  near 
the  vanishing  point  which  is  represented  by  the  cipher. 
There  have  been  years  in  which  95  per  cent  of  Cuba’s 
exports  were  sent  to  the  United  States.  Those  years 
are  coming  again,  and  under  conditions  which  render  it 
certain  that  American  vessels  will  not  enter  or  leave 
Cuban  ports  in  ballast. 

The  great  country  to  the  north  is  so  little  to  the 

216 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


north  that  the  vessel  twenty-four  hours  or  thirty-six 
hours  out  from  a Cuban  port  may  start  the  distribution 
of  products  over  an  area  of  1,500,000  square  miles  and 
among  50,000,000  consumers— all  the  region  from  the 
Mississippi  valley  to  the  New  England  coast.  Habana 
can  ship  its  freight  to  reach  New  York,  Chicago,  St. 
Louis,  and  Cincinnati  within  four  days.  The  Ameri- 
can markets  await  the  tropical  products  which  5,000,- 
000  inhabitants  of  Cuba  can  supply.  These  border 
tropics  will  not  encroach  seriously  on  the  products  of 
the  temperate  zone.  The  crevices  between  the  rocks  in 
New  England  will  be  sprouting  hand-nurtured  blades  of 
grass  when  the  caballeria  of  rich  Cuban  land  is  yielding 
its  maximum  of  sugar,  coffee,  and  fruits,  but  not  of 
wheat  in  competition  with  those  blades  of  grass  or  with 
the  prairies  of  the  West. 

On  the  part  of  merchants  in  the  United  States  there 
was  keen  disappointment  because  they  did  not  find  a 
market  of  5,000,000  consumers  awaiting  them  within 
three  months  after  Cuba  ceased  to  be  a possession  of 
Spain.  They  did  not  stop  to  reflect  that  the  inhabi- 
tants had  been  reduced  in  four  years  by  at  least  25  per 
cent,  and  that  consumption  could  not  make  a quick 
stride  forward  until  the  surviving  population  was  recu- 
perated. The  Mississippi  valley  was  surprised  that 
the  demand  for  bread-stuffs  was  not  vastly  larger  than 
when  the  flour  had  to  be  shipped  by  the  way  of  Barce- 
lona, while  the  Atlantic  coast  was  disappointed  that 
the  $100,000,000  of  Cuban  commerce  which  was  in 
vision  when  the  insurrection  broke  out  did  not  im- 
mediately sw'eep  into  its  ports.  A little  thought 
was  needed  to  recall  that  industrial  recuperation 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


has  its  limitations  of  time,  and  that  increased  com- 
merce can  only  come  from  increased  development  and 
increased  population.  And  the  basis  of  these  is  in- 
ternal development. 

The  question  recurs  to  the  resources  of  the  island 
and  the  means  of  unfolding  them  as  the  prelude  to  the 
growth  of  commerce.  A quaint  Spanish  author  once 
wrote  of  Cuba  as  an  island  “whose  population  and 
whose  richness  were  a drop  of  water  in  the  grand  ocean 
of  Spain’s  colonial  treasure.”  The  grand  ocean  has 
dried  up.  Shall  the  water-drop  become  a stagnant  pool 
or  a fountain  fed  by  steady  streams?  The  answer  is 
again  to  be  sought  in  the  uncovering  of  that  natural 
richness  and  in  the  population  which  uncovers  it. 
What  is  of  first  concern  is  the  lines  which  the  develop- 
ment will  follow  in  the  lifetime  of  the  young  men  of 
to-day.  The  market  is  assured.*  Capital  starts  with 
that  certainty.  Its  next  movement  is  for  the  quickest 
and  largest  returns  where  there  is  the  least  competition 
and  not  too  great  adventure. 

The  clearing  of  the  forest  lands  and  the  building 
of  railways  and  ordinary  roads  for  a time  will  go  for- 
ward evenly  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  sugar  planta- 
tions. The  island  to-day  has  1,135  miles  of  railway,  ex- 
clusive of  the  narrow-gauge  lines  on  the  sugar  planta- 
tions which  serve  to  bring  the  cane  to  the  central  mills. 
When  1,300  or  perhaps  1,200  miles  more  are  built, 
railway  construction  will  be  ended,  because  there  will 
be  no  need  of  further  means  of  rail  communication.  In 
its  industrial  aspects  the  Cuba  of  the  past  must  be 
viewed  almost  as  a stationary  body.  The  building  of 
* See  Appendix  B. 

218 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


railways  was  a slow  work.  A description  of  the  island 
in  1900  would  vary  little  from  a description  in  1845. 
The  towns  in  1850  were  wliat  they  were  in  1895.  The 
means  of  travel  were  the  same,  the  roads  were  the  same, 
and  few  new  highways  of  commerce  were  opened  dur- 
ing half  a century.  The  first  railroad  was  built  from 
Guines  to  Habana  within  a few  years  after  George 
Stephenson  told  the  poking  Parliamentary  committee 
which  quizzed  him,  that  the  locomotive  he  had  invented 
would  undoubtedly  prove  an  inconvenient  thing  for  the 
cows  which  happened  to  get  in  its  way. 

The  1,200  or  1,300  miles  of  railway  which  are  yet  to 
be  constructed  will  join  the  city  of  Santa  Clara  with  the 
city  of  Santiago,  closing  a gap  of  less  than  300  miles. 
It  will  have  feeders  to  the  north  and  south  coasts  to 
Nipe,  Gibara,  Baracoa,  Sancti  Spiritus,  Santa  Cruz  del 
Sur,  and  Manzanillo.  When  this  construction  is  fin- 
ished the  backbone  or  central  railway  across  the  length 
of  the  island  will  be  a fact,  because  existing  lines  will 
complete  the  links.  The  narrowness  of  Cuba  forbids 
parallel  roads,  except  for  short  distances.  This  back- 
bone railway  was  for  fifty  years  an  inviting  project;  but 
the  English  and  the  French  capitalists  who  organized 
companies,  made  surveys,  and  secured  what  they  sup- 
posed were  Government  concessions  were  always  foiled 
in  the  end  by  the  Spanish  shipowners.  Only  the  mem- 
ory of  banquets  to  the  government  officials  remained  to 
the  capitalists ; but  that  will  not  be  the  case  in  the  fu- 
ture. 

The  railways  in  actual  operation  in  Cuba  to-day,  as 
given  by  the  American  military  authorities,  are  as  fol- 
lows ; 


219 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Name.  Miles. 

United  Railways  of  Habana 244 

Western  Railway 109£ 

Marianao  Railroad 9 

Habana  Terminal  Railway  (American  military  line) 6 

Regia  and  Guanabacoa  Railroad 2£ 

Matanzas  and  Sabanilla  Railroad • • • • 172f 

Cardenas  and  .Tucaro  Railroad  System 248^ 

Sagua  la  Grande  Railroad 88 

United  Railroads  of  Caibari^n 67J 

Trinidad  Railroad 22 

San  Cayetano  and  Vinales  Railroad  (narrow  gauge,  2^-  feet)..  15 

Zaza  and  Sancti  Spiritus  Railroad  (narrow  gauge,  3 feet) 22J 

Jficaro-Mordn  Railway  (military  line) 40 

Nuevitas  and  Puerto  Principe  Railroad 45 

Guantdnamo  Railroad 10£ 

Gibara-Holgufn  Railroad 9£ 

Santiago  Railroads 33 


Total 1,135 


Of  the  systems,  the  Jucaro-Moron  Railway  belongs 
to  the  future  Government  of  Cuba.  It  is  an  inheri- 
tance from  Spanish  sovereignty,  being  the  old  military 
trocha.  It  passes  through  a thinly  populated  region, 
and  its  commercial  value  has  been  doubted  because 
neither  of  the  terminals  lias  a good  harbor.  Neverthe- 
less the  country  which  is  tributary  to  it  is  very  fertile 
and  capable  of  great  development,  while  branches  may 
be  built  from  the  main  stem  to  good  ports  on  both  the 
north  and  the  south  coast.  This  line  cost  the  Spanish 
Government  $1,152,800  in  gold.  The  Habana  Terminal 
Railway,  so  called,  is  a belt-line  running  from  the  docks 
at  Triscornia  and  intersecting  the  lines  which  enter 
Habana.  It  was  built  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  the 
troops  and  the  handling  of  the  supplies.  When  the 

220 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


United  States  ceases  to  have  use  for  it,  this  belt-line 
will  be  valuable  to  the  existing  roads,  and  if  sold  to 
them  should  bring  a good  price. 

The  present  ownership  of  the  Cuban  railways  is 
chiefly  in  London.  English  capitalists  were  heavily 
interested  before  the  insurrection  broke  out.  They 
built  the  Western  Railway  running  from  the  city  of  Ha- 
bana  to  the  town  of  Pinar  del  Rio,  through  the  tobacco 
country.  Surveys  have  been  made  to  extend  this  line 
30  miles  farther  westward.  English  capitalists  also 
control  the  United  Railways  of  Habana,  which  enter 
the  city  from  both  east  and  west,  though  the  most  of 
the  lines  run  eastward.  Cubans  and  Spaniards  were 
the  chief  stockholders  in  the  sugar-carrying  roads 
known  as  the  Cardenas- Jiicaro  and  the  Matanzas-Sa- 
banilla  systems.  After  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  in 
order  to  get  money  with  which  to  work  their  plantations 
or  for  other  purposes  they  sold  their  holdings  to  the 
Englishmen. 

At  one  time  American  capital  seemed  likely  to  con- 
trol the  Cuban  railways.  It  had  the  opportunity,  but 
the  chances  of  manipulation,  of  reorganization  commit- 
tees, and  of  new  issues  of  stock  and  bonds  apparently 
were  not  great  enough  to  appeal  to  the  daring  finan- 
ciers of  New  York.  So  the  American  capitalists  retired 
and  left  the  ground  to  their  English  rivals.  It  was 
another  illustration  of  American  disgust  because  Cuba 
was  not  a promising  field  for  “ quick  returns  and  double 
money.”  Some  financial  interest  is  still  held  by  Amer- 
icans, but  the  supremacy  is  in  London.  The  English 
owners,  after  they  gained  control,  sent  agents  to  the 
United  States  to  offer  a profitable  share  in  the  enter- 

221 


TO-MOEROW  IN  CUBA 


prises  to  public  men  whose  political  influence  was 
thought  desirable. 

In  a general  way  it  may  be  said  that  it  does  not  mat- 
ter whether  the  capital  invested  in  the  Cuban  railway 
system  is  from  the  United  States  or  from  Great  Brit- 
ain. The  English  owners  will  buy  their  material  in 
the  States  if  they  can  get  it  there  cheaper  than  in  Eng- 
land. Nevertheless  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  enter- 
prising American  railway  managers  will  not  operate 
the  Cuban  railways.  The  slow  and  conservative  man- 
agement of  the  Englishmen  is  not  suited  to  the  new 
industrial  life  of  Cuba.  Under  the  Spanish  system 
railway  charges,  both  freight  and  passenger,  were  exor- 
bitant. Both  the  theory  and  the  practice  were  a lim- 
ited business  and  high  charges.  The  English  capital- 
ists follow  the  same  plan.  During  the  insurrection 
both  freight  and  passenger  business  paid  a war  tax  of 
20  per  cent  in  addition  to  the  regular  government  im- 
post of  10  per  cent  on  passenger  business  and  3 per  cent 
on  freight  traffic.  The  English  management  does  not 
seem  likely  to  get  out  of  the  old  rut.  It  looks  forward 
to  continuing  to  collect  7 cents  a mile  iu  American  gold 
for  first-class  passengers  and  5 cents  for  second-class 
passengers.  Freight  tariffs  are  enormous.  The  bur- 
den for  the  sugar  industry  is  too  heavy  to  be  borne.  A 
fall  in  rates  must  come  either  by  the  voluntary  action 
of  the  railroad  companies,  which  is  improbable,  or  by 
the  action  of  government. 

There  is  something  of  a political  side,  also,  to  this 
European  ownership  of  Cuban  railways.  Controlling 
the  system  from  Pinar  del  Rio  to  Santa  Clara,  it  is 
natural  that  the  English  capitalists  should  want  to  con- 

222 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


trol  tho  backbone  railway  to  Santiago  when  it  is  con- 
structed and  the  branch  lines  to  the  coasts.  No  one 
supposes  that  the  main  stem,  or  trank  line,  between 
Santiago  and  Santa  Clara  will  be  in  itself  a paying  one, 
or  that  there  will  ever  be  much  through  freight  from 
Habana  to  Santiago  unless  the  Florida  straits  and 
the  Caribbean  Sea  dry  up.  Nevertheless  the  extension 
will  bo  valuable  in  a way.  At  the  present  time  the 
projects  of  the  English  capitalists  are  combated  by 
interests  which  are  said  to  be  American.  These  inter- 
ests claim  to  have  acquired  certain  rights  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Cuba  Central  Railway,  partly  by  the  action 
of  Generals  H.  W.  Lawton  and  Leonard  Wood  during 
the  early  militar}'  occupancy  of  Santiago  province,  but 
chiefly  by  acquiring  the  rights  of  the  French  company 
which  organized  the  project  for  the  backbone  railway 
in  1881.  The  surveys  made  by  the  French  engineers 
were  the  most  complete  and  valuable  of  any  that  had 
been  attempted.  As  to  the  precise  rights  regarding  the 
projected  railway,  either  Congress  or  the  future  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba  must  determine.  The  most  important 
point  is  not  to  delay  the  construction  of  the  road  too 
long. 

The  telegraph  and  the  telephone  systems  of  Cuba 
were  owned  by  the  Spanish  Government.  The  tele- 
phone privileges  were  leased  to  a private  company,  but 
the  telegraph  system  was  operated  in  connection  with 
the  post-office.  Under  the  American  military  authority, 
the  lines  have  been  repaired,  extended,  and  improved. 
They  will  be  valuable  property  to  the  State  cr  the  Re- 
public of  Cuba,  but  they  are  better  operated  in  connec- 
tion with  the  railway  system  than  independent  of  it. 

223 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  existing  1,135  miles  of  railway  are  valued  at 
$43,000,000  Spanish  gold,  according  to  the  stock  and 
bond  issues.  This  would  not  amount  to  $40,000,000  in 
American  money.  While  some  of  the  stock  and  bonds 
were  quoted  above  par  and  some  below  par  after  the 
restoration  of  peace,  the  general  average  would  bring 
the  total  value  up  to  the  capitalization,  regardless  of 
temporary  fluctuations  due  to  the  efforts  of  rival  inter- 
ests to  obtain  control.  These  lines  have  been  described 
by  American  experts  as  equal  to  the  worth  of  any  simi- 
lar length  of  railroad  in  the  United  States;  and  it  is 
probable  that  when  the  island  has  a complete  system  of 
2,500  miles,  this  system  will  be  equal  in  value  to  any 
2,500-mile  system  in  the  States. 

As  they  stand  in  the  present  day,  the  Cuban  railroads 
must  spend  large  sums  of  money  in  betterments  and  in 
repairing  the  destruction  caused  by  the  insurrection. 
This  work  will  be  completed  by  the  time  political  con- 
ditions reach  the  stage  at  which  there  will  be  some 
authority  capable  of  granting  the  franchises  necessary 
to  the  construction  of  new  lines.  Once  entered  upon, 
ten  years  will  be  enough  for  constructing  all  the  rail- 
ways Cuba  will  need,  for  clearing  the  forest  lands  of 
the  eastern  provinces,  and  for  opening  up  the  mines  of 
the  Sierra  Maestre  Mountains  wdiicli  are  yet  untouched. 
The  laborers  engaged  in  railway  construction  may  be 
drawn  from  the  inhabitants,  or  they  may  be  of  a class  of 
immigrants  who  will  settle  down  as  a part  of  the  agri- 
cultural population.  When  the  construction  is  com- 
pleted it  is  a simple  process  to  estimate  the  number 
of  people  who  will  be  engaged  in  the  administration 
and  operation  of  2,500  miles  of  railway. 

224 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Tbo  Cubau  railroads  will  always  have  water-way 
competitiou.  They  will  have  no  rivalry  in  hauling 
sugar  to  the  sea-board;  but  in  the  general  commerce  of 
the  island,  and  especially  in  the  local  commerce,  geog- 
raphy is  against  a monopoly.  Under  the  Spanish  rule 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  Atlantic 
waters  were  a monopoly  because  the  coasting  trade  was 
a privilege.  It  was  made  the  more  valuable  by  the 
obstacles  which  were  interposed  to  railway  construc- 
tion. But  with  the  artificial  limitations  of  government 
removed  there  can  be  no  monopoly,  and  with  the  coast- 
ing trade  free  a j^ermanent  alliance  of  railway  and  ves- 
sel interests  is  improbable.  Too  many  American  skip- 
pers can  engage  in  it  for  the  big  steamship  lines  to 
control  the  coasting  trade.*  Every  fishing-smack  is  a 
competitor.  Most  of  the  towns  are  on  the  coast  or  so 
short  a distance  inland  that  electric  lines  are  also  cer- 
tain to  compete  with  the  steam  railways  for  passengers 
and  even  for  light  freight.  A few  years  will  be  enough 
to  demonstrate  the  opportunities  Cuba  offers  to  the 
merchant  marine  of  the  United  States.  When  the 
island  has  5,000,000  inhabitants  relatively  no  more 
people  will  be  engaged  in  the  midway  occupations  than 
to-day.  Light  manufactures  will  increase  proportion- 
ately, while  the  shipping  at  the  ports  due  to  increased 
commerce  will  give  further  employment.  When  this 
is  stated  there  is  no  disturbance  in  the  balancing  of 
natural  occupations  which  grow  out  of  the  turning  over 
of  the  soil,  seed-time,  and  harvest.  In  its  broadest 
sense  the  subject  of  internal  development  ends  with  the 
agricultural  population,  though  it  does  not  begin  there. 

* See  Appendix  B. 


15 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  domestic  commerce  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  its  for- 
eign shipping  trade,  if  shipping  trade  with  the  United 
States  can  be  called  foreign,  makes  the  question  of 
the  water-ways  one  of  the  earliest  of  public  improve- 
ments. The  island  may  never  have  a river-and-harbor 
bill  such  as  regularly  floats  through  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  because  there  is  only  one  navigable 
river.  This  is  the  Cauto,  in  the  province  of  Santiago. 
But  when  it  comes  to  improvements,  harbors  supply 
the  deficiency  of  rivers.  Their  betterment  and  mainte- 
nance will  be  at  once  an  encouragement  to  commerce 
and  a temptation  to  extravagance  on  the  part  of  the 
State.  Private  enterprise  will  be  sufficient  to  supply 
every  need  and  to  meet  every  deficiency  of  the  shipping 
interests  in  so  far  as  relates  to  docks,  wharfs,  and 
piers,  but  the  actual  control  of  the  water-ways,  and 
therefore  the  improvement  of  the  harbors,  will  remain 
the  function  of  the  commonwealth.  Bahia  Honda,  Ca- 
bana, Matanzas,  Cardenas,  Sagua,  Caibarien,  Nuevitas, 
Nipe,  Baracoa,  Gibara  on  the  north  coast,  Santiago, 
Guantanamo,  Mazanillo,  Santa  Cruz,  Trinidad,  Tunas 
de  Zaza,  Cienfuegos,  and  Batabano  on  the  south  coast 
are  the  leading  ones,  but  there  are  a large  number  of 
smaller  havens  which  the  coral  reefs  do  not  render 
entirely  inaccessible. 

The  most  important  public  improvements  in  the 
future  of  Cuba  are  the  roads.  To  insure  its  success 
the  work  must  be  that  of  the  central  Government  rather 
than  of  the  provinces  or  the  municipalities.  A system 
suitable  to  the  development  and  the  permanent  interests 
of  the  island  can  only  be  carried  out  under  a central 
plan  and  by  a central  authority.  Good  roads  are  the 

226 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


industrial  and  in  a degree  tlio  political  future  of  Cuba, 
and  good  roads  cannot  be  limited  to  a province  or  to 
a municipality.  National  turnpikes  are  the  promiso 
of  the  island,  and  the  Cuban  statesman  who  emulates 
Henry  Clay’s  championship  of  the  old  Cumberland 
road  will  be  its  true  benefactor.  Whatever  form  of 
government  is  adopted  there  will  be  nothing  in  the 
Cuban  constitution  which  the  strict  constructionists 
will  be  able  to  invoke  against  this  form  of  public  im- 
provement. 

The  calzada,  as  it  is  called,  will  be  the  Cuban  turn- 
pike or  national  highway  running  in  all  directions 
across  the  country.  The  extent  to  which  the  building 
of  roads  was  neglected  and  even  discouraged  by  the 
Spanish  Government  has  been  so  often  recounted  that 
it  does  not  bear  repetition  in  detail.  The  military  road 
was  always  a good  one.  The  others  were  of  no  impor- 
tance. There  are  caminos  reales,  king’s  highways,  on 
the  maps  of  Cuba  by  the  hundreds,  but  neither  king 
nor  peasant  could  find  them  in  actual  travel.  Where 
not  trails  they  are  wagon-ruts  which  in  the  rainy  sea- 
son are  entirely  lost.  The  real  highway  of  internal 
commerce  and  of  agricultural  intercourse  is  the  calzada, 
or  macadamized  road.  When  once  constructed  it  resists 
the  changes  of  the  seasons  and  is  easily  kept  in  repair. 
Four  of  these  calzadas  lead  out  of  Habana.  The 
longest  one  is  40  miles,  and  extends  southeast  to  the 
plains  of  Giiines,  the  market-garden  of  the  city.  The 
shortest  one  runs  south  to  the  village  of  Managua,  15 
miles  away.  The  town  of  Pinar  del  Rio  has  a cal- 
zada connecting  with  its  port,  Coloma,  15  miles  south. 
Santiago  has  a few  miles  of  good  roads,  and  other 

227 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cities  Lave  short  calzadas,  but  there  is  no  general 
means  of  continuous  communication  in  any  section  of 
the  island.  When  good  roads  furnish  this  system  of 
continuous  communication,  not  only  will  an  industrial 
advance  of  one  hundred  years  be  made,  but  brigandage, 
the  commonest  form  of  rural  crime,  will  be  destroyed. 

Whether  it  be  in  railway  construction,  in  road  build- 
ing, or  in  tilling  the  soil,  the  cost  of  labor  is  relatively 
high  in  Cuba.  The  probability  that  it  will  continue 
relatively  high,  especially  agricultural  labor,  cannot  be 
argued  away.  But  what  is  commonly  lost  sight  of  is 
that  the  profits  of  capital  are  both  relatively  and  abso- 
lutely high.  Well-paid  labor  cannot  be  considered  an 
unhealthy  industrial  condition  when  well-remunerated 
capital  goes  with  it.  Nor  can  it  be  looked  upon  as 
a discouragement  to  investment  in  lands  or  in  commer- 
cial and  industrial  enterprises.  Sugar  plantations  for  a 
series  of  years  paid  12  per  cent  on  highly  secured 
loans,  and  were  not  depleted.  The  individual  usurers 
in  the  country  districts  drew  their  18  per  cent  from  the 
farms  of  the  neighborhood  for  long  periods  without  the 
opportunity  of  foreclosing  on  the  land.  It  was  too 
much.  It  drew  the  life-blood  from  the  small  farmers, 
but  their  endurance  of  it  showed  what  the  capabilities 
of  production  were.  In  time  agricultural  banks  will 
come,  and  in  displacing  the  individual  usurer  will  be  an 
immense  gain  to  the  industrial  life  of  the  country. 

The  agricultural  banks  will  not  be  established  until 
a stable  government  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  experiment 
and  the  old  Spanish  laws  relating  to  debtor  and  credi- 
tor and  mortgages  are  codified  into  a general  banking 
law.  That  may  not  be  so  far  off.  When  it  is  reached, 

228 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  country  bunks  will  be  able  to  exact  an  annual  inter- 
est of  8 per  cent,  while  performing  their  functions  of 
loans  and  deposits  in  the  community,  without  interfer- 
ing with  the  prosperity  of  the  people  or  becoming  the 
masters  instead  of  the  servants.  I have  made  the  state- 
ment of  8 per  cent  as  a probable  rate  of  interest  from 
a large  number  of  individual  calculations  without  go- 
ing into  the  intricate  details  on  which  they  are  based. 
Two  crops  a year  on  much  of  the  land  is  one  basis. 
Americans  hardly  conceive  of  a community  of  15,000 
people,  such  as  Giiinos,  engaged  in  varied  and  profit- 
able forms  of  farming  without  a bank,  or  of  the  town  of 
Pinar  del  Rio,  in  the  centre  of  the  tobacco-raising  coun- 
try, without  one.  That  is,  however,  true  of  these  places 
as  of  many  others. 

It  does  not  seem  to  bo  an  unwarranted  assumption 
that  a country  which  can  pay  8 per  cent  on  banking 
capital  conservatively  loaned  in  the  rural  regions  can 
pay  fairly  well  for  labor.  Farm  labor  in  Cuba  is 
usually  accounted  at  $20  per  month  throughout  the 
year  where  the  laborer  finds  his  own  “keep.”  On  the 
sugar  plantations  in  the  season  of  cutting  and  grinding 
the  cane  it  is  accounted  higher.  The  planters  are 
always  willing  to  pay  $1  per  day,  and  hands  are  in 
demand  just  as  they  are  on  American  farms  during  the 
harvest  season.  In  talking  writh  many  planters,  per- 
haps a majority  will  give  the  amount  of  $1  a day  as 
what  they  pay  for  nine  months  out  of  twelve ; but  the 
average  $20  per  month  is  commonly  accepted  as  the 
basis  for  farm  labor  in  Cuba. 

Unskilled  day  labor  on  the  streets  and  roads  and  on 
public  works  generally  may  be  said  to  command  $1  a 

229 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


day  also,  though  sometimes  80  cents  is  the  maximum. 
The  day’s  labor  begins  at  six  in  the  morning  and  ends 
at  four  in  the  afternoon,  with  an  hour  for  breakfast, 
making  a day  of  nine  hours.  This,  of  course,  does  not 
apply  to  the  plantations,  where  work  begins  at  sunrise. 
Formerly  the  wages  were  paid  in  Spanish  silver,  which 
was  usually  at  a discount  of  18  per  cent  from  gold;  but 
the  common  necessities  of  life  were  also  measured  in 
silver.  Considering  that  the  laborer  in  Cuba  does  not 
have  to  lay  up  fuel  for  winter,  that  less  clothing  is  re- 
quired, and  that  all  the  means  of  existence  are  more 
easily  procured  than  in  the  temperate  zones,  it  is  clear 
that  $15  to  $20  a month  in  the  country  and  $25  in  the 
city  is  good  pay.  After  the  military  occupation  began, 
American  contractors  who  had  contracts  for  public 
improvements  did  not  find  it  possible  to  secure  labor 
at  cheaper  figures.  The  laborers  who  were  employed 
directly  by  the  military  authorities  received  substan- 
tially the  same.  The  dollar-a-day  basis  is  not  likely 
to  be  materally  modified  under  prospective  conditions. 
Artisans,  railway  employes,  and  skilled  labor  of  what- 
ever kind  receive  higher  pay,  the  cigar-makers  being 
the  best  paid.  But  the  development  and  the  recon- 
struction of  Cuba  are  in  the  land  and  in  public  improve- 
ments, so  that  unskilled  labor  in  the  mass  is  the  real 
basis  for  computing  the  cost. 

In  the  industrial  readjustment  following  the  Ameri- 
can occupation,  a series  of  strikes  occurred  in  Habana 
and  in  other  cities.  These  were  cited  as  evidence  that 
American  methods  had  been  introduced,  and  that  labor 
disturbances  were  thenceforth  to  be  expected  as  though 
they  were  something  new.  Strikes  may  be  looked  for 

230 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


in  the  future  of  Cuba  just  as  they  may  bo  looked  for  in 
the  United  States ; but  they  will  not  be  a new  develop- 
ment nor  due  to  new  institutions.  They  occurred  under 
Spanish  dominion  with  all  its  rigor  of  military  repres- 
sion. The  most  determined  of  these  strikes  were  by 
the  cigar-makers  and  by  the  stevedores,  or  longshore- 
men. There  are  numerous  gremios,  or  trades-unions, 
but  the  majority  of  them  aro  benevolent  and  social 
organizations.  Under  the  Spanish  authority  the 
cigar-makers’  unions  were  partly  political  conspiracies 
against  the  Government  and  partly  centres  of  theoreti- 
cal socialism  where  collectivism  and  tho  collective  labor 
life  were  taught  somewhat  in  the  manner  of  the  French 
theorists.  After  the  exit  of  the  Spanish  rulers  the  So- 
cialist or  Workingmen’s  political  party  was  organized 
in  Habana  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  incorporating 
socialist  principles  into  tho  industrial  and  political  gov- 
ernment of  the  island.  It  gained  vitality  in  Habana, 
but  did  not  spread  to  the  other  towns.  The  majority 
of  its  members  were  from  the  cigar-makers’  unions. 
The  movement  did  not  give  promise  of  becoming  a for- 
midable organization. 

Most  of  the  strikes  after  the  American  control  was 
assumed  were  based  on  demands  for  the  scale  of  wages 
which  obtained  before  the  insurrection,  or  for  payment 
in  United  States  money  or  its  equivalent. 

It  is  unsafe  to  guess  when  the  artificial  monetary 
conditions  in  Cuba  will  work  into  natural  channels. 
The  only  safe  course  for  Americans  who  are  making 
investments  or  engaging  in  enterprises  is  to  follow  the 
example  of  their  Government  and  base  their  transac- 
tions on  the  money  of  the  United  States.  A disloca- 

231 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tion  must  come  at  some  period  when  the  inflated  value 
given  the  Spanish  and  the  French  gold  coinage  by  de- 
crees of  the  Spanish  Government  will  cease.  It  served 
the  good  end  of  keeping  abundant  gold  in  the  island ; 
and  though  silver  was  in  common  use,  the  white  metal 
was  a subsidiary  coinage  and  always  so  recognized. 

The  amount  of  American  money  in  circulation  may 
be  estimated  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  with  some 
degree  of  accuracy.  Then  a judgment  may  be  formed 
of  the  time  when  the  bankers  who  received  deposits  at 
the  inflated  government  value  of  Spanish  and  French 
gold  coinage  will  pay  the  deposits  back  in  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  American  standard,  and  when  the  value  of 
debts  incurred  on  the  old  basis  can  be  computed  in  the 
money  of  the  United  States.  The  requirement  for  the 
payment  of  customs  duties  in  American  money  or  its 
equivalent  at  a valuation  which  ignored  the  inflation  of 
the  European  coins,  the  disbursement  of  the  expenses 
of  administration  and  of  public  improvements  in  Amer- 
ican money,  the  distribution  of  the  $3,000,000  to  the 
insurgent  troops,  the  resumption  of  commerce  with  the 
United  States,  the  payments  for  the  sugar  crops — all 
contributed  to  the  one  end  of  establishing  a uniform  cur- 
rency of  the  American  standard  of  value. 

In  the  city  and  the  province  of  Santiago  it  did  not 
take  long  for  the  American  money  to  establish  its  su- 
premacy. In  Habana  and  throughout  the  island  as  a 
whole  the  change  was  not  so  rapid.  By  all  natural 
laws  Spanish  silver  ought  to  have  depreciated,  but 
instead  it  appreciated.  This  was  partly  due  to  specu- 
lative manipulation  and  partly  to  a genuine  need  of  the 
silver  in  commercial  transactions.  But  with  the  steady 

232 


TO-MOItItOW  IN  CUBA 


influx  of  United  States  currency  in  the  circumstances 
noted  above,  it  is  possible  to  foreseo  the  disappearance 
of  the  Spanish  silver.  When  that  happens  the  period 
cannot  be  a long  one  until  the  Spanish  and  the  French 
gold  pieces  will  circulate  at  parity  with  the  money  of 
the  United  States  on  their  bullion  value.  Cautious 
financiers  who  peer  further  into  the  future,  and  who 
also  take  a glance  backward,  may  see  the  shadow  of  an 
irredeemable  paper  currency.  They  may  recall  that 
the  various  Cuban  constitutions  adopted  by  the  assem- 
blies which  met  in  the  woods  all  provided  for  the  issue 
of  paper  money.  But  the  shadow  need  not  take  the 
outlines  of  spectre.  There  were  mitigating  circum- 
stances for  those  revolutionary  assemblies  in  devising 
means  of  support  for  the  insurrection. 

With  what  has  been  said  of  commerce  and  internal 
development,  in  conclusion  it  may  be  worth  recalling 
the  primary  formulas.  Cuba  will  have  no  expenses  of 
sovereignty  and  no  budget  of  a huge  debt  to  maintain 
out  of  her  customs  collections.  The  expenses  of  sov- 
ereignty were  the  burden  with  which  the  peninsula 
broke  the  back  of  the  island.  The  million  dollars  a 
month  from  customs  receipts  w-hich  the  present  popu- 
lation seems  capable  of  contributing  will  be  so  far  in 
excess  of  the  expenses  of  administration  that  the  bulk 
of  it  may  be  devoted  to  internal  and  external  improve- 
ments. If  the  ratio  of  increase  in  customs  collections 
does  not  keep  pace  with  increasing  population,  it  will 
at  least  show  a substantial  growth.  In  the  utter  de- 
moralization and  impoverishment  of  the  finances  of  the 
provinces  and  municipalities  the  American  authorities 
applied  a portion  of  the  customs  revenues  to  provincial 

233 


TO-MOBROW  IN  CUBA 


and  municipal  purposes.  That  was  a temporary  meas- 
ure. Ultimately  it  will  be  unnecessary. 

The  question  will  then  be  with  regard  to  the  applica- 
tions of  the  customs  revenues  to  island  purposes,  pub- 
lic improvements,  and  the  like.  They  may  be  large 
enough  to  discourage  the  laying  of  an  internal  impost 
upon  cigars,  cigarrettes,  and  aguardiente.  Yet  this 
means  of  raising  revenues  is  so  easy  and  would  be  so 
little  felt  by  the  consumer  that  it  will  hardly  be  over- 
looked. It  is  not  in  any  sense  a tax  on  agricultural 
production  as  were  the  Spanish  export  duties.  Looked 
at  in  any  light,  the  subject  of  revenue  and  taxation  in 
Cuba  is  a simple  one.  The  matter  of  the  purchasing 
power  of  a bag  of  sugar  and  a bale  of  tobacco  is  not  quite 
so  simple.  In  it  are  involved  both  the  future  commer- 
cial and  the  future  political  relations  of  the  Cuban  com- 
monwealth to  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


Religion  as  a Withered  Branch 

Reflections  of  a Spanish  Captain-General — Scarcity  of  Native  Priests 
— Statistics  of  Shepherds  and  Their  Flocks — Historical  Review 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church — A Part  of  the  State — Provisions 
for  Its  Support — Ecclesiastics  Against  Toleration  and  Civil  Lib- 
erties— Freemasonry  as  a Foe — Sketch  of  the  Institution — Con- 
flicts with  Authorities — Controversies  with  Champions  of  the 
Church — A Protest  Against  Intolerance — State  of  Religion  in 
Cuba  Summarized — Dregs  of  Spanish  Priesthood — Popular  Con- 
ception a Low  One — Exaction  of  Birth  and  Burial  Fees — Ob- 
stacles to  Future  Usefulness. 


Can  tlie  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  Cuba  call  again 
the  day  that  is  past?  The  dry  branch  withers.  The 
living  branch  puts  forth  fresh  leaves. 

Half  a century  ago  Don  Jose  Guiterrez  de  la  Concha, 
who  had  been  twice  Governor-General  and  Captain- 
General  of  the  island,  wrote  his  memoirs.  During  his 
term  of  office  he  studied  the  maladies  w'hich  threatened 
the  life  of  the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  Antilles.  In 
1846  he  found  458  ecclesiastics,  cures,  and  sacristans 
to  administer  to  the  spiritual  needs  of  nearly  1,000,000 
inhabitants.  Many  parishes  were  without  priests. 
The  clerical  households  of  the  archbishop  of  Santiago 
and  the  bishop  of  Habana  were  not  included  in  this  list, 
as  he  was  estimating  the  parish  priests.  Fifty  years 

235 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA 


earlier  Humboldt  had  incidentally  noted,  according  to 
Concha,  that  1,500  ecclesiastics  guided  the  spiritual 
paths  of  500,000  inhabitants.* 

General  Concha  was  impressed  by  the  falling  off  in 
the  number  of  the  parish  priests.  As  became  a devout 
and  reflective  churchman  he  deplored  it,  and  he  ana- 
lyzed the  sources  of  the  Church’s  decay.  The  lack  of 
interest  on  the  part  of  the  Government  in  Madrid  he 
criticised.  One  cause  of  the  decay,  he  said,  was  the 
indifference  to  the  education  of  the  clergy.  An  igno- 
rant priesthood,  was  his  pained  comment.  He  urged 
immediate  and  sweeping  reforms  which  would  insure 
educated  priests.  He  wanted  the  Government  to  look 
specially  to  the  welfare  of  the  Church.  The  memoir- 
writing Captain-General  also  noted  the  paucity  of  Cu- 
ban priests.  At  that  time  the  right  of  the  native-born 
inhabitants,  or  insulars,  to  share  with  the  peninsulars 
in  administering  the  secular  affairs  of  the  island  was 
not  admitted.  To  trust  them  with  spiritual  authority 
was  suggestive  of  sedition.  Yet  General  Concha  coura- 
geously gave  this  proscription  of  Cuban  priests  as  one 
of  the  causes  of  the  low  state  into  which  the  Church 
had  fallen.  He  wrote  frankly  and  warningly  of  the  bad 
results  of  excluding  the  natives.  He  advocated  an  edu- 
cated Cuban  priesthood  which  would  vitalize  the  Church 
by  keeping  it  in  sympathy  with  the  people.  So  far  from 
this  course  being  dangerous  to  the  authority  of  the 

* The  Paris  edition  of  Humboldt’s  work,  published  in  1827,  says 
that  the  number  of  ecclesiastics  did  not  exceed  1,100  according  to 
the  official  census  which  he  had,  but  gives  the  number  of  churches  as 
224.  He  speaks  of  the  clergy  as  neither  numerous  nor  riah,  except 
the  bishop  and  the  archbishop. 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


mother  country,  he  believed  it  would  give  the  priests 
the  confidence  of  the  people  and  would  encourage  loy- 
alty. This  was  a plain  hint  that  the  Spanish  shep- 
herds were  not  trusted  by  their  flocks. 

Preceding  and  succeeding  Captain-Generals  might 
have  written  memoirs,  and  might  truly  have  said  what 
General  Concha  said  about  the  state  of  the  Church  in 
Cuba.  Don  Jose  Garcia  de  Arboleya,  a layman,  writ- 
ing a few  years  later,  drew  a more  complacent  picture. 
He  noted  that  in  all  the  island  there  were  364  temples 
or  places  of  worship,  of  which  173  were  hermitages  and 
oratories.  He  recited  that  there  were  41  parishes  in 
the  jurisdiction  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  with  68  places 
of  worship  and  128  parishes  in  the  Habana  diocese. 
Each  diocese  had  a conciliario,  or  theological  seminary, 
for  the  education  of  priests.  In  all  he  estimated  700 
persons  consecrated  to  the  service  of  religion,  including 
the  monks.  As  General  Concha  had  not  included  the 
monks  in  his  estimate,  it  is  probable  that  when  Arbo- 
leya wrote  there  had  been  no  increase  in  the  number  of 
parish  priests. 

In  1864  the  Government  budget  made  provision  for 
106  cures  and  sacristans  in  the  eastern  diocese  and  for 
244  in  the  western  jurisdiction.  At  that  time  in  Ha- 
bana diocese  the  parish  churches  numbered  137,  with 
8 auxiliary  chapters,  32  oratories  and  hermitages,  6 
convents  for  monks,  and  8 convents  for  nuns.  The 
appropriation  for  maintaining  the  Church  in  the  Santi- 
ago diocese  was  $186,000,  and  of  that  in  Habana  $345,- 
000.  In  1872  the  “ Guide  for  Strangers”  placed  the 
parish  clergy,  cures,  coadjutors,  and  sacristans  in  the 
Habana  diocese  at  240,  and  in  the  eastern  diocese  at 

237 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


75 — a stationary  condition  in  Habana  and  an  apparent 
decrease  in  Santiago. 

General  Francisco  de  Acosta  y Albear,  writing  from 
his  estates  in  Spain  during  the  closing  years  of  the  Ten- 
Years’  war,  enumerated  the  causes  of  the  trouble  in 
Cuba.  He  had  long  been  a resident  of  the  island, 
and  was  familiar  with  its  internal  affairs.  One  of  the 
causes  of  the  trouble,  he  declared,  was  the  lamentable 
results  of  religious  abuses.  Religion  in  Cuba,  he  said, 
was  a myth.  It  was  a useful  agency  to  the  political 
party  which  secured  its  influence  for  national  integrity, 
but  it  was  grossly  abused.  The  parish  priests,  he  de- 
clared, were  models  least  of  everything  of  the  virtues 
necessary  for  the  good  discharge  of  their  sacred  mis- 
sion. The  example  of  their  bad  conduct  was  demoral- 
izing to  people  favorably  disposed  to  religion.  He 
himself  knew  their  exactions  from  personal  experience, 
they  sometimes  demanding  four  times  the  regular  fees 
for  baptisms  and  burials.  A concurrent  cause  in  per- 
verting the  moral  sense  of  the  Cuban  people,  he  said, 
was  the  lack  of  religious  belief. 

In  1898,  according  to  the  official  figures,  there  were 
110  parish  cures  and  sacristans  in  the  diocese  of  San- 
tiago and  216  in  the  diocese  of  Habana  for  whose  sup- 
port provision  was  made  out  of  Government  funds. 
The  amount  set  aside  for  the  support  of  the  Church 
was  $352,000.  This  was  not  a heavy  draft  out  of  peace 
revenues  which  some  years  reached  the  total  of  $26,- 
000,000,  though  it  was  more  than  was  appropriated 
for  public  education,  that  amount  being  $250,000.  The 
salaries  of  the  parish  priests  were  good,  ranging  from 
$500  to  $1,500.  It  is  more  than  the  majority  of  coun- 

238 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


try  clerymen  of  Protestant  denominations  in  tlie  United 
States  receive,  though  they  have  families  to  support. 
The  budget  figures  three  or  four  years  earlier,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  insurrection,  were  substantially  the 
same.  There  were  not  as  many  church  edifices  devoted 
to  worship  because  some  of  them  wore  barricaded  and 
turned  into  garrisons  for  the  Spanish  troops. 

When  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  Antilles  ceased,  the 
Pope  designated  the  Very  Reverend  Archbishop  Cha- 
pelle,  of  New  Orleans,  as  apostolic  delegate  to  Cuba 
and  Puerto  Rico.  Cuba,  which  had  once  formed  part  of 
a diocese  with  Louisiana  and  the  two  Floridas,  thus 
again  came  into  relationship  with  Louisiana.  The 
bull  of  Pope  Leo  X.  in  1518  erected  a bishopric  in 
hitherto  unknown  Cuba  with  the  seat  at  Baracoa.  A 
Franciscan  friar,  Juan  de  Witte,  of  Flanders,  was 
named  the  first  bishop,  but  he  was  not  able  to  go  to 
Cuba  to  take  possession  of  his  mitre.  By  the  pontifi- 
cal bull  of  1522  the  seat  of  the  diocese  was  transferred 
to  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Other  bishops  were  nominated, 
but  did  not  administer  the  diocese,  and  it  was  not  until 
1537  that  the  island  enjoyed  the  presence  of  its  bishop. 
He  was  Miguel  Ramariez  de  Salamanca,  a Dominican 
friar.  His  successor  was  a Carthusian  monk,  Friar 
Diego  Sarmiento,  of  Seville.  Then  there  were  a few 
bishops  who  were  not  monks;  after  them  the  monks 
again,  mostly  from  Valladolid;  and  then  prelates  who 
were  natives  of  Mexico. 

Don  Jose  Hechavarri,  the  first  bishop  of  Habana, 
was  translated  from  Santiago.  His  diocese  included 
the  Floridas,  Louisiana,  Cuba,  and  Jamaica.  In  1788, 
Cuba,  having  lost  more  than  one-half  of  its  jurisdic- 

239 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tional  territory,  was  assimilated  to  tlie  political  and 
military  territory.  It  was  divided  into  two  dioceses. 
In  1804  Santiago  was  created  a metropolitan  arclii- 
episcopal  diocese,  which  it  remains  to  this  day.  Ha- 
bana  was  made  a suffragan  bishopric  of  Santiago, 
but  each  diocese  served  as  a court  of  appeal  from  the 
other.  The  geographical  division  was  by  a line  run- 
ning from  coast  to  coast  through  the  western  section  of 
Puerto  Principe  province;  so  that  Habana,  while  a 
suffragan  diocese,  had  the  larger  territorial  area  and 
much  the  greater  population  and  wealth. 

The  spiritual  and  temporal  regimen  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  in  Cuba  was  embodied  in  the  sinodo 
diocesana,  the  synod  celebrated  in  1681  by  Bishop  Juan 
Garcia  de  Palacios.  This  was  approved  by  Royal 
pragmatic,  and  with  some  modifications  has  since  re- 
mained in  force.  Under  Spanish  dominion  the  eccle- 
siastical authorities  were  part  of  the  State.  The  bishop 
of  Habana  was  a member  of  the  Governor-General’s 
council.  The  ecclesiastical  tribunals  were  respected, 
and  the  ecclesiastics  did  not  hesitate  to  oppose  the  sec- 
ular authorities  in  insisting  on  the  rights  of  the  Church. 
Both  Santiago  and  Habana  have  cathedrals,  with  ca- 
thedral clergy  and  the  privileges  thereto  appertaining. 
Each  has  also  a theological  seminary  for  the  education 
of  priests.  Under  Spanish  rule  the  secular  or  temporal 
head  of  the  Church  in  Cuba  was  the  Governor-General, 
and  as  his  delegate  in  the  archbishopric  of  Santiago 
"the  general  commanding  that  military  department.  The 
archbishop  and  the  bishop  were  appointed  by  the  Vati- 
can on  the  nomination  of  the  Madrid  Government. 

Arboleya,  in  the  edition  of  his  manual  published 

240 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


forty  years  back,  observes  that  the  Church  was  poor, 
especially  in  the  archbishopric.  The  acts  of  worship 
were  celebrated  with  some  pomp,  although  there  were 
no  sumptuous  processions.  Ho  thought  the  royal  ced- 
illas, issued  a few  years  previously,  would  contribute 
without  doubt  to  the  aggrandizement  and  decorum  of 
worship.  These  royal  cedulas  fixed  definitely  the 
charges  of  the  Church  and  its  ministers  on  the  royal 
treasury,  and  also  fixed  the  salaries  of  the  priests  and 
their  assistants.  A computation  of  income  and  effi- 
ciency was  to  be  made  every  five  years.  If  the  in- 
come were  in  excess  of  the  salary,  the  excess  was  to  be 
apportioned  among  the  assistants  and  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  church  edifice.  If  deficient,  the  deficit 
was  to  be  made  up  by  the  royal  treasury.  One-third 
part  of  the  canons,  prebendaries,  and  sub-prebendaries 
when  vacated,  were  to  be  filled  from  parishes  whose 
cures  had  at  least  twenty  years’  service,  reserving  to  the 
dioceses  of  the  peninsula  a certain  number  of  preben- 
daries and  dignities  in  the  capitularies  of  the  two  dio- 
ceses, or  in  the  parishes  in  which  they  had  options. 

Arboleya  gives  an  interesting  list  of  the  church  fees, 
and  these  were  not  greatlj'  modified  during  subsequent 
years.  He  also  notes  as  one  of  the  softening  influences 
of  the  Church  on  slavery  that  in  addition  to  the  52 
Sundays  there  were  20  church  holidays  on  which  the 
obligation  was  to  hear  mass  and  not  to  work,  so  that 
the  slaves  had  actually  72  days  of  rest.  The  20  church 
holidays  were  known  as  the  days  of  two  crosses  because 
they  were  thus  marked  in  the  calendar.  The  days  of 
one  cross  on  which  it  was  obligatory  to  hear  mass  and 
permissible  to  work  numbered  22. 

16  241 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

With  respect  to  civil  reforms  and  to  liberal  political 
movements,  the  Church  in  Cuba  was  what  it  was  in 
Spain — always  reactionary.  Clerical  intransigentism 
became  a phrase  as  common  as  political  intransigent- 
ism. It  opposed  innovations.  The  Spanish  conserva- 
tives in  Cuba  joined  it  in  complaining  that  religious 
toleration  and  free  study  encouraged  the  separatists  and 
fomented  disaffection  towards  Spain.  They,  too,  de- 
plored what  they  called  the  vacuity  of  the  religious 
sense  in  the  island ; but  they  laid  this  to  the  concessions 
and  the  tolerations  that  were  granted.  The  statutes 
protected  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  as  the  state  re- 
ligion. The  penal  code  provided  that  those  who  in 
offence  of  state  religion  broke  or  profaned  objects  sa- 
cred or  devoted  to  worship  should  incur  the  penalty  of 
traision  correctional.  A similar  penalty  was  applicable 
to  whomever  made  ridicule  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
religion  by  word  or  writing,  by  publicly  contemning 
its  dogmas,  rites,  and  ceremonies.  The  Church  op- 
posed civil  marriages.  In  defending  in  the  Cortes  the 
toleration  which  the  constitution  of  1876  extended, 
Canovas,  rigid  churchman  that  he  was,  declared  that 
three  hundred  years  of  intolerance  had  so  brought  it 
about  that  religious  indifference  was  the  distinctive 
character  of  the  Spanish  society  of  the  age.  But  the 
clerical  intransigentes  would  not  have  it  so. 

In  Cuba  as  in  Spain  the  Church  was  against  free- 
dom of  worship.  The  religious  toleration  extended  by 
the  Constitution  of  1876  was  promulgated  in  the  An- 
tilles several  years  later.  It  was  confined  within  the 
narrowest  limits.  The  Baptist  mission  which  was 
established  in  Marianao,  a suburb  of  Habana,  by  ap- 

242 


TO-MORROW  IX  CUBA 


pealing  to  the  higher  authorities  secured  the  reversal 
of  a ruling  by  the  alcalde  who  had  held  that  public 
religious  services  were  within  the  restrictions  of  the  law 
of  public  meetings.  By  statute  provisions,  dissenting 
sects  were  limited  to  precincts  or  places  set  apart  for 
them,  and  within  those  precincts  were  protected  from 
interference  or  disturbance  by  ordinary  police  regula- 
tions. The  provision  was  not  broad  enough  to  have 
covered  the  Salvation  Army.  Under  it  the  Baptist 
mission  was  maintained  in  Habana,  and  a Protestant 
cemetery  under  the  same  denomination  was  secured. 
The  Presbyterians  had  a small  mission  in  Matan- 
zas,  and  there  were  missions  in  two  or  three  other 
places  of  the  island,  but  they  never  had  a vigorous 
growth. 

The  ecclesiastical  influence  was  exerted  strenuously 
against  the  more  liberal  provision  of  the  law  which 
permitted  civil  marriages.  The  Church  combated  this 
in  inception  and  in  operation.  As  late  as  1894  there 
was  a dispute  between  the  bishopric  and  the  civil  au- 
thority regarding  the  certificates  of  baptism  required  in 
order  to  contract  civil  marriages,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  issue  a legal  process  against  Juan  Bautista  Casas, 
ecclesiastical  governor  of  the  diocese. 

The  Spanish  ecclesiastics  laid  much  of  the  irreligious 
condition  of  Cuba  to  Freemasonary,  ignoring  the  degree 
to  which  their  reactionary  tendencies  encouraged  that 
institution.  Toleration  they  declared  to  be  an  evil  to 
the  State,  and  toleration  of  Freemasonry  they  held  was 
an  encouragement  of  a foe  to  the  Church  and  to  the 
State.  The  history  of  this  movement  is  worthy  of  a 
brief  review,  and  it  comes  as  much  within  a chapter  on 

243 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  Roman  Catholic  Church  as  within  an  analysis  of 
the  political  side  of  Spanish  dominion. 

Freemasonry  * was  introduced  in  Cuba  by  the  French 
refugees  from  Santo  Domingo  in  the  first  years  of  the 
century.  Lodges  were  formed  by  the  immigrants  who 
established  coffee  plantations  in  Santiago  province,  and 
also  in  the  west  in  the  country  around  Habana.  Hos- 
tile public  opinion  growing  out  of  Murat’s  attack  on 
Madrid  in  1808,  during  the  war  between  France  and 
Spain,  caused  the  French  colony  to  emigrate  a second 
time.  Its  members  went  to  Louisiana,  and  with  them 
the  lodges  disappeared  from  Cuba.  It  was  not  until 
ten  years  afterwards  that  lodges  were  again  formed  in 
Cuba  under  charters  from  the  grand  lodge  of  Penn- 
sylvania. In  the  same  period  the  grand  oriente  of 
France  authorized  the  founding  of  lodges  in  Cuba,  and 
the  conferring  of  the  thirty-two  degrees  of  the  Scottish 
rite.  A few  years  later  the  grand  oriente  Spanish 
American  Symbolical  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  placed 
itself  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  grand  oriente  of 
Spain,  but  shortly  afterwards  declared  its  independ- 
ence. A fusion  was  effected  of  the  various  lodges  in 
Cuba,  and  in  1822  they  numbered  67.  It  was  the 
time  of  political  conspiracies  and  revolt  from  Spain  by 
the  South  American  countries.  The  Captain-General 
of  Cuba,  Francisco  Yives,  protected  the  masons,  not 
because  he  was  one  of  them,  but  because  by  introducing 
the  official  element  into  them  he  was  able  to  check  their 
tendencies  towards  political  treason.  After  his  recall 
Freemasonry  came  under  the  ban  of  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment, and  a dozen  years  later,  through  the  vigorous 
*“La  Masoneria  en  la  Isla  de  Cuba,”  Inza.  Habana,  1891. 

244 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


prosecution  of  the  aggressive  Captain-General  Tacon, 
tho  masonic  lodges  disappeared  from  Cuba.  A score 
of  years  passed  and  they  reappeared  with  the  vigor  of 
a now  growth. 

When  tho  cry  of  Yara  portended  the  Ten-Years’  war, 
it  was  disclosed  that  some  of  the  leading  insurgents 
were  prominent  masons.  The  lodges  in  Santiago  de 
Cuba  were  disrupted  in  consequence,  and  those  of 
Habana  came  within  tho  suspicion  of  the  authorities. 
When  one  lodge  was  celebrating  a memorial  session  the 
police  and  an  armed  force  of  Volunteers  surprised  the 
meeting  and  took  fifty-two  members  prisoners.  Those 
who  were  Spanish  subjects  were  kept  in  prison  nearly 
four  months.  They  were  finally  released  by  direction 
of  the  Madrid  provisional  Government,  which  was  then 
under  the  Presidency  of  General  Prim,  himself  a mason. 

The  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  were  in  constant 
dread  of  the  lodges  as  centres  of  conspiracy.  In  the 
closing  year  of  the  Ten-Years’  war  there  was  another 
police  descent  on  a lodge  meeting  in  Habana,  and  two 
hundred  members  were  arrested  while  celebrating  a 
memorial  session.  Captain-General  Jovellanos  was  a 
mason.  By  his  direction  the  members  were  paroled, 
instead  of  being  imprisoned ; and  though  they  werd  kept 
under  surveillance,  no  further  consequences  were  visited 
upon  them.  At  all  times  the  lodges  had  among  them 
officers  of  the  army  and  Spanish  civil  officials.  After 
the  peace  of  El  Zanjon  the  lodges  reunited  and  Freema- 
sonry had  a fresh  growth.  There  were  60  lodges  with 
a total  membership  of  2,800.  Three  years  later,  more 
than  a score  of  new  lodges  had  arisen,  and  the  member- 
ship was  3,800.  Ultimately  it  reached  7,000.  "What 

243 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


was  known  as  the  Law  of  Associations,  promulgated  in 
1888,  enabled  the  grand  lodges  and  the  subordinate 
lodges  to  be  registered  as  lawful  societies.  Neverthe- 
less the  Spanish  authorities  always  feared  them  as 
cloaking  conspiracy. 

At  various  periods  the  Cuban  lodges  had  controver- 
sies among  themselves  and  with  the  Spanish  grand 
oriente  for  attempted  usurpation  of  authority.  They 
always  resented  this  usurpation.  When  the  masonic 
fraternity  of  Spain  split,  the  Cuban  lodges  celebrated 
a mutual  compact  of  recognition  with  the  faction  of  Don 
Praxades  Sagasta,  so  often  Prime  Minister  of  Spain. 
Though  Cuba  was  a political  dependency,  a possession 
of  Spain,  the  Cuban  lodges  uniformly  asserted  that  the 
masonic  confines  did  not  run  with  the  political  confines. 
The  Cuban  grand  lodge  regularly  reaffirmed  that  it  was 
a masonic  potency,  free,  independent,  and  sovereign. 
Previous  to  the  last  insurrection,  masonic  newspapers 
were  published  in  Habana,  and  a school  was  main- 
tained. The  lodges  ceased  to  exist  to  all  public  intents 
and  purposes  during  this  insurrection.  The  large  ma- 
jority of  their  members  were  Cubans.  This  meant  that 
they  were  in  sympathy,  either  actively  or  passively, 
with  the  revolt.  So  prudence  and  the  frown  of  the 
authorities  kept  them  from  holding  sessions.  More- 
over, most  of  the  members  were  either  in  the  field  with 
the  insurgents  or  in  exile.  Some  of  the  leading  chiefs, 
incuding  Calixto  Garcia,  were  Freemasons. 

From  this  sketch  of  Freemasonry  in  Cuba  the  infer- 
ence might  be  drawn  that  it  was  considered  solely  on 
its  political  side.  This  would  be  incorrect.  Its  prog- 
ress was  opposed  by  the  Church  on  twofold  grounds. 

246 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  main  one  was  that  it  was  a secret  society,  and 
in  contravention  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Church.  The 
other  objection  was  that  its  tendency  and  even  its  aim 
was  to  weaken  the  civil  authority  of  which  the  Church 
was  the  beneficiary  and  the  bulwark.  Clerical  intransi- 
gentism  opposed  it  as  vigorously  as  did  political  in- 
transigentism. 

Following  the  revival  which  Freemasonry  had  in 
Cuba  after  the  peace  of  El  Zanjon,  a fierce  dispute 
raged  over  its  tenets  and  its  tendency.  A notable  con- 
troversy was  carried  on  between  the  masonic  writers 
and  Don  Rafael  de  Rafael,  the  ablest  Spanish  editor  of 
the  leading  conservative  paper.  Rafael  de  Rafael  was 
a Catalan  who  believed  that  Freemasonry  had  initiated 
and  fomented  the  insurrection  of  Tara,  and  that  its 
object  was  the  destruction  of  the  Church  and  of  Span- 
ish sway.  Its  character,  he  sought  to  prove,  was  revo- 
lutionary alike  towards  established  government  and 
established  religion.  Since  in  the  Spanish  dominions 
the  two  fundamental  institutions  which  served  as  a base 
of  society  were  religion  and  monarchy,  he  reasoned 
that  masonry  was  the  special  enemy  of  Spanish  institu- 
tions. Other  journals  continued  the  controversy,  which 
lasted  for  several  years;  and  the  Church  authorities 
persistently  opposed  the  progress  of  the  society.  But 
with  Premiers  of  Spain  and  Captain-Generals  of  Cuba 
themselves  Freemasons,  it  was  not  always  easy  to  make 
out  that  the  fraternity  was  the  enemy  of  the  State  and 
of  the  State  religion.  Some  Cubans  of  intelligence 
joined  the  lodges  as  much  as  a protest  against  ecclesi- 
astical intolerance  as  from  fondness  for  the  principles 
of  masonry. 


247 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  fruitage  of  a century  of  Roman  Catholicism  in 
Cuba  bears  a simple  analysis  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
the  spiritual  welfare  of  the  masses.  It  may  be  studied 
without  prejudice  and  without  bias.  All  that  is  bad 
that  may  be  said  of  it  has  been  said  by  those  whose 
faith  it  is.  The  state  of  religion  in  Cuba,  if  not  retro- 
gressive, was  at  least  stationary,  while  the  movement 
of  population  was  progressive.  The  parish  clergy  who 
ministered  to  the  spiritual  needs  of  1,600,000  people 
were  fewer  by  at  least  one-fourth  than  those  who  ad- 
ministered to  800,000  souls.  Cuba,  not  being  in  parti- 
bus  infidelium,  was  not  the  object  of  missionary  zeal. 
Its  inhabitants  were  Catholics  from  the  time  the  Con- 
quistadores  exterminated  the  native  Indians  and  immi- 
grants from  the  peninsula  filled  the  void.  The  Africans 
whom  the  good  Las  Casas  thought  it  merciful  to  im- 
port into  human  servitude  in  order  that  the  soil  might 
yield  its  fruitfulness^  also  were  converted,  and  in  time 
came  within  the  pale  of  the  faith. 

With  entire  homogeneity  of  the  language  and  pre- 
dominant homogeneity  of  the  Spanish  race,  the  conver- 
sion of  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  was  not  an  incentive 
during  this  century  that  could  be  urged  on  zealots  or 
missionaries  in  the  peninsula.  The  stream  of  faith 
was  allowed  to  grow  sluggish  and  become  a stagnant 
pool.  Perhaps  the  trouble  was  in  the  fountain  from 
which  it  was  fed.  The  Catholic  Church  in  Spain  has 
its  rancorous  critics,  its  sturdy  champions,  and  its  apol- 
ogetic defenders.  They  may  all  bury  their  differences 
in  the  acknowledgment  of  a craggy  fact,  and  then  dis- 
pute the  cause.  The  Church  in  Cuba  was  not  respon- 
sive to  the  aspirations  of  the  inhabitants.  Church  and 

248 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Crown  were  one.  By  its  union  with  the  State,  the 
Church  became  identified  with  the  oppression  and  mis- 
goverument  of  Spanish  dominion.  Out  of  this  condi- 
tion came  the  refuse  of  the  priesthood  as  ministers  of 
the  spiritual  wants.  Often  they  were  in  ecclesiastical 
exile  from  the  peninsula  because  of  offences  which 
forbade  their  exercising  their  sacred  offices  among  the 
people  who  knew  their  offences.  Before  the  last  insur- 
rection, in  the  popular  mind  the  Spanish  priesthood  in 
Cuba  as  a class  personified  ignorance,  cupidity,  and 
indifference  to  their  holy  office.  This  is  a harsh  judg- 
ment. It  has  been  pronounced  in  calmness  and  sorrow 
by  Catholic  observers. 

The  popular  conception  is  shown  in  the  theatres.  In 
the  best  of  the  plays  the  foibles  of  the  cures  or  parish 
clergy  are  received  by  cultivated  audieuces  as  sugges- 
tive of  something  grosser.  In  the  low  variety  theatres 
the  grossness  of  the  stago  representation  makes  the 
suggestion  unnecessary.  The  escapades  of  the  cures 
are  a stock  subject.  The  nephews  and  nieces  of  the 
priests  are  sometimes  given  in  polite  company  their 
rightful  relationship.  It  does  not  need  a moral  essay 
to  show  that  these  ideas  would  not  prevail  or  would  not 
be  tolerated  if  they  were  baseless.  The  slanders  and 
insinuations  of  the  scoffer  are  ignored  where  holy  liv- 
ing enforces  the  respect  due  to  the  holy  office.  A rep- 
resentation of  Catholic  priests  or  of  Protestant  clergy- 
men such  as  finds  favor  in  Habaua  would  be  flat  and 
dull  to  a depraved  American  audience  because  of  their 
consciousness  of  its  falsity.  In  the  Habana  variety 
theatx-es  the  sauce  comes  from  the  truthfulness  of  the 
suggestion.  It  was  the  same  in  the  vile  literature. 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Americans  are  sometimes  momentarily  shocked  when 
they  see  a priest  in  his  vestments  sitting  in  a cate ; but 
this  is  an  exaggerated  sentiment.  For  the  priests  to 
smoke  in  public  or  to  lounge  in  a cafe  does  not  offend 
the  customs  of  the  country  or  degrade  religion.  The 
degradation  comes  from  a deeper  cause.  A priest  in 
one  of  the  suburbs  was  in  the  habit  of  gambling  in 
public  with  the  Spanish  officers.  He  invariably  won. 
One  night  the  game  broke  up  in  a fight.  The  officers 
accused  the  priest  of  cheating.  In  another  village  the 
parish  priest  played  regularly,  and  won  the  money  of 
the  officers.  Knowing  his  habits,  the  insurgents  knew 
when  the  officers  were  occupied  and  took  advantage  of 
it.  During  the  blockade  of  Habana  by  the  American 
fleet,  public  gambling  was  licensed  and  the  license  fees 
used  for  the  benefit  of  the  poor.  At  one  of  the  most 
notorious  places  a priest  in  vestments  nightly  tempted 
fortune  at  the  roulette  wheel.  These  were  individual 
instances  of  which  the  writer  had  personal  knowledge. 
The  American  military  commanders,  when  they  took 
control,  also  had  a chance  to  inform  themselves.  In 
one  of  the  most  prominent  towns  the  American  gene- 
ral sent  to  his  superiors  a peremptory  demand  for  the 
bishop  to  remove  the  parish  priest  because  he  was  a 
drunken  old  vagabond. 

Here  is  a portraiture  of  the  Spanish  priest  in  Cuba 
painted  by  what  may  be  called  an  unfriendly  hand,* 
yet  it  cannot  be  called  the  hand  of  an  enemy  of  the 
Church,  for  it  is  that  of  a native-born  Cuban  priest: 
“ Cuba,  like  all  of  Latin  America,  has  been  the  refuge 
of  the  Spanish  clergy  expelled  from  their  dioceses,  the 

* “Veritas”  in  the  newspaper  El  Grito  de  Tara,  December,  1898. 

250 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


filon  of  ambitious  prelates.  Here  they  have  come  in 
totality,  loast  of  all  to  preach  tho  dogma,  to  make  Cath- 
olic propaganda,  to  moralize.  They  have  betrayed  tho 
design  of  domination;  for  hope,  they  have  substituted 
lucre  and  usury ; for  charity,  tyranny ; the  god  of  tho 
majority  of  priests  has  been  the  vilo  metal.  In  their 
time  of  power  they  were  not  seeking  to  save  souls  or  to 
administer  the  sacraments,  but  to  make  money,  to  dom- 
inate, to  collect  dues.  Not  to  educate,  but  to  prosti- 
tute.” 

It  is  the  general  testimony  that  under  Spanish  rule 
the  Church  fees  for  marriage,  baptism,  and  burials  were 
mercilessly  exacted.  The  people  paid  tribute  from  tho 
cradle  to  the  grave.  Some  controversy  occasionally  is 
heard  in  the  United  States  about  the  abuses  of  tho 
priestly  office  and  the  exaction  of  these  Church  fees. 
There  could  be  no  controversy  in  Cuba,  where  the  fact 
was  one  of  prominent  experience.  Whoever  wishes  to 
understand  the  feeling  of  the  masses  of  the  population 
towards  the  Spanish  priests  because  of  these  exactions 
has  only  to  select  a given  community  and  judge  for  him- 
self. The  good  priests  remitted  or  moderated  the  legally 
authorized  tithes;  but  the  good  priests  were  few.  By 
the  majority  of  cures  the  parish  was  administered  for  its 
commercial  gain.  The  Church  thus  became  the  partner 
in  the  abuses  of  the  Spanish  political  system. 

During  the  insurrection,  in  some  parts  of  the  island  it 
was  the  belief — a belief  which  remains  to  this  day — that 
the  secrets  of  the  confessional  were  betrayed  to  the 
Spanish  authorities,  and  that  insurgents  wrere  sent  to 
their  deaths  from  the  altar.  That  belief  may  be  base- 
less, yet  its  existence  cannot  be  ignored.  Of  other  acts, 

25t 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


conjecture  is  not  needed.  Some  Spanish  priests,  with- 
out sympathizing  with  the  revolt,  labored  nobly  to  mit- 
igate the  horrors  of  Weyler’s  reconcentration.  Others 
were  indifferent,  and  some  abetted  it  and  gloried  in  it. 
The  memory  lingers  in  certain  parishes  of  priests  who 
told  their  flocks  that  the  enforced  death  of  women  and 
children  by  starvation  was  the  judgment  of  God  be- 
cause the  husbands  and  fathers  rose  up  against  lawful 
authority.  Physicians  of  Spanish  blood  honored  an 
honorable  profession  by  their  ministrations  to  the  sick 
and  dying  without  thought  of  political  passion.  Too 
often  the  spiritual  physician  was  reproachful  in  his 
ministrations.  So  the  obstacles  to  the  future  useful- 
ness of  the  Spanish  clergy  are  clearly  discernible. 
They  are  gross  ignorance  and  lack  of  the  sympathy  and 
confidence  of  the  Cuban  people. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


Cuban  Priests  toe  Living  Branch 

Native-Born  Clergy  in  Sympathy  with  Their  People— Persecutions— 
Movement  Against  Spanish  Bishop  and  Clergy — Manifesto  of 
Cuban  Priests — Hint  to  Vatican  Against  Italian  Intrigue — De- 
mand for  Ecclesiastical  Home  Rule — Pastorals  of  the  Bishop  of 
Habana — Acceptance  of  the  New  Conditions — Jesuits’  Adapta- 
bility— Appointment  of  Native-Born  Archbishop  in  Santiago 
Diocese — Alienation  of  People  Not  Permanent — Freemasonry 
Not  Virile  in  Opposition— Weakness  of  Religious  Orders — Un- 
grounded Fears — Conservative  Action  of  American  Authorities 
— Protestant  Evangelization — A Religion  of  Deeds. 

Tiie  morning  of  promise  which  came  to  the  island 
when  its  political  freedom  was  assured  was  not  her- 
alded by  a sunburst  of  ecclesiastical  rejoicing.  To  the 
mass  of  the  Cuban  people,  the  Church  as  it  remained  to 
them  was  hateful.  It  was  identified  with  all  that  was 
bad  in  the  buried  Spanish  domination.  If  not  hostile, 
they  were  indifferent.  Yet  the  withered  tree  of  the 
Church  has  a fresh  branch.  This  is  the  Cuban  clergy. 
Through  all  periods  and  through  all  phases  of  Spanish 
authority  this  small  Cuban  priesthood  interpreted  the 
feelings  of  the  people  and  was  true  to  their  aspirations. 
With  it  rests  the  future  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
in  Cuba. 

The  Cuban  priests  came  out  from  the  shadows  into 
sunlight.  Don  Manuel  Santander  y Frutes,  the  Span- 

253 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


ish-born  bishop  of  Habana,  is  credited  with  describing 
them  as  mutinous  and  pugnacious.  From  the  stand- 
point of  superior  ecclesiastical  authority  that  may  be  a 
proper  designation  of  their  defiant  and  aggressive  stand 
in  these  days.  In  the  former  period  it  would  hardly 
fit.  The  opportunity  was  lacking  for  them  to  be  pug- 
nacious and  mutinous,  but  they  were  intensely  and  con- 
sistently patriotic  in  the  Cuban  national  sense.  They 
were  with  their  people  in  all  the  struggles  for  freedom. 
For  their  national  instincts  they  suffered  contumely, 
discrimination,  ecclesiastical  persecution  and  exile,  po- 
itical  deportation  to  the  penal  settlements,  and  even 
death  by  military  execution. 

The  story  of  Padre  Escambre  is  known  to  every  Cu- 
ban priest.  In  the  Ten-Years’  wrar  he  blessed  a flag 
for  the  insurgents,  and  within  twenty -four  hours  was 
shot  by  the  Spanish  troops.  Padre  Luciano  Santano 
■was  present  at  a political  meeting  in  Santa  Clara. 
Cespedes,  its  leading  spirit,  afterwards  raised  the  ban- 
ner of  revolution.  Padre  Santano  was  taken  to  Habana 
a prisoner  and  deported  to  Santo  Domingo.  Padre 
Yera,  of  Esperanza,  in  the  province  of  Santa  Clara, 
blessed  a Cuban  flag.  He  was  arrested,  fined,  and  only 
through  the  influence  of  the  colonel  of  Volunteers  who 
arrested  him  was  enabled  to  go  into  exile  of  his  own 
choice  instead  of  to  the  penal  settlements.  The  colo- 
nel of  Volunteers  had  personal  reasons  for  his  course. 
Eight  priests  were  deported  to  Fernando  Po.  One  of 
them  died  on  the  voyage.  It  was  charged  that  he  had 
been  poisoned. 

In  the  last  insurrection  no  Cuban  priest  was  sub- 
jected to  military  punishment,  but  some  were  driven 

254 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


into  exile,  and  others  were  rnado  to  feel  the  superior 
ecclesiastical  displeasure.  The  few  who  had  churches 
were  changed  to  other  parishes.  It  was  known  that 
some  of  the  flags  carried  by  insurgent  troops — the  flags 
were  not  numerous — received  the  blessing  of  patriotic 
priests,  though  their  identity  was  not  disclosed  to  the 
ragged,  bushwacking  troops  who  carried  them.  In  the 
village  of  Artemisa,  in  the  province  of  Habana,  when 
the  church  was  occupied  by  Spanish  soldiers,  the  priest 
got  arms  and  ammunitions  past  them  in  a coffin  to  the 
insurgents.  It  is  possible  to  suppose  that  this  was 
not  the  only  instance  of  the  kind.  In  known  instances 
the  sacraments  were  administered  to  dying  insurgents 
when  to  visit  them  was  governmental  and  ecclesiastical 
peril.  This  encouragement  of  rebellion  was  contrary 
to  the  teachings  of  the  Church.  It  was  sedition  against 
the  Spain  which  sustained  the  Church.  But  it  is  over. 
The  revolution  triumphed,  and  through  it  comes  lawful 
government  not  under  Spain. 

After  the  termination  of  Spanish  rule  in  Habana  and 
the  ending  of  the  press  censorship,  articles  on  the  rela- 
tion of  the  Church  to  the  new  conditions  began  to  ap- 
pear in  the  newspapers.  Some  of  the  violent  sheets, 
which  were  demanding  a boycott  of  everything  Spanish, 
named  individual  priests  (Malos  sotanas — evil  robes) 
whose  removal  was  demanded  because  of  their  crimes 
against  the  Cubans.  Most  of  the  articles  were  of  a dif- 
ferent character.  Though  acrid  in  tone,  they  were  not 
attacks  on  revealed  religion  nor  on  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church.  A sceptic  or  a free-thinker  could  not  have 
written  them.  They  were  in  purpose  and  in  substance 
an  attack  on  the  Spanish  priests  in  Cuba  and  on  the 

255 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


bishop  of  Habana.  They  were  also  a notice  to  the 
Vatican  that  something  different  was  expected.  Their 
authors  were  known  to  be  Cuban  priests. 

The  essence  of  these  articles  was  that  religion,  the 
Roman  Catholic  religion,  in  Cuba  had  fallen  into  a low 
state  through  the  fault  of  its  bad  ministers  who  had  cor- 
rupted the  purity  of  doctrine  and  of  discipline.  The  first 
obstacle  to  the  revival  of  Catholicism  in  Cuba  was  its 
Spanish  representatives.  In  peace  the  attitude  of  the 
Spanish  clerics  had  been  to  collect  dues,  live  well,  and  to 
mix  in  politics.  In  war,  to  encourage  the  shooting  of 
Cubans,  betray  the  confidences  of  the  confessionals,  and 
to  deny  Christian  burial  to  the  reconcentrados  and  the 
insurgents.  The  religious  communities — the  Jesuits,  the 
Dominicans,  and  the  Franciscans — it  was  charged,  had 
followed  in  the  rut.  The  Paulists  were  especial^  cen- 
sured for  their  violent  denunciation  of  the  insurgents. 

The  persecutions  of  the  Cuban  clergjr,  both  by  the 
civil  and  the  military  authorities,  were  made  the  basis 
of  a special  indictment.  Bishop  Santander  was  bit- 
terly assailed.  The  pastorals  in  which  he  abused  the 
Cubans  for  their  patriotism  were  recalled  and  analyzed. 
He  had  contributed  $1,500  to  the  Spanish  navy,  had 
encouraged  converting  the  churches  of  God  into  bar- 
racks and  garrisons.  He  should  not  try  to  seduce  the 
Cubans.  Rather  he  should  remember  the  pastorals  in 
which  he  calumniated  them  when  he  changed  the  frock 
of  the  shepherd  to  the  sword  of  war.  He  had  done 
nothing  to  alleviate  the  miseries  of  the  reconcentration. 
It  had  been  stated  that  he  did  not  approve  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  reconcentration.  Where  was  the  evidence  ? 
When  he  should  have  protested  against  it,  he  was  shut 

256 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


up  in  his  closet  dreaming  of  Spanish  victories.  Tlio 
conclusion  of  all  those  articles  was  that  tho  Spanish 
clergy  from  tho  bishop  down,  having  been  identified 
with  the  odious  Spanish  rule,  and  having  made  them- 
selves odious  champions  of  it,  should  go  because 
Spanish  sovereignty  had  gone.  Tho  sons  of  the  coun- 
try should  bo  called  to  represent  the  Church.  It  was 
not  possible  for  the  Spanish  priesthood  to  continue 
directing  the  Cuban  conscience. 

Preceding  this  series  of  polemics  appeared  the  mani- 
festo of  the  Cuban  clergy.  It,  too,  furnished  the  text  of 
newspaper  articles.  In  somo  of  the  journals  the  docu- 
ment was  treated  as  apocryphal.  It  was  not  apocry- 
phal. It  was  written  by  Cuban-born  priests  of  the 
Habana  diocese.  Some  authorized  their  signatures 
directly,  and  somo  gave  their  adhesion  to  a general 
statement,  not  caring  in  what  language  the  utterances 
were  clothed.  A very  few  of  the  Cuban  priests  disap- 
proved of  the  doctrine.  Several  avowed  to  the  author 
of  this  volume  that  they  indorsed  it  in  every  line. 

From  either  the  ecclesiastical  or  the  political  stand- 
point, this  manifesto  was  a remarkable  document.  It 
declared  that  divine  Providence  had  made  to  shine 
resplendent  the  inalienable  right  of  the  Cuban  people 
to  liberty.  Coincident  with  the  establishment  of  the 
Cuban  republic  would  be  necessary  the  rejection  of  a 
foreign  and  a hostile  clergy.  Now  was  the  time,  the 
manifesto  insisted,  for  the  Spanish  clergy  to  renounce 
spiritual  sovereignty  over  a people  not  its  people.  The 
same  reasons  that  the  Cuba  people  had  for  rising  in 
arms,  the  native  clergy  had  for  not  wishing  to  be  de- 
pendent on  the  Spanish  clergy.  “ We,  the  most  humble 
17  257 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


of  the  citizens  who  compose  the  little  nucleus  of  the 
suffering  and  persecuted  clergy,”  said  these  things. 
They  reviewed  the  history  of  the  struggle  for  Cuban 
independence.  The  seminaries  overflowed  with  Galle- 
gos, Asturians,  and  peninsulars  from  other  provinces 
of  Spain.  Was  it  strange  that  the  Cuban  families 
should  dissuade  their  sons  from  the  priestly  calling 
when  to  the  priestly  peninsulars  were  the  roses  and 
violets  and  to  the  insulars  the  thorns? 

The  manifesto  rejected  energetically  the  idea  of  a 
schism  from  the  Roman  Pontificate,  but  it  was  a bold 
hint  that  Italian  intrigue  would  not  be  tolerated.  Re- 
specting dogma,  the  Cuban  priests  feared  nothing,  be- 
cause the  canonical  law  permits  dissidences  with  the 
divine  end  that  the  Catholic  clergy  be  advised.  They 
would  obey  faithfully  the  Pope  because  they  were 
persuaded  that  never  a Roman  Pontiff  such  as  Leo 
XIII.  would  impose  upon  a free  people  other  clergy 
and  prelates  than  those  which  the  sacred  canons  and 
the  sovereignty  of  that  free  people  held  respectively — 
that  is  the  duty  of  granting  and  the  right  of  having. 
In  the  actual  circumstances  the  Cuban  Church  must 
enter  the  new  orbit  of  reorganization.  The  first  step 
was  that  the  Spanish  ecclesiastics  should  go.  They 
proposed  that  the  spiritual  administration  should  be 
conducted  by  means  of  two  delegates  appointed  to 
organize  and  direct  the  Catholic  Church  in  Habana 
and  Santiago  de  Cuba  dioceses.  These  two  delegates 
should  be  chosen  from  priests  of  the  native  Cuban 
clergy  of  recognized  fitness,  and  indorsed  by  the  most 
conspicuous  defenders  of  the  liberty  of  the  island,  and 
should  not  be  members  of  the  Spanish  Catholic  clergy, 

258 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


which  always  had  boeu  a political  organization  of  tho 
Spanish  Government,  and  which  was  greedy  for  spir- 
itual domination  in  Cuba  to  compensate  in  a measure 
for  tho  lost  temporal  sovereignty,  tho  one  being  as  fatal 
as  tho  other. 

The  purpose  of  these  Cuban  priests  was  to  impress 
on  the  American  authorities  and  on  the  Vatican  tho 
right  of  the  Cuban  priesthood  to  tho  administration  of 
the  Church  in  Cuba.  Its  aim  was  also  to  accentuate 
the  demand  that  the  Spanish  priests  depart.  The 
manifesto  and  the  articles  in  the  daily  journals  caused 
a mild  controversy.  Some  of  tho  moderate  Cuban 
newspapers  in  an  apologetic  strain,  while  approving  tho 
principle,  deprecated  tho  polemical  and  personal  tone 
in  which  it  was  couched.  They  eulogized  tho  worthy 
attitude  of  the  Cuban  clergy  who  did  not  subscribe  to 
the  violent  language.  It  appeared,  nevertheless,  that 
the  Cuban  priests  were  in  full  accord  on  the  capital 
points  of  tho  manifesto.  All  tho  native  clergy  aspired 
that  the  Catholic  Church  in  Cuba  should  be  as  free  and 
as  expansive  as  in  the  great  American  nation. 

The  manifesto  was  censured  by  tho  Spanish  press  for 
its  uncharitable  and  unchristian  sentiments,  and  for 
the  contempt  it  showed  for  ecclesiastical  authority  even 
to  the  degree  of  heresy.  Tho  Spanish  papers  also 
pointed  out  that  it  was  directly  contrary  to  the  political 
doctrines  of  Maximo  Gomez  and  other  insurgent  chiefs 
who  were  urging  peace  and  concord  among  all  classes, 
Cubans  and  Spaniards,  forgetfulness  of  the  past  and 
union  for  the  future.  Tho  Spanish  priests  as  a body 
made  no  answer.  Silence  was  their  best  if  not  their 
only  defence. 


259 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


The  bishop  of  Habana  did  not  reply  directly  to 
the  contumacious  Cuban  clergy.  His  displeasure  was 
shown  by  mild  rebukes  in  his  pastoral  letters,  and  by 
his  efforts  to  put  them  in  the  wrong  before  the  Ameri- 
can authorities.  He  appeared  as  a grieved  prelate, 
deprecating  the  violence  and  the  uncharitableness  of 
his  enemies. 

What  the  Cuban  priests  said  of  the  bishop’s  Span- 
ish partisanship  was  true.  He  had  been  the  most 
zealous  of  loyal  Spaniards  in  combating  the  insurrec- 
tion. When  war  with  the  United  States  was  portend- 
ing he  made  an  Easter  offering  of  the  goods  of  the 
Church,  and  during  its  continuance  he  exhorted  his 
flock  to  the  lawfulness  of  resistance.  Notwithstanding 
the  harsh  judgment  of  the  Cuban  priests  for  his  failure 
to  denounce  the  reconcentration,  Bishop  Santander  was 
generally  credited  with  opposing  the  Weyler  policy, 
and  with  exerting  himself  to  relieve  the  suffering  it 
caused.  But  his  opposition  to  the  Spanish  military 
authorities  taking  j)ossession  of  church  property,  such 
as  hospitals  and  asylums,  was  credited  with  being  more 
pronounced  than  his  exertions  for  the  victims  of  en- 
forced starvation.  He  accepted  the  American  control 
without  question  and  counselled  full  obedience  to  it. 
Although,  he  said  in  his  pastoral  letters,  the  heroic 
flag  of  Spain  had  ceased  to  wave  over  the  country  she 
civilized  and  evangalized,  and  though  they  would  never 
cease  in  their  love  and  feeling  for  the  mother  country, 
the  will  of  the  Lord  should  be  fulfilled.  This  pastoral 
letter  was  also  conciliatory  towards  the  Cubans  and  the 
prospective  Cuban  Government.  Afterwards  the  bishop 
issued  other  pastorals  reciting  that  the  union  of  Church 

200 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  State  no  longer  existed,  that  consequently  the 
Church  must  be  supported  entirely  by  voluntary  contri- 
butions from  the  faithful,  and  exhorting  them  to  this 
support. 

The  bishop’s  attitude  towards  the  American  author- 
ity was  correct  if  not  cordial.  He  was  aggressive  in 
defending  the  property  rights  of  the  Church,  and  his 
protests  wore  prompt  and  vigorous  when  the  first  sug- 
gestion was  made  of  the  municipalities  taking  control  of 
the  cemeteries.  He  steadily  opposed  all  changes  look- 
ing to  lessening  the  privileges  and  perquisites  of  the 
Church  in  fees.  Naturally  he  was  against  broadening 
tho  law  of  civil  marriages.  Distrust  of  American  influ- 
ence was  shown  in  one  of  his  pastorals  which  guardedly 
warned  his  flocks  against  educational  movements  out- 
side the  Church. 

The  bearing  of  the  Spanish  priests  towards  the  Unit- 
ed States  authorities  was  sullen,  but  not  defiant  and 
meddlesome,  as  in  Puerto  Rico.  They  realized  their 
helplessness.  A few  whose  bitterness  towards  the  Cu- 
bans had  made  their  positions  unbearable  took  the  first 
opportunity  to  leave  their  parishes,  but  tho  majority 
preferred  to  remain  and  trust  to  the  bishop  to  make 
provision  for  them.  Tho  religious  orders,  with  one  or 
two  exceptions,  were  distrustful  of  the  American  influ- 
ence and  of  prospective  Cuban  control.  The  Jesuits 
showed  their  traditional  acuteness  and  adaptability. 
When  General  Gomez  emerged  from  the  woods  and 
made  his  journey  to  Habana,  the  Jesuit  priests  were 
among  the  first  to  visit  him  and  receive  his  words  of 
encouragement  that  religion  was  necessary  to  the  State. 

When  there  was  hesitation  in  Habana  and  its  suburbs 

201 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


by  the  Spanish  colony  to  receive  the  American  flag,  the 
Jesuits  promptly  raised  the  stars  and  stripes  in  wel- 
come of  the  new  authority. 

The  Habana  diocese  forms  so  important  a part  eccle- 
siastically of  Cuba  and  its  relation  to  the  United  States 
is  so  close  that  it  has  been  taken  as  a mirror  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  in  the  island.  This  is  correct, 
for  the  conditions  were  not  dissimilar  in  the  archbish- 
opric of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  the  tendencies  and  the 
influences  there  were  the  same.  Nevertheless  the  east- 
ern diocese  is  worth  a word  by  itself.  Notwithstand- 
ing that  it  was  a superior  diocese  ecclesiastically,  less 
was  known  of  the  Santiago  jurisdiction  because  of  its 
isolation  geographically  and  its  feebleness  in  compara- 
tive wealth  and  population.  Though  the  Spanish  pre- 
dominance was  maintained,  this  wras  less  pronounced 
because  in  the  intensely  Cuban  provinces  of  Santiago 
and  Puerto  Principe  it  was  impossible  for  the  Church 
to  be  so  thoroughly  out  of  sympathy  with  the  people 
and  retain  any  hold  on  them.  When  the  Spanish 
authorities  were  making  their  last  and  desperate  at- 
tempt to  save  Spanish  sovereignty  by  proffering  the 
insurgents  further  propositions  for  amplified  autonomy, 
one  of  these  propositions  was  that  the  archbishop  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba  should  always  be  Cuban-born. 

The  archbishop  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  when  the  revo- 
lution broke  out,  deplored  it  as  a fratricidal  struggle. 
If  not  in  direct  condemnation  of  the  Weyler  policy  of 
reconcentration,  his  voice  at  least  was  raised  frequently 
deploring  the  results  and  pointing  out  the  unmerited 
suffering  of  the  innocent  classes.  When  the  American 
army  lay  in  the  trenches  before  Santiago,  after  the 

2C2 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


heights  of  El  Caney  and  San  Juan  had  been  taken,  his 
message  was  the  first  one  which  went  to  Madrid  invok- 
ing tho  surrender  of  tho  city  in  the  name  of  humanity. 

The  feeling  among  the  Cuban  priests  of  tho  Santiago 
diocese  does  not  seem  to  have  been  friendly,  though  it 
may  not  have  been  so  intense  as  among  the  priests  in 
the  Habana  diocese  against  the  bishop.  Tho  Santiago 
journals  began  to  publish  articles  calling  for  a change. 
Tho  archbishop  was  defended  mildly  by  some  of  the 
priests,  yet  it  was  apparent  they  would  not  be  content 
with  a Spanish  ecclesiastic  as  their  superior  authority. 
Archbishop  Saenz  himself  was  too  intense  a Spaniard 
to  remain  under  American  administration  and  in  the 
face  of  Cuban  opposition.  He  returned  to  Spain.  On 
the  suggestion  of  Archbishop  Chapelle  as  apostolic  dele- 
gate, the  Vatican  named  tho  Rev.  Francisco  do  Barnada, 
a native-born  Cuban  priest,  for  the  vacant  diocese.  This 
was  the  first  step  of  Rome  towards  putting  tho  Church 
in  Cuba  in  harmony  with  the  new  conditions.  After  a 
struggle  of  nearly  a year  the  bishop  of  Habana  also  re- 
signed. The  Cuban  priests  charged  that  in  resigning 
he  sought  to  perpetuate  his  influence  by  persuading  the 
Vatican  to  name  his  own  choice  for  a successor. 

The  extent  to  which  the  Cuban  people  have  fallen 
away  from  the  Church  is  recognized  by  American  Cath- 
olics. Whether  it  is  a permanent  alienation  must  be 
determined  by  events.  The  author’s  opinion  is  that 
the  alienation  is  not  permanent.  The  Cuban  women 
were  all  violent  revolutionists.  They  lost  their  confi- 
dence in  the  Spanish  priesthood  even  as  an  impure  ves- 
sel which  might  hold  the  crystal  water  of  the  pure  faith 

without  corrupting  it.  Yet  they  did  not  lose  the  faith. 

263 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


It  is  rare  to  enter  a Cuban  household  and  not  find  a 
crucifix,  a print  or  a picture  of  the  Virgin  Mary  on  the 
wall.  During  the  bitterest  period  of  the  insurrection, 
in  the  families  of  Cubans  it  was  not  uncommon  to  hear 
from  the  men  the  remark,  “ Our  women  are  not,  like 
us,  free-thinkers.  They  do  not  go  to  church,  but  they 
pray  in  the  morning  and  they  pray  at  night.”  The 
rosary  in  their  hands  would  frequently  witness  the 
truth  of  this  saying.  The  humble  colored  women,  some- 
times of  the  outcast  classes,  keep  the  tapers  burn- 
ing in  oil  to  mark  their  saints’  days.  On  the  church 
holidays  or  celebrations,  throngs  of  these  black  women 
may  be  seen  gathered  at  the  sanctuary,  awe-struck  and 
devout.  Their  devotion  is  mingled  with  superstition, 
it  may  be  removed  only  a degree  from  fetichism,  but  to 
the  zealous  churchman  it  is  a basis  of  belief,  and  it  is 
infinitely  more  hopeful  than  indifferentism. 

The  lack  of  faith  has  sometimes  been  cited  as  evi- 
denced by  the  poor  attendance  at  the  churches.  Obser- 
vation does  not  support  this  assumption.  At  the  early 
morning  mass  at  any  of  the  churches  of  Habana  or  of 
any  of  the  larger  towns,  or  at  the  later  services,  attend- 
ants are  not  lacking.  The  churches  are  usually  well 
filled  w'ith  worshippers.  The  absence  of  men  may  be 
noted,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  services  are  more  a 
social  reunion  than  a devotional  exercise ; but  the  same 
thing  is  said  with  equal  truth  of  both  Protestant  and 
Catholic  congregations  in  American  cities.  After  the 
American  military  occupation  began,  in  some  places  the 
parish  priests  blessed  the  Cuban  flags  anew.  In  the 
village  of  Jaruco,  Te  Drum  was  chanted  in  the  Church. 
At  Alquizar  mass  was  said  on  the  anniversary  of  the 

264 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


death  of  Maceo.  In  Santiago  de  Cuba  mass  was  also 
said  as  in  other  towns.  When  Gomez  enterod  Habana 
on  tho  fourth  anniversary  of  the  insurrection,  three  Cu- 
ban priests  rode  with  him. 

The  intellectual  life  of  tho  island  has  boon  variously 
described  as  agnostic,  infidel,  and  free-thinking.  A 
majority  of  the  men  call  themselves  free-thinkers  to 
describe  their  mental  attitude  rather  towards  the  Catho- 
lic Church  than  towards  religion.  They  revel  in  the 
philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer;  but  speculative  politi- 
cal philosophy  has  more  attractions  for  them  than  spec- 
ulative theology.  Tho  influence  of  Freemasonry  is  not 
likely  to  be  a serious  bar  to  tho  efforts  of  the  Church 
to  regain  the  confidence  of  the  people.  Tho  institution 
has  not  shown  great  vitality  since  tho  change  in  politi- 
cal conditions.  Unquestionably  its  secret  character 
drew  to  it  many  Cuban  patriots  who  saw  in  it  the 
means  for  furthering  their  aspirations  for  independ- 
ence. That  inducement  no  longer  exists.  Without  the 
stimulus  likewise  of  prosecution  and  opposition  tho 
probability  is  that  Freemasonry  in  Cuba  will  not  be  a 
potent  factor  outside  of  its  social  features.  While  it 
will  remain  under  the  condemnation  of  the  Church,  the 
antagonism  is  not  likely  to  be  strong.  The  Cuban 
priests  in  their  national  aspirations  sympathized  with 
it,  and  their  condemnation  of  its  members  was  lenient. 
This  leniency  may  distress  the  superior  ecclesiastical 
authorities,  but  it  will  continue  during  the  lifetime  of 
this  generation  of  Cuban  priests. 

The  religious  orders  were  stronger  in  Cuba  in  the 
earlier  eras  than  in  the  later  days.  The  nominations 
of  the  monks  as  bishops  was  proof  of  this  fact.  Their 

265 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


powers  waned  and  rose  in  tlie  Antilles  with  the  vary- 
ing fortunes  of  the  religious  orders  in  the  peninsula. 
Dominicans  and  Franciscans  got  the  strongest  foot- 
hold. It  was  the  church  of  the  San  Franciscans  that 
was  profaned  by  English  military  occupation  in  17G2, 
and  thereafter  was  given  over  to  the  secular  business  of 
the  customs  service.  The  convent  of  the  Dominicans 
became  the  property  of  the  university  of  Habana  when 
that  institution  was  secularized  in  1837.  Forty  years 
ago  there  were  sixteen  convents  for  monks,  and  five  for 
nuns  in  the  diocese  of  Habana,  with  seven  or  eight  in 
the  jurisdiction  of  Santiago  de  Cuba.  In  Habana  there 
were  the  monks  of  Santo  Domingo,  San  Francisco  de 
Asis,  la  Merced,  San  Augustine,  San  Felipe,  San  Juan 
de  Dios,  San  Lazaro,  Jesuitas,  and  Escolapias.  The 
nunneries  were  of  Santa  Clara,  Santa  Catalina,  Santa 
Teresa,  and  two  of  Santa  Ursulina. 

At  present  there  are  eight  religious  congregations  in 
Habana  and  vicinity — those  of  San  Felipe,  San  Fran- 
cisco, Santo  Domingo,  San  Isidor,  Mission  of  St.  Paul, 
Escolapians,  and  Jesuits.  The  mission  of  the  two  lat- 
ter orders  is  declared  to  be  especially  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  youth.  The  Jesuit  college  of  Belen  in  Habana 
has  been  honored  by  the  astronomical  discoveries  of 
Father  Yihez,  who  has  contributed  his  share  to  higher 
education.  The  Jesuits  also  have  a college  in  Sancti 
Spiritus.  The  Escolapians  have  schools  in  Guanaba- 
coa  near  Habana,  and  in  Puerto  Principe.  Yet  it  can- 
not be  said  as  a whole  that  the  religious  orders  have 
done  much  for  public  education  in  Cuba. 

The  convents  of  nuns  include  the  Urbanistas  of  the 
Franciscan  order,  Santa  Clara,  Santa  Catalina,  the 

266 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cloistered  Carmelites,  and  the  Ursulines.  The  Sisters 
of  Charity  have  charge  of  various  hospitals  and  charita- 
ble institutions  in  all  parts  of  the  island.  At  various 
times  there  has  beon  an  agitation  against  the  ecclesias- 
tical authorities  for  keeping  the  cloistered  nuns  as  pris- 
oners shut  up  against  their  will.  All  the  religious 
orders  have  property,  but  the  title  to  some  of  it  will 
have  to  bo  settled  by  legal  process.  The  formal  title  to 
the  convent  of  Bolen  was  conveyed  to  the  Jesuits  by 
the  Spanish  authorities  after  the  signing  of  the  protocol. 
Scandal  was  thereby  caused,  though  the  procedure  was 
alleged  to  be  simply  recording  the  title  which  already 
existed.  All  the  religious  orders  showed  antagonism  to 
the  establishment  of  societies  from  the  United  States. 
Nevertheless,  in  Habana,  the  Augustine  Brothers  es- 
tablished a chapel  where  services  are  conducted  in 
English. 

Roman  Catholic  prelates  in  Cuba  and  elsewhere  were 
fearful  after  the  war  lest  there  should  be  hostile  legisla- 
tion and  confiscation  of  church  property  if  an  indepen- 
dent Cuban  government  were  established.  Tho  dispute 
over  the  title  to  church  property  shows  a possible 
ground  for  this  belief.  It  may  be  as  well  that  this 
question  is  to  be  settled  by  judicial  process  during  the 
American  control.  The  other  fears  were  born  of  the 
temporary  resentment  of  the  hour,  and  took  no  account 
of  the  restraining  influence  of  the  Cuban  priests.  A 
few  individuals  in  what  was  called  the  intellectual  ele- 
ment of  the  Cubans  talked  of  a philosophical  state 
without  religion,  but  their  talk  was  the  empty  echo  of 
French  reading.  One  of  the  assemblies  in  the  woods 
which  adopted  a constitution  for  the  Cuban  republic 

267 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


included  a provision  making  civil  marriages  alone  valid ; 
but  this  came  from  the  freshness  of  the  memory  of 
the  Church’s  opposition  to  legalizing  civil  marriages. 
Such  a provision  could  not  secure  support  in  a regu- 
larly constituted  assembly  legislating  for  the  island. 
Whenever  a Cuban  congress  comes  to  be  chosen  and 
enacts  laws  for  the  commonwealth,  it  will  unquestion- 
ably exercise  the  complete  divorcement  of  Church  and 
State.  There  is  no  danger  of  it  going  further  than  this, 
and  enacting  proscriptive  legislation  against  any  creed 
or  sect. 

From  the  outset  the  attitude  of  the  American  author- 
ity was  clear.  The  union  of  Church  and  State  ended 
with  the  end  of  Spanish  sovereignty.  None  of  the  rev- 
enues collected  by  the  American  Government  could  be 
applied  to  the  support  of  the  Catholic  clergy  or  of  any 
religious  sect.  The  Church  holidays  were  not  recog- 
nized as  State  holidays,  though  in  deference  to  long- 
established  custom  on  some  of  these  days  official  busi- 
ness was  not  transacted.  Absolute  freedom  of  worship 
was  guaranteed  the  same  as  in  the  United  States.  The 
assurance  was  given  that  the  property  rights  of  Roman 
Catholics  would  be  protected,  and  this  assurance  was 
broad  enough  to  quiet  all  fears.  Disputed  titles  to 
property,  such  as  the  Jesuit  church  of  Belen,  were  left 
for  future  judicial  adjudication.  No  other  course  was 
open.  The  American  authorities  on  the  one  hand  could 
not  afford  to  confiscate  church  holdings,  nor  on  the 
other  hand  could  they  confirm  a clouded  title  and 
possibly  rob  the  municipality  of  its  vested  interests. 

The  most  delicate  question  was  that  of  the  cemeteries. 
The  popular  resentment  against  the  Church  for  its 

208 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


monopoly  of  the  burial  of  the  dead  was  strong.  This 
Church  ownership  of  the  cemeteries  and  tho  resultant 
abuses  wore  among  the  causes  which  weakened  its  hold 
on  the  people.  The  municipalities  in  various  places 
declarod  for  the  right  of  free  burial,  and  proposed  to 
make  tho  cemeteries  froe  regardless  of  assumed  prop- 
erty rights  of  the  Church.  The  American  authorities 
could  only  decree  that  where  the  complete  ownership  of 
the  municipality  was  clear,  the  burial  grounds  should 
be  free;  where  the  title  was  plainly  in  the  Church,  it 
should  so  remain,  and  subject  only  to  Church  regula- 
tions. Where  it  was  held  in  joint  ownership  or  was  in 
dispute  the  respective  rights  should  be  left  to  judicial 
process.  Where  the  municipalities  had  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  cemeteries  before  the  American  occupation, 
that  action  was  allowed  to  stand  subject  to  judicial 
action.  In  time  all  the  towns  and  villages  of  Cuba  will 
have  free  burial  grounds. 

The  embarrassment  which  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church  will  meet  will  be  in  its  stand  on  popular  educa- 
tion. Under  the  American  authority  what  could  be 
done  towards  establishing  a school  system  on  the  basis 
of  the  former  Spanish  system  was  done,  and  in  the 
teaching  religion  is  ignored.  In  a country  whose  in- 
habitants are  at  least  nominally  Roman  Catholics  this 
majr  be  called  an  unjust  course;  yet  the  American 
authority  in  assuring  religious  freedom  could  not  do 
otherwise.  The  reversal  of  this  policy  may  be  sought 
by  the  Catholic  Church  when  Cuba  comes  to  manage  its 
own  affairs,  but  nothing  is  more  improbable.  A legis- 
lative assembly  may  have  a majority  of  members  who 
are  devout  churchmen,  but  they  are  not  likely  to  make 

2G9 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


provision  for  religious  instruction  in  the  schools.  The 
popular  mind  is  firmly,  irrevocably  fixed  on  keeping 
the  schools  apart  from  the  Church.  The  religious  in- 
struction of  the  Cuban  youth  must  be  within  the  portals 
of  the  temples  and  within  the  homes. 

Protestantism  was  quick  to  seize  upon  free  Cuba  as  a 
promising  field  of  evangelization.  Under  the  old  con- 
trol the  discouragement  and  the  obstacles  were  too 
great.  After  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  even  before  the 
American  occupation  began,  Habana  was  invaded  by 
the  apostles  of  rancorous  and  sensational  theology.  A 
brief  experience  was  enough  to  show  that  the  little  head- 
way which  Protestantism  had  gained  would  be  lost  by 
this  kind  of  propaganda.  It  received  no  encouragement 
from  those  who  Rad  sought  to  inculcate  a faith  other 
than  the  common  one,  and  it  fell  from  its  own  weakness. 
The  people  might  not  hold  the  Catholic  creed  in  vene- 
rated affection.  At  least  they  were  not  ready  to  accept 
a gospel  which  reviled  what  religious  instincts  they  did 
possess.  After  this  experiment  came  the  more  earnest 
effort  of  the  various  Protestant  denominations,  several 
of  which  established  chapels  in  Habana  and  missions  in 
other  towns. 

Protestant  ministers  travelled  over  the  island  study- 
ing the  prospects.  They  could  not  fail  to  see  that  the 
field  for  evangelization  was  a vast  one.  Some  acquired 
the  grotesque  misinformation  which  is  common  in  su- 
perficial observation  made  to  carry  out  preconceived 
notions.  The  majority  laid  hold  of  the  cardinal  fact 
that  the  religion  which  would  make  progress  in  Cuba 
must  be  the  religion  of  deeds.  They  showed  the 
strength  of  Protestant  evangelical  work  in  their  organi- 

270 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


zation  for  the  relief  of  the  suffering  population  and  for 
the  support  of  orphan  asylums  and  hospitals.  They 
also  grasped  the  depth  of  the  popular  feeling  against 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  for  its  taxes  on  birth  and 
death,  and  their  first  promise  was  free  burial  grounds. 
The  utterance  of  a young  Cuban,  “ Protestantism  can- 
not be  bad,  because  they  baptize  you  free  and  they  bury 
you  free,”  was  the  keynote  with  which  they  sought  to 
reach  tho  conscience  of  the  masses. 

Both  Spanish  prelates  and  American  ecclesiastics  were 
averse  to  the  idea  of  Protestant  evangelization  of  Cuba. 
The  bishop  of  Habana,  in  his  pastoral  accepting  Ameri- 
can authority,  said  that  those  who  were  happy  in  the 
thought  that  the  Church  would  lose  its  influence  and 
bo  vanquished  by  tho  Protestants  had  no  cause  to  be 
happy  at  such  a thought.  It  is  certain  that  tho  various 
evangelical  denominations  will  not  withdraw  from  the 
work  upon  which  they  have  entered.  There  is  no  oc- 
casion for  a conflict  of  creeds  in  Cuba.  Tho  majority 
of  people  will  be  as  in  other  Latin  American  countries 
at  least  nominally  Catholics.  If  the  liberal  policy  of 
the  apostolic  delegate  succeeds  in  making  them  genuine 
Catholics,  the  incentive  furnished  by  evangelical  Protes- 
tantism may  be  credited  with  a share  in  the  wrork. 

The  Cuban  clergy  wfill  not  be  content  until  the  Cuban 
parochial  priests  are  the  custodians  of  the  Cuban  con- 
science. They  will  also  insist  on  lessening  the  Spanish 
influence  in  the  religious  orders.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
either  Protestant  missionaries  or  Roman  Catholic  eccle- 
siastics from  the  United  States  appreciate  the  thorough- 
ness of  this  movement  or  the  degree  to  w^hich  it  may 
be  invoked  in  winning  the  masses  back  to  the  Church. 

271 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


In  the  lapse  of  years,  when  this  national  instinct  lias 
worked  its  mission,  immigration  from  Spain  may  bring 
Spanish  shepherds  with  the  flocks  from  the  peninsula, 
and  the  history  of  the  French  in  Canada  in  their  devo- 
tion to  the  faith  may  be  repeated.  But  that  is  not  of 
the  present  day. 


CHAPTER  XV 


Manners  and  Morals 

Ingenuous  Social  Life— Reserve  towards  Strangers — Immemorial 
Customs  and  Habits — Grosser  Amusements — Bull-Fight  and 
Lottery  Disappearing  Institutions — Gambling  as  a National 
Trait — Geography  and  Climate — Statistics  of  Illegitimacy  Not  a 
Criterion — Unmorality  and  Immorality— Ilabana  as  an  Antillian 
Paris — Vice  on  Exhibition  for  Visitors — State  Regulation  of 
Prostitution — System  Accepted  by  American  Military  Officials 
— Recruits  for  Iniquity  from  Abroad — Causes  of  Social  Demor- 
alization Traced — Disproportionate  Number  of  Males — Change 
for  Better  in  Social  State — Ilabana  Not  a Moral  Mirror  of  the 
Whole  Island — Healthful  Influences. 

Political  institutions  reflect  the  character  of  social 
institutions.  No  government  in  the  border  tropics 
which  seeks  to  place  itself  above  and  beyond  the  cus- 
toms and  habits  of  the  people  can  succeed.  How  far 
immemorial  usages  are  to  be  deemed  a reflex  of  the 
moral  station  is  not  worth  stopping  to  discuss.  The 
manners  and  customs  and  the  amusements  are  all  mir- 
rors of  Latin  traits.  Naturally  the  climate  has  some- 
thing to  do  with  them. 

Much  of  the  social  life  is  in  the  open  air.  Cubans 
and  Spaniards  are  indifferent  to  the  scrutiny  of  their 
neighbors.  There  is  an  unconsciousness,  even  a nai- 
vete, about  their  methods  of  living.  It  might  be  said 
that  they  live  in  public.  The  courtyards  of  their 
18  273 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

houses,  the  rooms  opening  directly  on  the  street,  make 
it  so.  Publicity  is  not  annoying  because  nobody  is  cu- 
rious about  that  which  can  be  seen  so  readily.  Fam- 
ily groups  at  the  open  windows  are  indifferent  to  the 
passers-by.  In  the  evening,  when  the  heat  of  the  day 
is  past,  it  is  customary  to  leave  the  house  for  the 
plaza  or  park  where  the  band  is  playing.  A stroll  of 
an  hour  or  two,  a meeting  with  friends,  the  interchange 
of  little  gossip  among  the  women  make  these  evening 
strolls  in  reality  social  reunions.  There  is  also  the 
theatre  to  attend,  and  half  an  hour  in  a cafe  with  all  the 
members  of  the  family,  and  then  the  return  home. 
Because  of  this  habit  of  recreation  in  public  and  of  the 
groups  in  the  cafes,  impressionist  American  observers 
form  their  conclusions  of  the  lack  of  home  life  among 
Cubans  and  Spaniards.  Nothing  could  be  more  mis- 
leading. The  custom  is  in  itself  a tribute  to  the  mode- 
ration and  temperance  among  all  classes  which  is  so 
general  as  to  be  almost  universal.  The  climate  helps 
to  enforce  temperance ; but  the  simplicity  of  the  social 
diversions,  the  innocence  of  the  recreations,  could  not 
exist  among  a people  predisposed  to  grossness. 

Cuban  social  life  has  lost  some  of  its  reserve,  but  it 
does  not  yet  conform  to  American  notions.  The  visitor 
from  the  United  States  does  not  readily  understand 
why  the  men  whom  he  meets  in  business  affairs  or  in 
official  intercourse  do  not  invite  him  to  their  homes. 
At  the  balls  or  dances  which  he  attends  as  a guest  the 
constraint  shown  by  the  sexes  appears  stiff  and  unnec- 
essary. Some  of  the  older  usages  are  disappearing. 
After  the  return  of  the  Cuban  families  which  had  been 
in  exile  in  the  States,  the  women  began  to  appear  in  the 

274 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


stroets  anil  in  the  shops  without  boiug  accompanied  by 
the  duenna  whose  presence  had  always  been  consid- 
ered indispensable.  They  also  showed  thoir  indepen- 
dence of  other  customs  with  which  previously  they  had 
been  hedged.  These  innovations  may  all  come  with- 
out a real  change  in  the  social  usages.  It  will  bo  a long 
time  before  the  visiting  stranger  will  be  received  into 
tho  families  of  his  Cuban  friends  with  the  same  free- 
dom that  he  meets  with  in  the  Unitod  States.  More 
than  the  crust  of  reserve  has  to  be  broken.  Cuban  hos- 
pitality is  a proverb,  but  it  is  hospitality  after  the 
manner  of  a Latin  country.  Until  he  is  on  more  famil- 
iar terms  it  is  well  for  tho  American  not  to  judge  too 
confidently  of  the  family  life  of  which  he  is  ignorant. 

Manners  do  undergo  a change  and  not  always  for  the 
bettor.  American  brusqueness  has  already  modified 
the  politeness  which  was  always  met  with  in  public,  in 
the  cafes,  the  theatres,  and  the  tramways.  It  was  per- 
haps superficial,  and  there  may  have  been  too  much 
servility  for  the  independent  and  self-asserting  native 
of  the  North.  Yet  the  habit  of  being  courteous  should 
not  be  too  roadily  accepted  as  a mark  of  an  inferior 
civilization. 

The  amusements  of  the  Latin  races  do  not  always 
conform  to  American  ideas.  It  is  to  be  said  for  the 
Cubans  that  in  spite  of  the  sombreness  of  their  political 
history  they  do  not  take  their  amusements  sadly.  The 
rural  diversions  are  both  simple  and  joyous.  Music  is 
the  soul  of  these  diversions.  The  serenade  is  the  pop- 
ular form.  The  calendar  of  Church  holidays,  feast  days, 
is  a full  one.  Its  length  sometimes  appalls  the  em- 
ployer of  labor.  The  people  are  always  ready  to  ob- 

275 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


serve  the  calendar  not  so  much  in  the  devotional  frame 
of  mind  as  in  the  holiday  spirit. 

The  robust  and  grosser  sports  are  to  be  considered. 
There  is  the  cocking  main.  This  is  not  a noble  sport, 
but  it  is  distinctively  a Cuban  one.  Nor  is  it  the 
amusement  of  the  lower  classes  alone.  The  neat  lat- 
ticed structure  in  the  form  of  an  amphitheatre  which  is 
seen  on  the  outskirts  of  many  of  the  villages  is  the  cock- 
pit. A similar  structure  is  found  on  private  estates. 
In  the  country  the  amusement  is  a favorite  one.  Its 
final  disappearance  is  not  of  the  immediate  future. 
The  most  that  can  be  expected  for  a time  is  that  the 
Cubans  who  have  been  decrying  the  sport  as  a brutal 
and  degrading  one  will  find  greater  encouragement  in 
their  efforts  to  banish  it.  A Captain-General  of  Cuba 
once  kept  a cock-pit  in  the  courtyard  of  his  official  resi- 
dence. Another  Captain-General  declared  that  game 
roosters  made  it  easy  to  rule  the  Cuban  people.  The 
Spanish  authorities  licensed  and  encouraged  matching 
the  game  roosters  because  of  the  revenue  it  brought  the 
Government.  This  knowledge,  among  the  Cubans  who 
were  bitterest  in  their  opposition  to  Spanish  rule,  is  a 
moral  argument  which  has  greater  weight  in  banishing 
the  amusement  than  its  brutality. 

It  was  a question  of  many  observers  who  judged  from 
the  South  American  countries  whether  when  Spanish 
sovereignty  was  gone  the  bull-fight  and  the  lottery 
would  also  go.  In  Cuba,  so  far  as  this  generation  is 
concerned,  the  answer  is  clearly  foreshadowed.  The 
bull-fight  and  the  lottery  wrere  part  of  the  Spanish  in- 
stitutions against  which  the  fiercest  resentment  was 
shown.  Educated  Cubans  charged  that  they  were 

276 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


maintained  by  tlio  Government  for  tlio  purpose  of  de- 
bauching  the  moral  souse  of  the  people.  By  one  who 
has  not  lived  in  the  midst  of  them  the  intensity  of  this 
feeling  would  not  bo  understood.  It  was  strong  enough 
to  give  assurance  that  those  institutions  once  gone 
would  not  be  revived  without  determined  resistance. 
Moreover,  the  bull-fight  was  the  especial  sport  of  the 
Spaniards.  Tlio  majority  of  its  patrons  were  always 
from  their  ranks. 

The  lottery  was  a more  subtle  evil.  Its  existence  was 
among  a people  who  are  declared  to  be  gamblers  by 
nature.  That  both  Cubans  and  Spaniards  are  inordi- 
nately addicted  to  gaming  there  can  be  no  denial.  How 
far  the  Government  was  responsible  for  encouraging  this 
instinct  by  maintaining  the  great  gambling  scheme  of 
the  lottery  as  a State  institution  may  be  a matter  of 
individual  opinion.  Outside  of  this,  the  Spanish  laws 
against  gambling  were  verj-  severe — quite  as  severe  as 
the  statutes  and  the  police  regulations  in  the  United 
States.  When  the  Spanish  lottery  fell,  the  mass  of  the 
people,  though  they  had  been  in  the  habit  of  buying 
the  tickets  regularly,  did  not  seem  to  miss  it.  Some 
surreptitious  schemes  of  lottery  drawing  found  their 
way  into  the  island — just  as  similar  schemes  existed 
in  the  United  States  after  the  Louisiana  lottery  was 
driven  out.  But  they  did  not  secure  patrons  in  the 
overwhelming  numbers  that  would  justify  the  belief  that 
the  people  could  not  get  along  without  the  drawings. 

The  time  since  the  stain  of  the  lottery  was  on  the 
escutcheon  of  the  United  States,  the  agitation  which 
was  necessary  in  order  to  secure  the  passage  of  an  act 
of  Congress  outlawing  it  from  the  mails,  are  so  recent 

277 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


that  it  hardly  lies  in  the  mouth  of  Americans  to  be  too 
critical  of  the  Latin  toleration.  They  will  find  to-day 
a pronounced  public  sentiment  against  the  lottery  which 
promises  to  continue  strong  enough  to  prevent  it  get- 
ting a foothold  under  whatever  form  of  government  pre- 
vails. And  in  any  given  community  in  Cuba  quite  as 
strong  a feeling  will  be  found  against  gambling  and 
quite  as  urgent  a demand  on  the  authorities  to  enforce 
the  laws  as  exist  in  any  given  community  in  the 
United  States.  This  does  not  mean  that  gambling  will 
be  eradicated.  It  does  mean  that  it  may  be  lessened 
among  a people  who  recognize  that  it  is  detrimental  to 
their  own  welfare  and  demoralizing  to  their  morals. 

These  questions  of  manners,  customs,  and  amuse- 
ments have  a bearing  on  the  relation  of  the  social  in- 
stitutions to  the  political  institutions,  yet  they  are  not 
the  core.  That  is  one  of  usages  and  habits  in  their 
effect  on  the  morality  of  the  people  and  their  capacity 
for  maintaining  good  government.  Public  morality  is 
the  closed  book  of  Spanish  rule.  Though  never  prac- 
tised in  the  past,  it  is  compatible  with  representative 
government  in  the  tropics.  But  what  of  private  mor- 
als? Cuba  comes  within  the  geographical  zone  of  sup- 
posed contamination.  The  state  of  civilization  has 
been  represented  as  one  of  gross  immorality. 

It  is  proper  to  inquire  how  far  this  impression  is 
correct,  and  what  is  the  actual  and  the  prospective  state 
of  morality  among  this  people  crossing  the  threshold 
of  nationality.  After  that  comes  the  inquiry  into  rela- 
tive morals,  into  the  causes  that  have  produced  the  pres- 
ent conditions  and  whether  they  are  ineradicable.  That 
is  to  say,  whether  the  morals  of  the  border  tropics  are 

278 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


a temporary  condition,  or  a fact  of  geography  and  cli- 
mate, a natural  rampart  of  vice  and  incapacity  for  good 
government  which  can  be  neither  scaled  nor  beaten 
down.  These  might  bo  considered  subjects  for  the 
closet  rather  than  for  open  discussion,  but  unfortu- 
nately they  cannot  bo  settled  in  the  closet.  In  making 
the  inquiry  I do  not  propose  to  take  the  statistics  of  il- 
legitimacy as  the  premises  of  any  conclusion.  The  rea- 
son is  that  they  do  not  furnish  the  basis  from  which 
just  conclusions  can  be  drawn. 

Illegitimacy  is  not  confined  to  tho  tropics,  and  is  not 
a product  of  tho  tropics.  Acrid  religious  controversy 
may  grow  out  of  the  discussions  over  Protestantism  and 
Catholicism,  or  over  the  relative  vice  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
as  shown  in  London  or  of  the  Latin  as  shown  in  the 
rural  regions  of  other  countries.  But  on  its  theological 
side  Cuba  may  cite  Jamaica  with  an  annual  birth-rate 
of  76  per  cent  of  illegitimates,  and  Habana  may  be  com- 
pared with  a dozen  other  cities.  And  if  the  religious 
instincts  of  the  American  people  are  done  violence  to 
through  this  apparent  indifference  to  the  sanctity  of 
the  marriage  rite,  they  may  find  sober  thought  in  thoir 
own  statistics  of  divorce.  If  the  statistics  of  illegiti- 
macy are  their  basis  for  measuring  the  capabilities  of 
the  tropical  Antilles  for  self-goverment,  why  may  not 
statistics  of  divorce  be  taken  as  a proper  means  of  de- 
termining the  standard  of  American  civilization?  Who 
shall  take  the  measurements?  The  state  of  unmorality 
in  Cuba  is  deplorable,  but  this  is  not  immorality  nor 
the  immoral  basis  of  a commonwealth. 

Habana  is  the  Paris  of  the  West  Indies.  Its  immo- 
rality is  worn  on  the  sleeve.  The  American  visitor  may 

279 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


learn  more  of  its  vices  in  a week  than  lie  lias  known  of 
the  dark  shadows  of  his  home  city  in  a lifetime.  He 
may  go  without  apology  or  without  disguising  his 
identity  to  one  of  the  public  balls  during  the  carnival 
season.  When  he  encounters  there  acquaintances  whom 
he  has  met  in  other  spheres  he  need  not  be  shamefaced, 
and  seek  to  explain  that  he  is  observing  the  customs 
of  the  country.  No  explanation  will  be  expected.  He 
may  attend  social  functions  of  the  best  society,  and 
wonder  at  the  insouciance  of  the  refined  ladies  who 
dance  what  he  is  told  is  the  Cuban  national  dance.  If 
his  mind  is  prurient  he  may  dwell  on  its  possibilities; 
but  this  impression  will  not  continue  after  his  famili- 
arity becomes  more  extended.  The  Cuban  dance  will 
fade  away  as  the  waltz  and  schottische  fade  away. 

At  the  public  ball  he  may  see  the  national  dance  ex- 
aggerated and  vulgarized  in  a manner  that  the  good 
women  whom  he  met  at  the  social  function  do  not  know 
to  be  possible.  The  probabilities  are  very  great  that 
he  will  see  nothing  more ; and  the  hours  will  wear  away 
into  the  gray  morning  to  the  thrumming  of  the  music 
without  variation  and  the  monotonous  motion  of  the 
dance  without  other  incident.  His  desire  for  some 
excitement  is  almost  sure  to  be  disappointed.  At  the 
variety  theatres  of  the  lower  order  his  experience  will 
be  more  varied.  The  stago  indecencies  may  be  more 
pronounced  than  may  be  seen  in  the  low  variety  thea- 
tres of  the  large  cities  in  the  United  States,  but  this  is 
doubtful.  Much  of  the  performance  will  be  dependent 
upon  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  Spanish  language, 
its  colloquialisms  and  the  double  meaning  which  can  be 
given  to  so  many  of  its  words. 

280 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


The  traveller  may  look  twice  at  the  comely,  graceful 
woman  with  the  chocolate  complexion  who  passes  the 
hotel  or  the  cafe  where  ho  is  seated.  He  may  assume 
that  he  is  in  Savannah  or  New  Orleans.  He  may  won- 
der if  it  is  the  eternal  doom  of  the  mulatto  to  bo  rfe- 
classfa,  and  if  she  is  to  know  no  other  fate.  If  he  has 
the  opportunity  to  study  the  social  life  of  the  middle 
classes  fully,  he  will  learn  that  the  struggle  against  this 
fate  is  going  on,  and  that  the  mulatto  race  is  not  accept- 
ing the  decree.  But  he  will  not  know  this  in  the  begin- 
ning. The  visitor  will  not  see  the  strange  women  in  the 
street  as  he  may  see  them  in  Chicago  or  New  York. 
But  they  will  peer  at  him  from  the  windows  and  the 
doorways  of  their  habitations,  and  will  resent  his  refu- 
sal of  their  hospitality.  Their  trade  is  the  open  trade 
of  the  outcast  everywhere.  It  is  lawful.  The  State 
recognizes  it. 

The  visitor  may  read  in  the  newspapers  municipal 
orders  about  the  location  and  other  regulations  for  the 
houses  of  tolerancy.  He  will  probably  be  told  that 
the  indifference  to  their  home  surroundings  is  one  of 
the  characteristics  of  this  branch  of  the  Latin  race,  and 
that  their  lack  of  morality  is  shown  in  their  toleration 
of  neighborhood  surroundings  of  that  kind.  It  is  true 
that  the  Spaniard  or  the  Cuban  builds  his  residence  for 
himself  and  not  for  the  outside  world.  Its  exterior 
gives  little  idea  of  the  interior,  and  this  sometimes 
causes  the  fine  house  to  be  near  a foundry,  a shop,  or 
something  not  so  harmless.  Yet  the  visitor  who  reads 
the  newspapers  will  find  constant  complaints  against 
the  authorities  for  permitting  the  houses  of  tolerancy  to 
go  beyond  their  prescribed  limits  and  invade  respect- 

281 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


able  neighborhoods.  This  assuredly  does  not  indicate 
a lack  of  moral  sensibility.  Being  recognized  by  the 
State,  they  have  their  metes  and  bounds  laid  down  by 
official  orders,  and  the  protests  against  their  overlapping 
the  bounds  are  usually  numerous  enough  and  emphatic 
enough  to  impress  upon  the  authorities  the  enforcement 
of  the  regulations. 

If  the  curiosity  of  the  visitor  develops  into  legitimate 
inquiry,  he  may  glean  knowledge  that  will  unsettle 
previous  opinions.  He  will  find  a complete  code  of 
civil  regulations  for  prostitution  enforced  by  special 
police  and  re-enforced  by  medical  inspectors.  He  will 
learn  of  the  system  of  license  fees,  and  will  not  fail  to 
hear  of  the  horrible  abuses  which  grew  out  of  that  sys- 
tem under  the  Spanish  administration.  In  comparison 
with  these  abuses,  police  blackmail  of  the  unfortunate 
classes  in  American  cities  becomes  a luminous  spot  in 
this  dark  shadow.  The  American  military  authorities 
accepted  the  system  as  they  found  it,  which  was  as  a 
measure  of  hygiene  and  not  of  reformation.  Some  of 
them  approved  the  principle  of  licensing  the  social  evil, 
but  they  would  have  preferred  a different  practice. 
Others  indorsed  it  both  as  a general  measure  and  for 
the  special  protection  of  the  soldiers.  Under  military 
administration  the  enforcement  of  the  regulations  was 
rigid,  but  no  effort  was  made  to  give  them  other  than  a 
hygienic  character. 

Some  phases  of  the  subject  are  better  fitted  to  a chap- 
ter on  medical  sociology  than  for  popular  information; 
but  the  system  in  so  far  as  legalizing  immorality  is 
concerned  is  not  different  from  that  of  other  countries 
which  adopt  the  same  principle.  Neither  this  official 

282 


TO-MORROW  IN  CURA 


recognition  of  the  social  ovil  nor  the  abusos  in  connec- 
tion with  its  regulation  are  chargeable  to  the  morals 
of  the  tropics.  Moreover,  notwithstanding  the  tolera- 
tion of  public  sentiment,  State  licensing  was  at  all  times 
opposed  by  a part  of  the  community.  Vicious  prac- 
tices in  the  United  States  might  be  exhibited  in  their 
deformity  because  the  American  military  authorities 
enforced  the  license  system  for  the  protection  of  their 
troops  with  the  same  justice  as  to  set  forth  its  existence 
as  evidence  of  a low  condition  of  morals  in  Cuba. 

But  the  stranger  may  learn  other  things.  Ho  may 
meet  many  porsons  who  will  tell  him  that  it  is  hopeless 
to  expect  a pure  home  life;  that  the  mixture  of  races 
forbids ; that  the  climate  produces  social  demoralization, 
and  that  climate  cannot  be  conquered.  He  may  follow 
his  inquiry  into  all  the  haunts  of  vice,  and  come  to  learn 
that  Habana  is  a port  ■where  vessels  from  the  four 
quarters  of  the  world  drop  anchor.  Ho  will  learn  that 
the  toleration  which  is  everywhere  extended  to  sailors 
ashore  is  not  denied  in  Habana.  With  these  sailors’ 
resorts  and  with  its  Chinese  quarters,  this  Paris  of  the 
Antilles  is  also  the  San  Francisco  of  the  West  Indies. 
Do  all  these  things  indicate  that  the  blood  of  this  peo- 
ple is  hopelessly  corrupt?  Or  are  they  the  excrescences 
which  grow  luxurious  like  all  growths  of  the  tropics, 
but  which  may  yet  be  rooted  out?  Not  rooted  out 
entirely.  The  social  vices  do  not  have  the  germs  frozen 
in  the  temperate  climates ; they  are  not  even  chilled  in 
the  border  tropics. 

The  austere  moralist  may  look  upon  it  as  a hopeless, 
almost  incurable,  condition  of  depravity.  The  cynical 

man  of  the  world  is  a better  judge.  Ho  will  not  be  apt 

283 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


to  condemn  without  knowledge  of  other  cities  than  Ha- 
bana,  nor  will  he  accept  unreservedly  the  verdict  of  the 
Habana  residents  regarding  themselves.  Probably  the 
man  of  the  world  knows  that  the  recruits  for  iniquity 
are  not  furnished  by  Cuban  homes.  He  may  know 
something  of  imported  immorality — that  more  than  50 
per  cent  of  the  outcast  classes  come  from  Mexico,  from 
the  Canaries,  and  from  the  peninsula.  If  he  were  in 
Cuba  during  the  insurrection,  he  will  know  that  misery 
did  not  conquer  chastity.  He  may  see  hope  for  the 
future  among  a people  where  wives  do  not  refuse  the 
office  of  maternity.  He  may  be  cynical  over  the  toler- 
ance which  permits  the  knowledge  of  male  infidelity, 
but  he  will  not  fail  to  pay  an  honest  tribute  to  the  do- 
mestic life  which  withdraws  the  wife  and  mother  from 
the  social  sphere  and  centres  her  life  in  the  rearing  of 
children.  It  narrows  her  intellectual  horizon,  but  it 
enlarges  her  usefulness  in  the  domestic  circle. 

The  casual  visitor  may  not  understand  this  state 
of  tolerant  morals  for  the  men.  Its  existence  may 
strengthen  his  conviction  that  all  is  bad.  His  other 
experiences  may  not  undeceive  him.  He  goes  to  the 
best  theatre  which  is  attended  by  a refined  audience. 
Broad  references  to  delicate  subjects  are  made  on  the 
stage.  He  expects  to  see  the  fans  which  the  Cuban  and 
the  Spanish  women  use  with  such  coquettish  dexterity 
instantly  covering  their  faces.  His  surprise  is  great  to 
find  them  utterly  unconcerned,  no  lull  in  their  talk,  no 
embarrassment  on  their  part  or  on  the  part  of  their 
escorts.  And  in  social  gatherings  he  will  hear  topics 
discussed  which  in  polite  society  in  the  United  States 
would  cause  a panic.  Certain  domestic  subjects  are 

284 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


treated  with  the  same  familiarity  as  in  German  house- 
holds. Is  all  this  an  indication  of  immorality?  Was 
it  so  a century  ago  in  tho  new  American  common- 
wealths? Has  Anglo-Saxon  morality  improved  so  vastly 
since  Chestorfiold’s  maxims  wore  published,  or  has  con- 
ventionality simply  been  veneered? 

Personal  immorality  does  not  muffle  its  face  in  Ha- 
bana — does  not  even  veil  itself.  The  American  fresh 
from  his  own  social  environment  prefers  the  hypocrisy 
of  veiled  vice,  yet  he  can  hardly  sit  in  judgment  among 
those  who  do  not  draw  the  curtains.  What  is  good  in 
Cuban  social  life  is  open.  What  is  bad  is  not  hidden. 
In  time  some  of  the  conventionalities  to  which  Ameri- 
cans are  accustomed  will  come.  In  time  conventional- 
ity will  clothe  the  naked  children;  but  their  nakedness 
is  that  of  custom  and  not  of  immorality.  Modesty  will 
take  the  place  of  indifference.  All  this  may  happen 
without  a real  change  in  the  innate  morals  of  the  peo- 
ple. Surface  morality,  if  I may  so  call  it,  will  im- 
prove. Houses  of  tolerancy  may  cease  to  be  proteges 
of  the  municipality.  Outward  public  decency  will 
undoubtedly  spread.  Yet  these  things  will  not  in  them- 
selves mean  a radical  change  in  tho  morals  of  the  topics. 

The  hope  of  the  Cuba  of  to-morrow  for  a sound 
public  morality  and  for  improved  private  morality  lies 
deeper  than  the  surface.  It  lies  in  the  removing  of  the 
causes  of  past  and  present  demoralization.  The  rela- 
tion is  an  intimate  one  to  the  future  population  of  Cuba. 
Is  it  to  be  of  mongrels,  negroids,  abhorrent  to  civiliza- 
tion? In  discussing  future  immigration  and  coloniza- 
tion, something  has  been  said  on  this  subject.  It  bears 

development.  The  race  mixture  that  grew  out  of  slav- 

285 


TO-MOREOW  IN  CUBA 


ery  lias  not  been  prolific,  although  the  unmixed  illicit- 
ness of  the  colored  race  is  declared  not  to  be  so  sterile 
as  that  of  the  white  race.  A barren  or  a sterile  popu- 
lation would  make  Cuba  forever  a stunted  growth  of  a 
commonwealth,  the  stump  of  a state  without  branches 
and  without  foliage.  The  black  race  is  prolific,  but  the 
families  of  the  blacks  are  not  relatively  much  larger  than 
those  of  the  whites.  The  Cuban  family,  of  whatever 
color,  usually  has  its  half  dozen  blessings,  and  some- 
times there  are  a round  dozen  of  them.  So  we  may  go 
out  and  beyond  that  phase  of  the  subject,  and  ask  again 
whether  the  morals  of  the  tropics  are  indigenous  or 
whether  there  is  something  exotic  in  them  which  may 
be  corrected  and  improved. 

The  condition  which  has  prevailed  in  Cuba  for  cen- 
turies was  not  indigenous.  The  men  outnumbered  the 
women.  The  Spanish  occupation  for  four  hundred 
years  was  a male  occupation.  This  was  not  alone  in 
the  military  garrisons.  It  was  also  of  the  civil  classes — 
the  officials,  the  merchants,  and  even  the  laborers. 
They  were  in  Cuba  to  make  money  and  return  to  Spain, 
not  to  settle  and  bring  up  families.  Those  who  did 
settle  and  marry  raised  Cuban  families  who  became 
hostile  to  Spanish  Government.  Of  those  who  had  fam- 
ilies in  the  peninsula,  few  thought  of  bringing  them 
to  Cuba.  They  were  conveniently  forgotten  during 
the  residence  on  the  island.  Little  distinction  was 
shown  in  this  regard  between  the  husband  and  the 
bachelor.  Inquiry  was  rarely  made.  They  were  single 
in  Cuba,  and  custom  tolerated  their  taking  a mistress. 
The  Cuban  woman  would  not  become  the  unlawful  com- 
panion of  the  Spaniard.  The  Cuban  home  did  not 

286 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


encourago  degradation.  The  Spaniard  bad  no  choice 
except  as  between  the  mulatto  and  the  black  woman. 
Usually  ho  chose  the  black  woman  because  she  would 
work,  and  she  did  not  demand  tlio  finery  that  tho  wom- 
an of  the  chocolate  complexion  wanted.  Tho  lattor 
occupied  more  the  position  of  the  Louisiana  octoroon. 
She  demanded  that  tho  title  of  a house  or  a small  piece 
of  property  be  vested  in  her.  The  Spaniard,  thrifty  in 
his  personal  vices,  therefore  took  tho  black  woman  for 
mistress. 

The  statement  of  this  condition  is  revolting,  but  it 
was  recognized.  It  is  stated  here  because  with  the  end 
of  Spanish  control  this  condition  begins  to  end.  Its 
prevalence  can  be  judged  from  census  figures.  In  I860 
tho  population  of  the  island  was  1,390,470.  Of  these, 
800,575  were  men  and  595,895  were  women.  By  Span- 
ish nativity  the  total  was  83,000,  of  whom  GO, 000  were 
men  and  17,000  women.  Of  the  Cuban-born  it  should 
be  noted  that  the  women  were  slightly  in  excess,  the 
total  standing  513,401,  of  whom  254,193  wrero  males  and 
259,208  were  females.  Further  subdivision  and  analy- 
sis show  that  the  black  males  outnumbered  the  black 
females.  Therefore  tho  excess  of  white  Cuban  women 
over  white  Cuban  men  was  greater.  In  1800  the  for- 
eigners, including  Europeans  and  Americans,  numbered 
7,725,  of  whom  5,073  were  men  and  2,052  were  women. 
Many  of  these  foreigners  were  married  to  Cuban  women. 
Many  of  the  Spaniards  also  married  Cuban  women ; but 
the  significant  fact  is  that  there  was  only  one  Spanish- 
born  female  to  four  Spanish-born  males. 

The  census  of  other  years  does  not  give  the  Spanish 
residents  by  sexes,  but  the  figures  apparently  indicate 

287 


TO-MORROW  m CUBA 


that  this  relative  proportion  was  not  changed.  In  1877 
55.88  per  cent  of  the  inhabitants  were  males,  44.12  fe- 
males. In  1887  the  ratio  was  54.70  males  and  45.30 
females.  The  variation  is  too  small  to  be  of  moment 
when  the  uncertainty  of  all  Spanish  censuses  is  remem- 
bered. Early  in  the  nineteenth  century  Humboldt 
observed  that  between  one-fourth  and  one-fifth  of  the 
population  of  Cuba  was  condemned  to  live  in  celibacy. 
He  meant  more  especially  the  negroes.  He  might  have 
added  that  such  Spaniards  as  were  condemned  to  celi- 
bacy modified  it  by  concubinage,  and  the  irregular  fe- 
male classes  by  polyandry.  Under  the  new  era  the 
parasitic  and  bureaucratic  class  of  Spaniards  disappears 
forever  from  Cuba.  The  demoralization  which  their 
presence  and  their  mode  of  living  caused  disappears. 

It  has  been  noted  that  the  majority  of  tradesmen  and 
their  clerks  in  Habana  and  the  larger  towns  were  Span- 
iards who  expected  to  return  to  the  peninsula.  Few 
of  the  clerks,  who  were  numbered  by  the  thousands, 
married  till  late  in  life.  They  helped  to  swell  the  dis- 
proportion between  the  sexes  of  Spanish  birth.  The 
change  in  political  and  commercial  conditions  will 
gradually  alter  this  unhealthy  social  state.  Future  cen- 
suses will  show  no  such  great  disproportion  as  formerly 
existed  between  males  and  females  born  in  the  penin- 
sula. For  various  causes,  such  as  in  the  first  stage  of 
immigration  men  coming  without  their  families,  the 
disproportion  will  not  wholly  disappear.  The  removal 
of  this  cancer  may  not  insure  the  social  regeneration  of 
Cuba,  but  it  does  assure  an  improvement  in  morals. 

It  might  be  said  that  for  thirty  years  the  social  de- 
moralization of  the  island  has  been  continuous,  due  to 

388 


TO-MORIIOW  IN  CURA 


war.  Tho  ten-years’  struggle  from  18f>8  to  1878  kept  a 
large  armed  forco  on  the  island.  Tho  entire  body  of 
troops  was  not  moved  until  long  after  the  peace  of  El 
Zanjdn,  for  the  insurrectionary  spirit  was  not  quelled 
in  the  eastern  provinces.  When  tho  last  insurrection 
broke  out,  in  1805,  the  Spanish  garrisons  numbered 
20,000  soldiers,  chiefly  single  men.  These  20,000  sin- 
gle men  could  not  be  accounted  a healthful  moral  influ- 
ence. Then  came  the  200,000  soldiers  from  the  penin- 
sula to  crush  the  revolution.  All  this  is  gone  forever. 
With  an  approach  to  normal  industrial,  political,  and 
social  conditions,  there  should  be  an  approach  to  nor- 
mal morality.  These  are  tho  signs  to  watch,  rather 
than  tho  surface  moralities. 

Nor  is  Habana  ever  to  be  taken  as  a type  of  the  whole 
island.  Being  the  chief  city,  it  will  always  have  both 
the  cream  and  the  dregs  of  vice,  and  these  will  always 
be  on  exhibition.  Tho  country  is  seen  to  better  advan- 
tage, and  the  virtues  of  the  people  are  not  obscured  by 
the  vices  of  individuals.  Glimpses,  too,  may  be  ob- 
tained of  the  secluded  home  life,  and  the  domestic  qual- 
ities which  have  their  foundation  in  the  family.  This 
home  life  is  the  answer  to  the  supposed  lack  of  morals 
in  the  tropics.  Reinforced  by  family  immigration,  it  is 
the  hope  of  the  future;  and  the  prospect  for  better- 
ing the  state  of  immorality  may  reasonably  be  assured 
in  the  circumstances  which  have  taken  the  monopoly  of 
marriage  away  from  the  grasping  Spanish  priesthood. 
From  now  forward  both  Protestantism  and  Roman  Ca- 
tholicism may  be  expected  to  diminish  the  statistics  of 
illegitimacy  by  the  encouragement  which  they  give  to 
lawful  marriage. 

19 


289 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


These  are  mere  incidents  in  the  moulding  of  morals 
in  the  border  tropics.  The  beginning  of  improvement 
is  in  the  disappearance  of  the  conditions  which  main- 
tain an  excessive  male  inhabitancy.  The  continuance 
of  improvement  lies  in  family  immigration. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
American  Military  Control 

Setting  Up  of  New  Political  Power— Provisions  of  Executive  Proc- 
lamation-Exercise of  American  Sovereignty  in  Customs- 
General  Wood’s  Bill  of  Rights— Extension  of  Authority  to  All 
the  Provinces — Regulation  of  Taxes— Cabinet  Secretaries— Tem- 
porary Naturo  of  Military  Occupation  Affirmed— Its  Usefulness 
Demonstrated  — American  Officials  in  the  Temple  of  Corrup- 
tion  Example  of  Integrity  and  Efficiency — Political  Reconstruc- 
tion  Defects  in  Military  Control — Doubtful  Reforms  of  Latin 

Laws— Unwise  Interference  with  Customs  and  Usages— Sunday- 
Closing  Regulations — Resemblance  to  Spanish  Captain-General  s 
Power Military  Trusteeship  Creditable  in  Broad  Sense. 

American  authority  in  Cuba  began  with  the  surrender 
of  Santiago  by  the  Spanish  troops  in  July,  1898.  It 
was  not  complete  until  the  formal  yielding  of  sover- 
eignty in  Habana  on  January  1st,  1899.  Its  basis  was 
purely  the  military  power  of  the  United  States  in  for- 
eign territory.  This  was  set  forth  aftei  the  surrendoi 
of  Santiago  in  the  proclamation  of  President  McKinley, 
which  provided  for  the  military  government  of  that 
section  of  the  island  which  was  surrendered.  Former 
political  relations  were  severed  and  the  new  political 
power,  that  of  the  United  States,  was  established. 

The  municipal  laws  of  the  conquered  territory  con- 
quered so  far  as  related  to  Spain  such  as  aflected  pri- 
vate rights  of  persons  and  of  property,  were  considered 

as  continuing  in  force.  The  judges  and  other  officials 

291 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


connected  with  the  administration  of  justice,  on  accept- 
ing the  supremacy  of  the  United  States  continued  ad- 
ministering the  ordinary  law  of  the  land,  as  between 
man  and  man,  under  the  supervision  of  the  American 
commander-in-chief.  The  commander-in-chief  had  the 
reserve  power  to  replace  or  expel  the  native  officials,  to 
substitute  new  courts  of  his  own  constitution,  and  to 
create  new  or  supplementary  tribunals.  The  treatment 
of  property  and  the  collection  and  administration  of  the 
revenues  was  declared  to  be  one  of  the  most  important 
and  practical  problems,  and  the  moneys  collected  were 
to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  expenses  of 
government  under  military  occupation  and  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  expenses  of  the  army.  All  ports  in  Cuba 
in  actual  possession  of  United  States  land  and  naval 
forces  were  open  to  the  commerce  of  neutral  nations. 
Following  the  surrender  of  Santiago  and  the  executive 
proclamation  came  the  protocol  in  which  Spain  relin- 
quished all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba. 

The  exercise  of  American  authority  began  first  in  the 
province  of  Santiago,  because  the  United  States  was 
earliest  in  possession  there.  Subsequently  jurisdiction 
was  taken  in  the  provinces  of  Puerto  Principe  and  Pinar 
del  Rio,  and  on  the  first  of  January  in  the  provinces  of 
Habana,  Matanzas,  and  Santa  Clara.  In  Santiago  the 
fixing  of  a new  customs  tariff  was  the  first  act  of  Amer- 
ican sovereignty.  It  was  followed  by  measures  of  local 
government  under  the  direction  of  General  Leonard 
Wood  as  commander-in-chief  and  military  governor  of 
the  pi’ovince.  By  virtue  of  his  authority  he  issued  a 
bill  of  rights  which  was  in  the  nature  of  a provisional 

constitution.  It  consisted  of  ten  articles. 

293 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

Tho  first  section  guaranteed  to  the  poodle  the  right  of 
assembly  for  tho  common  good  and  of  applying  to  tho 
authorities  petition  or  remonstrance  for  the  redress  of 
grievances.  Tho  second  guaranteed  freedom  of  worship 
according  to  individual  conscience,  provided  that  there 
should  be  no  interference  with  existing  form  of  worship 
and  assured  protection  to  all  Christian  churches.  Tho 
third  article  directed  that  the  courts  of  justice  should  be 
open  to  all,  and  that  no  private  property  should  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  compensation.  The  fourth 
article,  dealing  with  criminal  trials,  invested  the  accused 
with  the  right  to  be  hoard  himself  or  by  counsel,  and 
to  have  compulsory  process  to  secure  the  attendance  of 
witnesses  in  his  behalf.  The  fifth  said  that  no  person 
accused  of  crime  should  be  compelled  to  give  evidence 
against  himself  or  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  prop- 
erty, except  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  country. 
The  sixth  section  declared  that  no  person  once  acquitted 
should  bo  tried  again  for  the  same  offence.  The  sev- 
enth provided  that  all  persons  charged  with  crime 
should  be  entitled  to  bail,  except  in  cases  of  capital 
offence,  and  that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  should  not 
be  suspended  except  when  the  commanding  general 
deemed  it  advisable.  The  eighth  section  declared  that 
excessive  bail  should  not  be  required,  and  that  excessive 
fines  or  cruel  or  undue  punishments  should  not  be  in- 
flicted. Article  nine  provided  that  every  citizen  should 
be  guaranteed  in  his  business,  person,  papers,  house, 
and  effects  against  every  registry  and  embargo  unjustifi- 
able while  the  probable  motive  of  culpability  had  not 
been  declared  under  oath.  The  tenth  article  declared 
the  right  of  writing  or  printing  freely  on  any  matter 

293 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


whatever,  subject  to  responsibility  for  the  abuse  of  the 
right.  The  municipal  laws  were  to  be  administered  in 
accordance  with  these  declarations,  subject  to  modifica- 
tions which  in  the  judgment  of  the  commanding  gen- 
eral would  be  beneficent  and  would  promote  the  princi- 
ples of  enlightened  civilization.  Though  some  of  the 
principles  were  new,  these  declarations  found  in  the 
Castilian  tongue  a sufficient  medium  of  expression. 

This  promulgation  of  the  bill  of  rights  was  followed 
by  a new  constitution  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  by  local 
administrative  measures,  the  most  efficient  of  which  was 
sanitation,  and  by  reconstructing  the  municipal  govern- 
ments in  the  various  towns  of  the  province.  Among 
the  first  municipal  orders  in  Santiago  was  one  prohibit- 
ing gambling  and  lotteries. 

The  general  plan  of  American  military  control  was  set 
forth  by  executive  order  on  December  loth,  1898.  This 
created  the  military  division  of  Cuba,  and  designated 
Major-General  John  R.  Brooke  as  commander-in-chief 
and  military  governor  of  the  island.  General  Leonard 
Wood  was  commander  in  Santiago  de  Cuba,  General  L. 
H.  Carpenter  in  Puerto  Principe,  General  J.  C.  Bates 
in  Santa  Clara,  General  J.  H.  Wilson  in  Matanzas,  Gen- 
eral George  W.  Davis  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  and  General 
Pitzhugh  Lee  in  Habana  province.  The  character  of 
government  was  indicated  in  the  proclamations  and  de- 
crees which  followed  the  assumption  of  office.  There- 
after the  acts  of  the  American  authorities  in  the  differ- 
ent provinces  were  simply  the  carrying  out  of  a general 
policy  applicable  to  the  whole  island.  Habana  city  was 
erected  into  a separate  military  department  with  Gen- 
eral William  Ludlow  as  the  military  governor,  but 

294 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


subject  to  the  same  supreme  authority  as  the  others. 
Subsequently,  when  the  American  volunteers  were  with- 
drawn, the  departments  were  consolidated  in  the  mili- 
tary administration;  but  for  civil  administration  and 
purposes  of  local  government  the  six  provinces  and  tho 
city  of  Habana,  which  might  bo  called  a municipal 
province,  remained  unchanged. 

Following  the  exercise  of  American  authority  over 
the  entire  island,  by  direction  from  Washington  a new 
customs  tariff  and  new  regulations  for  the  coasting  trade 
were  promulgated.  Fiscal  adjustment  to  the  new  con- 
ditions was  made  by  proclamation  of  the  American  Ex- 
ecutive, fixing  the  parity  of  money  to  be  received  from 
customs  duties  and  paid  out  in  salaries  and  for  othor 
purposes.  Thus  was  the  highest  prerogative  of  sov- 
ereignty affirmed.  Tho  basis  of  value  was  American 
money,  and  French  gold  and  Spanish  gold  and  silver 
coins  in  circulation  were  measured  with  it  as  the  stand- 
ard by  their  bullion  value,  allowance  being  made  for 
exchange  and  for  transportation  charges. 

Under  the  American  control,  the  actual  functions  of 
internal  administration  were  exercised  by  the  military 
commanders  of  the  various  departments,  while  the  cus- 
toms revenues,  the  telegraph  lines,  and  the  postal  ser- 
vice were  administered  directly  through  the  general- 
in-chief  as  Governor-General  of  the  island.  With  the 
exception  of  the  postal  administration,  all  branches  of 
the  government  were  under  the  supervision  of  army  offi- 
cers. The  post-offices  were  administered  as  a branch  of 
the  department  in  Washington,  with  E.  G.  Rathbone,  an 
experienced  official,  as  director  of  posts.  The  customs 

districts  were  established  by  executive  order  from 

295 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Washington,  Colonel  Tasker  H.  Bliss  becoming  collector 
at  the  port  of  Habana. 

All  the  commanders  of  the  departments  on  assuming 
their  offices  issued  addresses  to  the  people,  explaining 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  and  inviting  their  co-op- 
eration. Governor-General  Brooke,  on  recommendation 
of  the  military  commanders,  appointed  civil  governors, 
alcaldes  of  the  towns,  and  other  officials  from  among 
the  natives.  The  acts  of  these  officials  were  subject 
to  the  approval  of  the  military  commanders.  Between 
the  supreme  power  exercised  by  the  Governor-General 
and  the  authority  exercised  by  the  military  governors, 
many  oppressive  practices  of  Spanish  rule  were  abol- 
ished and  some  of  the  laws  were  modified.  One  prac- 
tice which  was  abrogated  was  the  requirement  for  pass- 
ports and  the  cedula  or  personal  tax  certificate  for 
transit  from  one  part  of  the  island  to  another. 

Police  regulations  and  municipal  administrations 
were  moulded  to  the  new  conditions.  The  internal 
taxes,  as  distinct  from  local  or  municipal  taxes,  were 
regulated  by  the  central  adminstration  of  the  Governor- 
General.  After  a strong  protest  had  been  made  against 
letting  the  Spanish  Bank  of  the  island  of  Cuba  collect 
the  taxes,  as  had  been  done  under  Spanish  dominion, 
the  War  Department  revoked  the  agreement  with  the 
bank,  and  on  the  request  of  the  military  authorities, 
left  them  free  to  establish  an  independent  fiscal  system. 
This  was  done,  and  subsequently  an  entirely  new  basis 
of  internal  taxation  was  promulgated  by  authority  of 
the  Governor-General. 

An  advisory  cabinet  of  four  natives  of  the  island  was 

selected  by  Governor-General  Brooke.  It  was  corn- 

296 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


posed  of  Pablo  Desvernino,  secretary  of  the  treasury; 
Adolf  Saenz  Yahez,  secretary  of  public  works,  agricul- 
ture, industry,  and  commerce;  Domingo  Mendez  Ca- 
pote, secretary  of  state  and  government;  and  Jose 
Gonzales  Lauuza,  secretary  of  justice  and  education. 
Geographically  the  cabinet  was  open  to  criticism  be- 
cause all  its  members  were  from  Habana.  Their  pre- 
liminary work  consisted  chiefly  in  reconstructing  the 
administrative  personnel  of  their  departments  and  in 
reducing  the  number  of  place-holders  that  had  cum- 
bered the  official  lists  under  Spanish  rule.  These 
cabinet  secretaries  were  also  given  latitude  in  the  mat- 
ter of  appointing  their  subordinates.  The  judicial  sys- 
tem, after  much  care,  was  entirely  reconstructed.  A 
supreme  court  was  appointed  for  the  entire  island, 
which  took  the  place  of  the  former  court  of  final  appeal 
in  Madrid. 

In  every  act  of  the  United  States  Government,  scru- 
pulous regard  was  had  to  the  temporary  nature  of  the 
military  occupation.  The  American  Executive  acted 
w'ithin  the  narrow  limit  of  those  powers.  No  public 
franchises  of  any  kind  were  granted.  This  policy  was 
determined  in  the  beginning  and  was  adhered  to  with- 
out modification.  Mr.  Griggs,  the  Attorney-General,  in 
giving  an  opinion  against  granting  permission  to  land  a 
cable  in  Cuba,  declared  it  would  be  inexpedient  under 
all  cii’cumstances.  The  United  States,  he  said,  was 
exercising  administration  under  the  law  of  belligerent 
right,  and  the  matter  was  under  control  of  the  War  De- 
partment, but  the  Executive  Department  had  taken  the 
ground  that  in  view  of  the  circumstances  under  which 

the  United  States  came  into  control  of  affairs  in  Cuba, 

297 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


and  in  view  of  the  declared  purpose  of  the  American 
Government  to  retire  and  leave  the  government  to  the 
inhabitants,  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  grant  applica- 
tions for  concessions  except  in  case  of  absolute  neces- 
sity. The  Attorney-General  did  not  concede  that  what 
was  known  as  the  Foraker  amendment  to  the  army 
appropriation  bill  directing  that  no  property,  fran- 
chises, or  concessions  be  granted  by  the  United  States, 
or  by  any  military  or  other  authority  whatever  in  the 
island  of  Cuba,  during  the  occupation  thereof  by  the 
United  States,  was  mandatory  upon  the  Executive  De- 
partment. He  intimated  that  it  could  only  be  consid- 
ered as  advisory. 

Since  there  was  no  difference  in  intention  or  policy 
between  the  Executive  and  Congress,  the  distinction 
between  advisory  legislation  and  mandatory  legislation 
is  not  important.  In  demanding  that  Spain  withdraw 
from  Cuba,  Congress  by  resolution  disclaimed  any  dis- 
position or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdic- 
tion, or  control  over  Cuba,  except  for  its  pacification, 
and  declared  a settled  determination  when  that  was 
accomplished  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of 
the  island  to  its  people.  President  McKinley,  in  his 
annual  message  of  1898,  reaffirmed  this  doctrine,  and 
indicated  that  the  United  States  would  withdraw  when 
complete  tranquillity  should  be  established. 

This  is  the  framework  of  American  occupation  and 
administration  in  Cuba.  It  is  an  iron  framework.  It 
bridged  chaos.  Its  strength  was  not  so  much  in  its 
flexibility  as  in  its  completeness.  The  conditions  and 
the  pledges  under  which  the  control  of  the  United  States 

in  Cuba  began  have  been  regretted  by  many  persons  as 

298 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


an  interference  with  the  right  policy  and  a hindrance 
to  it.  There  need  be  no  regret.  The  first  duty,  that 
of  pacifying  the  island  and  maintaining  public  order, 
could  have  been  fulfilled  by  no  other  agency  so  effec- 
tively. The  foundations  of  political  and  industrial  re- 
construction could  have  been  laid  by  no  other  moans. 
Tho  situation  was  one  in  which  was  needful  supreme 
power,  unquestioned  by  either  judicial  or  legislative 
limitations.  Circumstances  had  to  govern.  Nor  could 
the  moasuros  of  sanitation,  which  was  the  greatest  of 
emergencies,  have  been  carried  forward  with  such  suc- 
cess under  ordinary  conditions.  The  military  author- 
ity was  best  adapted  to  cope  with  this  emergency.  It 
was  almost  as  valuable  in  the  establishment  of  an  edu- 
cational system. 

Tho  administration  of  Cuba  wTas  a fresh  and  untried 
field  for  the  American  military  officials,  many  of  them 
new  to  civil  duties  and  responsibilities.  The  discipline 
of  the  camp  and  garrison  was  not  such  as  to  fit  them 
for  the  exercise  of  power  that  could  bo  questioned. 
This  authority  in  the  main  was  exercised  with  tact  and 
discretion.  There  was  army  politics  wfith  ramifications 
in  Washington,  but  these  personal  ambitions  did  not 
interfere  with  the  discharge  of  official  duties,  and  did 
not  affect  tho  relations  of  the  army  officers  towards  the 
inhabitants  writh  whose  government  they  were  charged. 
Though  the  tongue  was  foreign  to  most  of  them,  and 
though  they  were  among  a strange  people,  they  showed 
quick  adaptability  to  their  surroundings.  They  were 
not  alien  governors  of  conquered  inhabitants. 

It  was  given  to  the  American  officials  in  Cuba  to  walk 

within  the  temple  of  corruption  erected  by  Spanish 

299 


TO-MOBBOW  IN  CUBA 


bureaucracy  while  the  ruined  walls  were  yet  standing. 
They  might  have  misgivings  about  the  capacity  and  the 
ability  of  the  Cubans  to  maintain  an  independent  repub- 
lic, and  their  doubts  might  sometimes  find  utterance. 
But  they  were  all  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  the 
rotten  structure  of  Spanish  administration  could  not 
have  continued  and  could  not  have  formed  the  basis  of 
a stable  edifice  of  government,  whatever  changes  in  the 
system  might  have  been  made.  Like  all  the  world  that 
saw  the  temple  from  within,  their  wonder  was  that  it 
lasted  so  long.  Their  own  administration  has  been  an 
example  of  American  institutions.  The  shrillest  want 
of  Cuba  in  the  future,  the  one  that  cries  out  in  the  wil- 
derness of  chaos  and  corruption,  is  that  of  official  integ- 
rity. The  American  officials  have  set  the  example. 
Their  standard  of  integrity  is  the  lesson  of  to-day,  but 
it  will  not  be  learned  in  a day.  It  should  be  continued 
to-morrow.  The  same  sense  of  responsibility  and  of 
a high  conception  of  duty  has  been  shown  in  other 
administrative  relations.  It  was  an  experiment.  The 
experiment  has  been  a success  in  demonstrating  Amer- 
ican capacity  and  adaptability  to  administer  govern- 
ment among  other  peoples  accustomed  to  other  institu- 
tions. 

In  a general  sense  it  may  be  said  that  the  plan  of 
American  administration  in  Cuba  was  reconstruction 
both  industrially  and  politically.  In  the  midst  of 
passing  conditions  it  is  not  worth  while  to  examine 
in  detail  experiments  in  fiscal  systems.  Being  experi- 
ments, they  can  be  rejected  when  found  unsatisfactory. 
And  the  industrial  recuperation  is  a manifest  witness 

for  itself.  If  it  fails  to  make  known  its  presence, 

300 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

searching  for  it  botwoon  the  covers  of  a book  would  bo 
fruitless. 

The  political  reconstruction,  the  operation  of  tho 
civil  machinery,  is  apart  and  of  itself.  It  can  be  fol- 
lowed in  all  the  intricacies  of  administration.  Tho 
strength  of  the  American  military  control  was  demon- 
strated in  its  way  of  meeting  emergencies  and  in  the 
impress  of  official  integrity  and  fidelity  which  it  made. 
It  stamped  its  mark  so  deeply  that  the  impress  will  not 
be  lost  whatever  government  obtains.  But  there  are 
defects  in  military  control.  The  very  success  of  the 
administration  in  its  initial  stages  makes  these  defects 
the  earlier  apparent.  To  change  the  laws  to  which 
people  have  been  accustomed  for  a long  series  of  years 
is  in  all  circumstances  a doubtful  experiment.  The  best 
that  the  wisest  jurists  would  hope  for  would  be  to  cor- 
rect flagrant  abuses  and  trust  to  finding  suitable  judges 
to  construe  the  laws  not  oppressively,  but  beneficently. 
The  abuses  were  flagrant  enough.  They  were  part  of 
the  Spanish  political  system. 

The  substance  of  the  provisional  bill  of  rights  first 
promulgated  in  Santiago  province  was  incorporated  in 
the  decree  of  the  supremo  American  military  authority 
regulating  court  practice  and  inculcating  various  de- 
sirable reforms  in  procedure.  Tho  tyrannical  practice 
of  keeping  accused  persons  incommunicado  — without 
means  of  communicating  with  friends  or  counsel — was 
abolished,  and  provision  was  made  for  giving  the  ac- 
cused person  an  opportunity  to  know  the  charges 
against  him  in  the  preliminary  hearing.  These  changes 
were  opposed  by  some  of  the  Habana  lawyers ; but  they 
will  stand  because  they  are  guarantees  of  personal  lib- 

301 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


erty  which  were  lacking  under  the  Spanish  system  of 
government. 

But  a disposition  was  shown  to  go  far  beyond  such 
simple  provisions.  The  Roman  law  and  its  adaptation 
in  the  Code  Napoleon  do  not  suit  a people  who  are  used 
to  the  common  law.  Americans  would  not  put  up  with 
it.  Therefore  the  assumption  was  that  under  the  new 
American  relation  to  Cuba  the  Latin  law  must  be  rooted 
out,  though  a million  or  more  inhabitants  were  accus- 
tomed to  it,  and  what  understanding  of  judicial  systems 
they  had  was  based  upon  it.  When  a purpose  to  reform 
the  system  of  laws  was  first  intimated,  the  College  of 
Abogados — the  bar  association — of  Habana  was  invited 
to  make  suggestions.  The  association  wTas  composed 
mainly  of  Cuban  lawyers.  Many  had  suffered  exile  for 
their  opposition  to  Spanish  misrule,  all  knew  the  op- 
pressiveness of  the  Spanish  laws.  But  they  venerated 
the  Latin  j>rinciples  of  jurisprudence.  The  issue  was 
raised  that  a concealed  purpose  existed  to  supplant  the 
Latin  law  by  American  law.  Dr.  Gener,  the  president 
of  the  bar  association,  supported  the  suggestion  that 
reforms  be  outlined  by  the  association.  Though  the 
common  courtesy  was  to  re-elect  the  president,  he  found 
the  opposition  to  his  course  so  strong  that  he  declined 
to  be  a candidate.  Domingo  Mendez  Capote,  who  after- 
wards became  a member  of  General  Brooke’s  advisory 
cabinet,  was  chosen  president  of  the  bar  association  on 
the  issue  that  radical  changes  in  the  laws  were  to  be 
opposed. 

Months  afterwards,  when  the  military  authorities  de- 
creed some  reforms,  the  Spanish  lawyers  met  and  or- 
ganized an  association  to  uphold  the  excellence  of  the 

302 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

Latin  law  ovor  tho  common  law.  Tho  American  military 
power  bad  tbo  advantage,  for  it  could  decree  not  simply 
changes  in  the  law,  but  could  enforce  the  changes,  nom- 
inally at  least.  Nevertheless  the  lasting  force  of  all 
the  changes  cannot  be  judged  in  the  midst  of  fleeting 
conditions.  For  a temporary  governing  authority  of  a 
military  character  to  reform  a permanent  system  of  juris- 
prudence is  a huge  task.  The  extent  to  which  the  sys- 
tem is  reformed  cannot  be  judged  until  the  military 
power  is  withdrawn  and  the  reorganized  system  is  left 
to  stand  on  its  own  support  among  the  people  of  whose 
institutions  it  is  a part.  Codifying  commissions  in  the 
States  which  find  years  of  laborious  work  rejected  might 
sigh  for  the  military  authority  to  enforce  the  acceptance 
of  what  they  know  are  beneficent  legal  reforms ; but  the 
worth  of  a codification  which  rested  on  that  basis  is 
readily  estimated. 

An  illustration  which  better  fits  the  case  of  Cuba  is 
that  of  Louisiana.  If  in  the  reconstruction  period  fol- 
lowing tho  civil  war  tho  military  commanders  had 
undertaken  to  destroy  the  Code  Napoleon  and  to  bring 
Louisiana’s  system  of  jurisprudence  to  the  basis  of  the 
common  law  in  other  States,  the  effect  could  be  judged. 
And  this  is  another  way  of  affirming  the  author’s  belief 
that  while  provisions  guaranteeing  personal  rights  will 
stand,  the  bulk  of  changes  in  the  laws  made  by  direc- 
tion of  the  American  military  authority  are  too  transi- 
tory to  call  for  detailed  analysis. 

After  a few  months’  experience  there  was  less  disposi- 
tion to  hasten  the  introduction  of  new  and  strange  prin- 
ciples of  jurisprudence.  Conservatism  took  the  place 
of  enthusiasm.  Events  showed  the  need  of  going  slow. 

303 


TO-MOEROW  IN  CUBA 


The  criminal  laws  required  amendment,  and  the  changes 
in  the  penal  code,  as  well  as  in  the  court  procedure, 
were  salutary.  Reforms  in  prison  management  were 
made  with  good  results,  especially  in  Habana  under 
the  vigorous  direction  of  General  Ludlow.  Yet  even  in 
the  criminal  law  reforms  a halt  was  necessary.  The 
most  ardent  military  reformer  did  not  advocate  project- 
ing grand  juries  and  trial  juries  on  a people  to  whom 
even  the  statutory  jury  of  other  Latin  countries  was 
unknown. 

It  was,  however,  in  the  domain  of  civil  laws  that  the 
gravest  shock  to  the  progressive  spirit  was  felt.  The 
most  troublesome  question  affecting  the  industrial  re- 
construction of  Cuba  is  that  of  mortgages.  By  direc- 
tion from  Washington  an  extension  of  two  years  from 
May  1st,  1899,  for  the  payment  of  mortgages  on  realty 
then  due  or  which  might  become  due  within  that  period 
was  granted.  The  extension  was  necessary  in  order  to 
save  a vast  amount  of  property  from  becoming  prey  to 
the  mortgage  sharks.  It  was  far  from  being  what  the 
debtors  asked.  It  was  more  than  the  creditors  con- 
ceded. No  government  can  expect  to  please  both  debt- 
ors and  creditors.  In  displeasing  both  classes  the 
American  authorities  felt  that  they  did  substantial  jus- 
tice. But  the  discussion  of  the  mortgage  law  and  the 
legal  rights  of  debtor  and  creditor  and  the  changes  pro- 
posed brought  up  the  whole  question  of  the  civil  laws. 
It  showed  how  one  change  must  lead  to  another  until 
the  entire  system  of  civil  jurisprudence  should  bo  re- 
constructed. Though  the  American  military  officials 
had  Latin  jurists  for  pilots,  they  wisely  hesitated  to 

enter  uj)on  these  unknown  seas.  Perhaps  they  were 

304 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


conscious  that  a few  months’  tutelage  could  not  make 
army  commanders  masters  of  jurisprudence.  The 
strength  of  military  administration  is  in  its  executive 
capacity,  and  not  in  its  ability  to  construe  abstract  laws. 
It  could  and  did  correct  abuses  in  practice,  and  endeav- 
ored to  find  the  right  individuals  for  the  discharge  of  ju- 
dicial duties.  The  wisest  way  is  to  stop  there.  The 
Latin  laws  will  shape  themselves  to  the  new  political  in- 
stitutions. American  military  authority  cannot  mould 
them  too  far  in  advance  of  the  political  institutions  that 
are  to  prevail. 

What  is  true  of  the  laws  is  true  of  customs  and 
usages.  The  zealous  social  reformer  might  sigh  for  the 
power  of  the  military  reformer  in  Cuba.  If  the  latter 
sometimes  gave  way  to  his  zeal  he  may  be  pardoned 
his  weakness.  So  much  there  was  to  be  reformed  that 
the  temptation  was  great  to  seek  to  do  it  all  at  once. 
Many  communities  in  the  United  States  would  perhaps 
be  better  if  a power  from  above  such  as  the  military  arm 
of  the  general  government  were  to  regulate  their  affairs, 
but  the  communities  would  not  tolerate  reforms  coming 
in  this  manner.  In  Cuba  there  is  danger  of  too  many 
sumptuary  reforms  by  the  American  military  authorities 
overriding  long-established  local  usages. 

When  the  American  control  began,  the  clerks  in  Ha- 
bana  petitioned  Governor-General  Brooke  for  the  early 
closing  of  the  shops  and  stores,  and  also  for  Sunday 
closing.  Their  hours  were  very  long,  and  they  were 
required  to  be  on  duty  till  ten  o’clock  at  night.  The 
first  intimation  given  was  that  to  grant  their  petition 
was  beyond  the  powers  of  the  military  government. 

The  shopkeepers  were  opposed  to  the  change  from  mo- 
20  305 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tives  of  self-interest,  but  the  habit  of  evening  shopping 
was  not  without  reason  in  a country  where  the  heat 
of  the  midday  and  of  the  afternoon  causes  almost  a sus- 
pension of  trade.  Ultimately  the  shops  were  ordered 
closed  nights  and  Sundays  after  ten  o’clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  the  closing  was  enforced  by  General  Ludlow  as 
military  governor  of  Habana.  A few  weeks  or  months 
of  the  enforced  experiment  will  hardly  furnish  sufficient 
basis  for  complacent  congratulation  about  the  obser- 
vance of  an  Anglo-Saxon  Sunday  or  a New  England  Sab- 
bath in  a Latin  community.  Left  to  itself,  the  agitation 
would  probably  have  resulted  in  a compromise  arrange- 
ment. Under  military  pressure  there  could  be  no  com- 
promise. When  civil  authority  becomes  supreme  it 
will  be  time  enough  to  judge  of  the  experiment.  Mean- 
time the  Anglo-Saxon  Sunday  should  not  be  taken  in 
too  liberal  a sense. 

There  are  other  customs  which  in  the  end  would  be 
better  regulated  by  local  regulations  than  by  the  mili- 
tary power  of  the  United  States.  In  a previous  chap- 
ter I have  given  the  reason  for  believing  that  the  bull- 
fight is  a dead  institution — for  this  generation  at  least. 
If  it  were  not  so  its  formal  prohibition  by  the  American 
Governor-General  of  the  island  would  not  be  apt  to 
change  the  nature  of  the  people  who  delighted  in  it. 

In  the  old  days  the  Governor-General  laid  down  iron- 
clad regulations  for  the  cocking-mains.  By  a decree 
promulgated  in  February,  1882,  they  were  only  per- 
mitted on  Sundays,  Church  holidays  of  two  crosses,  and 
the  day  fixed  in  each  town  or  village  for  the  celebration 
of  its  patron  saint.  Subsequent  dispositions  of  the  Gov- 
ernor-General prohibited  rival  cocking-mains  on  the 

306 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 

same  day;  required  tlio  owners  of  the  game  fowls  to 
alternate  the  lidias,  or  exhibitions,  and  reaffirmed  the 
prohibition  on  other  than  Sundays  and  the  Church  holi- 
days which  were  specified.  The  idea  was  not  to  permit 
the  sport  to  be  held  on  regular  working  days  because  it 
would  interfere  with  the  industry  of  the  laboring  popu- 
lation. 

Probably  in  its  effort  to  free  itself  from  the  past 
abuses  the  Catholic  Church  will  exert  its  moral  influ- 
ence against  Sundays  and  saints’  days  as  the  occasion 
for  cocking-mains  and  similar  sports.  This  influence 
is  also  likely  to  bo  exerted  against  the  amusement  on 
any  day  of  the  year.  With  such  encouragement,  local 
public  sentiment  might  be  depended  on  to  wean  the 
people  gradually  from  their  liking  for  these  sports,  so 
that  municipal  regulations  coidd  be  enacted  and  en- 
forced. But  the  circumstances  in  Cuba  are  not  so  ex- 
ceptional as  to  require  the  supremo  military  power  of 
the  island  to  issue  edicts  regarding  this  sport  and  simi- 
lar amusements  grounded  in  habits  and  customs  be- 
cause the  customs  are  not  in  conformity  with  American 
notions.  A proclamation  against  dog-fights  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  a great  State  such  as  New  York  or  Illinois 
would  be  no  more  absurd. 

There  is  extant  the  decree  of  a Spanish  Captain-Gen- 
eral prescribing  the  manner  in  which  the  legs  of  chick- 
ens should  be  tied  when  they  were  carried  to  market. 
The  purpose  was  a humane  one.  If  the  highest  military 
authority  under  American  occupation  is  to  be  concerned 
with  regulating  the  amusements  and  customs  of  the  peo- 
ple it  might  with  justice  be  asked  to  reform  the  customs 
of  marketing  and  revive  this  humane  decree,  Against 

307 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


this  it  may  be  urged  that  police  regulations  should  be 
sufficient.  So  they  should  be  in  innumerable  other  mat- 
ters which  were  taken  up  by  the  higher  authorities  for 
regulation  and  enforcement  under  military  decree.  It 
is  as  if  Connecticut  were  to  regulate  the  habits  of  Cali- 
fornia, or  Montana  to  prescribe  the  usages  of  Massachu- 
setts. 

These  comments  are  made  almost  with  apology  for 
their  triviality,  but  this  tendency  towards  sumptuary 
and  arbitrary  regulation  of  the  customs  of  a different 
people  became  a feature  of  the  power  exerted  by  the 
American  authorities.  It  could  not,  therefore,  be  ig- 
nored. Errors  of  this  kind  may  be  made,  yet  they  do 
not  affect  the  American  military  control  in  its  broadest 
sense.  The  example  of  official  integrity  and  of  earnest 
effort  in  good  administration  remains.  When  the  mili- 
tary trusteeship  ends  it  will  be  a creditable  ending,  with 
results  to  show  which  will  justify  the  confidence  of  the 
American  people. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
Political  Attitudes 

Training  for  Constructive  Government— Autonomy  as  an  Education 
— Growth  of  Popular  Element — Germs  of  Party  Organization- 
Development  of  Clubs — Caucus  and  Primary — Influence  of  the 
Newspapers— Responsiveness  of  Country  People  to  Good  Lead- 
ership— Regionalism  Again — Santiago  and  Puerto  Principe — 
Growth  of  Public  Opinion — Factions  and  Groups' — Cuban 
Weakness  in  Administration — Dreamers  in  the  Custom  Houses 
— Patterning  the  Institutions  of  the  United  States — Query  Re- 
garding Respect  for  Authority — Necessity  of  a Trial — What 
Constitutes  a State — Future  Commonwealth. 

Mechanical  aptitudes  are  usually  inherited.  Politi- 
cal aptitudes  may  be  either  acquired  or  inherited.  Pro- 
pensity for  revolution  may  exist  without  a grasp  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  free  government. 

Of  the  Cuban  people  as  a people,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  they  have  an  inheritance  of  political  aptitudes  from 
their  grandfathers,  and  atavism  in  political  government 
is  a phenomenon  not  to  be  expected,  because  the  right 
use  of  civil  liberty  is  a growth  and  not  a miracle. 
When  so  vast  a majority  of  the  human  race  has  not 
advanced  far  enough  in  civilization  to  find  chairs  either 
a necessity  or  a luxury,  it  should  not  cause  surprise 
that  a people  whose  habitation  is  the  border  tropics 
cannot  boast  of  inherited  disposition  for  constructive 
government.  What  they  do  have  is  the  acquired  apti- 
tude. This  is  another  way  of  saying  that  their  training 

309 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


has  begun.  The  extent  to  which  it  has  progressed  and 
the  influences  affecting  it  may  be  studied. 

From  the  knowledge  of  what  has  gone  we  gain  the 
knowledge  of  what  remains.  In  brief  compass  of  a few 
chapters  the  autonomist  agitation  and  regime  were  nar- 
rated chronologically  as  an  expisode  of  Spanish  his- 
tory in  the  Antilles.  From  that  narration  the  idea  may 
be  had  of  the  degree  to  which  the  movement  served 
the  purpose  of  political  education.  The  basis  of  free 
institutions  is  free  discussion.  Under  the  limitations 
of  free  print  and  free  speech  imposed  by  the  Spanish 
dominion,  this  basis  could  not  be  a broad  one.  But 
Spanish  Captain-Generals  had  one  quality  that  was  not 
bad.  While  they  occasionally  deported  journalists  and 
suppressed  journals  whose  outspokenness  was  uncom- 
fortable to  the  Government,  they  were  tolerant  of  ab- 
stract discussions  of  political  principles.  Liberty  in 
the  abstract,  the  theoretical  bases  of  civil  government, 
were  beyond  their  ken  or  care,  and  discussion  on  this 
line  was  treated  with  contempt.  It  was  only  when 
abuses  and  misgovernment  were  attacked  specifically 
that  the  iron  hand  was  shown. 

These  conditions  strengthened  a natural  disposition 
towards  speculative  discussion,  and  speculative  political 
philosophy  forms  a leading  part  in  the  programme  of 
all  the  political  leaders  in  Cuba.  But  in  the  days  of 
repression,  under  its  disguise  real  progress  was  made 
to  a greater  degree  than  was  known.  The  terms  “ meet- 
ing,” “mass  meeting,”  “self-government,”  “home  rule,” 
had  no  equivalent  in  the  Castilian  language.  Autono- 
my was  not  the  translation  of  either  self-government  or 
home  rule,  That  al]  these  terms  were  incorporated  into 

810 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


tho  idiom  and  are  to-day  current  is  the  best  evidence 
that  the  moaning  of  free  discussion  and  free  government 
is  understood.  Tho  town  meeting  is  not  known  because 
the  town  as  conceived  in  New  England  did  not  exist. 
Besides,  the  discussion  of  local  measures  and  of  local 
officials  would  necessarily  have  beon  too  concrete  for 
the  comfort  of  Spanish  authority,  and  would  have  been 
treated  harshly.  But  tho  town  meeting  is  coming  in 
Cuba.  The  aptitude  for  it  is  an  acquired  one — acquired 
from  the  mass  meeting  of  the  days  of  the  Autonomist 
movement. 

In  the  revolution  of  18G8  it  was  stated  that  a few 
wealthy  and  influential  Cubans  took  their  families, 
their  dependents,  and  their  slaves  into  the  field,  and 
thereupon  Spain  had  a Ten-Years’  war  on  her  hands. 
In  tho  last  insurrection  tho  influence  of  a few  leading 
Cubans  was  also  very  great;  but  all  they  could  do  was 
to  sustain  a revolution  that  already  had  the  supj)ort  of 
tho  masses.  The  autonomist  propaganda  was  the  work 
of  a group  of  talented  and  cultured  men.  They  laid 
down  their  principles,  and  a grouping  of  personal  fol- 
lowers accepted  the  dictum.  When  the  principles  were 
shifted  the  followers  waited  until  the  chief  formulated 
the  changed  issues.  Then  they  fell  in  line. 

During  the  later  years  of  the  autonomist  propaganda, 
when  it  gained  its  greatest  strength  as  a popular  move- 
ment, less  disposition  was  shown  to  heed  the  formulas 
of  the  leaders ; but  these  men  did  not  know  it.  They 
were  going  with  the  crowd,  and  they  thought  the  crowd 
was  going  with  them.  When  under  Blanco  the  autono- 
mists who  did  not  go  into  the  field  issued  their  allocu- 
tions and  manifestoes  accepting  the  new  regimen,  it  was 

311 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


disclosed  that  old  things  had  passed  away.  Neither 
whistle  nor  trumpet  could  bring  back  the  followers  who 
had  once  sat  at  the  feet  of  the  prophets.  This  was  in 
part  indisputably  due  to  the  presence  of  so  many  of 
them  with  the  insurgents  in  the  field.  But  it  was  also 
due  to  an  advance  in  political  education. 

When  peace  was  affirmed,  manifestoes,  addresses,  and 
allocutions  fell  like  autumn  leaves.  Some  were  from 
old-time  Autonomists  who  had  kept  out  of  the  insurrec- 
tion, some  from  insurgent  generals,  and  some  from  the 
Cubans  who  had  been  identified  with  the  revolution  on 
its  civil  side.  They  all  had  programmes  and  formulas. 
To  the  disappointment  of  their  authors,  little  heed  was 
paid  to  these  allocutions.  It  was  manifest  that  the  peo- 
ple were  thinking  of  their  own  concern  and  did  not  care 
for  ready-made  formulas.  This  does  not  mean  that 
they  had  ceased  to  be  responsive  to  good  leadership. 
It  is  questionable  if  anywhere  a people  can  be  found 
who  are  more  responsive  to  good  leadership;  but  that 
leadership  must  interpret  the  sentiments  and  aspirations 
of  the  people;  and  the  authors  of  the  allocutions  were 
not  doing  it.  Their  prepared  formulas  were  not  the 
thing,  and  the  majority  of  the  Cubans  had  become  apt 
enough  in  political  intuition  to  know  it. 

While  the  manifesto  of  the  leader  to  his  followers  lost 
much  of  its  importance  in  the  later  years,  another  out- 
growth of  the  autonomist  movement  gained  fresh  vital- 
ity. This  was  the  organization  of  juntas  or  commit- 
tees. The  Autonomist  party  rested  on  looal  juntas  or 
clubs.  So  did  that  'of  their  vigilant  opponents,  the 
Union  Constitutionals.  These  local  clubs  delegated 

their  functions  largely  to  a central  committee,  a junta 

312 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


magna  or  junta  directi va,  as  it  was  named.  This  body 
was  in  reality  a directory  of  the  entire  organization,  and 
it  directed  in  a far  greater  degree  than  the  central  com- 
mittee of  a political  party  in  the  United  States.  At  a 
period  when  a few  prominent  men  dominated  the  Auton- 
omist and  Union  Constitutional  parties  respectively, 
they  were  able  to  have  their  allocutions  and  manifestoes 
adopted  by  the  directories,  and  the  local  juntas  accepted 
the  creed  prepared  for  them  without  question.  Though 
the  later  development  of  popular  sentiment,  whether 
iutransigente  or  autonomist,  made  the  central  commit- 
tee more  the  organ  than  the  moulder  of  opinion,  the 
idea  of  a directory  for  a political  party  was  not  entirely 
lost.  It  has  survived  intervening  events  and  exists  to- 
day in  a modified  form. 

After  the  re-establishment  of  peace,  great  activity  was 
shown  in  the  formation  of  juntas  or  clubs.  Usually 
they  took  the  names  of  the  heroes  of  the  insurrection. 
They  furnish  the  means  for  political  activity  and  agita- 
tion. They  also  furnish  the  field  for  exercising  the 
ambitions  of  young  Cubans.  In  the  period  before  the 
insurrection  the  lyceum  was  the  institution  in  which 
young  Cubans  found  vent  for  their  literary  and  dramatic 
as  well  as  their  social  ambitions.  The  lyceum  existed 
in  every  town.  It  was  an  offset  to  the  Spanish  casino, 
the  casino  being  to  the  Cubans  the  token  of  a favored 
and  intolerant  oligarchy.  After  the  ending  of  hostili- 
ties the  lyceum  reappeared  everywhere ; but  it  did  not 
take  on  a political  character.  A common  feeling  ob- 
tained that  it  should  continue  what  it  had  been,  and  that 
political  effort  should  take  a different  form.  So  the 

membership  in  the  political  clubs  grew. 

313 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


In  the  gradual  development  of  parties  the  clubs  will 
be  the  basis  of  them  all.  They  are  the  existing  politi- 
cal units.  They  are  the  medium  of  party  organization 
and  promotion.  They  will  not  be  able  to  control  public 
sentiment,  but  they  promise  to  be  its  interpreters  and 
thus  preserve  their  influence.  The  primaries  are  yet  to 
come.  The  germ  of  the  caucus  is  already  in  evidence. 
It  is  likely  to  take  the  place  of  the  directory.  Cuban 
politicians  who  were  identified  with  revolutionary  juntas 
in  the  United  States  have  shown  a leaning  to  the  caucus, 
though  not  under  that  name. 

The  newspaper,  even  under  the  restricted  liberty  of 
the  press  which  was  permitted  by  Spanish  institutions, 
showed  an  aptness  for  political  discussion.  Though 
pamphleteering  always  prevailed,  the  journals  were  the 
most  sought-for  mediums  of  promulgating  opinions. 
They  conformed  to  all  the  traditions.  Each  journal 
represented  a party,  a group,  or  an  interest.  No  one 
ever  picked  up  a leading  paper  curious  to  see  what  stand 
it  would  take  on  a given  question.  The  only  curiosity 
was  as  to  how  it  would  champion  or  defend  its  side. 
The  journals  announced  themselves  as  the  organs  of  one 
set  or  another  set  of  opinions.  They  took  a serious 
view  of  their  mission.  Discussion  was  to  them  an  intel- 
lectual tournament,  and  they  recognized  that  there  could 
be  no  tournament  without  the  knights  of  the  contrary 
opinion  in  the  lists.  Invariably  their  leading  articles 
were  well  considered. 

No  great  change  was  worked  by  the  revolution  except 
that  with  the  end  of  the  press  censorship  discussion 
was  free.  It  is  still  possible  to  judge  the  probable 
course  of  the  Spanish  colony  by  reading  two  or  three 

314 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Spanish  newspapers.  The  views  of  the  moderate  Cu- 
bans are  reflected  in  journals  which  announce  themselves 
as  organs  of  moderate  opinion,  while  the  feelings  and 
purposes  of  the  radicals  may  be  easily  gleaned  from 
journals  which  carry  their  own  designation.  It  is  in 
the  new  and  changing  conditions  that  the  traditional 
organs  are  confused  and  lost.  The  manner  in  which 
the  newspapers  find  their  way  through  this  wilderness 
will  be  a valuable  guide  for  those  who  are  watching  the 
march  of  circumstances  in  Cuba.  They  may  be  de- 
pended on  to  reflect  the  aspirations  as  well  as  the  per- 
plexities of  the  Cuban  people.  And  their  aptitude  for 
discussing  the  problems  which  surround  them  may  be 
accepted  as  an  index  of  the  aptitude  of  the  people  for 
free  institutions. 

They  are  keen  in  retort.  Some  well-meaning  Ameri- 
cans on  their  arrival  in  Cuba  believed  they  had  a mis- 
sion among  savages  of  various  degrees  of  gentleness. 
They  thought  to  impress  the  natives  that  they  came 
from  a land  of  perfect  government.  Their  mistakes 
were  corrected  by  the  watchful  press.  The  wretched 
bickerings  among  the  insurgent  leaders  over  the  pay- 
ment of  the  troops,  the  personal  rivalries,  were  made 
much  of  in  the  United  States  as  proof  of  Cuban  incapac- 
ity for  independence.  The  Habana  newspapers  had 
their  campaign  argument  in  reply.  They  gave  instances 
of  discord  among  the  American  officials  which  showed 
just  as  much  jealousy,  factionalism,  and  selfish  ambi- 
tion. The  American  officials  in  the  midst  of  their  dis- 
cords could  not  fail  to  admit  the  fairness  of  the  retort. 

To  the  talk  of  crime  and  especially  of  brigandage  as 

a reason  for  continuing  military  control,  the  newspapers 

315 


TO-MOKEOW  IN  CUBA 


replied  with  full  accounts  of  the  train  robberies  in  the 
Western  States,  the  daily  crimes  of  the  cities,  the  scenes 
of  violence  at  the  strikes,  and  the  lynchings.  Nor  did 
they  fail  to  exploit  the  occurrences,  unfortunately  too 
frequent,  which  were  discreditable  to  individual  Ameri- 
cans in  Cuba.  These  are  passing  incidents.  They 
serve  to  show  that  while  Americans  insist  on  a search- 
ing scrutiny  of  everything  that  happens  in  Cuba,  the 
inhabitants  of  the  island  are  not  inapt  at  measuring 
them  with  their  own  yard-stick.  They  have  progressed 
far  enough  to  make  comparisons. 

In  the  broader  sense  the  discussion  in  the  journals 
showed  in  a high  degree  the  faculty  of  critical  analysis. 
Some  of  the  American  officials  were  sensitive  over  the 
criticism  they  received ; but  it  was  no  more  personal  and 
was  usually  less  unjust  than  that  which  was  visited 
upon  them  by  badly  informed  newspapers  at  home.  A 
full  understanding  was  shown  of  the  constructive  work 
they  were  doing.  The  greater  value  of  the  newspaper 
comments  and  suggestions  lay  in  the  complete  knowl- 
edge they  showed  of  the  close  relation  between  the  eco- 
nomic future  of  the  island  and  the  political  system. 
Discussion  of  the  Cuban  tendencies  was  thoughtful.  It 
is  common  to  find  in  the  journals  a warning  that  the 
reality  is  coming  to  the  Cuban  people,  a caution  that 
they  cannot  live  in  the  clouds.  The  enthusiasts  are 
told  that  government  is  something  more  than  writing 
poetical  manifestos  and  making  poetical  addresses.  The 
Spanish  idiom  is  a flowing  one.  The  sentiments  which 
find  utterance  in  the  United  States  on  the  fourth  of  July, 
translated  into  the  Castilian  language,  would  be  a stream 

of  hyperbole.  The  Cuban  patriot  voices  his  feelings  with 

316 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


more  metaphors  and  more  vivid  imagery ; but  the  press 
moderates  his  exuberance.  It  hints  at  the  practical  side 
of  government  suggestively,  though  not  in  a way  to  de- 
stroy his  idealism.  That  is  a rare  aptitude. 

From  what  has  been  written  a fair  conclusion  may  bo 
drawn.  Free  discussion  and  political  organization  are 
not  simply  elementary  ideas : they  are  a working  basis 
for  free  government  in  Cuba.  But  it  may  be  said  that 
the  discussion,  which  has  been  limited  to  newspapers 
and  pamphlets  and  to  public  meetings  which  were  nec- 
essarily select,  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  political  edu- 
cation in  an  island  a large  proportion  of  whose  popula- 
tion is  unable  to  read  or  write.  The  assumption  would 
be  misleading  in  any  circumstances,  but  especially  so 
in  Cuba.  The  commonest  sight  in  the  rural  communi- 
ties is  to  see  the  village  oracle  reading  the  newspaper  to 
a group  of  listeners,  among  whom,  it  is  easy  to  guess, 
few  can  read  for  themselves.  But  there  has  never  been 
a wide  gulf  between  the  classes  who  could  read  and  write 
and  the  ignorant  classes  whose  aspirations  they  inter- 
preted. 

Rocking  in  the  cradle  of  the  revolution,  in  the  midst 
of  guerilla  warfare,  in  the  manigua,  and  in  the  hills, 
there  was  the  semblance  of  a political  training.  The 
stern  commander,  Maximo  Gomez,  who  understood  the 
Cubans  better  than  they  understood  themselves,  en- 
forced military  discipline  and  civil  obedience,  while  the 
camp-fire  discussions  were  of  free  government.  The 
systems  of  prefecturas  in  the  regions  held  by  the  insur- 
gents were  lessons  in  military  and  civil  training.  The 
juntas  or  revolutionary  committees  in  the  towns  had  no 
educational  qualification.  They  were  a political  edu- 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


cation  as  well  as  a political  conspiracy  under  the  shad- 
ow of  Spanish  authority.  The  army  had  real  elections 
of  a kind,  for  it  chose  the  delegates  who  formed  the  as- 
semblies, which  constituted  the  provisional  government. 

The  aptitude  of  the  guajiro,  the  countryman  or  Cuban 
peasant,  for  public  affairs,  when  he  must  be  led  through 
tho  winding  paths  of  intellectual  reasoning,  is  not  great. 
Mental  processes  are  too  abstruse.  But  he  is  an  apt 
pupil  when  taught  through  the  physical  senses.  And 
he  is  a tenacious  positivist  in  his  conclusions.  Object 
lessons  reach  him.  He  found  himself  in  the  midst  of  a 
false  artificial  condition.  He  saw  the  Spaniards  govern 
and  take  everything  to  themselves.  He  knew  that  he 
was  a victim  of  oppression,  cruelty,  and  tax-eating  ra- 
pacity and  corruption.  He  knew  that  in  a dispute  with 
his  wrealthier  neighbor  he  had  no  rights,  because  the 
justice  that  sat  on  tho  magistrate’s  bench — justice  in  the 
choice  of  which  he  had  no  word — was  open-eyed  and 
keen  of  vision  for  the  hand  that  stretched  out  the  bribe. 
Where  the  guajiro  was  a negative  character  he  became  a 
pacifico,  sympathizing  mildly  with  the  insurrection  and 
aiding  it  like  a sheep.  Where  there  was  sterner  stuff 
in  his  make-up  he  became  an  insurgent  and  took  to  the 
brush.  Once  in  arms,  nothing  could  move  him.  His 
was  not  the  sublimated  patriotism  of  the  intellectual 
classes.  It  was  the  simple  grit  of  the  peasant.  The 
revolution,  while  it  had  the  support  of  the  educated  and 
the  wealthy  Cubans,  was  the  supreme  work  of  the  Cu- 
ban people  as  a mass.  The  mass  was  responsive  to 
good  leadership.  It  trusted  its  military  leaders.  It 
will  trust  leaders  in  civil  life  who  are  true  to  its  instincts 
and  unelfish  in  their  devotion  to  its  interests. 

318 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Araoricaus  who  have  watchod  tlio  internal  affairs  of 
tlio  island  closely  sometimes  propound  a query,  either 
mentally  or  openly,  whether  the  aptness  which  may  bo 
shown  for  decentralized  government  will  not  become  a 
propensity  for  revolution  by  sections  or  provinces  of  tho 
island.  It  is  in  lino  with  the  general  question  whether 
the  defeated  party  will  accept  the  verdict  of  tho  elections 
or  will  take  to  tho  woods.  The  question  cannot  be 
answered  with  full  satisfaction  until  the  experiment  has 
been  tried.  In  outlining  the  provinces  as  a federal 
framework  I have  given  tho  opinion  that  sectionalism 
or  regionalism  will  bo  less  rampant  in  Santiago  de 
Cuba  and  in  Puerto  Principe  than  is  feared.  This  is 
a matter  of  impartial  administration,  and  in  giving  no 
just  ground  for  jealousy  of  Habana. 

Should  a forced  test  of  annexation  be  made,  Santiago 
might  then  drop  out  of  line  wuth  the  other  provinces  in 
tho  hope  of  being  admitted  as  a separate  State.  But  tho 
ambitious  chiefs  will  have  little  prospect  of  satisfying 
their  ambition  by  taking  a defeated  faction  to  the  woods 
in  a single  province.  It  is  a pure  assumption  that  this 
class  of  leaders  would  have  followers  at  all.  Moreover, 
General  Maximo  Gomez  checked  the  possibilities  of 
regionalism  when  in  the  first  months  of  the  insurrection 
ho  nationalized  the  cause  of  independence.  His  policy 
bore  fruit,  and  one  result  of  the  revolution  was  more 
thoroughly  to  mix  up  the  inhabitants  of  the  different 
provinces.  Some  of  the  Santiago  natives  who  marched 
west  with  Maceo  to  Pinar  del  Rio  settled  and  remained 
there.  Some  of  those  from  Habana  and  Matanzas  who 
went  to  Puerto  Principe  made  it  their  permanent  abid- 
ing place.  Greater  homogeneity  among  the  Cubans  as 

319 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


a people  is  tlie  consequence.  This  has  its  bearing  on 
future  government.  It  helps  to  develop  the  aptitude  of 
the  whole  people  for  homogeneous  political  institutions. 

The  political  parties  will  not  be  essentially  different 
from  parties  everywhere.  As  they  exist  to-day  the  line 
is  not  sharply  drawn,  because  there  is  little  chance  to 
divide  on  domestic  policies  until  the  basis  of  division 
as  a territory,  state,  or  independent  commonwealth  ex- 
ists. There  is  the  National  League,  which  is  composed 
chiefly  of  the  civilian  elements;  the  Cuban  National 
Party,  which  wants  to  absorb  all  the  elements  favoring 
independence ; and  the  various  factions  which  call  them- 
selves military  parties.  They  are  all  following  one  line 
in  sustaining  schools  for  voting  which  are  preparing 
the  Cubans  for  the  use  of  the  ballot.  There  will  be  an 
anti-American  faction  composed  of  a few  military  chiefs. 
These  will  be  continuously  demanding  the  immediate 
grant  of  absolute  independence  and  the  withdrawal  of 
the  intervening  power.  It  is  not  probable  that  this 
group  will  ever  reach  the  dignity  of  a real  political 
party.  Some  of  its  agitators  fought  successfully  in 
the  insurrection,  but  it  is  yet  to  be  shown  that  they 
have  followers.  They  are  like  the  Autonomist  leaders 
who  issued  manifestoes  without  getting  responses. 

In  watching  the  development  of  sentiment  in  Cuba  it 
is  well  to  remember  that  the  cigar  smoke  which  rises 
from  the  cafes  in  Habana  is  not  always  the  will  of  the 
Cuban  people.  Habana  as  a great  city  will  naturally 
influence  the  politics  of  the  island,  but  the  controlling 
influence  will  not  be  with  it.  American  officials  in  the 
beginning  made  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  the  me- 
tropolis was  the  whole  island.  Other  Americans  make 

320 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


the  same  mistake.  What  is  best  in  Cuba  is  its  town 
anil  country  lifo.  The  influences,  whether  social  or 
political,  are  more  healthful  there.  They  should  always 
bo  sought  before  forming  a judgment. 

The  growth  of  public  opinion  is  something  that  is 
also  to  bo  noted,  and  it  has  its  basis  in  the  country.  It 
frequently  stilled  the  voices  of  the  agitators  who  were 
demanding  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  American 
forces.  When  the  factious  Assembly  was  seeking  to 
prolong  the  uncertainty  about  accepting  the  payment 
for  the  insurgent  troops,  public  opinion  compelled  that 
body  to  dissolve  itself.  There  is  no  reason  to  think 
that  it  will  be  less  healthful  in  the  future  whenever  a 
group  of  discontented  leaders  undertake  to  interfere 
with  peaceful  progress. 

The  radical  group,  as  it  is  called,  is  composed  mostly 
of  generals  who  were  antagonistic  to  Gomez  during  the 
insurrection.  They  were  patriotic  enough  to  control  their 
resentments  while  the  struggle  lasted.  Now  they  seek  to 
find  expression  for  it  and  to  prevent  the  old  commander 
dominating  in  civil  affairs.  They  have  among  them  some 
respectable  figures  such  as  Salvador  Cisneros  Betancourt, 
who  can  show  a record  as  president  of  the  provisional 
republic  during  the  Ten-Tears’  war  and  also  during  the 
last  insurrection.  Despite  their  personal  ambitions  and 
resentments,  it  is  not  just  to  class  all  these  men  as  un- 
patriotic. They  want  to  see  Cuba  strong,  maintaining 
friendly  relations  with  the  United  States;  but  they  want 
to  be  the  ones  who  shall  direct  her  destiny.  Some  of 
them  may  rebound  so  that  in  time  they  will  become  an- 
nexationists, for  the  honor  of  being  American  Senators 
and  Representatives  appeals  powerfully  to  them. 

21  321 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


Americans  who  sympathized  with  the  insurrection 
and  who  are  sincerely  desirous  for  the  success  of  the 
Cuban  commonwealth  admit  to  themselves  a certain 
distrust  in  the  virility  of  the  character  when  it  comes  to 
be  applied  to  public  administration.  Their  own  robust- 
ness is  lacking.  They  also  note  that  duplicity  is  a 
common  trait.  Often  they  may  turn  over  in  their  minds 
the  question  of  the  strong  hand  for  the  Latin  races ; but 
a study  of  past  and  present  conditions  in  the  island  sat- 
isfies them  that  the  strong  hand  will  never  control  the 
destiny  of  Cuba.  Not  even  a progressive  and  patriotic 
Porfirio  Diaz  could  make  himself  the  master  of  this 
people.  They  have  been  educated  to  the  point  where 
they  will  not  stand  a dictator.  It  is  also  worth  noting 
that  while  this  lack  of  virility  is  manifest,  sentiment  is 
a most  pronounced  trait  in  their  make-up.  An  appeal 
to  sentiment  rarely  fails  to  achieve  results.  When  their 
confidence  is  once  obtained  they  are  trustful  and  re- 
sponsive. But  with  distrust  implanted  among  them,  no 
progress  can  be  made. 

The  aim  of  intelligent  and  patriotic  Cubans  was  to 
pattern  the  political  institutions  of  the  United  States. 
They  showed  a hunger  for  information  regarding  local 
government  as  well  as  the  methods  of  federal  adminis- 
tration. The  American  control  set  the  pattern  before 
them.  In  every  possible  way  Cuban  administration 
was  modelled  after  American  methods.  It  is  certain 
that  with  the  entire  power  resting  with  themselves 
the  Cubans  will  not  do  as  well  as  the  officials  from  the 
United  States  were  able  to  do  for  them.  In  the  begin- 
ning and  at  the  various  stages  of  progress  these  offi- 
cials were  discouraged  and  sometimes  disheartened. 

322 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA 


They  Lad  to  meet  one  condition  which  was  the  out- 
growth of  the  wrar.  This  was  the  tendency  to  regard 
all  the  offices  as  a Cuban  club,  with  the  discharge  of  the 
duties  a mere  incident.  Unquestionably  under  Cuban 
administration  more  public  servants  will  be  required 
than  under  American  control.  But  in  time  the  people 
of  the  island  will  learn  what  every  people  learns — that 
the  cost  of  managing  public  affairs  comes  from  the  pro- 
ducers. 

It  may  furthermore  be  said  that  much  fondness  for 
office  is  shown  by  the  Cubans.  Whether  this  trait  is 
really  a racial  one  may  be  judged  by  the  scenes  at 
the  White  House  in  Washington  in  the  months  fol- 
lowing the  inauguration  of  a new  President,  or  the 
crowd  in  the  anteroom  of  the  newly  elected  mayor  of 
a big  city  or  of  the  governor  of  a State.  There  is 
one  difference : the  Latin  office-holder  or  office-seeker 
cares  more  for  the  dignity  of  the  position  than  for  its 
emoluments.  The  American  office-seeker  first  wants  to 
know  how  much  it  will  pay.  Nor  are  public  affairs  in 
Cuba  left  to  the  monopoly  of  one  profession.  The  doc- 
tor, the  dentist,  the  journalist,  and  the  civil  engineer 
mingle  in  politics  as  well  as  the  lawyer. 

Another  inquiry  which  Americans  make  sincerely  is 
to  what  degree  respect  for  constituted  authority  exists 
among  the  people  who  respected  it  only  when  enforced  by 
military  government.  They  want  to  know  whether  the 
masses  have  a clear  notion  of  the  difference  between  lib- 
erty and  license.  They  have  curiosity  to  learn  whether 
the  decisions  of  judicial  tribunals  will  be  respected 
when  there  is  nothing  beyond  the  confidence  in  the  tri- 
bunals themselves  to  enforce  respect.  These  are  ques- 

323 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


tions  that  cannot  be  answered  until  the  opportunity  has 
been  given  to  put  them  to  the  practical  test  of  experi- 
ence. The  test  cannot  come  under  American  military 
control.  The  most  that  can  be  looked  for  is  some  indi- 
cations of  an  answer  in  the  choice  of  a constituent,  rep- 
resentative assembly  to  formulate  the  future  govern- 
ment. That  the  political  aptitudes  exist  for  the  choice 
of  such  a body  and  for  its  deliberations  is  affirmed  in 
what  has  been  said  of  the  progress  of  free  discussion 
and  political  organization.  Here  seems  to  be  the  basis 
of  institutions  that  will  develop  and  endure.  Probably 
the  first  congress,  or  convention,  will  bear  witness  to 
the  saying  of  De  Tocqueville  that  a nation  is  always 
able  to  establish  great  political  assemblies  because  it  is 
sure  to  contain  a certain  number  of  persons  whose  in- 
tellectual cultivation  stands  them  to  a certain  extent 
instead  of  practical  experience.  The  fashioning  of  the 
rude  materials  of  the  local  community  is,  as  the  French 
philosopher  says,  a more  difficult  task ; but  the  begin- 
nings of  municipal  government  are  already  seen. 

The  originator  of  the  revolution  of  1895,  Jose  Marti, 
was  a poet.  He  sealed  his  aspiration  for  the  liberty  of 
the  land  he  loved  with  his  death  on  the  battlefield. 
Other  poets  before  him  perished  ignominiously  for 
their  faith  in  free  government.  Menocal,  an  artist  of 
European  reputation,  left  his  easel  to  join  the  ragged 
forces  of  Maximo  Gomez.  Cultured  men  were  marched 
through  the  streets  of  Habana  tied  to  common  crimi- 
nals. Loaded  with  chains  and  herded  in  the  foul  holds 
of  vessels  with  these  criminals,  they  were  sent  to  the  pe- 
nal settlements  of  Africa.  The  clanking  of  these  chains 

still  echoes  through  many  households.  All  this  was  for 

324 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


the  crime  of  rebellion.  College  professors,  learned 
men,  educators,  and  writers  went  into  voluntary  and 
involuntary  exile.  These  classes  returned  to  Cuba. 
They  are  a part  of  its  future.  Some  of  them  are 
dreamers.  They  dream  with  an  apostle  of  liberty  * of 
another  island : 

“The  dreamer  lives  on  forever, 

The  toiler  toils  for  a day.” 

These  men  may  prefer  to  dream  of  idyllic  government 
in  the  ideal  future  rather  than  to  work  for  the  imperfect 
structure  which  must  be  set  up  by  toiling  day  by  day. 
Their  fondness  for  speculative  thought,  their  theoriz- 
ing on  the  nature  of  liberty,  may  unfit  them  for  the 
intensely  practical  business  of  government.  Their  abil- 
ity to  administer  the  customs  houses  will  never  be  dem- 
onstrated. A poet  or  dreamer  in  a Latin  custom  house 
will  be  a failure.  But  the  sentiments  which  inspire 
them,  and  which  they  seek  to  inculcate,  will  have  a fruit- 
ful soil.  The  dreamers  will  have  their  place  in  the 
evolution  of  the  Cuban  commonwealth.  The  problem 
is  to  evolve  a successful  administration  not  only  of 
the  custom  house,  but  of  all  public  offices  between  the 
dreamers  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  side  the  men 
who  think  that  revolution  is  merely  a change  to  enable 
Cubans  to  loot  their  own  island  instead  of  letting  Span- 
iards loot  it.  The  poets  and  the  dreamers  themselves 
would  be  out  of  place  in  the  custom  house,  but  they 
have  their  place  in  keeping  alive  the  sentiment  which 
demands  honest  administration. 

In  Pensacola  are  the  ruins  of  an  old  Spanish  fort. 

♦John  Boyle  O’Reilly. 

325 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


At  St.  Augustine  are  the  ruins  of  the  oldest  Spanish  fort 
on  the  American  continent.  Near  Kingston,  Jamaica, 
are  the  ruins  of  what  must  have  been  an  extensive, 
almost  impregnable,  Spanish  fort.  When  the  Ameri- 
can troops  landed  at  Daiquiri  and  Siboney  the  old  for- 
tress which  was  discovered  in  the  jungle  compelled  their 
admiration.  They  might  have  thought,  too,  of  the  ven- 
geance of  history,  if  they  had  reflected  that  near  Dai- 
quiri landed  the  Spanish  expedition  from  Hispaniola 
wdiich  crushed  the  native  chief  Hatuey  and  established 
four  hundred  years  of  Spanish  dominion  over  Cuba. 
The  defences  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  called  forth  the  praise 
of  the  keenest  military  engineers.  The  defences  of  Ha- 
bana  won  admiration  for  their  scientific  thoroughness 
and  for  their  mathematical  exactness.  If  forts,  moats, 
walls,  castles,  cannons,  and  batteries  constituted  a 
state,  Spain  never  would  have  lost  her  American  pos- 
sessions. 

Men,  says  Sir  William  Jones,  constitute  a state. 
And  they  would  have  constituted  a colony.  Battle- 
ments and  walls  and  moated  gates  went  down  not 
because  Spain  lacked  men  to  defend  them ; it  was  be- 
cause she  lacked  men  who  knew  that  in  themselves  were 
the  power  and  the  majesty  of  the  state.  The  lands 
from  which  the  Conquistadores  sought  to  draw  only  the 
gold  that  was  yellow  to  the  eyes,  wThile  neglecting  that 
which  renews  itself  with  the  turning  over  of  the  soil, 
could  not  constitute  a state.  All  this  has  gone.  The 
medieval  civilization  of  fortresses  and  cannons  is  buried 
when  the  twentieth  century  is  opening  its  chrysalis  of 
potentialities.  The  future  commonwealth  of  Cuba  must 
be  built  with  sound  principles  of  government  at  the 

326 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


foundation,  and  with  men — real  men  of  muscle  and 
mind — for  the  builders.  If  they  have  not  the  faculties 
of  government  fully  developed,  they  have  acquired  the 
primary  aptitudes. 


CHAPTER  XVIH 


TO-DAY 

When  and  How  to  End  Military  Control — Position  of  United  States 
— Good  Government  from  Without — Ruling  by  Decree — Transi- 
tion to  Civil  Authority — Calling  a Constitutional  Convention — 
Universal  Suffrage  the  Basis  for  a Plebiscite — No  Denial  to  Race 
of  Color — Assumptions  of  Americanization — Some  Un-American 
Influences— Arguments  for  Annexation — Mistaken  Impressions 
— The  Latin  Doubters — Cuban  Understanding  Is  Statehood — 
Parties  During  Transition  Period — G6mez  and  His  Foes — Pro- 
tectorate as  Actual  Independence— Opposing  Economic  Tenden- 
cies— Sugar  as  a Factor — Choice  of  Popular  Assembly. 

Transition  of  institutions  may  be  during  a transit  of 
flags.  The  standard  of  Spain  is  of  yesterday.  The 
emblem  of  Cuba  may  be  of  to-morrow.  The  flag  of  the 
United  States  is  of  to-day.  The  creation  of  a common- 
wealth is  under  its  folds. 

This  does  not  mean  an  indefinite  continuance  of  the 
American  military  occupation.  Like  other  questions, 
the  one  as  to  the  time  of  its  withdrawal  is  better  met 
frankly.  No  policy  of  avoidance  will  be  successful  in 
dealing  with  these  problems.  The  pacification  of  the 
island  may  not  be  complete,  but  it  is  far  enough  ad- 
vanced to  look  forward.  It  is  in  advance  of  industrial 
progress,  though  the  latter  is  not  lagging.  The  question 
of  the  near  future  is  both  when  and  how  to  end  the 
American  military  control  in  Cuba.  It  is  of  to-day, 

328 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


though  by  to-day  should  be  understood  not  a few  weeks 
or  a fow  months,  but  a definite  period.  To-day  * is  a 
year. 

Pleas  may  be  offered  for  indefinite  control,  but  they 
fall  away  in  the  imperious  presence  of  facts.  Incentives 
to  vagueness  may  be  urged  on  the  ground  that  the  people 
are  so  far  from  being  capable  of  self-government  that 
they  must  be  put  through  a long  course  of  political 
training.  All  the  arguments  for  indeterminato  occupa- 
tion would  in  a short  time  force  the  necessity  of  a 
declaration  of  such  purpose,  and  such  a declaration 
would  mean  ultimate  and  coercive  annexation.  Sifted 
through  all  evasions,  this  is  what  these  pleas  mean. 

Before  going  further  a restatement  may  be  made  of 
the  position  of  the  United  States  with  reference  to  Cuba. 
That  position  is  both  of  to-day  and  of  all  time  to  come. 
The  United  States  is  a continuous  intervening  power. 
In  ending  the  Spanish  misgovemment  and  the  strife 
which  grew  out  of  it,  the  American  nation  pledged  itself 
not  to  permit  internal  misgovemment  in  the  future. 
"Whatever  shifting  there  may  be  of  policies,  it  is  pledged 
to  prevent  anarchy  and  intolerable  internal  conditions 
just  as  it  ended  those  conditions  under  Spanish  sover- 
eignty. It  is  also  a continuous  protecting  power  for 
Cuba.  Should  an  independent  government  be  set  up, 
no  bullying  European  nation  could  seize  a pretext  of 
damages  to  its  subjects  and  send  war- vessels  into  the 
harbors  of  Cuba  to  enforce  the  claim  without  reckoning 
with  the  United  States.  Besides,  in  the  obligations  for 
good  government  which  it  incurred  the  United  States 
became  the  protecting  power  for  foreign  subjects  therein, 

* October,  1899. 

329 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


whatever  their  nationality.  So  in  every  view  the  Ameri- 
can nation  has  a moral  protectorate  over  Cuba. 

The  immediate  question  is  whether  good  government 
shall  come  from  above  and  without,  or  from  within. 
The  military  authority  in  its  ultimate  analysis  is  similar 
to  the  control  exercised  under  Spanish  sovereignty.  The 
difference  is  that  it  assures  good  administration,  free- 
dom from  official  corruption  and  from  oppressive  taxa- 
tion. But  there  is  no  misunderstanding  that  it  comes 
from  above.  In  describing  the  military  control,  I have 
stated  its  strength  and  what  the  American  authorities 
were  able  to  accomplish  through  its  arbitrary  nature. 
If  it  were  of  indefinite  continuance  the  merging  of  a gov- 
ernment of  law,  order,  justice,  and  equality  into  the  im- 
position of  American  manners  and  customs  would  be 
hard  to  avoid,  judging  from  the  tendency  that  already  has 
been  shown.  Don  Geronimo  Valdes  might  literally 
walk  abroad  with  his  paternal  bando  amplified  to  the 
degree  of  regulating  public  smoking  and  the  wearing  of 
undershirts  by  the  workingmen  with  reference  to  the 
habits  of  a few  thousand  strangers  rather  than  of  some 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  natives.  And  under  American 
rule  it  would  be  made  more  than  ever  manifest  that 
these  regulations  were  in  reality  the  regulations  of  the 
military  power.  It  would  be  the  army  which  compelled 
the  teamster  to  wear  his  undershirt,  for  the  local  law 
officers  who  enforced  that  order  would  rest  on  the  mili- 
tary authority  and  would  carry  out  its  decrees. 

The  complaints  of  the  multiplicity  of  government  and 
of  rulers  are  a passing  phase  of  the  occupation.  The 
number  of  officials  might  be  reduced  and  still  the  civil 

authority  would  rest  upon  military  power.  The  gradual 

330 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


widening  of  municipal  government  after  the  full  frame- 
work of  laws  and  regulations  lias  been  set  up  by  the 
superior  military  commanders  may  be  a progressive 
step,  but  it  is  not  a decisive  one  nor  one  which  meets 
permanent  conditions.  The  test  of  the  capacity  and  the 
willingness  to  respect  authority — that  is,  lawful  govern- 
ment— cannot  come  under  army  rule  because  it  is  the 
army  which  enforces  that  respect.  The  limitations  of 
education  in  political  self-rule  under  these  conditions 
are  obvious.  In  its  essence  the  American  military  con- 
trol is  as  much  government  by  decree  as  was  the  Spanish 
authority.  The  difference  may  be  a wide  one  between 
beneficent  government  by  decree  and  oppressive  gov- 
ernment by  decree,  as  is  shown  under  the  American 
administration.  But  the  popular  element  cannot  enter 
largely  into  it,  and  that  is  the  weakness. 

So  thorough  is  my  own  conviction  that  this  fact  will 
be  recognized,  and  so  scrupulous  has  been  the  American 
Executive  in  affirming  that  the  military  control  is  of  a 
temporary  nature,  that  without  further  analysis  I pro- 
ceed to  the  subject  of  the  transition  from  military  con- 
trol to  something  else.  Undoubtedly  before  this  point 
is  reached  there  will  be  a further  relaxation  of  the  mili- 
tary administration,  and  the  high  standard  of  official 
integrity  and  fidelity  shown  by  the  American  officials 
will  be  given  a deeper  impress. 

In  the  transition  from  American  military  control  to 
something  else  the  preliminary  step  is  to  ascertain  the 
will  of  the  people.  It  may  be  said  that  instead  of  a 
constituent  representative  assembly  to  formulate  their 
wishes  in  the  shape  of  constructive  government,  it 
should  first  be  determined  whether  the  people  of  the 

331 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


island  want  annexation.  The  power  to  force  a deter- 
mination of  that  question  before  anything  else  is  settled 
undoubtedly  lies  with  the  United  States,  and  if  it  were 
attempted  the  verdict  would  be  so  overwhelmingly 
against  annexation  that  the  only  thing  accomplished 
would  be  to  prepare  for  another  election.  There  must 
unquestionably  be  a plebiscite  in  ascertaining  both  the 
aspirations  and  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  the  island. 
The  natural  process  would  be  the  choosing  of  a repre- 
sentative constitutional  convention.  In  that  election 
the  issues  would  determine  themselves  so  that  the 
opposing  tendencies  could  be  developed  in  the  conven- 
tion. Then  the  work  would  be  submitted  to  the  people 
for  their  ratification  or  rejection.  This  would  be 
another  plebiscite.  As  the  United  States  is  at  once  the 
intervening  power  and  the  only  recognized  authority, 
whatever  elections  are  held  must  be  under  its  direction. 
This  may  be  done  by  direct  Executive  action  or  by  the 
sanction  of  Congress.  The  only  important  point  is  that 
it  be  by  civil  instead  of  by  military  agency. 

It  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the  basis  of  the  plebiscite. 
The  declarations  are  so  clear  that  a stable  government 
is  to  be  formed  by  all  classes  that  no  question  can  arise 
on  this  point.  But  with  the  tendency  of  the  Spanish 
colony,  or  the  majority  of  its  members,  to  continue  as 
Spanish  subjects,  when  the  time  comes  it  will  be  found 
that  “all  classes”  who  are  entitled  to  participate  in 
determining  the  form  and  the  formation  of  the  new 
government  are  largely  and  overwhelmingly  the  Cuban 
classes.  The  foreigners,  whether  Europeans  or  Ameir- 
cans,  will  doubtless  exercise  an  indirect  influence,  but 
there  can  be  no  actual  participation  by  them  in  the  pro- 

332 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


ceedings  to  determine  the  form  of  the  commonwealth. 
It  will  develop  that  the  only  basis  for  the  plebiscite 
is  universal  suffrage.  Americans  are  appalled  at  this 
idea  when  they  think  of  the  illiteracy  of  the  island. 
The  saddest  chapter  in  the  history  of  Cuba  has  been 
said  to  bo  the  educational  chapter.  It  is  in  reality  a 
blank.  With  this  in  their  minds,  and  with  the  further 
thought  that  the  blacks  are  the  bulk  of  the  illiterates, 
Americans  draw  back  and  ask  if  the  mistakes  of  recon- 
struction are  to  be  repeated  in  Cuba. 

The  cases  are  not  parallel.  In  the  chapter  on  the 
Race  of  Color  I have  sought  to  show  that  the  blacks  in 
Cuba  have  reached  a higher  plane  than  the  negroes  in 
the  United  States.  Their  situation  is  not  similar  to 
that  of  the  American  negroes  after  the  civil  war.  The 
race  of  color  in  Cuba  fought  for  the  freedom  of  the 
island.  The  blacks  acquired  political  standing  by  their 
part  in  the  revolution.  It  assures  the  continuance  of 
their  civil  rights,  but  that  in  itself  will  not  be  enough. 
They  are  not  aggressive  in  demanding  a share  in  civil 
administration,  but  with  their  record  in  fighting  for 
freedom  they  will  never  be  content  with  a government 
in  which  they  have  no  voice  simply  because  the  majority 
of  them  in  this  generation  may  not  be  able  to  read  and 
write. 

If  a qualification  for  suffrage  should  be  required,  there 
would  be  the  question  as  to  whether  it  should  be  an 
educational  one  or  based  on  property,  or  both.  A large 
number  of  the  guajiros,  or  countrymen,  are  small  prop- 
erty owners,  but  they  cannot  read  and  write.  They 
have  all  the  conservative  instincts  of  the  property 
owner.  In  the  towns  and  cities  where  the  vicious 

333 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


classes  congregate,  a fair  proportion  of  these  are  not 
illiterate.  An  educational  test  would  enable  them  to 
vote  at  the  expense  of  the  small  landholders.  Under 
the  Spanish  Government  the  voting  was  so  manipulated 
that  the  influence  of  the  small  property  owners  was 
lessened,  and  the  influence  of  the  clerks  and  similar 
classes  in  the  towns  was  augmented.  Any  efforts  by 
the  United  States  to  restrict  the  suffrage  would  give  rise 
to  the  feeling  that  the  old  Spanish  practices  were  being 
restored.  And  the  Spanish  Government  itself  in  the 
decrees  proclaiming  autonomy  proclaimed  universal 
suffrage.  That  was  part  of  the  autonomous  constitu- 
tion. In  actual  operation  it  would  unquestionably  have 
been  nullified,  yet  it  stands  as  an  offer  from  Spain. 
The  United  States  can  do  no  less. 

As  to  the  blacks  as  a class,  neither  the  white  classes 
in  Cuba  nor  the  all-powerful  American  nation  can  deny 
them  their  rights.  There  was  neither  color  line,  prop- 
erty qualifications,  nor  educational  requirement  in  the 
insurrection.  There  can  be  none  in  determining  the 
future  government  of  the  island.  An  Australian  ballot 
is  not  necessary.  The  method  of  voting  by  word  of 
mouth,  which  until  recent  years  prevailed  in  Kentucky 
and  other  Southern  States,  will  answer  every  purpose. 
Various  expedients  will  be  suggested  and  various  plans 
discussed  for  limiting  the  suffrage  in  Cuba  on  the 
theory  that  its  exercise  by  all  classes  would  be  harmful 
to  the  people  themselves.  In  the  end  these  plans  will 
fail,  and  the  determination  of  the  wishes  of  the  Cuban 
people  will  be  on  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage  because 
that  is  the  simplest  and  the  most  natural  way.  It  is 
also  the  just  way. 


334 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


It  is  an  unpopular  thing  to  suggest  a doubt  about  the 
early  Americanization  of  Cuba.  Nevertheless  I venture 
to  suggest  it  in  the  sense  which  is  commonly  under- 
stood. The  veneer  of  Americanism  is  one  thing,  and  so 
is  the  varnish.  There  will  be  plenty  of  veneer.  The 
prophets  already  see  Cuba  an  English-speaking  country. 
My  vision  does  not  see  it.  So  much  has  been  promised 
from  teaching  English  in  the  schools  that  it  is  heresy 
to  insinuate  a doubt.  Nevertheless  the  American  who 
speaks  Spanish  will  be  the  successful  one  in  Cuba  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  this  generation.  The  American  who 
depends  on  English-speaking  Cubans  or  Spaniards  will 
be  misled.  In  spite  of  the  wave  of  English  teaching 
that  has  swept  over  the  island,  the  mass  of  people  will 
not  be  touched.  When  country  schools  come  to  be 
established  the  wisdom  of  forcing  English  upon  them 
is  questionable.  They  will  speak  the  tongue  of  their 
mothers,  they  will  think  in  that  tongue,  and  they  will 
act  in  accordance  with  the  customs  and  traditions  rooted 
in  that  tongue.  These  young  Latins,  whether  black  or 
white,  have  waxen  minds.  They  show  a facility  in 
acquiring  a foreign  idiom ; but  it  will  not  be  their  think- 
ing and  acting  medium  of  expression.  The  institutions 
of  which  they  become  part  will  be  interpreted  in  their 
own  language.  And  if  the  stream  of  immigration  flows 
in  from  the  Mediterranean  or  from  the  slopes  of  the 
Pyrenees,  Castilian  will  be  the  native  tongue  and  Eng- 
lish the  foreign  language. 

At  one  time  the  German  colony  in  Habana  and  West- 
ern Cuba  numbered  one  thousand  members.  After  the 
war  there  were  four  hundred  of  them.  Not  half  a 
dozen  purely  German  families  existed.  The  German 

m 


TO-MOBROW  IN  CUBA. 


merchants  married  Cuban  women.  Their  children  were 
gathered  up  into  a school  by  the  German  consul-gen- 
eral. It  was  found  that  a very  small  number  spoke  the 
language  of  their  fathers  or  had  any  knowledge  of  Ger- 
man customs.  Americans  and  Englishmen  who  married 
Cuban  wives  generally  had  their  children  taught  Eng- 
lish ; but  the  family  talk  was  in  Spanish,  and  the  Ameri- 
can talk  was  sometimes  the  broken  language  of  the  for- 
eign country.  Frenchmen,  with  more  affinity  between 
their  own  tongue  and  that  of  the  Castilian,  also  had  the 
same  experience.  The  history  of  Louisiana  for  a cen- 
tury affords  an  example.  Upper  Canada,  after  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years,  is  also  an  example.  The 
leaven  of  genuine  Americanism  will  be  felt  beneficially, 
but  for  a quarter  of  a century  or  more  it  will  be  only  a 
leaven  among  a Latin  people  and  an  African  population 
assimilated  to  a Latin  people.  Good  schools  do  not 
mean  that  English  will  uproot  the  language  which  is 
native  to  the  great  majority  of  the  inhabitants. 

Probably  before  the  political  future  of  Cuba  is  fully 
unfolded,  ten  per  cent  of  the  inhabitants  will  be  natives 
of  the  United  States.  There  will  be  a winter  colony 
whose  numbers  will  grow  year  by  year.  Many  wealthy 
Americans  with  the  charm  of  country  life  ever  present 
to  them  will  purchase  country  estates  on  which  they 
may  enjoy  the  palm-tree  landscape  and  the  azure  skies. 
Trades  and  mercantile  business  and  small  farming  will 
afford  further  openings.  Yet  with  these  inducements 
the  prospect  is  not  increased  that  the  field  labor  of  the 
country  and  the  day  labor  of  the  towns  can  be  drawn 
from  the  States.  This  is  what  bids  a pause  to  the  loose 
talk  of  Americanization. 


336 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


Tho  Americans  who  settle  iu  the  island  will  intermarry 
among  tho  Cuban  women;  their  vitality  will  bo  replen- 
ished by  fresh  immigration,  and  perhaps  by  themselves 
revisiting  tho  more  life-giving  climate  of  the  North.  Out 
of  this  intermixture  will  come  in  time  the  best  product 
of  the  two  civilizations.  Types  of  it  may  be  seen  in 
Cuba  to-day  where  Americans,  Englishmen,  and  Ger- 
mans havo  married  Cuban  women.  The  rule  is  general 
enough  to  bo  accepted  as  a principle  that  their  offspring 
combine  the  moral  fibre  and  the  physical  stamina  of  the 
fathers  with  the  domestic  traits  and  virtues  of  the 
mothers.  But  these  are  only  types.  It  will  take  fifty 
years  or  two  generations  to  develop  the  tropical  Ameri- 
can. When  he  is  developed  all  the  problems  of  govern- 
ment in  the  Antilles  will  be  solved.  Meantime  it  is  not 
well  to  assume  that  the  tropical  American  is  already 
evolved  or  that  a Latin  people  need  Americanization  in 
the  sense  of  losing  their  language,  their  habits,  their 
customs,  and  their  own  institutions.  Many  plants  that 
flower  in  the  temperate  climates  wither  when  transplanted 
to  the  tropics.  The  same  may  prove  true  of  customs  and 
laws. 

Nor  are  the  un-American  influences  to  be  overlooked. 
Were  the  United  States  to  be  judged  solely  by  its  offi- 
cial representatives,  military  and  civil,  the  influence 
would  be  without  exception  a healthy  one.  But  the 
nation  has  to  be  judged  by  all  classes  of  its  represen- 
tatives. The  buzzards  and  the  vultures  trailed  their 
flight  in  the  van  and  in  the  wake  of  the  American  oc- 
cupation. The  adventurer  from  the  Southwest  who 
had  failed  in  everything  at  home,  and  drifted  into 
Mexico  long  enough  to  get  a smattering  of  the  tongue, 
23  837 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


appeared  and  told  liis  contempt  of  Latin  civilization. 
He  talked  of  dagoes,  gringoes,  greasers,  and  mongrels, 
the  superiority  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  the  necessity 
of  “ our  folks  ” taking  hold  of  Cuba  and  running  it  so 
the  country  would  be  made  to  pay  “us.”  Often  he  de- 
clared his  preference  for  the  gringoes,  because  the  in- 
termixture of  blood  in  Mexico  was  Indian,  while  in 
Cuba  it  was  “nigger.” 

American  promoters,  with  experience  in  securing  fran- 
chises and  concessions  from  city  councils  and  State 
legislatures,  put  in  a prompt  appearance.  They  knew 
what  the  Spanish  system  had  been.  They  were  ready 
to  offer  “ gratifications  ” — bribes — with  more  effrontery 
than  had  been  customary  under  the  old  rule.  They 
sought  out  the  insurgent  leaders  and  opened  negotia- 
tions on  the  theory  that  these  men  would  have  fran- 
chises and  privileges  to  sell.  Usually  they  proclaimed 
loudly  that  their  investments  were  contingent  upon  Cuba 
seeking  immediate  annexation,  but  sometimes  they 
became  partisans  of  early  independence. 

When  the  custom-house  passed  under  American  control 
it  was  brokers  from  the  United  States  who  went  about 
whispering  their  ability  to  keep  up  the  old  fraudulent 
practices  in  new  ways.  It  was  American  agents  who 
sought  out  the  merchants  with  promises  of  bargains  based 
on  the  assumption  that  goods  could  be  imported  fraudu- 
lently through  connivance  of  the  quartermaster’s  depart- 
ment of  the  army.  Sometimes,  too,  it  was  an  American 
officer  who  heard  of  this  proceeding  and  kicked  his 
countrymen  out  of  doors.  American  firms  were  the  first 
ones  caught  in  actual  smuggling.  American  strumpetry 
drove  through  the  streets  of  Habana  in  blazoned  coaches 

338 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


aiul  proclaimed  its  presence.  American  drunkards  also 
reeled  through  the  streets  of  a city  in  which  drunken- 
ness was  so  rare  as  to  be  a genuine  novelty.  Habana 
saw  more  drunkenness  in  the  six  months  following 
American  occupation  than  it  had  seen  in  sixty  years. 
American  gamblers  sought  to  dispute  by  new  devices 
the  lean  pickings  of  the  gaming  table  with  the  native 
gamblers.  Americans  first  raised  the  color  line  and 
appealed  to  race  prejudice  in  the  cheapest  and  most 
blatant  form.  American  braggarts  swaggered  through 
the  town  with  their  hands  in  their  pockets  and  their 
hats  tilted  back.  They  shamed  their  fellow-countrymen 
who  were  there  on  legitimate  business  into  silence  and 
seclusion.  They  voiced  their  coarse  criticisms  of  the 
domestic  customs  of  a people  of  wfiose  home  life  they 
could  know  nothing.  The  whole  class  of  the  buzzards 
abused  the  American  officials  who  refused  to  recognize 
them  as  coadjutors  in  the  work  of  uplifting  Cuba. 
They  almost  justified  the  bitter  comment  of  one  com- 
mander that  American  military  control  was  necessary 
in  order  to  protect  the  island  fiom  American  harpies. 

Americans  understood  this  phenomenon  of  the  scum 
floating  across  the  gulf  before  the  healthier  undercur- 
rents reached  the  shores  of  the  island.  They  sought  to 
bear  it  with  patience.  Cubans  who  had  lived  in  the 
United  States  also  understood  it.  Those  whose  home 
always  had  been  on  the  island,  and  the  Spanish  classes 
least  of  all,  failed  to  understand  it.  This  class  of 
Americans  is  both  of  to-day  and  of  to-morrow.  They 
always  will  be  of  the  same  type,  claiming  kinship  in  the 
American  nation,  proclaiming  the  need  of  civilizing  the 
Latin  races  and  offering  themselves  as  missionaries  of 

839 


TO-MORROW  IX  CUBA. 


the  higher  civilization.  If  at  times  there  is  in  Cuba  a 
disposition  to  doubt  the  superiority  of  Americanism,  the 
presence  of  these  adventurers  may  help  to  account  for  it. 

Persons  who  visit  Cuba  for  a week,  especially  if  they 
happen  to  be  officials,  are  impressed  with  the  idea  that 
the  majority  of  the  property  holders  and  educated 
people,  as  well  as  a considerable  number  of  the  masses, 
want  annexation.  The  sugar  planters  and  the  business 
men  who  want  it  call  on  them  and  tell  them  so.  That 
the  sugar  planters  long  for  the  assurance  of  a market 
for  their  sugar  the  same  that  Hawaii  has,  does  not 
require  much  argument.  The  Spanish  financiers  and 
merchants  who  want  the  American  authority  without  the 
Americans  to  compete  in  business  tell  them  that  a stable 
government  cannot  be  maintained  except  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  United  States. 

The  Latin  doubters  confide  their  doubts  to  the  inquir- 
ing and  receptive  visitors.  These  are  educated  and 
generally  property-owning  Cubans.  They  see  with  the 
clearness  of  intellectual  perception  the  dangers  and  the 
uncertainties  of  the  future.  They  tell  of  the  quickness 
with  which  the  Latin  blood  mounts  to  the  head,  and 
they  distrust  the  capacity  of  their  race  to  maintain  free 
government.  They  also  saw  the  hopeless  corruption 
and  oppression  of  Spanish  authority ; but  while  sympa- 
thizing with  the  aspirations  of  their  people,  they  doubted 
whether  anything  better  could  come  of  revolt.  While 
they  were  doubting,  the  blacks  and  the  guajiros  and  the 
educated  Cubans  who  were  not  given  to  doubting  carried 
the  insurrection  forward.  These  Latin  doubters  tell 
American  visitors  truly  that  a momentary  agitation 
against  annexation  should  not  be  taken  as  the  deliberate 

340 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


conviction  of  the  Cuban  people.  But  their  own  influ- 
ence is  no  groator  than  that  of  the  doubter  in  othor 
places  and  in  other  circumstances.  It  is  certain  that 
American  officials  will  hear  all  the  arguments  and  pleas 
for  annexation,  but  it  is  not  always  creditable  to  their 
judgment  that  they  go  uo  further.  For  ono  thing,  they 
do  not  seem  to  understand  that  the  classes  who  oppose 
annexation  do  not  call  upon  them. 

Another  point  is  thoroughly  misunderstood.  Of  the 
Cubans  who  lean  to  annexation  not  one  has  the  idea 
other  than  of  immediate  Statehood.  The  Cubans  who 
have  lived  in  the  United  States  have  been  residents  for  a 
great  part  of  Florida,  Louisiana,  and  New  York.  They 
know  nothing  of  territories.  Those  of  them  who  advo- 
cate annexation  have  no  notion  that  if  they  were  to  seek 
admission  into  the  Union  it  could  be  on  any  other  basis 
than  that  of  equality.  The  island  could  furnish  accom- 
plished Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress  famil- 
iar with  the  language  and  the  laws  of  both  countries  and 
ambitious  of  distinction.  The  honor  of  sharing  in  the 
government,  of  taking  part  in  the  elections  for  President, 
and  possibly  at  a not  remote  period  of  having  a member 
of  the  Cabinet  appeals  to  all  the  ambitious  men.  With 
$100,000,000  of  commerce,  there  would  also  be  that 
element  of  power.  It  is  so  improbable  that  annexation 
sentiment  in  Cuba  could  be  based  on  anything  short  of 
Statehood  that  I have  not  stopped  to  discuss  the  pros- 
pect of  the  island  asking  territorial  form  of  government. 
If  such  a thing  should  happen  it  would  not  be  a twelve- 
month  before  the  $100,000,000  of  commerce  would  be 
demanding  recognition,  and  the  agitation  for  Statehood 
would  be  intense  and  ineradicable. 

341 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


With  the  greatest  faith  in  the  capacity  of  the  mixed 
nationalities  in  Cuba  to  work  out  their  own  destiny  as  a 
people,  and  with  the  determination  to  encourage  and 
help  them,  it  is  verjr  doubtful  whether  the  people  of  the 
United  States  are  ready  to-day  to  share  with  them  the 
full  glory  of  American  institutions.  Manifest  destiny 
can  wait  a quarter  of  a century,  but  in  discussing  the 
earlier  future  in  Cuba  there  should  be  no  misunder- 
standing. People  of  the  United  States  should  not  turn 
their  thoughts  to  annexation  when  by  it  they  understand 
only  limited  territorial  government,  while  the  people  of 
Cuba  who  are  turning  to  annexation  understand  only  full 
Statehood  and  equality  in  the  American  nation. 

It  has  been  noted  frequently  that  the  leaders  in  the  last 
insurrection  were  veterans  of  the  Ten-Tears’  war — Maceo, 
Gomez,  Calixto  Garcia,  Maso,  and  others.  The  young 
men  never  guided  its  fortunes.  Many  of  them,  espe- 
cially those  who  have  lived  in  the  United  States,  are  an- 
nexationists.' Some  of  the  older  leaders  want  to  see  the 
flag  of  free  Cuba  floating  for  a while  and  then  see  a new 
Antillian  star  in  the  American  firmament.  The  majority 
of  them  still  believe  that  the  ultimate  destiny  of  Cuba  is 
to  be  a part  of  the  republic,  but  they  say  not  now.  But 
if  a change  of  feeling  should  come  upon  the  people  and 
the  drift  should  be  toward  annexation,  neither  old  lead- 
ers nor  Americanized  young  Cubans  would  be  found 
supporting  a policy  that  was  not  based  on  Statehood. 

In  the  immediate  future,  during  the  transition  from 
American  military  control  to  something  else,  the  forma- 
tion of  Cuban  parties  may  be  on  the  line  of  Gomez  and 
anti-Gomez,  though  the  National  League  may  become 
strong  enough  to  retain  an  independent  existence.  Go- 

343 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


mez  is  an  old  man.  He  gave  bis  indomitable  spirit  to 
the  winning  of  the  freedom  of  Cuba.  That  he  may  live 
long  enough  to  see  in  what  form  it  shall  be  conserved, 
and  to  have  a potent  influence  in  determining  that  form, 
is  possible.  The  Spanish  blood  in  him  is  that  of  the 
conquistadores  devoted  to  human  liberty  instead  of  to 
oppression.  That  he  is  capricious  and  dictatorial  in  his 
temperament  is  true.  That  his  ambition  was  to  be  a 
dictator  never  has  been  justified  by  his  history.  He  has 
experienced  both  the  gratitude  and  the  ingratitude  of  the 
people  whom  he  served.  The  culmination  of  his  influ- 
ence was  when  ho  entered  Habana  on  the  fourth  anni- 
versary of  the  insurrection,  and  was  received  with  honors 
by  the  American  military  authorities  and  with  acclaim 
by  the  Cuban  people.  Their  confidence  in  him  was 
shown  when  they  overwhelmingly  repudiated  the  action 
of  the  Assembly  in  removing  him  from  the  command  of 
their  dissolving  army. 

General  Gomez  has  been  called  a soldier  of  fortune,  a 
mercenary  adventurer  whose  sword  was  at  the  disposal 
of  the  highest  bidder.  Yet  Spain  unavailingly  bid  mil- 
lions for  it.  Agents  of  sugar  planters  vainly  sought  the 
privilege  of  placing  to  his  credit  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  dollars  in  the  banks  of  London  and  Paris  if  his  orders 
for  the  burning  of  sugar-cane  and  against  the  mills  grind- 
ing were  not  enforced.  No  South  American  dictator 
could  have  levied  such  a tribute.  The  son  of  Gomez 
fell  by  the  side  of  Maceo.  His  own  life  was  risked 
countless  times,  but  it  was  fated  that  the  offspring  who 
was  his  pride  and  his  hope  should  be  the  sacrifice. 
There  has  been  no  change  in  the  position  of  General 
Gomez  regarding  the  future.  He  declared  that  Cuba 

343 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


was  neither  free  nor  independent  so  long  as  the  United 
States  administered  its  government.  After  coming  out 
of  the  woods  he  threw  the  weight  of  his  influence  in  sup- 
port of  the  American  authority  and  in  deprecating  the 
agitation  for  its  immediate  withdrawal.  At  all  times  he 
showed  his  comprehension  of  the  industrial  conditions 
which  underlie  the  political  progress  of  Cuba.  But  he 
is  not  for  annexation. 

The  belief  that  immediate  annexation  is  not  likely 
to  be  an  issue  during  the  transition  from  military  con- 
trol to  something  else,  has  been  indicated  throughout 
this  chapter.  While  this  opinion  is  put  forth  writh  diffi- 
dence in  the  face  of  confident  contrary  views,  I venture 
to  follow  it  up  and  to  indicate  the  possible  lines  on  which 
the  division  may  take  place.  The  mass  of  Cubans  have 
not  changed  their  aspirations  and  their  ideals.  They 
are,  as  when  an  American  statesman  * visited  them  dur- 
ing the  dying  days  of  Spanish  sovereignty,  united  in  their 
purpose.  The  prediction  of  General  Gomez  came  true 
to  them,  and  as  an  outcome  of  the  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence every  household  had  its  martyr.  But  these  aspi- 
rations, while  clear,  are  not  aggressive  and  unreasoning. 

It  is  my  own  conviction  that  while  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  Cuban  people  are  not  thinking  of  earty  an- 
nexation, they  are  not  in  a hurry  to  cut  themselves 
adrift.  They  recognize  that  the  moral  protectorate  of 
the  United  States  is  a fact.  They  have  given  more 
thought  than  is  commonly  credited  them  to  what  it 
means  to  create  an  army  and  a navy.  The  fondness  for 
military  show  may  be  part  of  the  Latin  character,  and 
there  will  always  be  that  desire  for  military  honors. 

* Senator  Redfield  S.  Proctor. 

344 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


But  this  desire  is  not  an  insatiato  one,  and  it  may  find 
expression  in  the  creation  of  a rural  police.  A navy  is 
not  being  thought  of  at  all,  and  yet  the  navy  is  a part  of 
an  island  nation. 

There  is  another  basis.  This  is  the  financial  one. 
Under  any  conditions  when  tho  military  control  is  with- 
drawn and  a different  government  is  set  up,  tho  now 
commonwealth  will  need  money.  Tho  United  States 
advanced  $3,000,000  for  the  insurgent  troops  as  a loan, 
and  not  as  a gift.  Further  advances  may  bo  made  for 
the  internal  improvements  under  similar  conditions,  with 
a lien  on  the  customs  receipts.  It  is  an  individual  opin- 
ion, but  I put  it  forth  that  this  moral  control  and  this 
lien  on  the  customs  and  the  guarantee  of  Cuba’s  protec- 
tion from  European  aggression  is  for  years  to  come  all 
that  is  desirable  by  the  United  States.  And  it  need  not 
be  surprising  if  Cuban  public  opinion  takes  this  channel. 
Its  opponents  may  charge  that  this  is  disguised  annexa- 
tion, but  the  disguise  is  so  thorough  that  annexation 
would  not  recognize  itself. 

A protectorate  would  be  something  more  than  auton- 
omy. It  would  be  an  independent  government  for  Cuba 
in  her  internal  affairs  and  in  consonance  with  her  aspi- 
rations. Mam-  years  would  pass  before  such  a govern- 
ment would  be  administered  as  well  as  the  United  States 
could  administer  it,  but  that  is  not  the  question.  The 
certainty  is  that  in  determining  the  method  of  transition 
from  military  control  to  something  else,  the  Cuban  peo- 
ple as  they  approach  the  reality  will  be  the  less  anxious 
to  withdraw  absolutely  themselves  from  the  American 
influence,  though  they  will  justily  and  properly  oppose 
indefinite  delay  in  ending  the  military  nature  of  that 

345 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


influence.  In  these  circumstances  the  Cuban  public 
opinion  which  turns  to  a Protectorate  may  be  left  to  con- 
trovert the  public  opinion  which  demands  absolute  sever- 
ance of  the  relations  with  the  United  States.  All  that 
the  intervening  power  can  do  is  to  assure  the  untram- 
melled utterance  of  these  opinions ; and  if  the  ultimate 
sentiment  should  develop  for  a complete  severance  from 
the  United  States,  it  must  be  respected. 

To-day  there  are  two  opposing  tendencies.  On  the 
surface  they  seem  political  and  social.  In  their  depths 
they  are  economic.  Commercialism  antagonizes  the 
instinct  of  nationality.  Legitimate  capital  thinks  it 
sees  quicker  industrial  recuperation  and  political  stabil- 
ity under  immediate  annexation  by  whatever  means 
brought  about.  Speculative  capital  has  no  chance  of 
exploitation  unless  Cuba  is  made  part  of  the  United 
States.  It  sees  chiefly  that  annexed  Cuba  would  mean 
free  sugar.  If  free  sugar  were  sure,  the  present  mort- 
gages on  the  cane  lands  would  be  easily  lifted.  Their 
value  would  increase  at  a bound.  There  would  be  an 
unexampled  era  of  investment  in  plantations.  Money 
that  was  seeking  outflow  in  coffee  culture,  fruit  raising, 
dairy  farming,  and  in  timber  lands  would  change  its 
course.  It  would  all  flow  toward  sugar-cane  production. 
Tobacco  would  be  the  only  agricultural  industry  not 
affected.  Then  the  agitation  would  begin  for  more  rad- 
ical tariff  legislation  by  the  United  States  to  destroy  the 
European  beet-sugar  bounties.  With  a profitable  mar- 
ket gained,  the  next  question  would  be  the  cultivation  of 
the  inexhaustible  cane  lands.  The  first  inquiry  would 
be  for  cheap  labor  in  a mass.  Efforts  to  get  Chinese 
coolies  would  probably  be  defeated  because  of  the  exclu- 

346 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


sion  policy  of  the  United  Statos.  Some  negro  coloniza- 
tion might  bo  attempted,  and  the  dregs  of  miscellaneous 
labor  would  be  gathered  up  in  all  quarters.  This  would 
not  be  an  encouragement  to  family  immigration.  It 
would  be  harmful  socially  and  politically.  Ultimately 
the  planters  would  have  to  turn  to  the  provinces  of 
Spain,  but  not  until  they  had  demoralized  the  whole 
island.  The  end  would  bo  a Latin  plantation  as  one  of 
the  States  of  the  Union. 

The  United  States  by  force  of  circumstances  made  an 
investment  in  Cuba.  The  investment  is  tho  promise  of 
a people  who  are  capable  of  self-govornment.  Whether 
these  conditions  are  met  by  encouraging  a sugar  craze 
which  has  no  definite  source  of  labor  supply  back  of  it 
can  easily  be  judged. 

Against  this  tendency  of  commercialism  is  the  aspira- 
tion of  the  Cuban  people.  Its  impelling  force,  though 
not  always  clearly  discernible,  is  the  hope  to  have  the 
country  populated  by  small  landowners.  The  labor 
which  is  looked  for  is  not  servile  or  cheap.  The  immi- 
gration which  is  sought  is  the  immigration  of  the  family 
from  sources  which  give  promise  of  constant  freshening. 
It  is  not  assured  that  the  Cubans  can  maintain  a gov- 
ernment which  will  invite  immigrants  and  insure  the 
repeopling  of  the  island.  That  is  part  of  the  experi- 
ment which  must  be  tried  and  which  may  fail.  But  it 
is  no  more  doubtful  than  the  experiment  which  in- 
evitably leads  to  the  exploitation  of  Cuba  as  a huge 
plantation,  and  which  insists  on  settling  the  political 
status  before  an  approach  has  been  made  to  securing  an 
industrial  population  that  will  be  in  harmony  with  the 
political  institutions. 


347 


TO-MOEEOW  IN  CUBA. 


Foreign  capitalists,  especially  the  English  and  Span- 
ish, are  not  concerned  with  the  difficulties  of  government 
which  may  perplex  the  United  States.  They  are  tran- 
sients. They  do  not  expect  to  be  of  the  island  and  of 
its  people.  Naturally  they  lean  to  the  annexation  idea, 
and  do  not  encourage  small  landholdings.  Viewed  as 
a billion-dollar  plantation,  Cuba  seems  to  offer  greater 
profit  to  foreign  investment  than  as  a country  in  which 
the  cane  lands  are  to  be  diversified  by  the  lesser  agricul- 
tural occupations. 

The  Cubans  are  sometimes  vague  in  their  utterances. 
They  do  not  put  forth  clearly  the  reasons  which  govern 
their  motives.  They  realize  the  infinite  richness  of  the 
sugar  lands,  but  they  also  realize  the  importance  of  di- 
versifying the  cane-sugar  industry  and  increasing  the 
number  of  small  landholders  who  will  not  be  dependent 
on  the  market  for  sugar.  Their  instinct  is  correct. 
The  interests  of  the  American  people  seem  to  lie  with 
the  interests  of  the  Cuban  people.  Industry  and  com- 
merce must  be  encouraged,  but  they  do  not  need  to  be 
stimulated  artificially  in  order  that  great  fortunes  may 
be  made  by  speculation  in  cane  lands  or  in  other  pro- 
jects. The  American  people  want  the  civilization  of  the 
church,  the  home,  and  the  school  to  obtain  in  Cuba. 
They  will  seek  the  foundation  for  these  in  the  economic 
conditions  which  develop  the  independent  life  of  the 
small  capitalists  and  landowners.  Their  patience  will 
be  tried.  They  may  be  sure  that  in  the  various  stages 
of  Cuban  government  human  nature  will  be  shown  at  its 
ordinary  level,  and  not  at  loftiest  heights.  But  the  end 
will  justify  their  patience.  When  the  mass  of  Cubans 
know  that  they  are  not  being  dispossessed  from  the 

348 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


country  that  is  theirs,  they  will  turn  with  intelligent 
judgment  to  determine  the  ultimate  relation  of  the  is- 
land to  the  United  States. 

These  are  the  natural  processes.  They  are  also  the 
healthier  ones.  They  give  time  for  the  closer  knowledge 
and  understanding  of  popular  government  in  the  United 
States  which  should  be  the  indispensable  requirement 
for  sharing  in  that  government.  Americans  on  their 
part  should  not  be  deceived.  They  should  keep  in  mind 
that  the  civilization  of  Cuba  is  Latin.  They  should  not 
blind  themselves  to  the  fact  that  the  streams  of  white 
immigration  which  are  to  freshen  and  renew  the  popula- 
tion of  the  border  tropics  must  continue  to  flow  from 
Latin  countries.  American  contact  and  example  may 
modify  and  mould  this  civilization,  but  cannot  change 
its  nature  in  a single  generation.  For  half  a century 
Cuba  is  to  be  understood  as  a Latin  commonwealth, 
whether  it  be  an  independent  nation,  a protected  repub- 
lic, or  a State  of  the  American  Union. 

In  conclusion,  if  the  majority  of  the  people  in  Cuba 
reject  the  idea  of  a protectorate  and  want  to  try  the  ex- 
periment of  nationality,  separate  and  distinct,  with  all 
its  perils,  they  must  be  allowed  to  try  it.  That  a gov- 
ernment of  this  kind  would  be  more  than  an  experiment 
its  most  earnest  champions  and  its  well-wishers  would 
not  assert.  The  first  step  toward  testing  the  sentiment 
and  toward  solving  the  problems  and  the  responsibil- 
ities with  which  the  LTnited  States  is  confronted  lies  in 
the  election  of  a constituent  representative  convention  on 
the  basis  of  universal  suffrage.  The  island  is  for  its 
people.  Their  welfare  must  be  trusted  to  an  assembly 
of  their  own  free  choice. 


349 


APPENDIX  A 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Spanish  colonial  history  begins  in  the  pages  of  Pres- 
cott and  Irving.  Three  centuries  of  its  record  are  almost 
barren.  The  student  who  wishes  to  know  its  outgrowth 
may  start  with  the  nineteenth  century.  He  cannot  do 
better  than  to  begin  with  Humboldt.  He  will  find  there 
a survey  of  the  state  of  Cuba  which  covers  its  physical, 
political,  social,  and  economic  phases.  Unfortunately 
Humboldt,  as  presented  in  English,  was  the  victim  of  a 
zealous  editor  who  imposed  on  American  readers  a long 
preliminary  essay  and  followed  it  with  copious  argu- 
mentative notes.  This  was  during  the  period  of  the  slave 
controversy,  and  the  editor  was  a partisan.  It  is  possi- 
ble to  extract  the  real  Humboldt  from  a mass  of  irrele- 
vant matter,  but  a simpler  way  is  to  consult  the  original 
French  edition  or  an  excellent  translation  into  Spanish 
which  was  published  in  Paris.  After  Humboldt  comes 
a long  list  of  Cuban  and  Spanish  writers  whose  works 
are  both  historical  and  controversial.  The  official  his- 
tory of  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba  may  be  found  in  the  Ga- 
zettes of  the  Captain-Generals  and  the  Bulletins  of  tho 
provinces.  A summary  of  these  was  published  two  or 
three  times  a year  as  a collection  of  decrees,  orders,  and 
dispositions  of  tho  general  Government. 

The  insurrectionary  period  of  Cuban  histon',  as  w'ell 
as  the  political  agitation,  is  reflected  in  current  news- 

350 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


paper  literature  for  the  last  thirty-five  years  and  in  an 
avalanche  of  pamphlets.  What  may  be  called  the  Cuban 
special  pleading  is  found  in  a series  of  volumes  which 
were  issued  in  the  United  States.  The  genuine  insur- 
gent literature,  from  which  the  spirit  animating  the  revo- 
lution may  be  gathered,  appears  in  some  publications 
which  came  from  the  printing-press  in  the  woods,  and 
in  a small  newspaper  Las  Villas,  which  was  the  medium 
of  the  official  orders,  appeals,  and  addresses  of  the  in- 
surgent military  chiefs.  Necessarily  the  times  of  pub- 
lication were  irregular,  but  the  journal  had  an  existence, 
and  its  files  are  valuable.  When  peace  came  the  old 
book-shops  of  Habana  also  gave  up  insurgent  literature, 
which  is  an  aid  in  helping  to  an  understanding  of  the 
struggle  that  ended  Spanish  rule. 

The  intellectual  life  of  Cuba  for  a hundred  years  is 
found  in  the  archives  of  La  Sociedad  Economica  de 
Amigos  del  Pais — the  Economic  Society  of  Friends  of 
the  Country.  These  archives  contain  the  history  of  four 
centuries.  From  them  was  drawn  the  material  for  the 
most  valuable  works  that  have  been  published.  Learn- 
ing breeds  sedition,  and  the  society,  if  not  under  the  ban, 
was  often  under  the  frown  of  the  Government.  But  it 
proved  that  it  was  composed  of  true  friends  of  the  coun- 
try. Its  memorials,  or  reports,  are  of  unusual  value.  A 
modern  librarian  would  be  appalled  at  the  confusion  in 
which  the  records  and  archives  appear,  but  the  honor- 
able poverty  of  this  learned  society  does  not  impair  its 
usefulness. 

On  what  may  be  called  the  American  side  it  is  not 
necessary  to  recapitulate  the  Congressional  and  Execu- 
tive documents  which  define  the  attitude  of  the  United 

351 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


States  toward  Spain.  They  are  all  accessible.  Eco- 
nomic tendencies  contemporary  with  Spanish  political 
rule  are  set  forth  for  a series  of  years  in  the  reports  of 
Consul-General  Ramon  0.  Williams.  Concerning  the 
present  military  government  in  the  island,  its  acts  are 
fully  recorded  in  The  Official  Gazette.  The  industrial 
and  commercial  conditions,  as  well  as  the  financial  sys- 
tem which  are  the  basis  of  the  tariff  and  other  regula- 
tions, are  discussed  in  the  reports  of  Mr.  Robert  P. 
Porter,  special  commissioner.  Information  regarding 
the  customs  duties,  the  laws  of  mortgages,  railroads, 
public  works,  and  other  matters  of  interest  are  given 
publicity  in  pamphlet  form  from  time  to  time  by  the 
insular  division  of  the  War  Department. 

Since  the  guardianship  of  the  United  States  over  Cuba 
was  assumed,  many  American  libraries  have  been  adding 
to  their  shelves  by  books  obtained  in  Madrid  and  in 
Habana.  It  is  with  the  belief  that  most  of  those  which 
I have  consulted  may  be  available  to  the  student  that  I 
indicate  the  following  list  of  references : 


Antiguos  Diputados  de  Cuba  (Los).  D.  Eusebio  Valdds  Dominguez. 
Prologo  de  D.  Rafael  Montoro.  Habana,  1879. 

Almanaque  Bailly-Baillierie,  Madrid,  1897-98-99.  (Contains  special 
chapters  with  reference  to  Cuba.) 

Asturianos  (Los)  en  el  Norte  y los  Asturianos  en  Cuba.  Ramdn 
Elices  Montes.  Habana,  1893. 

Bando  de  Gobernacidn  y Policfa  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba  expedido  por  el 
Excelentfsimo  Sr.  D.  Gerdnimo  Valdds,  Presidente  Gobernador  y 
Captain  General.  Quinta  edicidn.  Habana,  1875:  Imprenta  del  Gobi- 
erno.  (The  famous  code  of  paternal  despotism.) 

Cuba  with  Pen  and  Pencil.  Samuel  Hazard.  Hartford,  1871.  (The 
best  book  in  English  descriptive  of  the  country  and  its  people.  Thirty 
years  have  not  lessened  its  value  as  a mirror  of  customs  and  habits.) 

Cuban  Sketches.  J.  W.  Steele,  former  consul  at  Matanzas.  New 
York,  1881. 


352 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 

Cuba  y su  Gente:  Apuntes  para  la  Historia.  Francisco  Moreno. 
Madrid,  1887. 

Cuba  y sus  Jueces:  Rectificaciones  Oportunas.  (Answer  to  the 
above.)  Raimundo  Cabrera.  Sexta  edicidn.  Prdlogo  de  D.  Rafael 
Montoro.  Habana,  1889. 

Cuba  por  Fuera : Apuntes  del  Natural.  Tesifonte  Gallego  Garcia. 
Habana,  1890. 

Cuba  en  la  Cartera.  Antonio  E.  Menendez.  Habana,  1895. 

Cuba:  Monografia  Historica.  Antonio  Bachiller  y Morales.  Ha- 
bana, 1883. 

Cuba  ante  la  Historia  y el  sentido  comtin.  M.  Benitez  Veguillas. 
Habana,  1897. 

Cuba  para  los  Cubanos : Folleto  Politico.  Alvaro  de  la  Iglesia. 
Habana,  1898. 

Cuba  y la  reforma  colonial  en  Espafia.  Rafael  Delforme  Salto. 
Madrid,  1895. 

Cuba:  Physical  Features  of;  her  Past,  Present,  and  Possible  Future. 
Fidel  G.  Pierra.  New  York,  1896. 

Centro  Gallego — Memorias  de  la  Junta  Directive.  Habana,  1898. 
Centro  Gallego — Memoria  de  la  Sociedad  de  Beneficiencia.  Habana. 
1898. 

Cuestidn  de  Cuba  (La):  Historia  y Soluciones  delos  Partidos  Cuba- 
nos. Juan  Gudlberto  Gomez.  Madrid,  1885. 

Crdnicas  de  la  Guerra  de  Cuba.  Habana,  1895-96-97. 

Crimines  y Criminales  de  la  Habana.  Ignacio  D.  Ituarte.  Habana, 
1893. 

Control  of  the  Tropics  (The).  Benjamin  Kidd.  New  York,  1898. 
Cuestidn  Social  en  las  Antillas  Espafiolas  (La).  Rafael  M.  de  Labra. 
Madrid,  1874. 

Colleccidn  de  Reales  Ordenes,  Decretos  y Disposiciones.  Habana. 
1898.  3 tomos.  (Contains  the  Decrees  of  Autonomy.) 

Compilacidn  de  (los)  Articulos  con  Relacidn  al  Ramo  de  Loteria. 
Habana,  1873. 

Chinos  fuera  de  China  (los)  y el  Antagonismo  de  Razas.  Federico 
Ordas  Avecilla.  Habana,  1893. 

Cddigo  penal  para  las  Islas  de  Cuba  y Puerto  Rico.  Madrid,  1894. 

Diccionairo  geogrdfico,  estadistico,  histdrico  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba.  Don 
Jacobo  de  la  Pezuela.  Madrid,  1863.  4 tomos.  (The  fountain  of  much 
valuable  information.) 

Due  South : Cuba,  Past  and  Present.  M.  M.  Ballou.  Boston,  1885. 

Ensayo  Politico  sobre  la  Isla  deCuba.  El  Baron  A.  von  Humboldt. 
Obra  traducida  al  Castellano.  Paris,  1827. 

Esclavitud  en  Cuba  (De  la).  F.  de  Armas  y Cespedes.  Madrid,  1866. 
English  in  the  West  Indies  (The).  James  Anthony  Froude.  London, 
1888. 


?3 


853 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 

Froudaoity:  West  India  Fables  Explained.  J.  J.  Thomas.  Phila- 
delphia, 1890. 

Folletos  escritos  contra  la  Anexi6n  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba  d los  Estados 
Unidos.  Antonio  Saco.  Nueva  York,  1856. 

Guia  Geogrufica  y Administrativa  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba.  Don  Pedro 
Jos6  Imberno.  Habana,  1891.  (A  valuable  summary  of  the  condition 
and  resources  of  the  island. ) 

Guia  de  Forasteros  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba.  Habana,  1872,  etc.:  Imprenta 
del  Gobierno. 

Guia  de  Gobierno  y Policia  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba.  Don  Francisco  Garcia 
Morales.  Segunda  edici6n.  Habana,  1899. 

Guia  de  los  Ayuntamientos.  Habana,  1891. 

Habana  Antigua y Moderna  (La.)  D.  Jos6  Maria  dela  Torre.  Ha- 
bana, 1857. 

Historia  econOmica,  politic, a intelectual  y moral  dela  Isla  de  Cuba. 
Remon  de  la  Sagra.  Paris,  1861. 

Historia  contemporanea  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba  desde  1801  hasta  1896.  P. 
Giralt.  Habana,  1896. 

Historia  de  Matanzas.  D.  Pedro  Antonio  Alfonzo.  Matanzas,  1854. 

History  of  the  British  Colonies  in  the  West  Indies  (The).  Bryan 
Edwards.  London,  1807.  3 vols. 

Insurrection  de  Cuba  (La).  Vicente  Torres  y Gonzalez.  Madrid, 
1896. 

Insurrecciones  en  Cuba  (Las.)  Apuntes  para  la  historia  politica  de 
esta  isla  en  el  presente  siglo.  J.  Zaragoza.  Madrid,  1872-73.  2tomos. 

Isla  de  Cuba : Recuerdo  de  dos  Epocas.  Don  J.  M.  de  Andueza. 
Madrid,  1841. 

lie  de  Cuba  (L’).  J.  B.  Rosemond  de  Beauvallon.  Paris,  1844. 

Isla  de  Cuba:  Inmigracion  de  Trabajores  Espanoles.  D.  Urbano 
Feyjoo  Sotomayor.  Habana,  1853. 

Libro  del  Ciudadano  Espanol  (El):  Derechos Politicos  y Administra- 
tivos.  Jos6  Sedano  y Agramonte.  Segunda  edition.  Habana,  1889. 

Leyes  de  las  Indias.  Madrid,  1847.  4 tomos. 

Llave  del  Nuevo  Mundo.  Arrate.  Habana,  1830. 

Ley  de  Enjuiciamento  Civil,  reformada  para  las  Islas  de  Cuba  y 
Puerto  Rico.  Madrid,  1894. 

Legislation  Autonomica.  JosC  Raul  Sedano.  Habana,  1898. 

Manual  de  la  Isla  de  Cuba.  Su  Autor  D.  Jos6  Garcia  de  Arboleya. 
Segunda  edition.  Habana,  1859.  (A  valuable  compendium  of  infor- 
mation regarding  the  Cuba  of  half  a century  ago.) 

Memorias  sobre  el  Estado  Politico,  Gobierno  y Administration  de  la 
Isla  de  Cuba.  D.  Josfide  la  Concha.  Madrid,  1853. 

354 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 

Memorias  de  la  Sociedad  EconOmica  do  Amigos  del  Pafs.  Habana, 
passim. 

Muerte  del  General  Maceo.  Jos6  Mir6  y Argenter,  Brigadier,  jefe  de 
Estado  Mayor.  Campamento  de  Manajanado,  Diciembre  22  de  1896. 
(Imprenta  insurrecta.) 

Masoneria  (La)  pintada  porsi  misma.  D.  Rafael  de  Rafael.  Prdlogo 
de  Don  A.  J.  de  Vilddsola.  Madrid,  1883. 

Masoneria  (La)  Apuntes  HistOricos  sobre  el  origen  en  la  Isla  de  Cuba. 
Compilados  por  Manuel  Ruiz  Inza.  Habana,  1891. 

Masoneria  (La)  Procedimientos  de  la  gran  Logia.  Habana,  1878. 

Negro  in  Cuba  (El).  Por  un  Amante  de  la  Verdad.  Habana,  1866. 

Pafs  de  Chocolate  (El):  La  Inmoralidad  cn  Cuba.  Francisco  Moreno. 
Madrid,  1887. 

Pasado  y Presente  de  Cuba.  El  Brigadier  D.  Francisco  de  Acosta  y 
Albear.  Madrid,  1875. 

Peninsulares  y Cubanos.  Aurelio  C.  Silveria  y Cdrdova.  Habana, 
1891. 

Partido  Liberal : Segundo  Anniversairo.  Habana,  1880. 

Partido  Liberal  Autonomista : Procedimientos  para  la  Eleccidn  do 
Representantes.  Habana,  1898. 

Presupuestos  Generales  de  Gastos  e Ingresos  de  1898-99.  Habana, 
189S.  Imprenta  del  Gobierno. 

Penal  Code  (The)  of  the  Islands  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico.  Trans- 
lated into  English.  Habana,  1898. 

Prostitution  (La)  en  la  Ciudad  de  la  Habana.  Dr.  Benj.  deCOspedes. 
Habana,  1888. 

Restauracion  Teocratica  (La).  Fernando  Garrido.  Segunda  ediciOn. 
Madrid,  1881. 

Revista  Cubana  (La).  Habana,  passim. 

Sistemas  Coloniales.  Rafael  M.  de  Labra.  Madrid,  1874. 

Los  Yankees  enICuba  : Pro  Patria.  Antonio  P.  Rioja.  Habana,  1897. 
La  Guerra  con  los  Estados  Unidos.  Adolfo  Llanos.  Habana, '1897. 
La  Invasion  Norte  Americana.  Antonio  P.  Rioja.  Habana,  1898. 
(These  last  three  pamphlets  give  an  excellent  idea  of  the  feeling  of 
the  ultra-Spanish  classes  towards  the  United  States  when  war  was 
known  to  be  inevitable.) 


APPENDIX  B. 


TRADE  PROSPECTS. 

Exports  and  imports  are  a good  means  of  showing  the 
resources  of  the  island  and  the  opportunities  it  offers 
for  American  markets.  Joined  with  these  statistics  are 
the  possibilities  of  commerce  as  shown  in  the  vessel 
clearances,  and  the  sources  of  revenue  as  exhibited  in 
the  customs  and  similar  receipts.  Those  persons  who 
are  specially  interested  in  knowing  what  the  inhabitants 
of  Cuba  are  buying  and  what  they  are  selling  will  be 
able  to  keep  abreast  of  the  subject  by  following  the 
monthly  and  quarterly  statements  published  in  the  news- 
papers. A general  survey  may  be  had  from  a summary 
of  the  first  six  months  of  American  control.  This  infor- 
mation, together  with  that  regarding  the  articles  of  ex- 
port and  import,  is  supplied  in  the  following  official 
statement.  I am  indebted  for  it  to  Colonel  Tasker  H. 
Bliss,  collector  of  customs  at  Habana,  under  whose  effi- 
cient administration  the  opportunities  of  Cuban  com- 
merce have  been  demonstrated. 

OFFICIAL  STATEMENT. 

The  principal  exports  of  Cuba  are  sugar,  tobacco, 
cigars,  honey,  molasses,  aguardiente  (cane  rum),  wax, 
sponges,  fruits,  minerals — principally  manganese,  iron, 
steel,  etc.,  from  the  province  of  Santiago;  wood  from 

356 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


Santiago  and  Puerto  Principe;  cocoanuts  and  bananas, 
the  latter  two  articles  principally  from  the  ports  of  Banes 
and  Baracoa. 

The  principal  imports  with  their  sources  are  as  fol- 
lows : 

Rice,  mostly  from  England  and  Germany. 

Mineral  waters,  from  France  and  Germany. 

Oats,  barley,  and  hay,  from  the  United  States  and  South  America. 
Olive  oil,  from  Spain  and  France. 

Codlish,  from  Norway  and  Canada. 

Varnish  and  turpentine,  from  the  United  States. 

Beer,  from  the  United  States,  England,  and  Germany. 

Cement,  from  the  United  States,  England  and  France. 

Coal,  from  the  United  States  and  England. 

Coffee,  from  Puerto  Rico  and  some  from  the  United  States. 

Shoes,  from  the  United  States  and  Spain. 

Onions,  from  the  United  States  principally,  some  from  Spain. 
Preserves,  from  the  United  States,  Spain,  and  France. 

Drugs,  from  France,  United  States,  and  Germany. 

Beans,  principally  from  Mexico,  some  from  the  United  States. 
Cattle,  from  the  United  States,  Mexico,  and  Central  and  South 
America. 

Wheat-flour,  from  the  United  States. 

Hams,  from  the  United  States  and  Spain. 

Condensed  milk,  from  the  United  States. 

Crockery  and  crystal  ware,  from  the  United  States,  England,  Ger- 
many, and  Spain,  principally  from  England. 

Woods,  from  the  United  States. 

Furniture,  from  the  United  States,  France,  and  Germany. 

Butter,  from  the  United  States,  Spain,  and  England. 

Corn,  from  the  United  States. 

Lard,  from  the  United  States. 

Machinery,  from  England  principally,  some  from  the  United  States. 
Metals,  from  England  and  Germany,  some  from  the  United  States. 
Paper  and  pasteboard,  from  the  United  States,  Germany,  and  France. 
Hides,  from  the  United  States,  France,  Germany,  and  Spain. 

Paint,  from  the  United  States,  England,  Germany,  and  Spain. 
Petroleum,  from  the  United  States. 

Chemical  products,  from  the  United  States,  France,  England,  and 
Germany. 

Potatoes,  from  the  United  States,  England,  and  Spain. 

Cheese,  from  the  United  States  and  Holland, 

Silk,  from  the  United  States,  France,  England,  and  Germany. 

357 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


Canned  sardines,  from  Spain. 

Hats,  from  the  United  States,  England,  and  Spain. 

Jipijapa  hats,  from  South  America. 

Salt,  from  England  and  Spain. 

Linen  tissues,  from  England  and  Spain. 

Woollen  goods,  from  the  United  States,  England,  and  France. 

Cotton  goods,  from  the  United  States,  France,  and  England. 

Bacon,  from  the  United  States  and  Spain, 

Dried  beef  (“tasajo”),  from  Uruguay  and  the  Argentine  Republic. 

Wines  and  liquors  from  Spain,  France,  and  the  United  States. 

Eggs  and  poultry,  from  the  United  States. 

[Author’s  Note.— The  importation  of  these  last  two  articles  will  prob- 
ably disappear  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  country.  The  possibility 
of  the  Southwestern  States  securing  a share  of  the  trade  in  tasajo,  or 
jerked  beef,  is  worth  following  up.  Dried  beef,  from  the  nature  of  the 
climate,  will  always  have  a market  in  the  tropics.  In  Cuba  it  is  con- 
sumed chiefly  by  the  negroes  and  laboring  classes  generally,  partly  on 
account  of  its  cheapness  and  partly  on  account  of  its  toughness,  which 
renders  it  difficult  of  digestion,  and  for  this  reason  especially  preferred 
by  those  who  perform  hard  physical  labor.  Any  one  who  travels  in 
the  interior  learns  to  value  its  nutritive  qualities.  The  consumption  is 
chiefly  in  the  tobacco  regions  of  Pinar  del  Itio  and  Habana  provinces 
in  Matanzas,  and  in  a section  of  Santa  Clara  where  live  beef  is  hard  to 
procure.  The  price  is  eleven  cents  per  pound  in  American  money. 
During  the  last  year  the  consumption  has  been  about  12,000  hundred- 
weights per  quarter ; but  this  is  below  the  normal  amount,  and  is  due 
to  the  poverty  of  the  people.  Lately  much  of  the  importation  has  been 
by  way  of  New  York.  Spanish  ship  captains,  both  of  steamers  and 
sailing  vessels,  were  in  the  habit  of  buying  large  quantities  of  tasajo  for 
sale  in  Cuba  on  their  return  voyages  from  South  America.  Minister 
W.  I.  Buchanan,  in  a recent  report  to  Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
Meiklejolin,  leans  to  the  belief  that  some  of  the  trade  can  be  transferred 
from  Argentine  and  Uruguary  to  the  United  States,  though  he  says 
the  cheapness  of  stock  raising  in  South  America  makes  competition 
difficult.  The  process  of  salting  and  drying  the  raw  beef  in  the  sun 
could  be  followed  as  well  in  the  Southwest  as  in  Uruguay.] 

The  following  data  furnished  by  Collector  Bliss  with 
regard  to  receipts  of  customs  funds  are  instructive : 
Total  receipts,  sixteen  ports  from  January  1 to  July 
1, 1899,  were  $6,983,705.  Of  this  amount  there  was  col- 
lected at  the  port  of  Habana  $5,146,162. 

Of  the  above-mentioned  total  receipts  at  all  ports,  the 

358 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


import  duties  were  $6, 229, 905,  and  the  export  duties 
were  $388, 9G0,  the  balance  being  from  tonnage  dues, 
fines,  harbor  improvement  taxes,  capitation  taxes,  cattle 
inspection  fees,  etc. 

At  the  port  of  Habana  during  the  six  months  the  im- 
port duties  amounted  to  $4,537,348,  and  the  export  du- 
ties to  $386,114. 

The  order  of  the  ports  in  the  amount  of  collections 
was  as  follows:  Habana,  Cienfuegos,  Santiago,  Matan- 
zas,  Cardenas,  Nuevitas,  Sagua  lo  Grande,  Manzanillo, 
Caibarien,  Gibara,  Guantanamo,  Baracoa,  Trinidad, 
Tunas  de  Zaza,  Batabano,  and  Santa  Cruz. 

During  the  six  months  there  entered  at  the  sixteen 
ports  of  the  island,  2,227  foreign  vessels  and  4,487  coast- 
wise vessels,  making  the  total  number  entered  6,714. 
During  the  same  period  there  cleared  from  all  ports 
2,125  foreign  vessels  and  4,524  coastwise  vessels,  making 
the  total  number  of  clearances  6,649. 

At  the  port  of  Habana  during  the  six  months,  the  num- 
ber of  foreign  entries  was  1,031,  coastwise,  889;  total 
entries,  1,920.  The  total  number  of  foreign  clearances 
was  953,  coastwise  850;  total  clearances,  1,803. 

The  total  tonnage  entered  at  all  the  sixteen  ports  of 
the  island  was:  foreign  vessels,  2,477,562  tons;  coast- 
wise vessels,  735,696  tons.  The  total  amount  of  tonnage 
cleared  was,  of  foreign  vessels  2,351,936  tons,  and  of 
coastwise  vessels  707,152  tons;  making  the  total  amount 
of  tonnage  entered  of  3,213,258  tons,  and  the  total 
amount  of  tonnage  cleared  of  3,069,080  tons. 

At  the  port  of  Habana  the  total  amount  of  tonnage 
entered  was,  of  foreign  vessels  1,292,960  tons,  and  of 
coastwise  vessels  124,420  tons.  The  total  amount  of 

359 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


tonnage  cleared  was,  of  foreign  vessels  1,227,234  tons, 
and  of  coastwise  vessels  99,291  tons;  making  a total 
amount  of  tonnage  entered  during  tlie  six  months  of 
1,417,380  tons,  and  a total  amount  cleared  of  1,326,525 
tons. 

The  course  of  commerce,  foreign  and  coastwise,  is  ex- 
hibited at  a glance  in  the  following  official  tables : 


STATEMENT  OF  FOREIGN  VESSELS  ENTERED  AND 
CLEARED,  PORT  OF  HABANA,  CUBA, 
JANUARY  1st  TO  JULY  1st,  1899. 


Entered. 


Months. 

1899. 

Steam. 

Sail. 

Total  No. 
Entered. 

United 

States. 

Spain. 

Other 

Coun- 

tries. 

Total. 

United 

States. 

Spain. 

Other 

Coun- 

tries. 

Total. 

January. . 

61 

27 

69 

157 

44 

7 

9 

60 

217 

February. 

58 

17 

47 

122 

32 

1 

5 

38 

160 

March  . . . 

64 

25 

61 

150 

43 

1 

6 

50 

200 

April 

53 

0 

61 

114 

27 

0 

12 

39 

153 

May 

56 

0 

76 

132 

28 

0 

6 

34 

166 

June 

47 

17 

47 

111 

10 

7 

7 

24 

135 

Totals. . 

339 

86 

361 

786 

184 

16 

45 

245 

1031 

Cleared. 


months. 

1899. 

Steam. 

Sail. 

Total  No. 
Cleared. 

United 

States. 

Spain. 

Other 

Coun- 

tries. 

Total. 

United 

States. 

Spain. 

Other 

Coun- 

tries. 

Total. 

January. . 

56 

26 

62 

144 

28 

1 

8 

37 

181 

February. 

45 

16 

47 

108 

26 

1 

6 

33 

141 

March  . . . 

57 

24 

54 

135 

33 

1 

5 

3D 

174 

April 

49 

0 

69 

118 

38 

0 

4 

42 

160 

May 

52 

0 

74 

126 

19 

0 

7 

26 

152 

June 

49 

17 

49 

115 

20 

3 

7 

30 

145 

Totals 

308 

83 

355 

746 

164 

6 

37 

207 

953 

360 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA, 


STATEMENT  OF  FOREIGN  AND  COASTWISE  VESSELS  EN- 
TERED AND  CLEARED,  PORT  OF  HABANA,  CUBA, 
JANUARY  1st  TO  JULY  1st,  1899. 


Foreign. 


Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

Entered 

157 

122 

150 

114 

132 

Ill 

786 

60 

38 

50 

39 

34 

24 

245 

Total 

217 

1G0 

200 

153 

106 

135 

1,031 

Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

Cleared 

Steam. 

144 

108 

135 

118 

126 

115 

746 

Sail  ... 

37 

33 

39 

42 

26 

30 

207 

Total 

181 

141 

174 

160 

152 

145 

953 

Coastwise. 


Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

Entered 

Steam. 

22 

25 

20 

20 

24 

26 

137 

Sail . . . 

88 

114 

130 

135 

161 

124 

752 

Total 

110 

139 

150 

155 

185 

150 

889 

Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

10 

21 

14 

17 

18 

27 

107 

110 

96 

125 

147 

140 

125 

743 

Total 

120 

117 

139 

164 

158 

152 

850 

Supplementary  to  these  tables  is  the  following  infor- 
mation relative  to  the  arrival  and  departure  of  passen- 
gers. It  should  be  noted  that  the  departures  during  the 
months  from  April  to  October  always  have  been  consid- 
erably in  excess  of  the  arrivals. 

361 


TO-MORROW  IN  CUBA. 


PASSENGER  STATEMENT,  ARRIVALS  AND  DEPARTURES, 
HABANA,  CUBA,  JANUARY  1st  TO  JULY  1st,  1899. 


Arrived. 


Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

United  States  . . . 

3,618 

3,486 

2,634 

1,675 

1,329 

951 

13,693 

Spain 

369 

446 

1,106 

342 

745 

613 

4,565 

Other  Countries. 

1,074 

1,023 

609 

689 

716 

454 

3,621 

Total 

5,061 

4,955 

4,349 

2,706 

2,790 

2,018 

21,879 

Departed. 


Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

Total. 

United  States  . . . 

1,423 

2,215 

5,243 

2,492 

2,124 

998 

14,495 

Spain 

769 

577 

1,031 

1,757 

2,084 

1,749 

7,967 

Other  Countries. 

231 

235 

256 

869 

243 

122 

1,956 

Total 

2,423 

3,027 

6,530 

5,118 

4,451 

2,869 

24,418 

Date  Due 


’4f?  • 

PE  1&’52 

MY20'55 

#28  3 

FEB  1 7*5f 

mar  1 

MAR  3 1 m 

« n Af 

4395 

f) 

«r  -»  • »•* 


